Justia Delaware Supreme Court Opinion Summaries

A publicly traded investment banking corporation entered into a stockholders agreement with an entity controlled by its founder in 2014, contemporaneous with its initial public offering. The agreement granted the founder’s entity extensive governance rights, including restrictions on board actions and control over board and committee composition, provided certain ownership and other conditions remained met. These arrangements and the founder’s control were disclosed in the company’s IPO prospectus and subsequent public filings. Nearly nine years later, a Class A stockholder filed suit seeking a declaratory judgment that key provisions of the stockholders agreement were facially invalid under Section 141(a) of the Delaware General Corporation Law, which vests management authority in the board of directors unless otherwise provided in the certificate of incorporation.The Court of Chancery of the State of Delaware denied the company’s time-bar and laches defenses, holding that if the challenged provisions violated Section 141(a), they were void rather than voidable, and therefore not subject to equitable defenses like laches. The court further reasoned that the alleged statutory violation was ongoing, so the claim was not untimely even though it was brought many years after the agreement was executed. The court proceeded to find that several provisions of the stockholders agreement facially violated Section 141(a), declared them void and unenforceable, and later awarded attorney fees to the plaintiff.On appeal, the Supreme Court of the State of Delaware reversed. It held that to the extent the challenged provisions conflicted with Section 141(a), they were voidable—not void—and thus subject to equitable defenses, including laches. The Supreme Court concluded that the plaintiff’s claim accrued when the agreement was executed in 2014, that the delay in bringing suit was unreasonable, and that the claim was barred by laches. The Supreme Court vacated the declaratory judgment and fee award, declining to reach the merits of the facial validity of the agreement’s provisions. View "Moelis & Company v. West Palm Beach Firefighters' Pension Fund" on Justia Law

Johnson & Johnson acquired Auris Health, a medical robotics company, in a transaction where Auris’s shareholders could earn up to $2.35 billion in additional payments if certain regulatory and sales milestones were met for Auris’s surgical devices. These milestones required Johnson & Johnson to use “commercially reasonable efforts,” defined by the contract as efforts comparable to those used for its own priority devices. All regulatory milestones were expressly conditioned on achieving specific FDA “510(k) premarket notification” approvals. After none of the milestones were met, Fortis Advisors, representing Auris’s former shareholders, sued, alleging that Johnson & Johnson failed to meet its efforts obligations and fraudulently induced Auris into accepting a contingent payment for one milestone by misrepresenting its likelihood.The Delaware Court of Chancery held a trial and found largely in Fortis’s favor. The court ruled that Johnson & Johnson breached the contract by not applying the required level of effort to Auris’s iPlatform system and acted with the intent to avoid earnout payments. For the first milestone, the court relied on the implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing to require Johnson & Johnson to pursue an alternate FDA pathway when the original 510(k) process became unavailable. The court also found that Johnson & Johnson fraudulently induced Auris to accept a contingent payment for the Monarch lung ablation milestone by portraying its achievement as almost certain, despite knowing of a recent patient death and an ongoing FDA investigation.On appeal, the Supreme Court of Delaware agreed with Johnson & Johnson regarding the implied covenant, holding that the merger agreement did not contain a contractual gap and that the risk of an unavailable 510(k) pathway was foreseeable and allocated by the contract. The court reversed the Chancery’s ruling that Johnson & Johnson was required to pursue an alternative regulatory pathway for the first milestone and vacated the related damages. The Supreme Court otherwise affirmed the findings on breach of contract for the remaining milestones, upheld the damages calculation for those, and affirmed the fraud finding and the conclusion that the contract did not bar extra-contractual fraud claims. The case was remanded for recalculation of damages consistent with this opinion. View "Johnson & Johnson v. Fortis Advisors LLC" on Justia Law

