Justia Delaware Supreme Court Opinion Summaries

Articles Posted in Business Law
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This appeal pertains to a merger between TerraForm Power, Inc. (“TerraForm”) and affiliates, officers, and other executives of Brookfield Asset Management Inc. (“Brookfield”). The plaintiffs, former TerraForm stockholders, filed a lawsuit alleging breach of fiduciary duty by the defendants. The case involves the application of the legal framework established in Kahn v. M & F Worldwide Corp. (MFW), which provides for business judgment review if certain conditions are met.The trial court dismissed the case, holding that the merger satisfied the MFW conditions, thus entitling the transaction to business judgment review rather than the more stringent "entire fairness" review. The trial court also found that the plaintiffs had failed to adequately allege coercion under MFW and had failed to adequately plead that the stockholder vote was not fully informed.On appeal, the Supreme Court of Delaware concluded that the trial court correctly dismissed the coercion claim. However, the Supreme Court disagreed with the trial court's conclusion on the disclosure issues. The Supreme Court held that it was reasonably conceivable that the proxy statement's failure to disclose certain of the special committee’s advisors’ conflicts of interest and certain management fees Brookfield anticipated from the merger was a material omission that rendered the minority stockholders' vote uninformed.Therefore, the Supreme Court reversed the trial court’s decision and held that the case should not have been dismissed. View "City of Dearborn Police and Fire Revised Retirement System v. Brookfield Asset Management Inc." on Justia Law

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In the State of Delaware, a lawsuit was brought by two non-profit organizations against multiple public officials, including tax collectors in Delaware's three counties. The organizations sought increased funding for Delaware’s public schools. The Court of Chancery held that the organizations were entitled to attorneys’ fees and expenses. On appeal, the Supreme Court of Delaware held that the Court of Chancery erred in its application of the "common benefit doctrine" and its expansion of a precedent case, Korn v. New Castle County, beyond taxpayer suits. The Supreme Court affirmed the Chancery Court's award of expenses, but reversed the award of attorneys' fees. The Supreme Court held that the litigation brought by the organizations was to compel the defendant county governments to comply with the law, a benefit that did not warrant an exception to the "American Rule" which states that each party bears its own attorneys' fees, absent certain exceptions. The Court also held that, even if this case were a taxpayer suit, it does not meet the standard set forth in Korn because there was not a quantifiable, non-speculative monetary benefit for all taxpayers. View "In re Delaware Public Schools Litigation" on Justia Law

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In the case before the Supreme Court of the State of Delaware, Cantor Fitzgerald, L.P., a global financial services company, appealed a decision by the Court of Chancery. The case involved the company's contractual provisions that allowed it to withhold distributions otherwise owed to a partner who leaves the partnership and then competes with the partnership. The plaintiffs were six former partners who had their distributions, ranging from under $100,000 to over $5 million, withheld after they left Cantor Fitzgerald and joined competing businesses.The lower court held that these "forfeiture for competition" provisions were unenforceable, ruling they were unreasonable restraints on trade. However, the Supreme Court reversed this decision. It ruled that, under Delaware law, courts should enforce such agreements absent unconscionability, bad faith, or other extraordinary circumstances. The court emphasized the importance of freedom of contract, particularly in the context of sophisticated parties entering into a limited partnership agreement. It argued that public policy considerations favored enforcing the agreement, particularly as the parties had voluntarily agreed to the terms. As such, it held that Cantor Fitzgerald was within its rights to withhold the distributions based on the plaintiffs' competitive activities. The case was remanded to the lower court for further proceedings consistent with the Supreme Court's opinion. View "Cantor Fitzgerald, L.P. v. Ainslie" on Justia Law

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In 2022, Fox Corporation and Snap Inc. amended their corporate charters to exculpate their officers from damages liability for breaches of the duty of care. The amendments were authorized by recent Delaware legislation. The companies' Class A non-voting common stockholders claimed that these amendments deprived them of their power to sue officers for damages for duty of care violations and, thus, a separate class vote was required to approve the amendments. However, the Supreme Court of the State of Delaware affirmed the Court of Chancery's decision that a separate class vote was not required. The court held that the ability to sue directors or officers for duty of care violations was a general right of the stockholders, not a class-based power stated in the corporate charter. Therefore, it was not a "power, preference, or special right" of the Class A common stock under Section 242(b)(2) of the Delaware General Corporation Law, which requires a separate class stockholder vote to amend a corporate charter if the amendment would adversely affect the powers, preferences, or special rights of the shares of such class. The holding was based on long-standing precedent and the court's interpretation of related sections of the Delaware General Corporation Law. View "In re Fox Corporation/Snap Inc. Section 242 Litigation" on Justia Law

