Justia Delaware Supreme Court Opinion Summaries

Capice Johnson was convicted of attempted murder in the first degree, reckless endangering in the first degree, and two counts of possession of a firearm during the commission of a felony. The incident involved a drive-by shooting in Middletown, Delaware, where a masked man on an orange dirt bike fired at least 17 shots at Siyona Jones and Thomas Haye, critically injuring Jones. Surveillance footage and other evidence, including images from Johnson’s cell phones, linked him to the crime. Johnson was sentenced to 75 years of incarceration, suspended after 30 years for probation.In the Superior Court of the State of Delaware, Johnson was found guilty on all counts except for carrying a concealed deadly weapon without a license. His defense strategy was to create reasonable doubt about the identity of the shooter. The State’s key witness, Detective Joshua Stafford, provided testimony while surveillance videos were played to the jury. Johnson did not request a limiting instruction regarding Stafford’s narration of the videos, and the jury was instructed that they were the sole judges of the facts and witness credibility.The Supreme Court of the State of Delaware reviewed the case and affirmed the Superior Court’s judgment. The court held that the trial judge did not err in failing to provide a limiting instruction sua sponte regarding Stafford’s testimony. The court found that Stafford’s testimony was a neutral explanation of the surveillance footage and did not constitute lay-opinion identification testimony. Additionally, the jury was properly instructed on their role as fact-finders. Even if the failure to give a limiting instruction was considered an error, it did not rise to the level of plain error that would have affected the outcome of the trial. View "Johnson v. State" on Justia Law

The case involves nearly 75,000 plaintiffs who filed personal injury claims in the Delaware Superior Court, alleging that their ingestion of ranitidine, marketed under the brand name Zantac, caused them to develop various types of cancer. The plaintiffs claim that ranitidine contains or degrades into N-Nitrosodimethylamine (NDMA), a likely carcinogen. The defendants in the case include GlaxoSmithKline LLC, Boehringer Ingelheim Pharmaceuticals, Inc., Sanofi US Services Inc., Pfizer Inc., and Patheon Manufacturing Services, LLC.The Superior Court of Delaware denied the defendants' motions to exclude the plaintiffs' expert testimony, which supported the claim that ranitidine causes cancer. The court concluded that the general causation question could focus on NDMA rather than ranitidine itself and that Delaware law does not require a "threshold dose" for general causation. The court also applied a "liberal thrust" favoring the admissibility of expert testimony, viewing challenges to the experts' methodologies as questions for the jury.The Supreme Court of Delaware reviewed the case and reversed the Superior Court's decision. The Supreme Court held that the Superior Court erred in interpreting Delaware Rule of Evidence 702 by applying a "liberal thrust" favoring admissibility and by concluding that Delaware's standard for admissibility is distinct from the federal standard. The Supreme Court emphasized that the proponent of expert testimony must establish its admissibility by a preponderance of the evidence, and the trial court must act as a gatekeeper to ensure the reliability and sufficiency of the expert's methodology and application.The Supreme Court also found that the Superior Court erred in defining the general causation question as focusing on NDMA rather than the product at issue, ranitidine. The court concluded that the plaintiffs' experts did not reliably link the NDMA studies to the exposure caused by ranitidine, failing to establish the necessary scientific connection between the product and the alleged harm. Consequently, the Supreme Court reversed the Superior Court's decision and remanded the case for further proceedings consistent with its opinion. View "In re Zantac (Ranitidine) Litigation" on Justia Law

