Justia Delaware Supreme Court Opinion Summaries

Defendant Raymond Blake was tried before a jury for Trafficking in Cocaine, Possession with Intent to Deliver ("PWID") Cocaine, PWID Heroin, and Maintaining a Vehicle for Keeping Controlled Substances. The jury found Defendant guilty of the lesser-included offenses of Possession of Cocaine and Possession of Heroin, not guilty of Maintaining a Vehicle, and could not agree unanimously on the trafficking charge. Prosecutors sought and obtained another indictment of Defendant, charging him with Trafficking in Cocaine and Trafficking in Heroin, based upon his possession of the same contraband he was convicted of possessing in the first trial. Defendant's motion to dismiss was denied and at the second trial he was convicted as charged. Defendant appealed, claiming the protection against Double Jeopardy under the Fifth Amendment of the United States Constitution barred the State from trying him on trafficking in a controlled substance charges when he had already been convicted of the lesser included offense of Possession based on the same conduct. Upon review, the Supreme Court agreed and accordingly reversed and remanded the case with instruction to vacate Defendant's trafficking convictions. View "Blake v. Delaware" on Justia Law

Claimants Cecil Palomino, Salvador Avila-Hernandez and Julio Munoz were each injured in different work-related accidents. It was not disputed that their injuries were compensable under the Worker's Compensation Act and that payments of some worker's compensation have been made. After their doctors recommended certain treatments, their employers requested determinations of whether the treatment plans fell outside of the Health Care Practice ("HCAP") Guidelines through a utilization review ("UR"). The UR panel determined that portions of their treatments were not approved for coverage. Claimants petitioned the Industrial Accident Board for review of the UR determination after the 45 day time window prescribed by Department of Labor Regulation 5.5.1. The Board dismissed the petitions as untimely. Claimants appealed to the Superior Court, which determined that the 45 day limit of Regulation 5.5.1 was invalid because it conflicted with 19 Del. C. sec 2361. The employers appealed from the Superior Court's judgment. Finding no merit to the appeal, the Supreme Court affirmed. View "Christiana Care Health Services v. Palomino" on Justia Law

The issue before the Supreme Court in this matter was whether the Chancery Court was required to dismiss a Delaware derivative complaint after a California federal court entered final judgment dismissing the same complaint brought by different stockholders. The Chancery Court determined it was not required to give preclusive effect to the California judgment. Upon review, the Supreme Court held that the Chancery Court erred in its determination: (1) the lower court held as a matter of Delaware law that the stockholder plaintiffs in the two jurisdictions were not in privity with one another; (2) that the California stockholders were not adequate representatives of the defendant corporation; (3) California law controlled the issue, and derivative stockholders were in privity with one another because they acted on behalf of the corporation; and (4) the Chancery Court adopted a presumption of inadequacy without the record to support it. Accordingly, the Supreme Court reversed and remanded. View "Pyott v. Louisiana Municipal Police Employees' Retirement System" on Justia Law

The trial court precluded appellants' experts from testifying at trial because appellants failed to provide the experts' reports in accordance with the trial scheduling order. Without any expert testimony, appellants' claims failed as a matter of law, and judgment was entered for appellees. But appellants had requested a conference with the trial court six months before the trial date to discuss the need to revise the scheduling order. The trial court refused to meet with counsel or change the trial date. This case was one of four appeals to the Supreme Court where in each case, plaintiffs' claims were dismissed without being heard on the merits. Upon review, the Supreme Court held that the trial court abused its discretion. "the trial courts have been applying the factors set forth in 'Drejka v. Hitchens Tire Service Inc.' when deciding whether a case should be dismissed for the attorneys' failure to obey scheduling orders," the Court determined it necessary to refine the 'Drejka' analysis: "parties who ignore or extend scheduling deadlines without promptly consulting the trial court, will do so at their own risk. In other words, any party that grants an informal extension to opposing counsel will be precluded from seeking relief from the court with respect to any deadlines in the scheduling order. By the same token, if the trial court is asked to extend any deadlines in the scheduling order, the extension should not alter the trial date. Counsel may face a compressed time period to complete discovery, or the filing of dispositive motions, but the most important aspect of the scheduling order – the trial date – will be preserved. In the unusual circumstance where the trial court does decide to postpone the trial date, litigants should expect that the trial will be rescheduled after all other trials already scheduled on the court's docket." View "Christian v. Counseling Resource Associates, Inc." on Justia Law

