Justia Delaware Supreme Court Opinion Summaries

Defendant-appellant Robert Williams was convicted of two counts of robbery in the first degree, two counts of possession of a firearm during the commission of a felony, one count of conspiracy in the second degree, and one count of assault in the third degree. He was sentenced to twenty-two years at Level V incarceration, followed by probation. He appealed a Superior Court order that denied his motion for postconviction relief, arguing: (1) the trial court should have found that his trial counsel was ineffective because he failed to file a motion to suppress a statement that Williams made to the police approximately fifteen hours after he was taken into custody; and (2) the trial court should have determined that his trial counsel was ineffective because he failed to investigate and present readily available mitigating evidence at Williams’ sentencing hearing. The Supreme Court affirmed the Superior Court, but took the opportunity to discuss its decision with regard to Williams second "novel" contention regarding a mitigation investigator in a non-capital case. "Given the seriousness of Williams’ criminal record, the chances he had to get on the right track, and the pre-sentence report that detailed his difficult childhood and the fact that his parents were poor role models, there is not a basis to conclude that there was a reasonable probability that Williams’ twenty-two year sentence, which was well below the 103 years he could have received, would have been lesser had the evidence Williams now points to been presented." Furthermore, the Court found that Williams' argument that a mitigation specialist should have been retained in a serious non-capital case as an invariable requirement of effective representation was without legal basis. View "Williams v. Delaware" on Justia Law

A jury found appellant Victor Rodriguez guilty of Reckless Burning, Burglary in the Third Degree, two counts of Criminal Trespass in the Third Degree, and three counts of Arson in the Second Degree. After finding that he was an habitual offender, the Superior Court sentenced Rodriguez to life in prison for each of his arson convictions. The Delaware Supreme Court affirmed Rodriguez's convictions on direct appeal. Filing a pro se motion for postconviction relief, Rodriguez argued he received ineffective assistance of trial counsel. The Superior Court ultimately denied the motion, and Rodriguez appealed. Finding no reversible error, the Supreme Court affirmed the denial. View "Rodriguez v. Delaware" on Justia Law

Defendant-appellant Freddie Flonnory appealed his conviction for felony Driving Under the Influence of Alcohol (DUI). Specifically, Flonnory challenged the Superior Court's denial of his motion to suppress the results of a blood draw, arguing: (1) that the trial court erred in holding that Delaware's implied consent statute exempted the blood draw from the Fourth Amendment's warrant requirement; and (2) that there was no voluntary consent, and that the trial court erred when it did not perform a Fourth Amendment totality of the circumstances analysis to determine whether Flonnory had in fact consented to the blood draw. The Supreme Court found that a totality of the circumstances analysis applied. Such analysis was not applied in this case by the Superior Court. Accordingly, the Court remanded this matter for further proceedings. View "Flonnory v. Delaware" on Justia Law

Defendant-appellant William S. Sells, III appealed a Superior Court judgment where the jury found Sells guilty of Robbery in the First Degree, Possession of a Firearm During the Commission of a Felony, Possession of a Firearm by a Person Prohibited, Wearing a Disguise During the Commission of a Felony, six counts of Aggravated Menacing, and five counts of Reckless Endangering in the Second Degree. Sells raised two arguments on appeal: (1) the Superior Court erred when it denied his motion to sever his trial from his co-defendant's, Russell Grimes; and (2) the Superior Court erred in finding one of his peremptory challenges of a white juror violated the United States Constitution, and that it erred in upholding the State's Batson challenge. After review, the Supreme Court agreed with Sells' as to his second claim and, therefore, did not reach the first claim. Accordingly, Sells' conviction was reversed and the matter remanded for further proceedings. View "Sells v. Delaware" on Justia Law

Defendant-appellant Ira Brown appealed a Superior Court order denying his first motion for post-conviction relief under Superior Court Criminal Rule 61. Brown raised two issues on appeal: (1) he was entitled to a new trial based on newly discovered evidence of misconduct at the Office of the Chief Medical Examiner (although Brown did not raise this claim in his Rule 61 motion because problems at the Examiner's Office did not come to light until almost a year after Brown filed his Rule 61 motion), the Delaware Supreme Court nonetheless considered this issue on appeal in the interests of justice); and (2) Brown argued the Superior Court erred in its 2012 denial of both his oral motion and his written motion to withdraw his guilty plea. The Supreme Court found that Brown's first claim had no merit. Further, Brown could have raised his second argument in his Rule 61 motion (or in a timely direct appeal) but did not. That argument was therefore waived and procedurally barred. The Court therefore affirmed the Superior Court's denial of post-conviction relief. View "Brown v. Delaware" on Justia Law