Lauren Scottoline gave birth to J.S.S. at Christiana Care Hospital on July 28, 2015. After birth, J.S.S. could not breathe on his own, had low blood-oxygen levels, and suffered seizures. He was diagnosed with hypoxic-ischemic encephalopathy (HIE) and stayed in the newborn intensive care unit for three weeks. J.S.S. showed developmental delays and was diagnosed with autism spectrum disorder (ASD) in 2018, confirmed in 2021. Lauren and Stephen Scottoline filed a lawsuit against Christiana Care Health System, Inc. and Women First, LLC, claiming negligence during J.S.S.’s birth caused his condition.The Superior Court of Delaware excluded the expert causation opinion of Dr. Daniel Adler, a pediatric neurologist, who claimed that HIE caused J.S.S.’s ASD. The court found Dr. Adler’s opinion unreliable and inadmissible under Delaware Rule of Evidence 702, as it lacked a scientific basis and did not employ a reliable methodology. The court granted the defendants’ motion in limine to exclude Dr. Adler’s testimony and subsequently granted summary judgment for the defendants due to the lack of admissible causation testimony.The Supreme Court of Delaware reviewed the case and affirmed the Superior Court’s rulings. The court held that Dr. Adler’s causation opinion was inadmissible because it was not supported by scientific literature or a reliable differential etiology. The court also found that Dr. Adler’s third report did not materially differ from his previous reports and failed to provide a reliable basis for his causation opinion. The Supreme Court concluded that the Superior Court did not abuse its discretion in excluding Dr. Adler’s testimony and denying an evidentiary hearing. The court also upheld the exclusion of Jody Masterson’s derivative opinion and found no error in the Superior Court’s handling of procedural motions. View "Scottoline v. Women First LLC" on Justia Law

A Canadian energy company acquired a Delaware corporation in a merger, resulting in significant change-in-control payments to three of the acquired corporation’s executives. Two of these executives negotiated the transaction. Stockholders of the acquired corporation sued, alleging breaches of fiduciary duties by the executives and the board of directors, claiming the merger was timed to benefit the executives at the expense of stockholders. They also alleged that the acquiror aided and abetted these breaches and that the executives issued a misleading proxy statement.The Court of Chancery found that the plaintiffs proved their aiding-and-abetting claims, determining that the acquiror had constructive knowledge of and participated in the breaches. The court assessed damages, entering a judgment of approximately $200 million against the acquiror.The Supreme Court of Delaware reviewed the case. It reversed the Court of Chancery’s judgment, holding that for an acquiror to be liable for aiding and abetting a sell-side breach of fiduciary duty, the acquiror must have actual knowledge of both the target’s breach and the wrongfulness of its own conduct. The court found that the standard of actual knowledge was not met in this case. The court also concluded that the acquiror’s actions did not constitute substantial assistance in the fiduciary breaches, as required for aiding-and-abetting liability. Consequently, the Supreme Court of Delaware reversed the Court of Chancery’s judgment. View "In re Columbia Pipeline Group, Inc. Merger Litigation" on Justia Law

Ryan West, a former employee of Village Practice Management Company, LLC ("Village"), sought a declaratory judgment from the Court of Chancery of Delaware. West argued that Village could not declare a forfeiture of his vested Class B Units after he joined a competitor post-employment, as the Agreement did not limit post-employment competitive activities. Village contended that West forfeited his vested Class B Units by joining a competitor, invoking the Management Incentive Plan's ("Plan") forfeiture provisions.The Court of Chancery denied Village's motion to stay proceedings and compel West to submit his claims to Village's Compensation Committee. The court then granted West's motion for judgment on the pleadings, holding that the Agreement only restricted "detrimental activity" during employment. Consequently, Village could not enforce a forfeiture of West's vested Class B Units for activities occurring after his resignation. The court also awarded West his attorneys' fees.On appeal, the Supreme Court of Delaware reversed the Court of Chancery's decision. The Supreme Court found that the term "Participant" in the Agreement could reasonably be interpreted to include former employees, making the Agreement ambiguous. Therefore, the grant of judgment on the pleadings in favor of West was improper. The Supreme Court also reversed the award of attorneys' fees to West, as he was no longer the prevailing party. However, the Supreme Court upheld the Court of Chancery's denial of Village's request for a stay, distinguishing the case from others that required disputes to be resolved by a committee first. The case was remanded for further proceedings consistent with the Supreme Court's opinion. View "Village Practice Management Company, LLC v. West" on Justia Law

