Justia Delaware Supreme Court Opinion Summaries

Appellant T.A.H. First, Inc. had a default judgment entered against it because it failed to answer appellee Clifton Leasing Company, Inc., t/a Delmarva Kenworth's complaint in a timely manner. T.A.H. First moved the Superior Court to vacate the default judgment. The Superior Court denied that motion, and specifically held that not only was T.A.H. First not entitled to defend the claims brought by Clifton against it, but T.A.H. First also was prohibited from pressing counterclaims against Clifton because those counterclaims were not filed in a timely manner. The Superior Court agreed to hold an inquisition hearing to quantify the amount of the default judgment against T.A.H. First. But Clifton eventually concluded that T.A.H. First was likely judgment proof and that it did not want to waste further resources or those of the Superior Court by holding an inquisition hearing. Clifton sought to dismiss the case with prejudice as to all claims that any party to the case was required to have raised in a timely pleading in the case. The Superior Court granted Clifton’s request and dismissed the case. T.A.H. First appealed, arguing that the Superior Court abused its discretion by denying the motion to vacate the default judgment. Because Clifton had dismissed the case without seeking to quantify the default judgment and impose a duty upon T.A.H. First to pay a sum certain, the Supreme Court was concerned that it was addressing a moot point and that there might not be proper grounds for appeal. After receiving supplemental submissions, the Court entered an order that, "in candor, was confusing and can be read as contradictory. In essence, the Order contains language that can be read as both affirming the Superior Court’s denial of T.A.H. First’s motion to vacate the default judgment, while simultaneously reviving T.A.H. First’s ability to file counterclaims that it had not timely filed." After the Superior Court granted summary judgment on T.A.H. First’s claims on remand, T.A.H. First again appealed, arguing that the Supreme Court's prior mandate required the Superior Court to allow T.A.H. First to press its claims, despite the default judgment T.A.H. First had earlier suffered. Upon re-review of the matter, the Supreme Court concluded the Superior Court did not abuse its discretion or commit an error of law in its rulings in this case. View "T.A.H. First, Inc. v. Clifton Leasing Company, Inc." on Justia Law

In a medical malpractice action, the issue before the Supreme Court centered on whether the Superior Court erred by denying appellants' motion for judgment as a matter of law, and by excluding certain evidence. Dr. Jennifer Barlow performed a Caesarean section on Laura Cooney-Koss to deliver her baby. There were no apparent complications from the delivery, and Laura was discharged from the hospital three days later. A month later, Laura experienced heavy vaginal bleeding, and she returned to the hospital. In an attempt to slow or stop her bleeding, a hospital physician determined that Laura would need a dilation and evacuation (D&E) procedure. Dr. A. Diane McCracken performed the D&E; further attempts to stop the bleeding were unsuccessful. McCracken decided to perform a hysterectomy, believing that Laura would die otherwise. The doctor removed Laura's uterus, and Laura eventually stopped bleeding. Laura and her husband, Jerome Koss, filed a complaint against McCracken, Barlow, their employer, All About Women of Christiana Care, Inc., and Christiana Care Health Services, Inc., alleging that McCracken negligently failed to undertake an appropriate number of conservative treatment options to stop Laura's bleeding before performing the hysterectomy, which was unnecessary. After trial, the jury returned a verdict in favor of the Kosses. The Superior Court denied McCracken's motions for judgment as a matter of law or for a new trial. Upon review of the Koss' arguments on appeal, the Supreme Court concluded that the trial court correctly determined that appellees' medical expert evidence supported a verdict in their favor. Thus, its denial of the motion for judgment as a matter of law is affirmed. The trial court's evidentiary rulings, however, constituted an abuse of discretion requiring a new trial. View "Cooney-Koss v. Barlow" on Justia Law