Justia Delaware Supreme Court Opinion Summaries

LKQ Corporation, a Delaware corporation in the auto salvage and recycled parts business, designated certain employees as "Key Persons" eligible for Restricted Stock Units (RSUs) through RSU Agreements. These agreements included non-competition clauses and provisions for forfeiture of RSUs and any stock issued if the employee competed with LKQ within nine months post-departure. Robert Rutledge, a plant manager at LKQ, signed these agreements and received stock under them. In April 2021, Rutledge resigned and joined a competitor shortly after.LKQ sued Rutledge in Illinois federal court for breach of contract and unjust enrichment, seeking to enjoin him from working for a competitor and to recover proceeds from the sale of LKQ stock. The district court dismissed the unjust enrichment claim and granted summary judgment for Rutledge on the contract claims, holding that the non-competition provisions were unreasonable restraints of trade under Illinois law and unenforceable under Delaware law, based on the Court of Chancery's decision in Ainslie v. Cantor Fitzgerald, L.P.The United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit affirmed the district court's dismissal of the unjust enrichment claim and the summary judgment ruling on the Restrictive Covenant Agreements. However, it was uncertain about the enforceability of the RSU Agreements' forfeiture-for-competition provisions under Delaware law, especially after the Delaware Supreme Court reversed the Court of Chancery's decision in Cantor Fitzgerald. The Seventh Circuit certified two questions to the Delaware Supreme Court regarding the applicability of Cantor Fitzgerald outside the limited partnership context.The Delaware Supreme Court held that the principles from Cantor Fitzgerald, which endorse the employee choice doctrine and prioritize freedom of contract, apply beyond the limited partnership context, including to RSU agreements. The court emphasized that forfeiture-for-competition provisions do not restrict competition or an employee's ability to work and should be treated as enforceable terms subject to ordinary breach of contract defenses. View "LKQ Corp. v. Rutledge" on Justia Law

The case involves Sunder Energy, LLC (Sunder), a solar sales dealer, and its former employee, Tyler Jackson, along with several other defendants. Sunder sought to enforce restrictive covenants against Jackson, who had joined a competitor, Solar Pros LLC, and allegedly recruited Sunder employees to the new company. The restrictive covenants were part of Sunder's operating agreement, which Jackson signed without negotiation or full understanding of its terms.The Court of Chancery of the State of Delaware denied Sunder's motion for a preliminary injunction to enforce the restrictive covenants. The court found the covenants unenforceable for two reasons: they originated from an egregious breach of fiduciary duty by Sunder's principals, and they were facially unreasonable. The court also declined to "blue pencil" the covenants to make them reasonable, citing the overbroad and oppressive nature of the restrictions. Additionally, the court ruled that Utah law governed Sunder's tortious interference claim against Jackson's new employers, which effectively dismissed that claim under Utah law.The Supreme Court of the State of Delaware reviewed the case and affirmed the Court of Chancery's decision in part and reversed it in part. The Supreme Court agreed that the Court of Chancery did not abuse its discretion in refusing to blue pencil the restrictive covenants, given the lack of negotiation, minimal consideration, and the overbroad nature of the covenants. The Supreme Court also upheld the application of Utah law to the tortious interference claim. However, the Supreme Court reversed the Court of Chancery's ruling that the operating agreement was unenforceable as a matter of law, stating that such a determination exceeded the scope of the preliminary injunction stage and should await a complete factual record. View "Sunder Energy, LLC v. Jackson" on Justia Law

The case involves a dispute over the control of Byju’s Alpha, Inc., a Delaware subsidiary of Think and Learn Private Ltd. (T&L), an Indian company. Byju’s Alpha entered into a $1.2 billion loan agreement with GLAS Trust Company LLC (GLAS) as the administrative and collateral agent. The agreement required Whitehat, another T&L subsidiary, to become a guarantor, contingent on approval from the Reserve Bank of India (RBI). However, changes in RBI regulations made it impossible for Whitehat to obtain the necessary approval.The Court of Chancery of Delaware held a trial and ruled that Timothy R. Pohl was the sole director and officer of Byju’s Alpha, following actions taken by GLAS to enforce its rights under the loan agreement. The court found that the failure of Whitehat to accede as a guarantor constituted a breach of the loan agreement, allowing GLAS to take control of Byju’s Alpha’s shares and appoint Pohl as the sole director and officer.The Delaware Supreme Court reviewed the case and affirmed the Court of Chancery’s decision. The Supreme Court held that the amendments to the loan agreement explicitly defined Whitehat’s failure to accede as a “Specified Default,” entitling GLAS to enforce its remedies. The court also rejected the impossibility defense, concluding that the changes in RBI regulations were foreseeable and could have been guarded against in the contract. The court found that the sophisticated parties involved should have anticipated the regulatory changes and included provisions to address such risks.In conclusion, the Delaware Supreme Court affirmed the lower court’s ruling that Pohl was the sole director and officer of Byju’s Alpha, and that GLAS was entitled to enforce its remedies under the loan agreement due to the breach caused by Whitehat’s failure to accede as a guarantor. View "Ravindran v. GLAS Trust Company LLC" on Justia Law