In early 2020, Erste Asset Management GmbH filed a derivative action against Kraft Heinz Company’s fiduciaries, arising from an August 2018 stock sale by 3G Capital, Inc., a significant minority stockholder. The Court of Chancery dismissed the complaint under Rule 23.1, concluding that the plaintiffs failed to plead particularized facts creating a reasonable doubt that six of Kraft Heinz’s eleven directors were disinterested or lacked independence. One of those directors, John Cahill, was alleged to have ended his consulting relationship with Kraft Heinz before the derivative action was filed. However, it was later revealed that Cahill continued to serve as a consultant after July 2019, contrary to Kraft Heinz’s public disclosures.The Court of Chancery dismissed the derivative action, relying on the false representation that Cahill’s consulting agreement had terminated. Erste later discovered the ongoing consultancy and filed a new action seeking relief from the judgment under Rule 60(b) for fraud and newly discovered evidence. The Court of Chancery dismissed this new action, holding that the fraud must be extrinsic and that the new information was not newly discovered evidence because Erste could have learned it with reasonable diligence.The Supreme Court of Delaware reversed the Court of Chancery’s decision, holding that Rule 60(b)(3) applies to both intrinsic and extrinsic fraud and that Erste had pleaded a claim that Kraft Heinz’s misrepresentations prevented it from fairly presenting its case. The court remanded the case for further proceedings, including Rule 23.1 motion practice to reassess demand futility in light of the new evidence. The court also remanded Erste’s breach of fiduciary duty claim for further consideration. View "Erste Asset Management GmbH v. Hees" on Justia Law

Steven Kellam was convicted in the Superior Court of Delaware for racketeering, two counts of first-degree felony murder, and other crimes, resulting in two life sentences plus 770 years in prison. Kellam sought postconviction relief under Superior Court Criminal Rule 61, arguing that his convictions were unjust. The Superior Court rejected all but one of his claims, agreeing that the felony-murder jury instruction misstated the law, leading to the vacatur of his felony-murder convictions and life sentences.Kellam appealed the Superior Court's rejection of two grounds for postconviction relief. He argued that the amendment of his indictment was so substantive that it resulted in his conviction for racketeering without proper indictment, undermining the court's jurisdiction. He also claimed ineffective assistance of counsel for his trial lawyer's failure to request a jury instruction on accomplice liability.The Delaware Supreme Court reviewed the case. It found that Kellam's challenge to the indictment amendment was procedurally barred because he did not object during the trial and failed to show cause and prejudice. The court also determined that the alleged defect in the indictment was curable and did not divest the Superior Court of jurisdiction.Regarding the ineffective assistance of counsel claim, the court concluded that Kellam's trial counsel made a reasonable strategic decision not to request a Section 274 instruction, as it would not have benefited Kellam and could have undermined the defense's credibility.The State cross-appealed, arguing that the Superior Court erred in vacating Kellam's felony-murder convictions due to the flawed jury instruction. The Delaware Supreme Court agreed, distinguishing this case from Ray v. State, and found that the faulty instruction did not prejudice Kellam's defense. The court reversed the Superior Court's vacatur of Kellam's felony-murder convictions and remanded for reinstatement of those convictions and sentences. View "Kellam v. State" on Justia Law

