Justia Delaware Supreme Court Opinion Summaries

In the name of controlling litigation costs, a heating and air conditioning contractor, Blue Hen Mechanical, Inc. sued Christian Brothers Risk Pooling Trust as subrogee for the Little Sisters of the Poor for malicious prosecution. In January 2008, the Little Sisters of the Poor contracted with Blue Hen to maintain the heating, ventilation, and air conditioning equipment at its nonprofit residential nursing home facility. Two months later, the nursing home's air conditioner broke, requiring the unit to be replaced at a cost of $168,740. The Little Sisters of the Poor filed suit against Blue Hen, alleging that the unit's failure was due to Blue Hen's negligence in inspecting and maintaining the equipment. After briefing and oral argument, the Superior Court determined that the Little Sisters of the Poor had not produced sufficient evidence of Blue Hen's negligence, and granted Blue Hen's motion for summary judgment. Rather than seek costs in that lawsuit, Blue Hen initiated another suit against the Little Sisters of the Poor, alleging malicious prosecution and abuse of process. Blue Hen conceded that the Little Sisters of the Poor initially had good cause to sue. But it contended that during the course of that litigation, the Little Sisters of the Poor should have realized that its suit lacked probable cause, and should have dismissed its claims against Blue Hen. The Superior Court refused to enlarge the tort of malicious prosecution, which has historically been disfavored by Delaware courts, and determined that under the tort (as Delaware court have defined it), Blue Hen failed to demonstrate that the Little Sisters of the Poor acted maliciously in bringing its action and granted summary judgment to the Little Sisters of the Poor. Blue Hen appealed, and the Supreme Court affirmed: "[w]hatever the original wisdom for sanctioning the tort of malicious prosecution, we refuse to extend it to encompass claims properly brought before the court in the first instance. As important, there is no basis in the summary judgment record to support a rational jury finding that the Little Sisters of the Poor acted maliciously in the original suit, rather than in a good faith belief that Blue Hen was responsible for the serious losses that the Little Sisters of the Poor had suffered." View "Blue Hen Mechanical, Inc. v. Christian Brothers Risk Pooling Trust" on Justia Law

A dispute pending before the United States Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit turned on the interpretation of Delaware’s Equipment Dealer Contracts Statute, 6 Del. C. sec. 2720, et seq. (the “Dealer Statute”). The Third Circuit certified a question of Delaware law to the Delaware Supreme Court: "[d]oes a supplier’s repurchase obligation under section 2723(a) of the Dealer Statute extend to used inventory or is it limited to “new, unused, undamaged and complete inventory” under section 2723(b)?" The Court answered the certified question of law by concluding that a supplier’s repurchase obligation under the Dealer Statute is limited to new, unused, undamaged, and complete inventory. View "Terex Corporation, et al. v. Southern Track & Pump, Inc." on Justia Law

The Delaware Alcoholic Beverage Control (ABC) Commissioner appealed a superior court judgment dismissing his claim against the Delaware Alcoholic Beverage Control Appeals Commission for lack of standing. The Appeals Commission overturned the ABC Commissioner's decision to deny an application for a change of license classification by Lex-Pak, Inc., d/a/b Hak's Sports Bar & Restaurant. Hak's filed a motion to dismiss on grounds that the ABC Commissioner lacked standing. The superior court agreed and dismissed the case. After its review, the Supreme Court concluded that the Delaware Code did not vest the ABC Commissioner with standing to pursue an appeal of decisions by the Appeals Commission. Accordingly, the Court affirmed the superior court's judgment. View "Office of the Commissioner Delaware Alcoholic Beverage Control v. Appeals Commission Delaware Alcoholic Beverage Control" on Justia Law

