Justia Delaware Supreme Court Opinion Summaries

Articles Posted in March, 2013
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The trial court precluded appellants' experts from testifying at trial because appellants failed to provide the experts' reports in accordance with the trial scheduling order. Without any expert testimony, appellants' claims failed as a matter of law, and judgment was entered for appellees. But appellants had requested a conference with the trial court six months before the trial date to discuss the need to revise the scheduling order. The trial court refused to meet with counsel or change the trial date. This case was one of four appeals to the Supreme Court where in each case, plaintiffs' claims were dismissed without being heard on the merits. Upon review, the Supreme Court held that the trial court abused its discretion. "the trial courts have been applying the factors set forth in 'Drejka v. Hitchens Tire Service Inc.' when deciding whether a case should be dismissed for the attorneys' failure to obey scheduling orders," the Court determined it necessary to refine the 'Drejka' analysis: "parties who ignore or extend scheduling deadlines without promptly consulting the trial court, will do so at their own risk. In other words, any party that grants an informal extension to opposing counsel will be precluded from seeking relief from the court with respect to any deadlines in the scheduling order. By the same token, if the trial court is asked to extend any deadlines in the scheduling order, the extension should not alter the trial date. Counsel may face a compressed time period to complete discovery, or the filing of dispositive motions, but the most important aspect of the scheduling order – the trial date – will be preserved. In the unusual circumstance where the trial court does decide to postpone the trial date, litigants should expect that the trial will be rescheduled after all other trials already scheduled on the court's docket." View "Christian v. Counseling Resource Associates, Inc." on Justia Law

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Two employees of Connections CSP, Inc. were killed in an automobile collision during the course and scope of their employment. Connections owned the vehicle and had purchased underinsured motorist insurance (UIM) for the vehicle and also worker's compensation insurance which covered the employees. The UIM insurer paid its policy limit of $1,000,000. The worker's compensation insurer also paid benefits to the representatives of the decedents. The worker's compensation insurer then sought to enforce a lien upon the UIM payment equal to the worker's compensation benefits it paid. But the UIM policy specifically excluded the direct or indirect benefit of any insurer or self-insurer under a worker's compensation claim. Notwithstanding this exclusion, the Superior Court enforced the lien based upon its interpretation of 19 Del. C. 2363(e), which allows reimbursement of a worker's compensation carrier "from the third party liability insurer." The UIM insurer appealed. Upon review, the Supreme Court held that General Assembly eliminated the ability of a worker's compensation insurer to assert a lien against the UIM payments made pursuant to the employer's UIM policy. Because the Superior Court erred as a matter of law in enforcing a lien, the Supreme Court reversed its decision and remanded the case for further proceedings. View "Simendinger v. National Union Fire Insurance Co." on Justia Law

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In 2006, a German bank organized two affiliated entities under Delaware law. One sold a class of securities (Trust Preferred Securities) as part of the bank's effort to raise capital. In 2009, the bank acquired a second German bank by merger, whereby the bank assumed an obligation of the acquired bank to make certain payments with respect to a class of the acquired bank's securities. The bank made those payments in 2009 and 2010. In 2010, Plaintiff, who is the Property Trustee for the holders of the acquiror bank's Trust Preferred Securities sued claiming the 2009 and 2010 payments on the acquired bank's securities (which was a "Parity Security") triggered a contractual obligation by the bank to make comparable payments on the Trust Preferred Securities. The bank argued that it had no such contractual obligation. On cross motions for summary judgment, the Court of Chancery rejected the Trustee's claim on the basis that, because the 2009 and 2010 payments were not made on "Parity Securities," the bank had no obligation to make payments on the Trust Preferred Securities. Because the Supreme Court disagreed and concluded that the Court of Chancery erred, the Court reversed and remanded with instructions to enter final judgment for the Trustee. View "Bank of New York Mellon v. Commerzbank Capital Funding Trust II" on Justia Law