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In 2022, Fox Corporation and Snap Inc. amended their corporate charters to protect their officers from liability for duty of care violations, following recent legislation in Delaware. Class A non-voting common stockholders of both companies filed a lawsuit, claiming that a separate class vote was required for these amendments, as it deprived them of the power to sue officers for damages for duty of care violations. The Court of Chancery of the State of Delaware ruled in favor of Fox and Snap, holding that the ability to sue corporate officers for damages was not a class-based power stated in the charters and thus separate Class A stockholder votes were not required. The Court of Chancery also noted that the amendments did not affect any peculiar attribute of the class of stock, and hence, did not necessitate a separate vote. The Supreme Court of the State of Delaware affirmed this decision, holding that the powers, preferences, or special rights of class shares in Section 242(b)(2) refers to those authorized for a class by Section 151(a) and expressed in the charter as required by Sections 102(a)(4) and 151(a). The ability to sue directors or officers for duty of care violations is an attribute of the Companies’ stock, but not a power, preference, or special right of the Class A common stock under Section 242(b)(2). View "In re Fox Corporation/Snap Inc. Section 242 Litigation" on Justia Law

Posted in: Business Law
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A case involving Lebanon County Employees' Retirement Fund and Teamsters Local 443 Health Services & Insurance Plan, as plaintiffs-appellants, and Steven H. Collis, Richard W. Gochnauer, Lon R. Greenberg, Jane E. Henney, M.D., Kathleen W. Hyle, Michael J. Long, Henry W. McGee, Ornella Barra, D. Mark Durcan, and Chris Zimmerman, as defendants-appellees, was heard by the Supreme Court of the State of Delaware. The plaintiffs, shareholders in AmerisourceBergen Corporation, brought a derivative complaint against the directors and officers of the Corporation alleging that they failed to adopt, implement, or oversee reasonable policies and practices to prevent the unlawful distribution of opioids. The plaintiffs claimed that this led to AmerisourceBergen incurring liability exceeding $6 billion in a 2021 global settlement related to the Company's role in the opioid epidemic. The Court of Chancery of the State of Delaware initially dismissed the complaint, basing its decision on a separate federal court finding that AmerisourceBergen had complied with its anti-diversion obligations under the Controlled Substances Act. However, the Supreme Court of the State of Delaware reversed the Court of Chancery's dismissal of the complaint, ruling that the lower court had erred in considering the federal court's findings as it changed the date at which demand futility should be considered and violated the principles of judicial notice. The case was remanded for further proceedings. View "Lebanon County Employees' Retirement Fund v. Collis" on Justia Law

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In this case, the Supreme Court of the State of Delaware reversed the decision of the Superior Court of the State of Delaware. The case centered around an insurance dispute involving Verizon Communications, Inc. and several of its insurers. The dispute arose after Verizon settled a lawsuit brought by a litigation trust, which was pursuing claims against Verizon arising out of a transaction Verizon had made with FairPoint Communications Inc. The litigation trust had alleged that Verizon made fraudulent transfers in the course of the transaction, which harmed FairPoint's creditors. After settling the lawsuit, Verizon sought coverage for the settlement payment and defense costs from its insurers.The insurers denied coverage, arguing that the litigation trust's claims did not qualify as a "Securities Claim" under the relevant insurance policies. The Superior Court disagreed, ruling that the litigation trust's claims were brought derivatively on behalf of FairPoint by a security holder of FairPoint, as required to qualify as a Securities Claim under the policies.The Supreme Court of Delaware reversed this decision, finding that the litigation trust's claims were direct, not derivative. The court reasoned that the trust's claims were brought on behalf of the creditors, not FairPoint or its subsidiary, and the relief sought would benefit the creditors, not the business entity. Therefore, the claims did not meet the definition of a Securities Claim under the insurance policies. Consequently, the Supreme Court held that the insurers were not obligated to cover Verizon's settlement payment and defense costs. View "In re Fairpoint Insurance Coverage Appeals" on Justia Law

