Justia Delaware Supreme Court Opinion Summaries

Articles Posted in May, 2011
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The State of Delaware ("State") filed an habitual driving offender petition in the Court of Common Pleas against respondent under Chapter 28 of Title 21 of the Delaware Vehicle Code. Hours after declaring respondent an habitual offender, the Court of Common Pleas, sua sponte, vacated its earlier judgment, holding that the State's exercise of prosecutorial discretion in respondent's case was inconsistent with the State's prosecution of other habitual driving offender petitions heard that same day. At issue was whether the Court of Common Pleas erred in vacating its earlier order declaring respondent an habitual driving offender. The court held that the Court of Common Pleas had no legal basis to conclude that respondent was not an habitual driving offender where the statutory requirements for habitual driving offender status had all been established. The court also held that the Court of Common Pleas erred in finding the State's refusal to offer a continuance to respondent constituted a legal "wrong" where the state was not required to request a continuance in each and every habitual driving offender prosecution. The court further held that the Court of Common Pleas erroneously relied on Court of Common Pleas Civil Rules 60(b)(3) and 60(b)(6) as a basis to remedy the State's "misrepresentations." The court finally held that nothing in Court of Common Pleas Civil Rule 11 suggested that the trial court could vacate an earlier order, thereby resulting in a dismissal of the proceeding, as sanction for a party's alleged violation of that rule.

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Defendant was convicted of first degree murder and appealed a superior court judge's denial of his second motion for postconviction relief. At issue was whether the sidebar commentary defendant's counsel made to the trial judge during a pretrial hearing created an unlawful "appearance of impropriety," violated defendant's due process rights, and denied his Sixth Amendment right to counsel. The court held that the relevant circumstances did not disclose any "appearance of impropriety" sufficient to reverse the judgment and grant a new penalty phase where the court did not find an unacceptable risk that a reasonable observer would believe that bias influenced the trial judge. The court also held that the superior court judge did not violate defendant's due process rights where there was no evidence proving reliance on counsel's remarks. The court further held that defendant was not denied his Sixth Amendment right to counsel where there was no "complete" failure of counsel and defendant failed to establish actual prejudice sufficient to warrant relief. Accordingly, the judgment of the superior court was affirmed.

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Plaintiff sued defendant for injuries she suffered when she slipped and fell on an icy parking lot on defendant's premises. At issue was whether the superior court erred in granting summary judgment for defendant where immunity, pursuant to Title 14, section 1056(h) of the Delaware Code, did not apply to negligence for failing to inspect the premises and failing to warn of known and existing dangers. Also at issue was whether the superior court erred in granting summary judgment for defendant where defendant waived, or should be estopped from asserting, section 1056(h) immunity. The court held that section 1056(h) provided defendant with immunity where there was no legal distinction between the failure to maintain a reasonably safe parking lot free of ice and snow and the failure to warn of a slippery parking lot. The court also held that defendant did not waive, and was not estopped from asserting, that immunity where the record did not reflect that plaintiff was aware of any insurance coverage, the record did not show that plaintiff relied on the conduct of defendant, or that plaintiff changed her position as a result of her reliance. Therefore, the judgment of the superior court was affirmed.

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Appellant filed requests with appellee for refunds of taxes that appellant paid on premiums derived from certain life insurance policies, for tax years 2001 to 2003. The Delaware Insurance Commissioner ("Commissioner") denied appellant's request on the basis that appellant could not aggregate the premium income from those insurance policies into one unitary "case" for tax purposes under section 702 of the Delaware Insurance Code. At issue on appeal was the meaning of the term "case," which appeared in section 702. The court held that the plain meaning of section 702(c)(2)b, both pre- and post-amendment, was that the premiums received from insurance policies could be aggregated into one "case" only if those policies were issued through the same private placement memorandum. Therefore, appellant could not aggregate the seven insurance policies that were issued via separate private placements into one "case."

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Defendant was charged with nineteen counts in a final re-indictment related to charges of attempted murder, reckless endangering, firearm charges related to attempted murder charges, aggravated menacing by a firearm, aggravated intimidation of a witness, criminal solicitation, disregarding a police officer, resisting arrest, and reckless driving. At issue was whether the trial judge abused his discretion when he decided that a single complaint by the jury during trial, that some members had difficulty hearing one videotaped section 3507 statement, justified departure from the general default rule that such statements did not go into the jury during deliberations. The court held that the jury certainly should not be permitted to "work through" the recorded section 3507 statement during their deliberations until it was understandable and the undue emphasis placed upon the section 3507 evidence by its unwarranted admission into the jury's deliberative process was not harmless beyond a reasonable doubt. Therefore, the court reversed the judgment and remanded for a new trial.

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Respondent, the wife, appealed from the Family Court's July 27, 2009 entry from divorce from petitioner, the husband, who initiated the divorce proceedings on January 16, 2009. At issue was whether the Family Court erred by concluding that the husband had completed the applicable Parent Education Program ("PEP") as required by 13 Del. C. 1507(h) because he should have been required to complete a PEP that had a domestic violence course component. Also at issue was whether the Family Court erred in holding that the PEP requirement of section 1507(h) did not have to be satisfied before entry of the divorce decree. The court held that the Family Court did not err by entering the final divorce decree on July 27, 2009 where, because the court never found that husband was required to attend a PEP that had a domestic violence education course component, the husband's earlier completion of the April 2009 PEP course satisfied the requirements of section 1507(h). The court also held that, even if the husband was required to complete a PEP which included a domestic violence education course component, completion of that PEP was not a condition precedent to the Family Court's entry of the divorce decree. Therefore, the judgment of the Family Court was affirmed.