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Defendant-Appellant Thomas Sammons appealed several final superior court judgments after he was convicted by jury of second-degree burglary, second-degree robbery and criminal mischief. Defendant raised two issues on appeal to the Supreme Court: (1) that the trial judge erred in declaring Defendant an habitual offender pursuant to title 11, section 4214(b) of the Delaware Code based on a prior conviction in the State of Florida for burglary; and (2) that the trial judge erred in declaring Defendant an habitual offender, where the issue of rehabilitation, in light of his "organic dysfunctions," was not addressed. Upon review, the Supreme Court that both of Defendant's arguments were without merit. View "Sammons v. Delaware" on Justia Law

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Defendant-Appellant Ewelina Kulowiec appealed her conviction for third-degree assault. Defendant elected to have a non-jury trial, after which she was acquitted of Aggravated Menacing, a firearm offense, and Terroristic Threatening, but was convicted of assault. Defendant was sentenced to one year of imprisonment at Level 5, suspended for one year of probation at Level 2. On appeal, Defendant argued that the State did not prove beyond a reasonable doubt that she inflicted "physical injury" upon her then-husband. Upon review, the Supreme Court concluded that the record did not support Defendant's argument. Therefore, the superior court's judgment was affirmed. View "Kulowiec v. Delaware" on Justia Law

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Defendant-Appellant Leshawn Washington was convicted by jury on four counts of first-degree assault, second-degree assault, twelve counts of possession of a firearm during the commission of a felony and six counts of first-degree reckless endangerment. He appealed his convictions, arguing that the superior court abused its discretion by permitting the admission of certain evidence that the jury ultimately used to convict him. Upon review of the trial court record, the Supreme Court found no merit to Defendant's arguments, and affirmed his convictions. View "Washington v. Delaware" on Justia Law

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A passenger in a car stopped by the police for illegally tinted windows claimed to have no identification and provided an officer with a false identity. After a database search returned no results, the officer handcuffed the passenger and recovered a gun during a pat down. The passenger challenged his conviction, arguing officers had no probable cause to arrest him, and moved to suppress evidence of the recovered gun. Upon review, the Supreme Court held that the officer possessed probable cause to arrest the passenger for criminal impersonation, and affirmed the trial judge's denial of a motion to suppress the gun. View "Stafford v. Delaware" on Justia Law

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Plaintiff-Appellant Richard J. Sternberg, M.D. brought an action against Defendants-Appellees Nanticoke Memorial Hospital, its CEO and members of the hospital's Medical Executive Committee (MEC) (collectively "Nanticoke") for tortious interference with existing business relationships, defamation, and breach of the Medical Staff Bylaws. The suit arose from a precautionary suspension of his clinical privileges imposed by Nanticoke under its professional review procedures. Nanticoke asserted immunity under federal and state law and sought attorneys fees, citing state law and a fee-shifting provision of Nanticoke's Medical Staff Bylaws Credentials Policy. After cross-motions for summary judgment, the Superior Court denied Sternberg's motion and granted Nanticoke's motion, awarding attorney's fees under state law without addressing Nanticoke's claim for costs and fees under the Credentials Policy. Sternberg appealed and the Supreme Court affirmed on the issue of immunity but reversed the award of attorney's fees under the applicable statute because Sternberg refuted the only fact supporting the requisite bad faith for an award under that law. Upon remand, the Superior Court awarded attorney's fees and costs based upon the Credentials Policy. Sternberg raised three claims on appeal: (1) he claimed that the Superior Court erred by granting Nanticoke's motion for summary judgment for attorney's fees under the Credentials Policy, because the bylaw violates public policy; (2) he claimed the Credentials Policy was unenforceable against him because Nanticoke materially breached the bylaws; and (3) he claimed that the Superior Court abused its discretion in determining the amount of attorney's fees and costs to be awarded. Finding no merit to any of his claims on appeal, the Supreme Court affirmed the Superior Court. View "Sternberg, M.D. v. Nanticoke Memorial Hospital, Inc., et al." on Justia Law