In 2018, the board of a major clean-energy vehicle company approved a substantial equity compensation plan for its CEO, contingent on achieving a series of ambitious market capitalization and operational milestones. The plan granted the CEO the right to purchase significant company stock if these milestones were met. A company shareholder filed a derivative suit, alleging that the CEO, as a controlling stockholder, had improperly influenced the board to secure excessive compensation. The shareholder also claimed failures in disclosure to stockholders who later approved the plan.The Court of Chancery of the State of Delaware held a five-day trial. It found that the CEO exercised transaction-specific control despite not holding a majority of voting power. Concluding that the CEO and the board had breached their fiduciary duties, the court applied the “entire fairness” standard and ordered rescission of the CEO’s compensation package. After this decision, the board resubmitted the compensation plan to the stockholders with new disclosures, and a majority of disinterested stockholders approved it in a second vote. The board then requested that the court revise its prior judgment, but the Court of Chancery refused, maintaining rescission and awarding the plaintiff’s counsel substantial fees.On appeal, the Supreme Court of the State of Delaware reviewed whether rescission was a proper remedy. The Supreme Court held that rescission was improper because it could not restore all parties to their positions before the transaction, given the CEO’s six years of performance under the plan. The Court reversed the rescission remedy, reinstated the compensation plan, and awarded the plaintiff nominal damages. The Supreme Court further ruled that the plaintiff’s attorneys were entitled to fees based on the reasonable value of their services. View "In re Tesla, Inc. Derivative Litigation" on Justia Law

Loews Corporation created a publicly traded master limited partnership, Boardwalk Pipeline Partners, LP, to operate natural gas pipelines. The partnership agreement included a call-right provision allowing the general partner, controlled by Loews, to acquire all public limited partnership units if certain conditions were met. In 2018, following proposed policy changes by the Federal Energy Regulatory Commission (FERC) that could affect pipeline profitability, Loews sought legal opinions to justify exercising the call right. Although Boardwalk's internal analysis suggested minimal impact from the FERC changes, Loews’ outside counsel issued an opinion that the policy shift was reasonably likely to have a material adverse effect on Boardwalk’s rates, satisfying a key condition for the call right. After obtaining a second law firm’s endorsement of the opinion’s acceptability, Loews exercised the call right, acquiring public units at a price that unitholders alleged was artificially depressed.The Court of Chancery initially found that the legal opinion used to trigger the call right was not rendered in good faith, meaning a contractual condition for exercising the call right had not been fulfilled. As a result, the court held that Boardwalk’s general partner breached the partnership agreement and awarded damages to the unitholders. The court stayed the remaining claims, which included breach of the implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing, tortious interference, and unjust enrichment.On appeal, the Supreme Court of the State of Delaware first held that the general partner was exculpated from monetary liability for breach of contract under the partnership agreement, reversing the damages judgment and remanding for consideration of the non-exculpated claims. Upon remand, the Court of Chancery dismissed those remaining claims, concluding that the Supreme Court’s prior decision foreclosed them. On further appeal, the Supreme Court of Delaware held that the lower court misunderstood the scope of its prior ruling; it affirmed dismissal of most claims but reversed as to tortious interference, remanding that claim for further proceedings. View "Bandera Master Fund LP v. Boardwalk Pipeline Partners, LP" on Justia Law

Three siblings, who are stockholders in a closely held, family-run Delaware corporation that streams sports content, sought access to the company’s books and records. The siblings were dissatisfied with the lack of financial information and annual meetings after their brother was replaced as CEO. Their motivation was to value their shares and possibly sell them. Over a ten-month period, the siblings made three separate demands under Section 220 of the Delaware General Corporation Law, each seeking inspection of various corporate documents. The company denied all three demands, asserting that each failed to satisfy the statute’s procedural “form and manner” requirements for such demands.After the company denied the demands, the siblings filed a complaint in the Delaware Court of Chancery to compel inspection. The matter was first reviewed by a Magistrate in Chancery, who found that the third demand satisfied the statutory waiting period and that the siblings had a proper purpose for inspection, granting most of the requested documents except for tax-related items. The Magistrate also ordered the parties to negotiate a confidentiality agreement. Both parties filed exceptions to the Magistrate’s report, and the Court of Chancery conducted further review.The Court of Chancery ultimately found that all three demands failed to meet Section 220’s procedural requirements. It ruled that the first demand was deficient for lack of oath, power of attorney, and identification of stockholders; the second demand failed because affidavits verifying the demand were signed before the demand was finalized, with no evidence the verified version matched the final one; and the third demand was rejected because the siblings applied to the court before the statutory five-day waiting period had elapsed. Judgment was entered for the company.On appeal, the Supreme Court of Delaware affirmed the Court of Chancery’s decision. It held that strict compliance with Section 220’s form and manner requirements is necessary, and that the siblings failed to meet those requirements for all three demands. View "Martin Floreani v. FloSports, Inc." on Justia Law

