Justia Delaware Supreme Court Opinion Summaries

This litigation arose from the construction of a "Johnny Janosik" furniture store in Laurel. The Plaintiff-appellant LTL Acres Limited Partnership (LTL) was the owner of the Janosik Building. Defendant-appellee Butler Manufacturing Company (Butler) provided pre-engineered components which were used to build the roof and exterior walls. Defendant-appellee Dryvit Systems, Inc. (Dryvit) supplied a product used on the exterior finish of the walls, to protect and seal them. Dryvit warranted its product for ten years from the "date of substantial completion of the project." The building was completed in 2006. Unfortunately, the building had issues with water infiltration from the beginning. By February 2012, cladding began to crack and buckle. The water infiltration and delamination persisted through 2013 despite attempts to fix the issues. LTL brought this action in 2013, alleging breach of warranty, breach of contract, and negligence claims against Butler; and breach of warranty and breach of contract claims against Dryvit. The Superior Court granted summary judgment to both Butler and Dryvit on the grounds that the actions against both were barred by the applicable statute of limitations. It held that the action against Butler was barred by 10 Del. C. sec. 8127,which is a six year statute of limitations relating to alleged defective construction of an improvement to real property. After review, the Supreme Court concluded that summary judgment in favor of Butler was proper. The Superior Court ruled that LTL’s action against Dryvit was barred by a four year statute of limitations set forth in 6 Del. C. sec. 2-725. Dryvit gave LTL a ten year express warranty. The Superior Court described the warranty as a “repair and replacement warranty” and reasoned that such a warranty cannot be one that extended to future performance. It therefore concluded that the statute of limitations for an action on the warranty expired not later than four years after the Dryvit product was tendered and applied to the building; that is, not later than four years after 2006. The Supreme Court concluded that grant of summary judgment in favor of Dryvit was inappropriate, and had to be reversed. The case was remanded for further proceedings. View "LTL Acres Limited Partnership v. Butler Manufacturing Co." on Justia Law

Canadian resident Marc Hazout was the President, CEO, Principal Financial and Accounting Officer, and a director of a Delaware corporation, Silver Dragon Resources, Inc. He was sued for acts taken in his official capacity on behalf of the corporation based in Canada. As alleged in the complaint, Hazout was the lead negotiator for Silver Dragon in negotiating a capital infusion from a group of affiliated investors including Tsang Mun Ting and other residents of Hong Kong. That capital infusion when consummated would have required a change of control of Silver Dragon from Hazout and certain others to Tsang and his fellow investors, who would have achieved the right to control Silver Dragon‘s board. Hazout and two other Silver Dragon directors signed the agreement, but a fourth refused. Rather than return $1 million to Tsang, however, Hazout not only caused Silver Dragon to keep it, but also had Silver Dragon send $750,000 of it to Travellers International, Inc., a corporation that Hazout controlled. Tsang therefore brought this suit in the Superior Court of Delaware against Silver Dragon, Hazout, and Travellers for unjust enrichment, fraud, and fraudulent transfer in violation of the Delaware Uniform Fraudulent Transfer Act. Hazout moved to dismiss on the ground that there was no basis for the exercise of personal jurisdiction over him in Delaware because Tsang was not suing Hazout as a stockholder of Silver Dragon for breach of any fiduciary or other duty owed to Silver Dragon as an entity or Tsang as a stockholder. The Superior Court disagreed and found Delaware law provided a proper basis for personal jurisdiction. The Delaware Supreme Court accepted a certified interlocutory appeal on the personal jurisdiction question from the Superior Court and affirmed: “there is no rational argument that the terms of [10 Del C. sec.] 3114(b) are not satisfied.” View "Hazout v. Ting" on Justia Law