These appeals both involved damages actions by stockholder plaintiffs arising out of mergers in which the controlling stockholder, who had representatives on the board of directors, acquired the remainder of the shares that it did not own in a Delaware public corporation. Both mergers were negotiated by special committees of independent directors, were ultimately approved by a majority of the minority stockholders, and were at substantial premiums to the pre-announcement market price. Nonetheless, the plaintiffs filed suit in the Court of Chancery in each case, contending that the directors had breached their fiduciary duty by approving transactions that were unfair to the minority stockholders. In both appeals, it was undisputed that the companies did not follow the process established in "Kahn v. M&F Worldwide Corporation" as a safe harbor to invoke the business judgment rule in the context of a self-interested transaction. In both cases, the defendant directors were insulated from liability for monetary damages for breaches of the fiduciary duty of care by an exculpatory charter provision adopted in accordance with 8 Del. C. 102(b)(7). Despite that provision, the plaintiffs in each case sued the controlling stockholders and their affiliated directors, and also sued the independent directors who had negotiated and approved the mergers. The issue central to both, presented for the Supreme Court's review was whether, where the plaintiff challenges an interested transaction that is presumptively subject to entire fairness review, must plead a non-exculpated claim against the disinterested, independent directors to survive a motion to dismiss by those directors. The Court answered that question in the affirmative: a plaintiff seeking only monetary damages must plead non-exculpated claims against a director who is protected by an exculpatory charter provision to survive a motion to dismiss, regardless of the underlying standard of review for the board's conduct. The Court of Chancery in both of these cases denied the defendants' motions to dismiss because it read the Supreme Court's precedent to require doing so, regardless of the exculpatory provision in each company's certificate of incorporation. When the independent directors are protected by an exculpatory charter provision and the plaintiffs are unable to plead a non-exculpated claim against them, those directors are entitled to have the claims against them dismissed, in keeping with the Court's opinion in "Malpiede v. Townson" (and cases following that decision). Accordingly, the Court remanded both of these cases to allow the Court of Chancery to determine if the plaintiffs sufficiently pled non-exculpated claims against the independent directors. View "In Re Cornerstone Theraputics, Inc. Leal, et al. v. Meeks, et al." on Justia Law

The issue this case presented for the Supreme Court's review arose from a business merger. Appellant, Lazard Technology Partners, LLC, represents former stockholders of Cyveillance, Inc. (the seller). Appellee Qinetiq North America Operations, LLC paid $40 million up-front money to the company and promised to pay up to another $40 million if the company's revenues reached a certain level. When the earn-out period ended, the revenues had not reached the level required to generate an earn-out. The seller filed suit in the Court of Chancery, arguing that the buyer breached the merger agreement. The seller also argued that the buyer violated the merger agreement‟s implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing by failing to take certain actions that the seller contended would have resulted in the achievement of revenue sufficient to generate an earn-out. After review, the Court of Chancery found that the seller had not proven that any business decision of the buyer was motivated by a desire to avoid an earn-out payment. Further, the Court found that the merger agreement's express terms were supplemented by an implied covenant. But as to whether conduct not prohibited under the contract was precluded because it might result in a reduced or no earn-out payment, the Court of Chancery held that, consistent with the language of implicated section of the merger agreement, the buyer had a duty to refrain from that conduct only if it was taken with the intent to reduce or avoid an earn-out altogether. On appeal, the seller argued the Court of Chancery misinterpreted the merger agreement. Finding no misinterpretation, the Supreme Court affirmed. View "Lazard Technology Partners v. Qinetiq North America Operations LLC" on Justia Law

ev3, Inc., the buyer of Appriva Medical, Inc., appealed a jury verdict that held it breached its contractual obligations to Appriva's former shareholders, who gave up their shares in the merger. The merger agreement between ev3 and Appriva provided for the bulk of the payments to the Appriva shareholders to be contingent upon the timely accomplishment of certain milestones toward the approval and marketability of a medical device that Appriva was developing. After it became clear that the milestones were not going to be achieved, the former Appriva shareholders sued, arguing that the full amount of contingency payments was due because ev3 had breached its obligation under the merger agreement to fund and pursue the regulatory milestones in its "sole discretion, to be exercised in good faith." But instead of confining itself to that argument, Appriva also contended that ev3 had breached a provision of a non-binding letter of intent that had been signed by the parties early in their negotiations. That non-binding provision stated that ev3 "will commit to funding based on the projections prepared by its management to ensure that there is sufficient capital to achieve the performance milestones." At many points during the trial, ev3 attempted to convince the Superior Court that the non-binding letter of intent should not have been used to interpret or contradict the clear terms of a clause in the merger agreement. Nevertheless, Appriva was permitted to argue to the jury that ev3 not only failed to act in good faith under the agreement, but that it breached a "promise" to honor the Funding Provision contained in the letter of intent. On appeal, ev3 argued that the Superior Court erred by permitting Appriva to argue that the Funding Provision in the non-binding letter of intent continued to bind ev3, and also that the non-binding letter of intent modified the "sole discretion" standard in the merger agreement. After review, the Supreme Court concluded the Superior Court erred by accepting Appriva‘s position that the non-binding Funding Provision within the letter of intent was admissible to affect the meaning of the merger agreement. Furthermore, by its plain terms, the merger agreement overrode any other provision in the Agreement to the contrary. "Thus, whether or not the letter of intent survived for some purposes, any provisions that conflicted with [section] 9.6 were without force and effect." View "EV3, Inc. v. Lesh" on Justia Law

