Justia Delaware Supreme Court Opinion Summaries

Defendant-appellee Andy Laboy was arrested and indicted on charges of driving under the influence. He pled guilty, admitting in his plea colloquy with the Superior Court and his plea agreement that he was eligible to be sentenced as a third-time offender because he had been convicted of two previous DUIs. The Superior Court sentenced Laboy as a first-time offender. The State appealed, arguing that the Superior Court erred in disregarding his first two DUI offenses. Upon further review, the Supreme Court agreed: the Superior Court did not have discretion to ignore Laboy's previous DUI convictions under the DUI statute. The Court therefore reversed and remanded so that Laboy could be sentenced in accordance with the DUI statute as a third-time offender. View "Delaware v. Laboy" on Justia Law

Appellant Donta Vickers appealed his sentence stemming from his conviction as a habitual offender. A jury found Vickers guilty of assault second degree as a lesser-included offense of assault first degree; attempted robbery first degree; home invasion; conspiracy second degree; and three counts of possession of a firearm during the commission of a felony. Vickers did not dispute that he has been convicted of three violent felonies on three separate occasions, nor did he dispute that, at least as to all of the convictions, the requirements of the habitual offender statute, 11 Del. C. 4214(b), have been met by these offenses. Instead, Vickers argued on appeal that his conviction for the first of the three violent felony offenses, arson first degree, should not have been counted under the habitual offender statute because he was a juvenile at the time of the offense and conviction. The Supreme Court found no merit in the appeal and therefore affirmed. View "Vickers v. Delaware" on Justia Law

Defendant-appellant April Milligan appealed her convictions of Driving Under the Influence and Improper Lane Change. Milligan argued on appeal: (1) the Superior Court erred by admitting documentation relating to the chain of custody in the absence of live testimony, which she contended violated her right to confront her accusers as guaranteed by the Sixth Amendment to United States Constitution and Section 7 of the Delaware Constitution; and (2) the Superior Court abused its discretion by allowing the State to introduce the results of her blood draw without first establishing a proper foundation. Finding no merit to either contention, the Supreme Court affirmed. View "Milligan v. Delaware" on Justia Law

The issue this case presented for the Supreme Court's review centered on whether the provisions of the Truth In Sentencing Act of 1989 (the “TIS Act”) that indisputably abolished parole as to Title 11 and Title 16 of the Delaware Code also applied to felony DUI offenses imposed under section 4177 of Title 21. If the answer was yes (as the State argued), felony DUI offenders were ineligible for parole. The judicial and administrative answer to the question has consistently been no: the Superior Court and the Board of Parole have operated with the understanding that the provisions of the TIS Act that eliminated parole did not apply to felony DUI offenses. In addition, the Delaware Sentencing Accountability Commission (“SENTAC”) adhered to this position in its 2014 Benchbook. The Supreme Court, in its decision in this case, adhered to the principle of stare decisis and held that the TIS did not apply to felony DUI offenses under section 4177. "If the General Assembly wishes to amend the Code to alter this long-standing interpretation, it is free to do so." View "Delaware v. Barnes" on Justia Law

This case stemmed from crimes committed by defendant-appellant Rashie Harris at two barbershops on different dates. After a jury trial, Harris was found guilty of the following offenses: Attempted Murder First Degree, eight counts of Robbery First Degree, two counts of Burglary Second Degree, Unlawful Sexual Contact First Degree, Kidnapping Second Degree, eleven counts of Possession of a Firearm During the Commission of a Felony, Carrying a Concealed Deadly Weapon, Endangering the Welfare of a Child, Possession of a Non-Narcotic Schedule I Controlled Substance, and Resisting Arrest. The Superior Court also found Harris guilty of two counts of Possession of a Deadly Weapon by a Person Prohibited. Harris was sentenced as a habitual offender and sentenced to Level V incarceration for the balance of his natural life plus 524 years for his felony charges, and three years and five days for his misdemeanor charges. Prior to trial, the defense filed a Motion to Sever Charges, a Motion to Suppress the Photo Lineup Identification, and a Motion to Suppress the Show-up Identification. After conducting a hearing and receiving post-hearing submissions, the trial court denied all three motions. After trial but before the verdict, the defense moved for reconsideration of and reargument on the denial of the Motion to Suppress the Show-up Identification. The Superior Court reserved judgment until after the verdict. Following a jury verdict of guilty on all counts, the pending Motion for Reargument was converted into a Motion for a New Trial. After hearing oral arguments, the Superior Court denied the motion. On appeal, Harris argued that the Superior Court erred in denying his Motion for a New Trial. He contended that the admission into evidence of his show-up identification by witnesses to the incident in question violated his Due Process rights. The Supreme Court disagreed and affirmed the trial court's judgment. View "Harris v. Delaware" on Justia Law