The United States Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit certified a question of law arising out of an appeal of a decision by the United States District Court for the Southern District of Florida to the Delaware Supreme Court. Paulson Advantage Plus, L.P. (the “Investment Fund”) was a Delaware limited partnership that invested in corporate securities. Paulson Advisers, LLC, a Delaware limited liability company, and Paulson & Co., a Delaware corporation (the Investment Fund Managers) were the general partners and managers of the Investment Fund. One of the Investment Fund’s limited partners was HedgeForum Paulson Advantage Plus, LLC, (the “Feeder Fund”). The Feeder Fund was managed and sponsored by Citigroup Alternative Investments, LLC. AMACAR CPO, Inc. was the Feeder Fund’s managing member. Along with other investors, Plaintiff-appellant Hugh Culverhouse was a member of the Feeder Fund, not a limited partner in the Investment Fund. Culverhouse filed a putative class action against the Investment Fund Managers in the United States District Court for the Southern District of Florida. The first amended complaint alleged that between 2007 and 2011, the Investment Fund invested about $800 million in a Chinese forestry company. Following another investment firm’s report claiming that the forestry company had overstated its timber holdings and engaged in questionable related-party transactions, the Investment Fund sold its holdings for about a $460 million loss. On appeal of the dismissal for lack of standing, the United States Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit determined that resolution of the appeal depended on an unsettled issue of Delaware law. The Eleventh Circuit posited the question to the Delaware Supreme Court on whether the diminution in the value of a limited liability company, serving as a feeder fund in a limited partnership, provides a basis for an investor’s direct suit against the general partners when the company and the partnership allocated losses to investors’ individual capital accounts and did not issue transferrable shares and losses were shared by investors in proportion to their investments. The Delaware Court answered in the negative. View "Culverhouse v. Paulson & Co., Inc." on Justia Law

In the first appeal, the Supreme Court upheld the Court of Chancery’s finding that SIGA Technologies, Inc. in bad faith breached its contractual obligation to negotiate a license agreement consistent with the parties’ license agreement term sheet, known throughout this litigation as the “LATS.” The Supreme Court also held that where parties have agreed to negotiate in good faith, and would have reached an agreement but for the defendant’s bad faith conduct during the negotiations, the plaintiff could recover contract expectation damages, so long as the plaintiff can prove damages with reasonable certainty. Because the Court of Chancery ruled out expectation damages in its first decision, the case was remanded for consideration of damages to SIGA ("SIGA I”). On remand, the Court of Chancery reevaluated the evidence, and held that PharmAthene, Inc. met its burden of proving with reasonable certainty expectation damages and awarded PharmAthene $113 million. The parties once again appealed to the Supreme Court. SIGA raised two claims of error in this appeal: (1) the Court of Chancery was not free to reconsider its prior holding that lump-sum expectation damages were too speculative; and (2) if reconsideration was permitted, the expectation damages awarded following remand were too speculative. After careful consideration of SIGA’s arguments, the Supreme Court found that the law of the case doctrine did not preclude the Court of Chancery from reconsidering its earlier determination that lump-sum expectation damages were too speculative. The Court also found that the court did not abuse its discretion when it awarded PharmAthene lump-sum expectation damages, and its factual findings supporting its new damages determination were not clearly erroneous. Accordingly, the Court affirmed the judgment of the Court of Chancery. View "SIGA Technologies, Inc. v. PharmAthene" on Justia Law

The Court of Chancery issued four opinions which were appealed to the Delaware Supreme Court. In sum, the appeal and cross-appeal in this case centered on the Chancery Court’s final judgment finding that RBC Capital Markets, LLC aided and abetted breaches of fiduciary duty by former directors of Rural/Metro Corporation ("Rural" or the "Company") in connection with the sale of the Company to an affiliate of Warburg Pincus LLC, a private equity firm. RBC raised six issues on appeal, namely: (1) whether the trial court erred by holding that the board of directors breached its duty of care under an enhanced scrutiny standard; (2) whether the trial court erred by holding that the board of directors violated its fiduciary duty of disclosure by making material misstatements and omissions in Rural’s proxy statement, dated May 26, 2011; (3) whether the trial court erred by finding that RBC aided and abetted breaches of fiduciary duty by the board of directors; (4) whether the trial court erred by finding that the board of directors’ conduct proximately caused damages; (5) whether the trial court erred in applying the Delaware Uniform Contribution Among Tortfeasors Act ("DUCATA"); and (6) whether the trial court erred in calculating damages. After careful consideration of each of RBC’s arguments on appeal, the Supreme Court found no reversible error and affirmed the "principal legal holdings" of the Court of Chancery. View "RBC Capital Markets, LLC v. Jervis" on Justia Law