Isaiah McCoy was tried by jury and ultimately sentenced to death. Seven counts were submitted for the jury to decide; McCoy was found guilty as to all but Count 7. Following his convictions for first degree murder, the trial court held a capital murder penalty hearing, after which, the jury found several aggravating circumstances. On appeal, McCoy raised five grounds on which his convictions should have been reversed. After review of all five, the Supreme Court concluded: (1) the trial court committed reversible error when it improperly denied McCoy's right to exercise a peremptory challenge to strike a potential juror; (2) it was reversible error when the prosecutor improperly vouched for the credibility of a key witness for the State; and (3) the pervasive unprofessional conduct of the prosecutor that permeated the proceedings compromised McCoy's right of self-representation. The Court found the other two issues McCoy raised on appeal were without merit. The case was reversed and the matter remanded for a new trial. View "McCoy v. Delaware" on Justia Law

Derrick Crosby was convicted by a jury of second degree robbery and second degree conspiracy. He was arrested within minutes of the alleged crime, because the robbery was committed against a police informant who had arranged to purchase a gun from co-defendant Rakim Huggins as part of a police sting operation. Crosby argued that the Superior Court erred by sustaining an objection by the State to any argument that Crosby could have obtained the informant’s cell phone from Huggins’ accomplice. The Superior Court reasoned that there was no evidence in the record that supported a rational inference that, in the limited time between when the informant was robbed and when Crosby was arrested, Huggins’ accomplice turned over the cell phone to Crosby and then left the scene. But the Superior Court did allow Crosby’s attorney to argue that “there’s a fair inference that someone other than Mr. Crosby committed this robbery and that there were ways in which [Crosby] came into possession of the cell phone after the incident.” Finding no reversible error, the Delaware Supreme Court affirmed Crosby's convictions. View "Crosby v. Delaware" on Justia Law

Defendant-appellant Bernardo McKinney appealed a superior court judgment convicting him for possessing a firearm by a person prohibited (PFBPP). On appeal, he argued the trial court erred when it denied his motion to suppress evidence, because the affidavit in support of the search of his residence lacked probable cause. The warrant issued on a confidential informant's statement to police that the informant purchased marijuana from a white woman with blue eyes, and previously purchased from a black man, both of whom lived at McKinney's apartment. The police determined that McKinney's girlfriend was a white woman with blue eyes, and McKinney was a black man. The warrant was found to have no discussion of the informant's reliability, and had no police corroboration of criminal activity at the apartment. The Supreme Court concluded that these missing statements were fatal to the search warrant. Finding merit to McKinney's argument on appeal, the Supreme Court reversed the superior court and remanded the case for further proceedings. View "McKinney v. Delaware" on Justia Law

Following a six-day trial, a jury convicted Sirron Benson of Murder First Degree and Possession of a Firearm During the Commission of a Felony in connection with the 2011 shooting death of Braheem Curtis. Benson was sentenced to a term of life imprisonment as to Murder First Degree and twenty years at Level V to be served consecutively as to Possession of a Firearm During the Commission of a Felony. On appeal, Benson argued: (1) it was plain error for the trial judge not to issue a curative instruction sua sponte when the prosecutor, in his rebuttal summation, stated that Benson’s intent to cause death could be inferred from the weapon used to perpetrate the crime; and (2) the trial judge committed reversible error by failing to give a cautionary instruction relating to the testimony of an informant witness who was receiving a benefit from the State in exchange for his testimony. Finding no merit to either of Benson’s arguments, the Supreme Court affirmed. View "Benson v. Delaware" on Justia Law

Tameka Giles was murdered after a botched robbery attempt in 2006. She was walking with her husband when two men approached them and demanded money. After she refused, one of them fatally shot her in the back. Both men fled. The police quickly identified Ronald Harris as a suspect based on eyewitness identification from Angela Rayne, who had been smoking crack cocaine nearby at the time of the shooting. Mrs. Giles' husband also tentatively identified Kellee Mitchell as one of the shooters in a photo lineup. The police arrested both men on February 18, 2006. At the time of the arrest, defendant Mark Purnell was in Harris' apartment, but was not yet considered a suspect. Neither Harris nor Mitchell identified Purnell as one of the assailants during any of their respective interviews with the police in 2006. Purnell was not identified as a suspect until January 2007, when Corey Hammond informed the police that he had seen Purnell and Harris together on the day of the shooting. Purnell was ultimately tried and convicted for second degree murder, first degree attempted robbery, possession of a firearm during commission of a felony, possession of a deadly weapon during commission of a felony, possession of a deadly weapon by a person prohibited, and second degree conspiracy. Purnell was sentenced to an aggregate of 77 years at L-5, 21 years of which were mandatory, suspended after serving 45 years at decreasing levels of supervision. Purnell's convictions and sentences were affirmed by the Supreme Court on direct appeal. He appealed the Superior Court's denial of his Rule 61 motion for postconviction relief raising four arguments on appeal, all related to the performance of his trial counsel. After review, the Delaware Supreme Court found no merit to Purnell's appeal. Accordingly, it affirmed the Superior Court. View "Purnell v. Delaware" on Justia Law