The case involves a dispute over attorneys' fees following a $1 billion settlement in litigation challenging Dell Technologies' redemption of Class V stock. The plaintiff, Steamfitters Local 449 Pension Plan, alleged that Dell Technologies, controlled by Michael Dell and Silver Lake Group LLC, redeemed the Class V stock at an unfair price. The litigation was complex, involving extensive discovery and expert testimony, and was settled on the eve of trial.The Court of Chancery of the State of Delaware awarded 26.67% of the settlement, or $266.7 million, as attorneys' fees. Pentwater Capital Management LP and other class members objected, arguing that the fee was excessive and that a declining percentage method should be applied, similar to federal securities law cases. The Court of Chancery rejected this argument, holding that Delaware law, as established in Sugarland Industries, Inc. v. Thomas and Americas Mining Corp. v. Theriault, does not mandate a declining percentage approach. The court found that the $1 billion settlement was a significant achievement and that the fee award was justified based on the results achieved, the time and effort of counsel, and other relevant factors.The Supreme Court of the State of Delaware reviewed the case and affirmed the Court of Chancery's decision. The Supreme Court held that the Court of Chancery did not exceed its discretion in awarding 26.67% of the settlement as attorneys' fees. The court emphasized that the Sugarland factors, particularly the results achieved, are paramount in determining fee awards. The Supreme Court also noted that while a declining percentage approach is permissible, it is not mandatory, and the Court of Chancery adequately justified its decision not to apply it in this case. View "In re Dell Technologies Inc." on Justia Law

The case involves a dispute between two parties who entered into a partnership agreement that specified the financial conditions under which the appellant would receive a distribution upon the sale of the partnership’s principal asset. The agreement set a net-sale-price threshold above which the appellant would receive a distribution, and it directed the general partner to calculate that net sale price by deducting certain categories of costs from the gross sales price. The general partner determined that the deductions reduced the net sale price below the minimum threshold for a distribution. The appellant challenged several of these deductions, particularly the costs incurred to defease the interest payments on the mortgage.The Court of Chancery of the State of Delaware reviewed the case and held that the deduction for the costs to defease the interest payments on the mortgage was proper under the partnership agreement. The court concluded that this deduction was outcome determinative and entered judgment in favor of the partnership. The court also noted that the general partner acted in good faith in calculating the net sale price, which eliminated any breach of contract claim.The Supreme Court of the State of Delaware reviewed the case and affirmed the Court of Chancery’s judgment. The Supreme Court held that the plain language of the partnership agreement and the formula used permitted the challenged deduction for defeasance costs. The court did not reach the effect or correctness of the Court of Chancery’s alternative holding regarding the general partner’s good faith. The Supreme Court concluded that the defeasance costs were properly deducted, which reduced the net resale price below the threshold required for the appellant to receive a distribution. View "Exit Strategy, LLC v. Festival Retail Fund BH, L.P." on Justia Law

A group of AIM ImmunoTech, Inc. stockholders believed the board was mismanaging the company and initiated a campaign to elect new directors. This effort included two felons convicted of financial crimes. The board rejected two nomination attempts under its bylaws, leading to a lawsuit. The Court of Chancery denied the insurgents' request for a preliminary injunction, citing factual disputes. The insurgents, led by Ted D. Kellner, made a third attempt to nominate directors. The board amended its bylaws to include new advance notice provisions and rejected Kellner's nominations for non-compliance. Kellner filed suit.The Court of Chancery invalidated four of the six main advance notice bylaws and reinstated a 2016 bylaw. The court upheld the board's rejection of Kellner's nominations for failing to comply with the remaining bylaws, including the reinstated 2016 provision. Kellner argued that the court improperly used the 2016 bylaw and that the amended bylaws were preclusive and adopted for an improper purpose. The defendants contended that the court erred in invalidating the bylaws and that they withstood enhanced scrutiny.The Delaware Supreme Court reviewed the case. It found that the AIM board identified a legitimate threat to its information-gathering function but acted inequitably by adopting unreasonable bylaws to thwart Kellner's proxy contest. The court held that the board's primary purpose was to interfere with Kellner's nominations and maintain control. Consequently, the court declared the amended bylaws unenforceable. The judgment of the Court of Chancery was affirmed in part and reversed in part, closing the case. View "Kellner v. AIM ImmunoTech Inc." on Justia Law