This case involved an appeal from a complicated transaction between a private company whose equity was wholly owned by the family of A.R. Sanchez, Jr., Sanchez Resources, LLC (the “Private Sanchez Company”), and a public company in which the Sanchez family constituted the largest stockholder bloc with some 16% of the shares and that was dependent on the Private Sanchez Company for all of its management services, Sanchez Energy Corporation (the “Sanchez Public Company”). The transaction at issue required the Sanchez Public Company to pay $78 million to: (i) help the Private Sanchez Company buy out the interests of a private equity investor; (ii) acquire an interest in certain properties with energy-producing potential from the Private Sanchez Company; (iii) facilitate the joint production of 80,000 acres of property between the Sanchez Private and Public Companies; and (iv) fund a cash payment of $14.4 million to the Private Sanchez Company. In this derivative action, the plaintiffs alleged that this transaction involved a gross overpayment by the Sanchez Public Company, which unfairly benefited the Private Sanchez Company by allowing it to use the Sanchez Public Company‟s funds to buy out their private equity partner, obtain a large cash payment for itself, and obtain a contractual right to a lucrative royalty stream that was unduly favorable to the Private Sanchez Company and thus unfairly onerous to the Sanchez Public Company. As to the latter, the plaintiffs alleged that the royalty payment was not only unfair, but was undisclosed to the Sanchez Public Company stockholders, and that it was the Sanchez family's desire to conceal the royalty obligation that led to a convoluted transaction structure. The Court of Chancery dismissed the complaint, finding that the defendants were correct in their contention that plaintiffs had not pled demand excusal under "Aronson v. Lewis," (473 A.2d 805 (1984)). "Determining whether a plaintiff has pled facts supporting an inference that a director cannot act independently of an interested director for purposes of demand excusal under "Aronson" can be difficult. And this case illustrates that." Because of that, the Supreme Court found that plaintiffs pled facts supporting an inference that a majority of the board who approved the interested transaction they challenged could not consider a demand impartially. Therefore, the Court reversed and remanded so that plaintiffs could prosecute this derivative action. View "Delaware County Employees Retirement Fund, et al. v. Sanchez, et al." on Justia Law

The plaintiffs filed a challenge in the Court of Chancery to a stock-for-stock merger between KKR & Co. L.P. ("KKR") and KKR Financial Holdings LLC ("Financial Holdings") in which KKR acquired each share of Financial Holdings's stock for 0.51 of a share of KKR stock, a 35% premium to the unaffected market price. The plaintiffs' primary argument was that the transaction was presumptively subject to the entire fairness standard of review because Financial Holdings's primary business was financing KKR's leveraged buyout activities, and instead of having employees manage the company's day-to-day operations, Financial Holdings was managed by KKR Financial Advisors, an affiliate of KKR, under a contractual management agreement that could only be terminated by Financial Holdings if it paid a termination fee. As a result, the plaintiffs alleged that KKR was a controlling stockholder of Financial Holdings, which was an LLC, not a corporation. The Court of Chancery held that the business judgment rule was invoked as the appropriate standard of review for a post-closing damages action when a merger that is not subject to the entire fairness standard of review has been approved by a fully informed, uncoerced majority of the disinterested stockholders. For that and other reasons, the Court of Chancery dismissed plaintiffs' complaint. In this decision, the Delaware Supreme Court found that the Chancellor was correct in finding that the voluntary judgment of the disinterested stockholders to approve the merger invoked the business judgment rule standard of review and that the plaintiffs' complaint should have been dismissed. "Delaware corporate law has long been reluctant to second-guess the judgment of a disinterested stockholder majority that determines that a transaction with a party other than a controlling stockholder is in their best interests." View "Corwin, et al. v. KKR Financial Holdings LLC., et al." on Justia Law

