Justia Delaware Supreme Court Opinion Summaries

The issue common for forty-five defendants (whose cases were consolidated for this opinion) was whether a defendant who pled guilty after a colloquy and admitted to crimes involving the possession of illegal narcotics should have her conviction vacated because she was unaware of serious problems at the Office of the Chief Medical Examiner (the “OCME”) involving the handling of narcotics evidence. The Superior Court answered that question no, and held that the defendants were bound by their pleas. A 2014 investigation by the Delaware State Police and the Department of Justice revealed that some OCME employees had stolen drug evidence stored at the OCME due in large part to flawed oversight and security. To date, those problems, although including substantial evidence of sloppiness and allegations of “drylabbing,” did not involve evidence-planting. Much of the uncovered misconduct seemed to be inspired by the reality that the evidence seized from defendants in fact involved illegal narcotics, and the temptation this provided to certain employees to steal some of that evidence for their personal use and for resale. In prior decisions, the Delaware Supreme Court made clear that if a defendant knowingly pled guilty to a drug crime, he could not escape his plea by arguing that had he known that the OCME had problems, he would not have admitted to his criminal misconduct in possessing illegal narcotics. In those prior decisions, the Court found that defendants' please did not invalidate their freely-made pleas. The Court reached the same conclusion after review of this case, and affirmed the Superior Court. View "Aricidiacono,et al. v. Delaware" on Justia Law

In October, 2014, a Superior Court jury convicted Irvan Adams of possession of a firearm by a person prohibited, possession of ammunition by a person prohibited, carrying a concealed deadly weapon, and conspiracy second degree. The Superior Court judge sentenced Adams to five years at Level V on the conviction for possession of a firearm by a person prohibited, and suspended the terms of imprisonment on the remaining offenses for probation. On appeal. Adams argued the Superior Court abused its discretion when it refused to admit into evidence a prior consistent statement of Adams's brother, Javan Cale. Adams claimed the affidavit supported Cale's exculpatory testimony at trial and rebutted the State's implication of recent fabrication on Cale's part. The trial judge refused to admit the affidavit, ruling it was superfluous. The Supreme Court found that the trial court erred when it sustained the State's objection and excluded the affidavit from evidence, and that the exclusion was not harmless error beyond a reasonable doubt. The Court therefore reversed Adams's conviction and remanded for further proceedings. View "Adams v. Delaware" on Justia Law

Defendant-appellant Akeem Cropper was indicted on multiple firearms possession charges. He filed a motion to suppress, which was denied after a hearing. Following a bench trial, the Superior Court found defendant guilty of Possession of a Firearm by a Person Prohibited and Possession of Ammunition By a Person Prohibited. On appeal, defendant argued the warrantless seizure and pat-down search was not supported by reasonable suspicion, and the evidence seized from him should have been suppressed. After review of the superior court record, the Supreme Court concluded defendant's argument on appeal lacked merit, and affirmed his conviction. View "Cropper v. Delaware" on Justia Law

Defendant Rondaiges Harper was convicted by jury of carjacking in the first degree, kidnapping in the first degree, and two counts of conspiracy in the second degree. On appeal he argued that his convictions should have been reversed because the crime of carjacking was completed by the time he joined the two teenagers who had stolen the victim's car and confined her in the trunk. After review, the Supreme Court concluded, based on the language and legislative history of Delaware's carjacking statute, that the crime of carjacking was not a continuing crime, but instead was completed at the point when all the elements of the crime have been satisfied. In this case, because the carjacking of the victim's vehicle was completed before Harper's involvement, and each of Harper's convictions depends upon carjacking as a predicate crime, the Court reversed his convictions and remanded for further proceedings. View "Harper v. Delaware" on Justia Law