The case involves NGL Energy Partners LP and NGL Energy Holdings LLC (collectively, "NGL") and LCT Capital, LLC ("LCT"). NGL, entities in the energy sector, engaged LCT, a financial advisory services provider, for services related to NGL's 2014 acquisition of TransMontaigne Inc. However, the parties failed to agree on payment terms, leading LCT to file a lawsuit in 2015. The Superior Court held a jury trial in July 2018, which resulted in a $36 million verdict in LCT's favor.NGL appealed the Superior Court's decision, challenging the $36 million final judgment and a set of evidentiary rulings. LCT cross-appealed, contesting the Superior Court's methodology for computing post-judgment interest. NGL argued that the Superior Court erred by admitting evidence and arguments about the value/benefit supposedly gained by NGL in the Transaction, asserting that such evidence is prejudicial and irrelevant to a quantum meruit claim. NGL also argued that the Superior Court erred by admitting evidence of benefit-of-the-bargain or expectancy damages when assessing the quantum meruit value of LCT’s services.The Supreme Court of the State of Delaware affirmed the Superior Court’s evidentiary rulings and rejected NGL's contention that the Superior Court incorrectly allowed LCT to recover benefit-of-the bargain/expectancy damages. However, the Supreme Court disagreed with the Superior Court’s post-judgment interest determination. The Supreme Court held that prejudgment interest is part of the judgment upon which post-judgment interest accrues under Section 2301(a). Therefore, the Supreme Court reversed the Superior Court as to this issue and remanded the case to the Superior Court for entry of judgment consistent with its opinion. View "NGL Energy Partners LP v. LCT Capital, LLC" on Justia Law

The case involves BitGo Holdings, Inc. and Galaxy Digital Holdings Ltd., who entered into a merger agreement. BitGo, a technology company, was required to submit audited financial statements to Galaxy, the acquirer, by a specified date. When BitGo submitted the financial statements, Galaxy claimed they were deficient because they did not apply recently published guidance from the Securities and Exchange Commission’s staff. BitGo disagreed, but submitted a second set of financial statements. Galaxy found fault with the second submission and terminated the merger agreement. BitGo then sued Galaxy for wrongful repudiation and breach of the merger agreement.The Court of Chancery sided with Galaxy and dismissed the complaint. The court found that the financial statements submitted by BitGo did not comply with the requirements of the merger agreement, providing Galaxy with a valid basis to terminate the agreement.On appeal, the Supreme Court of Delaware reversed the decision of the Court of Chancery. The Supreme Court found that the definition of the term “Company 2021 Audited Financial Statements” in the merger agreement was ambiguous. The court concluded that both parties had proffered reasonable interpretations of the merger agreement’s definition. Therefore, the court remanded the case for the consideration of extrinsic evidence to resolve this ambiguity. View "BitGo Holdings, Inc. v. Galaxy Digital Holdings Ltd., et al." on Justia Law

The case involves a group of pension funds (plaintiffs) who filed a lawsuit against Inovalon Holdings, Inc., and its board of directors (defendants), challenging an acquisition of Inovalon by a private equity consortium led by Nordic Capital. The plaintiffs claimed that the defendants breached their fiduciary duties and unjustly enriched themselves through the transaction. They also alleged that the company's charter was violated because the transaction treated Class A and Class B stockholders unequally.In the lower court, the Court of Chancery of the State of Delaware, the defendants moved to dismiss the case. They argued that the transaction satisfied the elements of a legal framework known as MFW, which would subject the board's actions to business judgment review. The Court of Chancery granted the defendants' motions to dismiss in full.On appeal, the Supreme Court of the State of Delaware reversed the decision of the Court of Chancery. The Supreme Court found that the lower court erred in holding that the vote of the minority stockholders was adequately informed. The Supreme Court determined that the proxy statement issued to stockholders failed to adequately disclose certain conflicts of interest of the Special Committee’s advisors. Therefore, the Supreme Court concluded that the transaction did not comply with the MFW framework, and the case was remanded for further proceedings. View "City of Sarasota Firefighters' Pension Fund v. Inovalon Holdings, Inc." on Justia Law

The case involves a shareholder lawsuit challenging the fairness of IAC/InterActiveCorp’s separation from its controlled subsidiary, Match Group, Inc. The plaintiffs alleged that the transaction was unfair because IAC, a controlling shareholder of Match, received benefits in the transaction at the expense of the Match minority shareholders. The defendants claimed that business judgment review applied because they followed the MFW framework, which included approval by an independent and disinterested “separation committee” and a majority of uncoerced, fully informed, and unaffiliated Match shareholders. The Court of Chancery agreed and dismissed the complaint.On appeal, the Supreme Court of Delaware concluded that in a suit claiming that a controlling shareholder stood on both sides of a transaction with the controlled corporation and received a non-ratable benefit, entire fairness is the presumptive standard of review. The controlling shareholder can shift the burden of proof to the plaintiff by properly employing a special committee or an unaffiliated shareholder vote. But the use of just one of these procedural devices does not change the standard of review. If the controlling shareholder wants to secure the benefits of business judgment review, it must follow all MFW’s requirements. The court reversed the lower court's finding that the separation committee functioned as an independent negotiating body. The case was remanded for further proceedings. View "In re Match Group, Inc. Derivative Litigation" on Justia Law