A stockholder of Amazon.com, Inc. sent a letter to the company demanding to inspect its books and records under Section 220 of the Delaware General Corporation Law. The stockholder aimed to investigate potential wrongdoing and mismanagement by Amazon, believing the company engaged in anticompetitive activities in the U.S. and Europe. When the stockholder and Amazon could not agree on certain conditions for producing the records, the stockholder filed an action in the Court of Chancery.A Magistrate in Chancery conducted a one-day trial and concluded that the stockholder did not meet its burden to prove a "credible basis" for inferring possible wrongdoing by Amazon. The stockholder took exceptions to the final report. A Vice Chancellor adopted the final report's conclusion but did not reach its credible basis analysis, instead finding the scope of the stockholder's stated purpose to be "facially improper" and not "lucid."On appeal, the Supreme Court of the State of Delaware found that the Vice Chancellor erred in interpreting the scope of the stockholder's purpose and was required to engage with the evidence presented. The court determined that the evidence, including a complaint filed by the Federal Trade Commission against Amazon for alleged antitrust violations that largely survived a motion to dismiss, established a credible basis from which a court could infer possible wrongdoing by Amazon. The Supreme Court reversed the judgment of the Court of Chancery and remanded for further proceedings to determine the scope and conditions of production consistent with its decision. View "Roberta Ann K.W. Wong Leung Revocable Trust v. Amazon.com, Inc." on Justia Law

A Canadian energy company acquired a Delaware corporation in a merger, resulting in significant change-in-control payments to three of the acquired corporation’s executives. Two of these executives negotiated the transaction. Stockholders of the acquired corporation sued, alleging breaches of fiduciary duties by the executives and the board of directors, claiming the merger was timed to benefit the executives at the expense of stockholders. They also alleged that the acquiror aided and abetted these breaches and that the executives issued a misleading proxy statement.The Court of Chancery found that the plaintiffs proved their aiding-and-abetting claims, determining that the acquiror had constructive knowledge of and participated in the breaches. The court assessed damages, entering a judgment of approximately $200 million against the acquiror.The Supreme Court of Delaware reviewed the case. It reversed the Court of Chancery’s judgment, holding that for an acquiror to be liable for aiding and abetting a sell-side breach of fiduciary duty, the acquiror must have actual knowledge of both the target’s breach and the wrongfulness of its own conduct. The court found that the standard of actual knowledge was not met in this case. The court also concluded that the acquiror’s actions did not constitute substantial assistance in the fiduciary breaches, as required for aiding-and-abetting liability. Consequently, the Supreme Court of Delaware reversed the Court of Chancery’s judgment. View "In re Columbia Pipeline Group, Inc. Merger Litigation" on Justia Law