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The issue this case presented for the Delaware Supreme Court's review stemmed from a failed, multibillion-dollar merger (the “Merger”) of two fuel pipeline giants - The Williams Companies, Inc. (“Williams”) and Energy Transfer LP (“ETE”). The parties spent a decade litigating over various fees to which they argued they were entitled under the Merger Agreement. ETE continued to assert its entitlement to a $1.48 billion breakup fee, despite being the party who terminated the Merger. It also disputed that it had to pay Williams a $410 million reimbursement fee, which it was required to pay if the Merger failed and certain conditions were met. Finally, ETE argued a related $85 million attorney’s fee award was unreasonable. But the Supreme Court found no error with the Court of Chancery’s opinions that held ETE was not entitled to an over-one-billion-dollar fee and find that ETE had to pay Williams the $410 million reimbursement fee and the related $85 million in attorney’s fees. View "Energy Transfer, LP v. The Williams Companies, Inc." on Justia Law

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Defendants-appellants and cross-appellees, Gregory Holifield (“Holifield”) and GH Blue Holdings, LLC (“Blue”), appealed a Court of Chancery memorandum opinion in favor of plaintiff- appellee and cross-appellant, XRI Investment Holdings LLC (“XRI”). The issue this case presented was whether Holifield validly transferred his limited liability membership units in XRI to Blue on June 6, 2018. The resolution of that issue bore on the ultimate dispute between the parties (not at issue here) on whether XRI validly delivered to Holifield a strict foreclosure notice purporting to foreclose on the XRI membership units, or whether such notice was incorrectly delivered to him because Blue was, in fact, the owner of the units following the transfer. Following a one-day trial, the Court of Chancery determined that the transfer of the units from Holifield to Blue was invalid because it was not a permitted transfer under XRI’s limited liability company agreement, which provided that noncompliant transfers of XRI interests were “void.” The trial court, in interpreting the Delaware Supreme Court's holding in CompoSecure, L.L.C. v. CardUX, LLC, 206 A.3d 807 (Del. 2018), held that the use of the word “void” in XRI’s LLC agreement rendered the transfer incurably void, such that affirmative defenses did not apply. Despite this holding, the trial court, in dicta, further found that XRI had acquiesced in the transfer. The Delaware Supreme Court affirmed Court of Chancery’s judgment with respect to the Blue Transfer, but reversed the judgment insofar as it precluded XRI’s recovery for breach of contract damages and recoupment of legal expenses advanced to Holifield. The Court held that the trial court’s finding of acquiescence as to only one of the alleged breaches did not bar either remedy, and the Court remanded the case for the trial court to make further determinations. View "Holifield v. XRI Investment Holdings LLC" on Justia Law

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The corporate charter of a bank holding company capped at 10% the stock that could be voted by a “person” in any stockholder vote. During a proxy contest for three seats of a staggered board, the CCSB board of directors instructed the inspector of elections not to count 37,175 shares voted in favor of a dissident slate of directors. According to the board, the 37,175 shares exceeded the 10% voting limitation because certain stockholders were acting in concert with each other. If the votes had been counted, the dissident slate of directors would have been elected. The CCSB corporate charter also provided that the board’s “acting in concert” determination, if made in good faith and on information reasonably available, “shall be conclusive and binding on the Corporation and its stockholders.” In a summary proceeding brought by the plaintiffs, the Court of Chancery found: (1) the “conclusive and binding” charter provision invalid under Delaware corporate law; (2) the board’s instruction to the inspector of elections invalid because the individuals identified by the board were not acting in concert; and (3) the board’s election interference did not withstand enhanced scrutiny review. The court also awarded the plaintiffs attorneys’ fees for having conferred a benefit on CCSB. CCSB argued the Court of Chancery erred when it invalidated the charter provision and reinstated the excluded votes. The Delaware Supreme Court affirmed the Court of Chancery: plaintiffs proved that the board breached its duty of loyalty by instructing the inspector of elections to disregard the 37,175 votes. "The charter provision cannot be used to exculpate the CCSB directors from a breach of the duty of loyalty. Further, the court’s legal conclusion and factual findings that the stockholders did not act in concert withstand appellate review." View "CCSB Financial Corp. v. Totta" on Justia Law