Justia Delaware Supreme Court Opinion Summaries

Defendant appealed from his convictions for unlawful sexual contact in the first degree, a lesser-included offense of rape in the first degree. Defendant contended that his conviction should be reversed because the prosecutor improperly prodded the victim to cry in front of the jury. The court concluded that the record evidence did not support that contention. Accordingly, the judgment of the Supreme Court was affirmed. View "Williams v. State" on Justia Law

Sussex County filed a complaint against DNREC asserting that it exceeded its constitutional and statutory authority in promulgating the PCS Regulations, which were promulgated in 2008 to effect DNREC's Pollution Control Strategy for the Inland Bays Watershed. At issue was the validity of Sections 4 and 5 of the PCS Regulations. The Superior Court held that Section 4, which established the water quality buffer, and the related stormwater control provisions of Section 5, constituted "zoning," and thus directly conflicted with the Sussex County Zoning Ordinance. The Superior Court held those portions of the PCS Regulations were void and ordered that they be stricken. The court concluded that DNREC's "no zoning" argument was contradicted by language in those portions of the PCS Regulations that were at issue. Therefore, the judgment of the Superior Court was affirmed. View "DE Dept. of Natural Resources & Environmental Control v. Sussex County, et. al." on Justia Law

Plaintiff filed this action seeking books and records from HP under 8 Del. C. 220. At issue was whether a letter concerning allegedly inappropriate conduct by a corporate executive should be kept under seal. The court held that the Court of Chancery acted well within its discretion in holding that the intervenor did not establish good cause to maintain the confidentiality of the letter and therefore, the letter should be unsealed. View "Hurd v. Espinoza and Hewlett-Packard Co." on Justia Law

Sagarra, a Spanish corporation, was a minority shareholder of Uniland, also a Spanish corporation. Sagarra brought a Court of Chancery action to rescind the sale, by CPV, of Giant, to Uniland. CPV was the controlling stockholder of both Giant and Uniland. Sagarra purported to sue derivatively on behalf of a wholly-owned Delaware subsidiary of Uniland, UAC, which was specifically created as the vehicle to acquire Giant. Defendants moved to dismiss the complaint on the ground that Sagarra lacked standing to enforce a claim on behalf of UAC. The Court of Chancery held that Sagarra's standing to sue was governed by Spanish law, because Uniland - the only entity in which Sagarra owned stock - was incorporated in Spain. The court upheld the Court of Chancery's reasoning and judgment because Sagarra failed to satisfy the demand requirements of Spanish law. View "Sagarra Inversiones, S.L., v. Cementos Portland Valderrivas, S.A., et al." on Justia Law

Defendant was convicted of murder and sentenced to death. On a motion for postconviction relief, defendant raised four arguments. The court found that the unpresented mitigation evidence would not alter the totality of the evidence sufficiently to change the outcome of the penalty hearing; the trial judge properly found no prosecutorial misconduct; the trial judge did not err by eliminating "conscience of the community" and "great weight" from the jury instructions; and Delaware's sentencing procedure did not violate Ring v. Arizona. Accordingly, none of defendant's claims had merit and the court affirmed the postconviction judge's denial of defendant's motion for postconviction relief. View "Norcross v. State" on Justia Law

Defendants, Dana and Zoom, appealed from a Superior Court order denying their post-trial motions for judgment as a matter of law, or alternatively, for a new trial. A Superior Court jury found defendants partially liable for asbestos-related mesothelioma suffered by decedents. The trial court denied defendants' motions on the ground that the jury verdict was supported by sufficient evidence. Plaintiffs cross-appealed from the trial court's denial of their separate motions for additur or, alternatively, a new trial on damages. On the principal appeal by Dana and Zoom, the court affirmed the trial court's judgment on the basis of its well-reasoned opinion. On the cross-appeal by plaintiffs, the court found that the trial court committed legal error in ruling on plaintiffs' additur motion, and also that trial court erroneously failed to address a potentially determinative issue of Louisiana law. Therefore, the court reversed in part and remanded for further proceedings. View "Dana Co., LLC v. Crawford, et al.; Zoom Performance Products v. Crawford, et al." on Justia Law

Defendant, a Tier I sex offender, was arrested for violating 11 Del. C. 4120(f) by failing to register his wife's Bridgeville address. At issue was whether the term "residence" should be defined for purposes of a sex offender registration statute, and whether there was sufficient evidence to support defendant's conviction for violating the statute. The court held that the term "residence" should be given its commonly accepted dictionary definition - a place where one actually and habitually lived, as opposed to a place where one stays temporarily. The trial court decided that "residence" meant a permanent or temporary place of abode, and instructed the jury accordingly. Using the dictionary definition, the court concluded that the State failed to present sufficient evidence to support a finding that defendant had changed his residence where defendant went "back and forth" between his wife's house in Bridgeville and his parents' house in Georgetown. View "Andrews v. State" on Justia Law

This case arose when the Zoning Board of Adjustment (ZBA) granted three use variances to Ingleside to allow partial demolition and renovation of the H. Fletcher Brown Mansion for use as a thirty-five unit multi-family apartment building for senior citizens. Appellants raised three issues on appeal. The court concluded that the ZBA was not properly constituted and therefore, it was without authority to act. Consequently, there was no need to address the merits of appellants' other two arguments. The judgment of the Superior Court was reversed and the matter remanded for further proceedings. View "Friends of the H. Fletcher Brown Mansion, et al. v. The City of Wilmington, et al." on Justia Law

Plaintiffs sued defendant in contract and tort, alleging that defendant failed to take necessary precautions to protect its premises from water damage. At issue on appeal was the trial judge's decision not to grant prejudgment interest on the amounts that were awarded by the jury to plaintiffs. The court held that plaintiffs were entitled to prejudgment interest as a matter of right and remanded to the Superior Court to determine the amount of prejudgment interest owed. View "Brandywine Smyrna, Inc., et al. v. Millennium Builders, LLC" on Justia Law