Tyler Ford was involved in a fatal car accident where he raced his friend, Kyle Fischer, towards a busy intersection, ran a red light, and collided with another vehicle, killing its driver, Nathaniel Milton. Ford was driving at a high speed, weaving through traffic, and did not brake before the collision. He later claimed that his brakes were malfunctioning, but a mechanic found no issues with them. Ford was charged with second-degree murder, driving under the influence, improper passing, and disregarding a red light.The Superior Court of Delaware held a jury trial where Ford was convicted of second-degree murder and related traffic offenses but acquitted of one DUI charge. Ford moved for a judgment of acquittal and a new trial, both of which were denied by the Superior Court. The court found that the evidence supported the jury's verdict and that the jury instructions were appropriate.The Supreme Court of Delaware reviewed the case and affirmed the Superior Court's decision. The court held that the evidence presented at trial was sufficient for a reasonable jury to find Ford guilty of second-degree murder, as his actions demonstrated a "cruel, wicked, and depraved indifference to human life." The court also found that the jury instructions were correct and that any minor errors in the oral instructions were harmless, as the written instructions provided to the jury were accurate. Additionally, the court ruled that the video of the collision was admissible and its probative value was not substantially outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice. The court concluded that the Superior Court did not abuse its discretion in any of its rulings, and Ford's convictions were upheld. View "Ford v. State" on Justia Law

A Delaware limited partnership, acting as the Members’ Representative for former members of a company, engaged in a merger agreement with a Delaware limited liability company. The merger agreement included specific notice requirements for indemnification claims, which required the acquiring company to provide written notice with reasonable detail and all available material written evidence of the claim. The agreement also stated that failure to comply with these requirements would result in forfeiture of the right to recover from the indemnity escrow fund.The Court of Chancery dismissed the Members’ Representative’s complaint, which sought a declaration that the acquiring company’s claim notice was invalid for failing to meet the contractual requirements. The court held that the notice was valid under the escrow agreement and dismissed the complaint, reasoning that the notice provided sufficient detail and was timely.On appeal, the Delaware Supreme Court reversed the Court of Chancery’s decision. The Supreme Court held that the merger agreement and escrow agreement should be read together as an integrated contractual scheme. The court found that the final sentence of the notice provision in the merger agreement created a condition precedent, requiring compliance with the notice requirements to avoid forfeiture of the right to recover from the indemnity escrow fund. The court determined that it was reasonably conceivable that the acquiring company failed to comply with the notice requirements, particularly the requirement to include all available material written evidence.The Supreme Court remanded the case to the Court of Chancery for further proceedings to determine whether the acquiring company’s noncompliance with the notice requirements could be excused. The court instructed the lower court to consider whether the notice requirements were a material part of the agreed exchange and whether excusing the noncompliance would result in a disproportionate forfeiture. View "Thompson Street Capital Partners IV, L.P. v. Sonova United States Hearing Instruments, LLC" on Justia Law

The buyers of a pharmaceutical business appealed the Superior Court’s dismissal of their fraudulent-inducement and indemnification claims against the sellers. The trial court determined that the buyers had waived their fraudulent-inducement claims and that the indemnification claim was time-barred. The court’s waiver determination was based on its interpretation of a letter agreement between the parties, executed after the buyers’ acquisition of the business and following governmental proceedings involving FDA and Department of Justice investigations. The sellers argued that the letter agreement precluded further litigation, including the buyers’ claims. The buyers contended that the letter agreement only limited the size and scope of claims for losses attributable to the governmental proceedings. The Superior Court agreed with the sellers and dismissed the buyers’ fraudulent-inducement claims.The Superior Court found that the buyers’ indemnification claim was untimely because it was filed more than 60 months after the acquisition closed, as required by the Purchase Agreement. The court rejected the buyers’ argument that the survival period was tolled due to the sellers’ fraudulent concealment, reasoning that the buyers were on inquiry notice of the alleged breaches well within the limitations period.The Supreme Court of Delaware reviewed the case and held that the buyers’ interpretation of the letter agreement was reasonable, as was the sellers’ and the trial court’s. The court found the relevant provision of the letter agreement to be ambiguous, making it inappropriate to dismiss the buyers’ fraudulent-inducement claim. The court also concluded that the buyers adequately pleaded that the sellers had fraudulently concealed the facts giving rise to the indemnification claim, potentially tolling the survival period. Consequently, the court reversed the Superior Court’s judgment and remanded the case for further proceedings. View "LGM Holdings, LLC v. Gideon Schurder" on Justia Law