Justia Delaware Supreme Court Opinion Summaries

In this appeal, the issue before the Supreme Court was whether a contractor's bid was responsive to the Delaware Department of Transportation's (DelDOT) Request for Proposals (RFP). The contractor's bid did not include required paint certifications. In addition, the bid reflected the contractor's plan to use new steel beams, rather than refurbish the existing ones, as required by the RFP. The contractor chose to submit a bid that did not conform to the project specifications. The Supreme Court concluded that the contractor therefore did so at its own risk. DelDOT's decision that the bid was non-responsive was not arbitrary or capricious. Accordingly, the Court affirmed the trial court's entry of summary judgment in DelDOT's favor. View "Julian v. Delaware Dep't. of Transportation" on Justia Law

This was an appeal from a post-trial decision and final judgment of the Court of Chancery that awarded more than $2 billion in damages and more than $304 million in attorneys' fees. The Court of Chancery held that defendants-appellants, Americas Mining Corporation (AMC), subsidiary of Southern Copper Corporation's (Southern Peru) controlling shareholder, and affiliate directors of Southern Peru (collectively, Defendants), breached their fiduciary duty of loyalty to Southern Peru and its minority stockholders by causing Southern Peru to acquire the controller’s 99.15% interest in a Mexican mining company, Minera Mexico, S.A. de C.V., for much more than it was worth (i.e., at an unfair price.). Plaintiff challenged the transaction derivatively on behalf of Southern Peru. The Court of Chancery found the trial evidence established that the controlling shareholder, Grupo Mexico, S.A.B. de C.V., through AMC, "extracted a deal that was far better than market" from Southern Peru due to the ineffective operation of a special committee. To remedy the Defendants’ breaches of loyalty, the Court of Chancery awarded the difference between the value Southern Peru paid for Minera ($3.7 billion) and the amount the Court of Chancery determined Minera was worth ($2.4 billion). Defendants raised five issues on appeal. Upon review, the Supreme Court determined that all of the Defendants' arguments were without merit. Therefore, the judgment of the Court of Chancery was affirmed. View "Americas Mining Corp. v. Theriault Southern Copper Corp." on Justia Law

Plaintiffs-Appellants WaveDivision Holdings, LLC and Michigan Broadband, LLC (collectively, "Wave") entered into two exclusive agreements with third-party Millennium Digital Media Systems, LLC ("Millennium") to purchase cable television systems from Millennium. Millennium terminated the agreements and pursued a refinancing with its note holders and senior lenders. In a separate proceeding, the Court of Chancery found Millennium liable to Wave for breach of contract and awarded Wave damages. Wave also brought an action in the Superior Court against Millennium's note holders and senior lenders, Defendant-Appellees Highland Capital Management L.P., Highland Crusader Funds, Highland Floating Rate Fund, Trimaran Capital Partners, L.P., and Pioneer Floating Rate Trust, (collectively, "Appellees"). Wave sought damages against Appellees, contending among other things, that the Appellees tortiously interfered with the Wave-Millennium contract. The Superior Court granted summary judgment to Appellees on this claim, concluding that any interference was justified under Delaware law and that Appellee Pioneer did not have actual or imputed knowledge of the underlying contract. Upon review, the Supreme Court agreed and affirmed the appellate court's decision. View "WaveDivision Holdings, LLC, et al. v. Highland Capital Management, L.P., et al." on Justia Law

Plaintiff Martin Marietta Materials, Inc. appealed a Chancery Court judgment granting Defendant Vulcan Materials Company relief on its counterclaims, and an accompanying injunction. The Chancery Court enjoined Martin for a four month period from continuing to prosecute its pending Exchange Offer and Proxy Contest to acquire control of Vulcan. That injunctive relief was granted to remedy Martin's adjudicated violations of two contracts between Martin and Vulcan: a Non-Disclosure Letter Agreement (the "NDA") and a Common Interest, Joint Defense and Confidentiality Agreement (the "JDA"). Finding that the Chancery Court did not abuse its discretion in holding that the equities favored Vulcan, the Supreme Court affirmed that court's decision. View "Martin Marietta Materials, Inc. v. Vulcan Materials Co." on Justia Law

Plaintiff-Appellee William Mohr was struck in Delaware as a pedestrian by a car insured in Delaware. He recovered the minimum $15,000 coverage limit from the carrier that insured the striking car. Plaintiff also sought to recover from Defendant-Appellant Progressive Northern Insurance Company which sold an automobile insurance policy to Plaintiff's mother. Under the policy, Plaintiff's mother was the named insured, and Plaintiff was a member of her household. The Progressive policy, by its terms, did not cover Plaintiff as a pedestrian. The superior court held nonetheless that Plaintiff was entitled to recover under Progressive's policy because insofar as it denied PIP coverage, the policy conflicted with the Delaware automobile insurance statute which mandated such coverage. Progressive appealed. The court ordered Progressive to pay the difference between the amount Plaintiff recovered from the striking-car's policy and PIP limit of his mother's policy. Finding no error in the superior court's decision, the Supreme Court affirmed. View "Progressive Northern Insurance Co. v. Mohr" on Justia Law

