Justia Delaware Supreme Court Opinion Summaries

Defendant-appellant Darryl Copper appealed his convictions for Possession with Intent to Deliver Cocaine, Possession of a Firearm During the Commission of a Felony, Carrying a Concealed Deadly Weapon, and Possession of Drug Paraphernalia. Defendant contended he was denied his right to a fair trial by an impartial jury because the jurors heard him say that he was not content with the jury and because one juror heard him say that he wanted to take a plea. Finding Defendant's claims was without merit, the Supreme Court affirmed his convictions. View "Copper v. Delaware" on Justia Law

Plaintiffs-appellants Marlene and Paul Dabaldo, Jr. filed a complaint against nineteen defendants, including defendant-appellee, URS Energy & Construction, f/k/a/ Washington Group International, as successor to Raytheon Constructors, f/k/a/ Catalytic, Inc. and Crane Co. Plaintiffs alleged that Mr. DaBaldo developed pulmonary asbestosis as a result of exposure to asbestos from defendants' companies and sought recovery for those alleged injuries. After the completion of discovery, the defendants moved for summary judgment arguing that the DaBaldos' claims were barred under the two-year statute of limitations applicable to personal injury claims. The Superior Court ruled from the bench that the DaBaldos' claims were time-barred. Plaintiffs argued on appeal that their 2009 complaint was timely filed. The Supreme Court concluded the trial court record supported plaintiffs' assertion. Therefore, the judgment of the Superior Court was reversed. View "Dabaldo v. URS Energy & Construction, et al." on Justia Law

Defendant-Appellant Tiffany Parker was convicted of second-degree assault. She appealed that conviction, arguing the Superior Court erred in admitting statements posted on her Facebook profile. Defendant urged the Supreme Court to adopt Maryland's approach to admitting this kind of evidence: social media evidence could only be authenticated through the testimony of the creator, documentation of the internet history or hard drive of the purported creator's computer, or information obtained directly from the social networking site. Under this approach, social media evidence is only authenticated and admissible where the proponent can convince the trial judge that the social media post was not falsified or created by another user. The State argued the Delaware Court adopt the Texas approach: the proponent could authenticate social media evidence using any type of evidence so long as he or she could demonstrate to the trial judge that a jury could reasonably find that the proffered evidence was authentic. The Superior Court adopted the Texas approach and found that Defendant's social media post was sufficiently authenticated by circumstantial evidence and by testimony explaining how the post was obtained. On appeal, Defendant contended that social media evidence requires greater scrutiny. The Delaware Supreme Court concluded that the Texas approach better conformed to the requirements of Rule 104 and Rule 901 of the Delaware Rules of Evidence. The Court therefore found no abuse of discretion by the trial court in admitting the social media evidence in accordance with the Delaware Rules of Evidence, and affirmed. View "Parker v. Delaware" on Justia Law

A vice principal of an elementary school asked a Delaware State Trooper to come to the school give a talk about bullying to four or five fifth grade students who were under “in-school suspension.” The next day, the principal was told that there had been a bullying incident involving an autistic student whose money had been taken from him on the school bus by "AB." The principal told AB’s mother about the incident, and asked her permission to have the officer talk to AB. AB’s mother consented. The officer arrived and was told what happened. The principal and officer went to a room where AB was waiting. The principal was called away, leaving the officer alone with AB. The officer got AB to admit that he had the money (one dollar), but AB claimed that another student had taken the money. AB said that he did not know that other student’s name, but that the student was seated with AB on the school bus. Without discussing the matter with the principal, the officer followed up on AB’s claim despite being virtually certain that AB was the perpetrator. The officer obtained the bus seating chart, found AB's seat-mate, brought the two students together and questioned that student in the same manner as AB. According to the other child, the officer used a mean voice and told him 11 or 12 times that he had the authority to arrest the children and place them in jail if they did not tell the truth. AB finally admitted to taking the money from the autistic student. When he got home from school, the seat-mate told his mother what had happened. The child withdrew from school and was home schooled for the rest of that school year. The mother filed suit on her son’s behalf, as well as individually, against the Cape Henlopen School District, the Board of Education of Cape Henlopen School District, the principal, the State, the Department of Safety and Homeland Security, the Division of the Delaware State Police, and the officer, Trooper Pritchett (collectively, Pritchett). Charges against all but the officer were eventually settled or dismissed; Pritchett successfully moved for summary judgment, and this appeal followed. Viewing the record in the light most favorable to the child, the Supreme Court held that there was sufficient evidence to raise issues of material fact on all claims against the officer except a battery claim. Accordingly, the Court affirmed in part and reversed in part. View "Hunt v. Delaware" on Justia Law