Defendant Bruce Worthy allegedly threatened his mother and brother at gunpoint. Worthy’s mother, Valerie Coleman, called 911 to report the threat, leading to Worthy’s arrest and a number of criminal charges. At trial, Coleman was one of the State’s main witnesses. The State subpoenaed Coleman to testify, but she failed to appear. The State tracked her down and put her in jail on a material witness capias. When the State brought her from jail to testify, Coleman was uncooperative and tried to end her testimony by "plead[ing] the Fifth." The trial judge removed the jury and spoke with the prosecutor, who in response to prompting from the trial judge, said that the State was giving Coleman "full immunity . . . [o]n everything," including perjury. The trial judge instructed Coleman that "[e]ven if you commit a crime by your testimony the State has basically said that you cannot be prosecuted." Coleman reluctantly continued her testimony after the judge’s instruction. A jury found Worthy guilty of aggravated menacing against Coleman, but acquitted him on all other counts. On appeal, Worthy argued that the prosecutor erred in granting Coleman immunity against prosecution for perjury, and that the legal error was not harmless beyond a reasonable doubt. After review of the trial court record, the Supreme Court agreed, reversed and remanded for a new trial. View "Worthy v. Delaware" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court found no merit to defendant-appellant Melvin Morse’s arguments on appeal and affirmed his conviction by jury on child abuse charges. Defendant physically abused his step-daughter, A.M. The abuse spanned two years and consisted of, inter alia, suffocating and "waterboarding" A.M. as punishment for what he deemed to be misbehavior. On appeal, defendant argued: (1) the trial court abused its discretion by admitting evidence of other uncharged abusive acts against A.M. in violation of Delaware Rule of Evidence (“D.R.E.”) 403.6; and, (2) the trial court erred in allowing the jury to re-watch videotaped statements of A.M. and her younger sister, M.M., after the jury requested to view them during deliberations. In regard to defendant's second argument, the Supreme Court found that it was not an error to allow the jury to re-watch the statements, but used the occasion of this opinion to discuss a jury’s request to rehear a section 3507 statement during deliberations. A request to rehear such a statement is an exception to the general rule, and applies when the jury requests to rehear a section 3507 statement of its own accord. "This exception was created with the understanding that the request would be spontaneous in nature, not made at the encouragement of counsel. As the State admitted at oral argument before this Court, this action is not 'best practice,' and it should not be repeated in the future. Attorneys should not direct the jury to make requests to the trial judge to review testimonial evidence that is otherwise not permitted during deliberations." View "Morse v. Delaware" on Justia Law

Appellant Heather Rybicki was convicted by a jury of driving under the influence of alcohol (“DUI”). She was sentenced to two years of Level V incarceration, suspended after three months for one year and six months of Level IV home confinement, suspended after six months for one year of Level III probation. On appeal, Rybicki argued: (1) there was no probable cause to issue the search warrant to obtain a blood sample used to determine her BAC; (2) there was no probable cause for her warrantless arrest; (3) absent the BAC evidence, there was insufficient evidence for conviction; (4) the State did not lay a sufficient foundation for the BAC evidence; and (5) two jury instructions given by the trial court were improper comments on the evidence. Rejecting all of appellant's contentions on appeal, the Supreme Court affirmed. View "Rybicki v. State" on Justia Law

Defendant-appellant Mark Zambrana was convicted by the Superior Court following a bench trial on two counts of Sexual Solicitation of a Child. On appeal, he argued that his admitted misconduct of soliciting his 15 year old neighbor, S.Z., to remove her shirt and bra while he surreptitiously watched her did not qualify as sexual solicitation. He argues that 11 Del. C. 1112A required a defendant to create a physical “depiction” of the victim’s nudity in order to be convicted, and that he created no such “depiction” here. The Supreme Court disagreed and affirmed the conviction: "[a]lthough the term 'depiction' has multiple definitions, we find that for the purposes of section 1112A, 'depiction' encompasses not only tangible manifestations such as photographs and videos, but also includes live conduct. This definition best accords with the statute as a whole and the legislative purpose in enacting it. Applying this definition to the facts before us, we conclude that Zambrana’s actions constituted Sexual Solicitation of a Child." View "Zambrana v. Delaware" on Justia Law

In August 2013, officers from New Castle County Police Operation Safe Streets searched a home in Bear. During the search, the officers found Mark Smolka inside the house and a Taurus .38 special revolver in a closet. Smolka, who was a person prohibited from possessing a firearm, admitted at the scene that he had moved the gun to a closet and placed a lock on it. Smolka was arrested and charged with, among other offenses, possession of a firearm by a person prohibited. Before trial, Smolka moved to suppress evidence he claimed was illegally obtained during the search as well as his statements to the officers. The Superior Court denied Smolka's motion because Smolka failed to appear at the suppression hearing. The State then introduced at trial the evidence subject to the suppression motion. The jury found Smolka guilty of the firearm possession offense, and the trial judge sentenced him to three years imprisonment at Level 5 suspended for six months at Level 4 home confinement and one year at Level 3 probation supervision. Smolka claimed on appeal that the trial court erred when it found that he waived his right to suppress the evidence in question because he failed to appear at the suppression hearing. Upon review, the Supreme Court held that a defendant's voluntary failure to appear at a suppression hearing waived his right to be present at the hearing, but did not waive the defendant's constitutional right to challenge evidence as unlawfully obtained. The Court therefore remanded the case to Superior Court to conduct a suppression hearing. View "Smolka v. Delaware" on Justia Law

A jury convicted Anzara Brown on various drug dealing and drug possession charges. In his direct appeal to the Delaware Supreme Court, Brown challenged three decisions of the Superior Court regarding the admissibility of certain evidence used against him at trial. Because the Supreme Court found that the Superior Court acted within its discretion to deny Brown's suppression motions and admit the evidence, the Supreme Court affirmed his judgment of convictions. View "Brown v. Delaware" on Justia Law