This dispute arose from a contract signed by the parties in 2006, the Wireless Patent License Agreement, which provided for arbitration as the mechanism to resolve any claims arising under that Agreement. LG Electronics, Inc. sought a declaration in the Court of Chancery that InterDigital Communications, Inc., InterDigital Technology Corporation, and IPR Licensing Inc. that InterDigital had breached a nondisclosure agreement between the parties by disclosing confidential information during a pending arbitration proceeding. The Court of Chancery granted InterDigital's motion to dismiss, holding that all of LG's claims were properly before the arbitral tribunal, and deferred to the "first-filed proceeding" based on the factors established by the Delaware Supreme Court in "McWane Cast Iron Pipe Corp. v. McDowell-Wellman Engineering Co." After review, the Supreme Court agreed that the McWane doctrine applied in this case, and that it supported dismissing LG's claims. View "LG Electronics, Inc. v. InterDigital Communications, Inc." on Justia Law

In this case, the buyer persuaded the Superior Court to award it $15.1 million in damages when it bought a 65% interest in an investment advisory firm for $25 million. The buyer’s premise was that it would not have paid $25 million but for its expectancy that it would manage seven funds for three or more years. But the majority of the assets under management at the investment advisory firm were attributable to accounts other than the seven funds. Importantly, the contract enabled the seller to terminate the buyer’s right to manage the seven funds for any reason, so long as it paid a termination fee capped at $3.5 million, and to terminate the buyer without any compensation if the seller believed its fiduciary duties required or if the buyer’s performance fell below a contractual standard. After three years, the seller could terminate the buyer as manager of the funds for any reason and owe no compensation at all. Instead of giving effect to the parties’ contractual bargain, the Delaware Supreme Court determined that Superior Court erred by implying contractual obligations on the part of the seller that were inconsistent with the contract’s express terms. This enabled the buyer to obtain in litigation benefits in excess of those potentially available under the contract, and contractual protections that the buyer had failed to obtain in negotiations. The Supreme Court therefore reversed the Superior Court's judgment in favor of the buyer and remanded the case for a determination of what, if any, termination fee is due to the buyer because of the seller’s termination of it as manager of the funds. View "Nationwide Emerging Managers, LLC, et al. v. Northpointe Holdings, LLC, et al." on Justia Law

In this case, the buyer persuaded the Superior Court to award it $15.1 million in damages when the buyer bought a 65% interest in an investment advisory firm for $25 million. The buyer’s premise was that it would not have paid $25 million but for its expectancy that it would manage seven funds for three or more years. But the majority of the assets under management at the investment advisory firm were attributable to accounts other than the seven funds. Significantly, the contract enabled the seller to terminate the buyer’s right to manage the seven funds for any reason, so long as it paid a termination fee capped at $3.5 million, and to terminate the buyer without any compensation if the seller believed its fiduciary duties required or if the buyer’s performance fell below a contractual standard. After three years, the seller could terminate the buyer as manager of the funds for any reason and owe no compensation at all. The Delaware Supreme Court reversed the Superior Court. The Supreme Court found that instead of giving effect to the parties’ contractual bargain, the Superior Court erred by implying contractual obligations on the part of the seller that were inconsistent with the contract’s express terms. This enabled the buyer to obtain in litigation benefits in excess of those potentially available under the contract, and contractual protections that the buyer had failed to obtain in negotiations. The case was remanded for a determination of what, if any, termination fee is due to the buyer because of the seller’s termination of it as manager of the funds. View "Nationwide Emerging Managers, LLC, et al. v. Northpointe Holdings, LLC, et al." on Justia Law

Textron, Inc. appealed a Superior Court judgment which held that the company was not entitled to reimbursement from its former fastening manufacturing business, now known as Acument Global Technologies, Inc. for paying certain pre-closing contingent liabilities in the United States. The Superior Court's opinion centered on the meaning of a "tax benefit offset" provision in the parties' Purchase Agreement under which Acument was required to reimburse Textron if Acument received a "tax benefit" related to the contingent liabilities. Textron argued that even if the tax benefit had to be actual rather than merely hypothetical, the Superior Court erred by not finding that Acument actually enjoyed the right to tax benefits. Textron contended that its payment of the pre-closing liabilities constituted a tax benefit because the payments automatically increase Acument's tax basis under U.S. tax law. The Supreme Court disagreed after its review of the appeal: the Agreement, taken as a whole, guaranteed that Acument would not receive a net tax benefit simply because Textron made a required indemnification payment. Accordingly, Textron's argument that Acument has received a tax benefit triggering Textron's right to reimbursement was without merit, as the total effect of Textron's payments is tax-neutral. Similarly, Textron's second and related claim that the Superior Court erred in "redefining" the required tax benefit to mean only a "deduction" rather than any "reduction" was meritless. The therefore affirmed the Superior Court's judgment. View "Textron v. Acument Global Technologies, Inc." on Justia Law