In 2011, the Board of Cosmetology and Barbering suspended Petitioner Randall Richardson's license due to his leasing work space to his wife who Petitioner knew did not have a valid license. A Hearing Officer recommended a fine and a 90-day suspension of Petitioner's license. The Board voted to adopt the Hearing Officer’s recommendations. The Superior Court affirmed the Board’s decision. On appeal, Petitioner argued: (1) the Board failed to create a complete record for the Supreme Court to review on appeal; (2) the Board failed to properly appoint the Hearing Officer to his case; (3) the Board failed to consider exceptions to the Hearing Officer’s recommendation; (4) the Board erred in suspending Petitioner's license because he only violated the requirements of his Shop License; and (5) the Hearing Officer lacked statutory authority to conduct hearings involving potential license suspensions. Upon review, the Supreme Court concluded that the Hearing Officer had the authority to act and that the Board had the authority to suspend Petitioner's License. However, the Court agreed that the Board created an insufficient record for appellate review. Accordingly, the Superior Court's judgment was vacated and the matter remanded for further proceedings.View "Richardson v. Board of Cosmetology & Barbering" on Justia Law

The Superior Court in this personal injury action sua sponte excluded a medical expert witness' testimony that it was possible plaintiff's permanent injury might have improved depending on the results of further recommended testing. The jury awarded plaintiff $292,330; defendant moved for a new trial. The court granted defendant's motion. In the second trial, the jury heard the expert's testimony and returned a lesser, $7,500 verdict. Plaintiff appealed the trial court's grant of a new trial. Upon review, the Supreme Court concluded that the trial judge initially made the right decision to exclude the expert; it was an abuse of discretion to order a new trial. Accordingly, the Supreme Court vacated the judgment granting a new trial and all attendant rulings, and remanded the case to reinstate the original jury verdict. View "O'Riley v. Rogers" on Justia Law

Defendant-appellant Izzy Whitehurst appealed his conviction on First Degree Assault, Robbery in the First Degree, Burglary in the First Degree, Conspiracy in the Second Degree, three counts of Possession of a Firearm During the Commission of a Felony, and three counts of Tampering with a Witness. Defendant argued on appeal: (1) that the trial court erred in denying a motion to suppress his prison telephone calls because the State lacked a legal basis to collect them; and (2) that the admission of those prison telephone calls improperly tainted his trial. Finding no merit to his first contention, the Supreme Court did not address defendant's second contention, and affirmed his conviction. View "Whitehurst v. Delaware" on Justia Law

Plaintiff-Appellant Heather Turner appealed a superior court judgment that ruled in favor of Defendants-Appellees Michael Conway, M.D., Eric Kalish, M.D. and their practice, Delaware Surgical Group. Plaintiff sued defendants over what was initially an appendectomy, but ended with a "mass" on her liver from "something that had spilled out from prior surgeries" performed by the two doctor defendants. Plaintiff argued that the trial court abused its discretion in improperly admitting defendants' expert evidence . Upon review, the Supreme Court agreed and remanded the case for a new trial. View "Turner v. Delaware Surgical Group, P.A., et al." on Justia Law

A group of Dewey Beach property owners appealed the dismissal of their lawsuit against the Town. They sued to challenge the town's authority to enter into what they characterized as a "private zoning arrangement" to violate certain longstanding zoning requirements. The Court of Chancery dismissed the complaint finding it was not filed within 60 days of the notice given following approval of the developer's record plan. Finding that the Court of Chancery lacked jurisdiction, the Supreme Court affirmed. View "Murray v. Town of Dewey Beach" on Justia Law

Before the Supreme Court, a matter of first impression: "does Delaware recognize cross-jurisdictional tolling?" Plaintiff Jose Blanco was allegedly exposed to a toxic pesticide manufactured by Defendant Dow Chemical Corporation in 1979-1980. In 1993, he entered a class action lawsuit against Defendant in Texas. The case stalled in procedure, with class certification being ultimately denied. Defendants moved to dismiss, citing the run of the two-year statute of limitations. Plaintiff contended on appeal that the putative Texas action tolled the statute of limitations. The Delaware superior court concluded that Delaware recognized the doctrine of cross-jurisdictional class action tolling. Defendants filed for an interlocutory appeal with the Delaware Supreme Court. The Supreme Court held that until class action certification is denied, individual claims are tolled under Delaware law. Accordingly the Court answered the question in the affirmative, and remanded the case for further proceedings. View "The Dow Chemical Corp. v. Blanco" on Justia Law