In early 2020, Erste Asset Management GmbH filed a derivative action against Kraft Heinz Company’s fiduciaries, arising from an August 2018 stock sale by 3G Capital, Inc., a significant minority stockholder. The Court of Chancery dismissed the complaint under Rule 23.1, concluding that the plaintiffs failed to plead particularized facts creating a reasonable doubt that six of Kraft Heinz’s eleven directors were disinterested or lacked independence. One of those directors, John Cahill, was alleged to have ended his consulting relationship with Kraft Heinz before the derivative action was filed. However, it was later revealed that Cahill continued to serve as a consultant after July 2019, contrary to Kraft Heinz’s public disclosures.The Court of Chancery dismissed the derivative action, relying on the false representation that Cahill’s consulting agreement had terminated. Erste later discovered the ongoing consultancy and filed a new action seeking relief from the judgment under Rule 60(b) for fraud and newly discovered evidence. The Court of Chancery dismissed this new action, holding that the fraud must be extrinsic and that the new information was not newly discovered evidence because Erste could have learned it with reasonable diligence.The Supreme Court of Delaware reversed the Court of Chancery’s decision, holding that Rule 60(b)(3) applies to both intrinsic and extrinsic fraud and that Erste had pleaded a claim that Kraft Heinz’s misrepresentations prevented it from fairly presenting its case. The court remanded the case for further proceedings, including Rule 23.1 motion practice to reassess demand futility in light of the new evidence. The court also remanded Erste’s breach of fiduciary duty claim for further consideration. View "Erste Asset Management GmbH v. Hees" on Justia Law

A Delaware limited partnership, acting as the Members’ Representative for former members of a company, engaged in a merger agreement with a Delaware limited liability company. The merger agreement included specific notice requirements for indemnification claims, which required the acquiring company to provide written notice with reasonable detail and all available material written evidence of the claim. The agreement also stated that failure to comply with these requirements would result in forfeiture of the right to recover from the indemnity escrow fund.The Court of Chancery dismissed the Members’ Representative’s complaint, which sought a declaration that the acquiring company’s claim notice was invalid for failing to meet the contractual requirements. The court held that the notice was valid under the escrow agreement and dismissed the complaint, reasoning that the notice provided sufficient detail and was timely.On appeal, the Delaware Supreme Court reversed the Court of Chancery’s decision. The Supreme Court held that the merger agreement and escrow agreement should be read together as an integrated contractual scheme. The court found that the final sentence of the notice provision in the merger agreement created a condition precedent, requiring compliance with the notice requirements to avoid forfeiture of the right to recover from the indemnity escrow fund. The court determined that it was reasonably conceivable that the acquiring company failed to comply with the notice requirements, particularly the requirement to include all available material written evidence.The Supreme Court remanded the case to the Court of Chancery for further proceedings to determine whether the acquiring company’s noncompliance with the notice requirements could be excused. The court instructed the lower court to consider whether the notice requirements were a material part of the agreed exchange and whether excusing the noncompliance would result in a disproportionate forfeiture. View "Thompson Street Capital Partners IV, L.P. v. Sonova United States Hearing Instruments, LLC" on Justia Law

Alexion Pharmaceuticals, Inc. develops therapies for rare disorders and was insured under two director and officer liability insurance programs covering different periods. The first program provided $85 million of coverage for claims made between June 27, 2014, and June 27, 2015 (Tower 1). The second program provided $105 million of coverage for claims made between June 27, 2015, and June 27, 2017 (Tower 2). In 2015, the SEC issued a formal investigation order against Alexion, which led to a subpoena seeking information related to Alexion’s grant-making activities and compliance with the Foreign Corrupt Practices Act (FCPA). Alexion disclosed this investigation to its Tower 1 insurers.The Superior Court of Delaware found that the SEC investigation and a later securities class action against Alexion were unrelated, placing the securities class action coverage in Tower 2. The court applied the “meaningful linkage” standard and concluded that the connection between the SEC investigation and the securities class action was insufficient to make them related.The Supreme Court of Delaware reviewed the case and disagreed with the Superior Court’s conclusion. The Supreme Court found that the securities class action was meaningfully linked to the wrongful acts disclosed in Alexion’s 2015 notice to its Tower 1 insurers. Both the SEC investigation and the securities class action involved the same underlying wrongful acts, including Alexion’s grant-making activities and compliance with the FCPA. The Supreme Court held that the securities class action claim should be deemed to have been first made during the Tower 1 coverage period, and therefore, coverage should be under Tower 1. The judgment of the Superior Court was reversed. View "In re Alexion Pharmaceuticals, Inc. Insurance Appeals" on Justia Law