The United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit certified a question of Delaware law to the Delaware Supreme Court: "If a shareholder demands that a board of directors investigate both an underlying wrongdoing and subsequent misstatements by corporate officers about that wrongdoing, what factors should a court consider in deciding whether the board acted in a grossly negligent fashion by focusing its investigation solely on the underlying wrongdoing?" The plaintiffs in this case made a demand that the board of JPMorgan Chase & Co. investigate two related issues regarding a high-profile situation, what the Second Circuit has called the "London Whale debacle." According to the Second Circuit, these issues were: (1) the failure of JPMorgan‘s risk management policies to prevent the trading that resulted in corporate losses; and (2) supposed false and misleading statements made by JPMorgan management in the wake of the emergence of the problem. According to the plaintiffs, the board investigative committee only made findings as to the former issue by arguing that what management knew when it made disclosures was the subject of several pages of the report. In the Delaware Supreme Court's view, Delaware law on the relevant topic required that the decision of an independent committee to refuse a demand should only be set aside if particularized facts were pled supporting an inference that the committee, despite being comprised solely of independent directors, breached its duty of loyalty, or breached its duty of care, in the sense of having committed gross negligence. The Court concluded that the determination of what constituted gross negligence in the circumstances by definition required a review of the relevant circumstances facing the directors charged with acting. The Court requested more information from the Second Circuit prior to answering the certified question. View "Espinoza v. Dimon, et al." on Justia Law

Defendants-appellants Hill International, Inc., David Richter, Camille Andrews, Brian Clymer, Alan Fellheimer, Irvin Richter, Steven Kramer and Gary Mazzucco sought review of Court of Chancery orders dated June 5, 2015 and June 16, 2015. In its June 5, 2015 Order, the Court of Chancery enjoined Hill from conducting any business at its June 9, 2015 Annual Meeting, other than convening the meeting for the sole purpose of adjourning it for a minimum of 21 days, in order to permit plaintiff-appellee Opportunity Partners L.P. to present certain items of business and director nominations at Hill’s 2015 Annual Meeting. On June 16, 2015, the Court of Chancery entered the Order dated June 5, 2015 as a partial final judgment pursuant to Court of Chancery Rule 54(b). This expedited appeal presented for the Supreme Court's resolution a dispute over the proper interpretation of certain provisions of Articles II and III of Hill’s Bylaws as Amended and Restated on November 12, 2007. The sections of the Bylaws at issue, specifically language in Sections 2.2 and 3.3, concerned the operative date for determining the time within which stockholders must give notice of any shareholder proposals or director nominees to be considered at Hill’s upcoming annual meeting. After review of the bylaws and the Court of Chancery's orders, the Supreme Court found reversible error and affirmed. View "Hill International, Inc., et al. v. Opportunity Partners, L.P." on Justia Law

The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit certified a question of Delaware law arising out of an appeal from a decision issued by the U.S. District Court for the Southern District of New York. The question pertained to contract interpretation. Plaintiff-appellant NAF Holdings secured a contractual commitment of its contracting counterparty, defendant Li & Fung (Trading) Limited, to render a benefit to a third party. The counterparty breached that commitment. Could "the promisee-plaintiff bring a direct suit against the promisor for damages suffered by the plaintiff resulting from the promisor's breach, notwithstanding that (i) the third-party beneficiary of the contract is a corporation in which the plaintiff-promisee owns stock; and (ii) the plaintiff-promisee's loss derives indirectly from the loss suffered by the third-party beneficiary corporation; or must the court grant the motion of the promisor-defendant to dismiss the suit on the theory that the plaintiff may enforce the contract only through a derivative action brought in the name of the third-party beneficiary corporation?" The Delaware Supreme Court answered that under Delaware law, a party to a commercial contract who sues to enforce its contractual rights can bring a direct contract action under Delaware law. "Although the relationship of that party to the third-party beneficiary might well have relevance in determining whether the contract claim is viable as a matter of contract law, nothing in Delaware law requires the promisee-plaintiff's contract claim to be prosecuted as a derivative action. " View "NAF Holdings, LLC v. LI & Fung (Trading) Limited" on Justia Law