Defendant-Appellant Thomas Sammons appealed several final superior court judgments after he was convicted by jury of second-degree burglary, second-degree robbery and criminal mischief. Defendant raised two issues on appeal to the Supreme Court: (1) that the trial judge erred in declaring Defendant an habitual offender pursuant to title 11, section 4214(b) of the Delaware Code based on a prior conviction in the State of Florida for burglary; and (2) that the trial judge erred in declaring Defendant an habitual offender, where the issue of rehabilitation, in light of his "organic dysfunctions," was not addressed. Upon review, the Supreme Court that both of Defendant's arguments were without merit. View "Sammons v. Delaware" on Justia Law

Defendant-Appellant Ewelina Kulowiec appealed her conviction for third-degree assault. Defendant elected to have a non-jury trial, after which she was acquitted of Aggravated Menacing, a firearm offense, and Terroristic Threatening, but was convicted of assault. Defendant was sentenced to one year of imprisonment at Level 5, suspended for one year of probation at Level 2. On appeal, Defendant argued that the State did not prove beyond a reasonable doubt that she inflicted "physical injury" upon her then-husband. Upon review, the Supreme Court concluded that the record did not support Defendant's argument. Therefore, the superior court's judgment was affirmed. View "Kulowiec v. Delaware" on Justia Law

Defendant-Appellant Leshawn Washington was convicted by jury on four counts of first-degree assault, second-degree assault, twelve counts of possession of a firearm during the commission of a felony and six counts of first-degree reckless endangerment. He appealed his convictions, arguing that the superior court abused its discretion by permitting the admission of certain evidence that the jury ultimately used to convict him. Upon review of the trial court record, the Supreme Court found no merit to Defendant's arguments, and affirmed his convictions. View "Washington v. Delaware" on Justia Law

A passenger in a car stopped by the police for illegally tinted windows claimed to have no identification and provided an officer with a false identity. After a database search returned no results, the officer handcuffed the passenger and recovered a gun during a pat down. The passenger challenged his conviction, arguing officers had no probable cause to arrest him, and moved to suppress evidence of the recovered gun. Upon review, the Supreme Court held that the officer possessed probable cause to arrest the passenger for criminal impersonation, and affirmed the trial judge's denial of a motion to suppress the gun. View "Stafford v. Delaware" on Justia Law

Plaintiff-Appellant Richard J. Sternberg, M.D. brought an action against Defendants-Appellees Nanticoke Memorial Hospital, its CEO and members of the hospital's Medical Executive Committee (MEC) (collectively "Nanticoke") for tortious interference with existing business relationships, defamation, and breach of the Medical Staff Bylaws. The suit arose from a precautionary suspension of his clinical privileges imposed by Nanticoke under its professional review procedures. Nanticoke asserted immunity under federal and state law and sought attorneys fees, citing state law and a fee-shifting provision of Nanticoke's Medical Staff Bylaws Credentials Policy. After cross-motions for summary judgment, the Superior Court denied Sternberg's motion and granted Nanticoke's motion, awarding attorney's fees under state law without addressing Nanticoke's claim for costs and fees under the Credentials Policy. Sternberg appealed and the Supreme Court affirmed on the issue of immunity but reversed the award of attorney's fees under the applicable statute because Sternberg refuted the only fact supporting the requisite bad faith for an award under that law. Upon remand, the Superior Court awarded attorney's fees and costs based upon the Credentials Policy. Sternberg raised three claims on appeal: (1) he claimed that the Superior Court erred by granting Nanticoke's motion for summary judgment for attorney's fees under the Credentials Policy, because the bylaw violates public policy; (2) he claimed the Credentials Policy was unenforceable against him because Nanticoke materially breached the bylaws; and (3) he claimed that the Superior Court abused its discretion in determining the amount of attorney's fees and costs to be awarded. Finding no merit to any of his claims on appeal, the Supreme Court affirmed the Superior Court. View "Sternberg, M.D. v. Nanticoke Memorial Hospital, Inc., et al." on Justia Law

Mother Charlene M. Hall filed a petition to terminate the parental rights of father Christopher Moore with regard to their child born August 24, 2005. The Family Court granted the Mother's petition. The Father raised two issues on appeal: (1) the Family Court violated his right to due process under the United States and Delaware Constitutions by not appointing new counsel to represent him, after it allowed his court-appointed attorney to withdraw; and (2) the record did not support the Family Court's decision to terminate his parental rights. Upon review, the Supreme Court concluded that the Father's due process rights were indeed violated, therefore the Court reversed and remanded the case to the Family Court for a new hearing after an attorney was appointed to represent the Father. View "Moore v. Hall" on Justia Law