RAA appealed from a final judgment of the Superior Court that dismissed its complaint pursuant to Rule 12(b)(6). RAA's complaint alleged that Savage told RAA, one of several potential bidders for Savage, at the outset of their discussions that there was "no significant unrecorded liabilities or claims against Savage," but then during RAA's due diligence into Savage, Savage disclosed three such matters, which caused RAA to abandon negotiations for the transactions. The complaint contended that had RAA known of those matters at the outset, it never would have proceeded to consider purchasing Savage. Therefore, according to RAA, Savage should be liable for the entirety of RAA's alleged $1.2 million in due diligence and negotiation costs. The court held that, under Paragraphs 7 and 8 of the non-disclosure agreement (NDA), RAA acknowledged that in the event no final "Sale Agreement" on a transaction was reached, Savage would have no liability, and could not be sued, for any allegedly inaccurate or incomplete information provided by Savage to RAA during the due diligence process. The court also held that RAA could not rely on the peculiar-knowledge exception to support its claims. Finally, the court held that, when Savage and RAA entered into the NDA, both parties knew how the non-reliance clauses had been construed by Delaware courts. Accordingly, the court affirmed the judgment. View "RAA Management, LLC v. Savage Sports Holdings, Inc." on Justia Law

In 2010, BLGH entered into an agreement with enXco to sell BLGH's renewable energy business, Beacon, to enXco. The Unit Purchase Agreement that governed the sale of Beacon (UPA) called for a purchase price of $12 million, plus a "bonus payment" to BLGH if certain conditions were met. The sale of Beacon took place and BLGH was paid $12 million. A dispute arose, however, over whether BLGH was entitled to the additional bonus payment. enXco claimed that no bonus payment was legally due. BLGH responded by filing a Superior Court action against enXco for breach of contract. The Superior Court granted summary judgment to enXco, holding that no bonus payment was owed to BLGH under the UPA. The court reversed and held that the Superior Court erred as a matter of law in granting summary judgment to enXco where the transaction "outlined" in the letter of intent met the requirements of Section 1.7 of the UPA, triggering BLGH's right to a bonus payment, and nothing more was required by the UPA for BLGH to become legally entitled to the bonus payment. View "BLGH Holdings LLC v. Enxco LFG Holding, LLC" on Justia Law

Defendants appealed from a Superior Court opinion and order granting summary judgment in favor of plaintiffs in a dispute over the remedy for a breach of contract. Defendants also appealed from an order awarding plaintiffs attorneys' fees, costs, and expenses incurred in that action. The court found that the parties' agreement was ambiguous and held that the ambiguity preceded an award of summary judgment. Therefore, the court reversed and remanded both matters for further proceedings. View "GMG Capital Investments, LLC, et al. v. Athenian Venture Partners I,L.P., et al." on Justia Law

Plaintiffs sued defendant in contract and tort, alleging that defendant failed to take necessary precautions to protect its premises from water damage. At issue on appeal was the trial judge's decision not to grant prejudgment interest on the amounts that were awarded by the jury to plaintiffs. The court held that plaintiffs were entitled to prejudgment interest as a matter of right and remanded to the Superior Court to determine the amount of prejudgment interest owed. View "Brandywine Smyrna, Inc., et al. v. Millennium Builders, LLC" on Justia Law

DTC filed a complaint with the Court of Chancery against the Union and Harry Bruckner, a para-transit driver, in the nature of a declaratory judgment action (Complaint) pursuant to Title 1, Chapter 65. The Complaint sought an order vacating or modifying a labor arbitration award issued by a certain arbitrator pursuant to a collective bargaining agreement between DTC and the Union. The award reinstated Bruckner, who was terminated by DTC, with back pay less interim earnings. The Court of Chancery granted the Union's motion for summary judgment. DTC's sole argument on appeal was that the arbitrator's decision should be vacated due to the appearance of bias or partiality on the part of the arbitrator. The court held that the alleged bias or partiality which DTC attributed to the arbitrator failed to meet the "evident partiality" standard where the mere fact that an arbitrator may share a personal life experience with a party or a party's agent was legally insufficient to constitute a substantial relationship that a reasonable person would conclude was powerfully suggestive of bias. Accordingly, the judgment was affirmed. View "Delaware Transit Corp. v. Amalgamated Transit Union Local 842" on Justia Law