At issue in this case was whether the Superior Court abused its discretion by declining to exercise its mandamus jurisdiction to remedy various alleged violations of the Law Enforcement Officers’ Bill of Rights (LEOBOR). Petitioners-appellants Shawn Brittingham and Christopher Story sought mandamus relief for several alleged violations of LEOBOR while they were police officers with the Georgetown Police Department (GPD). Respondents-appellees Town of Georgetown, Georgetown Chief of Police William Topping, and Captain Ralph Holm moved for summary judgment. The Superior Court granted the motion, thereby denying Brittingham and Story’s petition. In 2007, Chief Topping issued an oral order prohibiting GPD officers from meeting or speaking with the mayor or members of the Town Council to discuss internal police business without first obtaining his permission and going through the chain of command. In spite of this order, seven off-duty officers met with a Town Council member at her home to discuss police department issues. Captain Holm learned of the meeting, and informed appellants and the other officers involved that they were being investigated for violating GPD Rules and Regulations. A written reprimand was offered to each officer. Rather than accept the reprimand, appellants elected to request a hearing as to the allegations made against them (namely, for insubordination) with the Criminal Justice Council (CJC). The panel found substantial evidence to support the insubordination charge. Chief Topping imposed discipline against appellants: Brittingham received a four-week suspension without pay and a fourteen-day reduction in rank, and placed on disciplinary probation for a year; Story received a two-week suspension without pay, a seven-day reduction in rank, and disciplinary probation of a year. The officers appealed to the Town's Disciplinary Action Appeals Board, which upheld the CJC panel. Appellants filed a civil complaint against appellees, claiming (amongst other things) a violation of their First Amendment rights. On appeal, appellants argued that the process afforded them did not comply with LEOBOR, and that their only remedy was a mandamus writ ordering vacatur of the resulting disciplinary decisions. Appellees responded that they did not violate LEOBOR, that Appellants’ claims are now moot, and that the Superior Court did not abuse its discretion in denying the requested relief. After review, the Supreme Court found that Brittingham and Story were correct that a technical violation of LEOBOR occurred, but the Court rejected their claims as to all other alleged violations. However, as to the one meritorious claim, the matter was moot because neither Brittingham nor Story were then-employed by the GPD, and because the relief they sought was not relief that was available to them in a mandamus proceeding. Accordingly, the Court affirmed the Superior Court’s decision as to all claims but one, and as to that claim, the Court held that the claim was moot. View "Brittingham v. Town of Georgetown" on Justia Law

Defendant Brandon Wyche was charged by grand jury with murder first degree, possession of a firearm during the commission of a felony, possession of a deadly weapon by a person prohibited, and possession of a firearm by a person prohibited. The case went to trial, and ended with a hung jury. Wyche filed a motion in limine to exclude the prior recorded statement of a witness for the State, Carlyle Braithwaite. The Superior Court denied the motion and the matter proceeded to a second trial. A second jury found Wyche guilty of murder first degree and possession of a firearm during the commission of a felony. He was sentenced to life plus 25 years. On appeal, Wyche argued that Braithwaite's statement to police was involuntary because the police failed to administer a Miranda advisement prior to questioning him. Upon review, the Delaware Supreme Court concluded that the evidence presented supported the Superior Court's conclusion that Braithwaite's statement, which was not self-incriminating, was the product of an uncoerced and voluntary decision to speak with the police. Therefore the statement was properly admitted into evidence at trial, and Wyche's conviction was affirmed. View "Wyche v. Delaware" on Justia Law

At issue in this appeal was the meaning of suffering a "physical injury" as an element of the crime of Assault Second Degree against a law enforcement officer. Defendant Troy Williamson was arrested and charged with offensive touching of a law enforcement officer. The misdemeanor offense was later upgraded, and he was subsequently indicted for the felony Assault Second Degree of a law enforcement officer. After a bench trial in March 2014, Williamson was convicted of Assault Second Degree and was sentenced to four years of incarceration at Level V, suspended after two years for six months of Level IV supervision at the discretion of the Department of Correction, followed by one year of Level III probation. On appeal, Williamson argued that there was insufficient evidence concerning physical injury to a law enforcement officer to convict him of Assault Second Degree. Furthermore, he argues that the verdict should have been a finding of guilty of the lesser included offense of offensive touching of a law enforcement officer, a Class A misdemeanor, rather than Assault Second Degree, which is a Class D felony. After review, the Supreme Court disagreed and affirmed the trial court's decision. View "Williamson v. Delaware" on Justia Law

Following an accident where a motorcycle ran into the rear-end of an SUV, police called to the scene detected a faint odor of alcohol emanating from the the rider of the motorcycle while he was being treated by paramedics. Defendant-appellant Bradford Lambert, III admitted he ran into the rear end of the SUV with his motorcycle. A jury later convicted Lambert of driving a vehicle while under the influence of alcohol (DUI). On appeal, he argued that the trial court erred by denying his motion to suppress blood alcohol concentration evidence because the search warrant affidavit failed to set forth facts sufficient to show probable cause. Finding no merit to this contention, the Supreme Court affirmed Lambert's conviction. View "Lambert v. Delaware" on Justia Law

Appellant Ambrose Sykes appealed the Superior Court’s denial of his Motion for Post-conviction Relief. In 2006 Sykes was convicted by a jury of two counts of Murder in the First Degree, two counts of Rape in the First Degree, one count of Kidnapping in the First Degree, two counts of Burglary in the Second Degree, and other offenses. After a penalty phase hearing, the trial judge imposed the death penalty. On direct appeal, Sykes’ conviction and sentence were affirmed. In this appeal, Sykes raised five issues: (1) he received ineffective assistance of trial counsel in investigating, preparing and presenting mitigating evidence during his penalty-phase hearing; (2) trial counsel was ineffective by failing to argue that an erroneous comment which the trial judge made about allocution during the guilt phase of the trial violated his Sixth Amendment right to a fair trial by an impartial jury; (3) the trial judge committed error when he failed to remove Juror No. 9 from the jury after her impartiality was called into question during the guilt phase of the trial; (4) the State failed to prove Burglary, Rape and Kidnapping beyond a reasonable doubt; and (5) trial counsel was ineffective for failing to move for a judgment of acquittal on the kidnapping charge on the grounds that the restraint of the victim was incidental to, and not independent of, restraint pertaining to the underlying rape charge. After review, the Supreme Court found no merit to any of these claims and affirmed the judgment of the Superior Court. View "Sykes v. Delaware" on Justia Law