Justia Delaware Supreme Court Opinion Summaries

The United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit certified a question of Delaware law to the Delaware Supreme Court: "If a shareholder demands that a board of directors investigate both an underlying wrongdoing and subsequent misstatements by corporate officers about that wrongdoing, what factors should a court consider in deciding whether the board acted in a grossly negligent fashion by focusing its investigation solely on the underlying wrongdoing?" The plaintiffs in this case made a demand that the board of JPMorgan Chase & Co. investigate two related issues regarding a high-profile situation, what the Second Circuit has called the "London Whale debacle." According to the Second Circuit, these issues were: (1) the failure of JPMorgan‘s risk management policies to prevent the trading that resulted in corporate losses; and (2) supposed false and misleading statements made by JPMorgan management in the wake of the emergence of the problem. According to the plaintiffs, the board investigative committee only made findings as to the former issue by arguing that what management knew when it made disclosures was the subject of several pages of the report. In the Delaware Supreme Court's view, Delaware law on the relevant topic required that the decision of an independent committee to refuse a demand should only be set aside if particularized facts were pled supporting an inference that the committee, despite being comprised solely of independent directors, breached its duty of loyalty, or breached its duty of care, in the sense of having committed gross negligence. The Court concluded that the determination of what constituted gross negligence in the circumstances by definition required a review of the relevant circumstances facing the directors charged with acting. The Court requested more information from the Second Circuit prior to answering the certified question. View "Espinoza v. Dimon, et al." on Justia Law

Defendants-appellants Hill International, Inc., David Richter, Camille Andrews, Brian Clymer, Alan Fellheimer, Irvin Richter, Steven Kramer and Gary Mazzucco sought review of Court of Chancery orders dated June 5, 2015 and June 16, 2015. In its June 5, 2015 Order, the Court of Chancery enjoined Hill from conducting any business at its June 9, 2015 Annual Meeting, other than convening the meeting for the sole purpose of adjourning it for a minimum of 21 days, in order to permit plaintiff-appellee Opportunity Partners L.P. to present certain items of business and director nominations at Hill’s 2015 Annual Meeting. On June 16, 2015, the Court of Chancery entered the Order dated June 5, 2015 as a partial final judgment pursuant to Court of Chancery Rule 54(b). This expedited appeal presented for the Supreme Court's resolution a dispute over the proper interpretation of certain provisions of Articles II and III of Hill’s Bylaws as Amended and Restated on November 12, 2007. The sections of the Bylaws at issue, specifically language in Sections 2.2 and 3.3, concerned the operative date for determining the time within which stockholders must give notice of any shareholder proposals or director nominees to be considered at Hill’s upcoming annual meeting. After review of the bylaws and the Court of Chancery's orders, the Supreme Court found reversible error and affirmed. View "Hill International, Inc., et al. v. Opportunity Partners, L.P." on Justia Law

These appeals both involved damages actions by stockholder plaintiffs arising out of mergers in which the controlling stockholder, who had representatives on the board of directors, acquired the remainder of the shares that it did not own in a Delaware public corporation. Both mergers were negotiated by special committees of independent directors, were ultimately approved by a majority of the minority stockholders, and were at substantial premiums to the pre-announcement market price. Nonetheless, the plaintiffs filed suit in the Court of Chancery in each case, contending that the directors had breached their fiduciary duty by approving transactions that were unfair to the minority stockholders. In both appeals, it was undisputed that the companies did not follow the process established in "Kahn v. M&F Worldwide Corporation" as a safe harbor to invoke the business judgment rule in the context of a self-interested transaction. In both cases, the defendant directors were insulated from liability for monetary damages for breaches of the fiduciary duty of care by an exculpatory charter provision adopted in accordance with 8 Del. C. 102(b)(7). Despite that provision, the plaintiffs in each case sued the controlling stockholders and their affiliated directors, and also sued the independent directors who had negotiated and approved the mergers. The issue central to both, presented for the Supreme Court's review was whether, where the plaintiff challenges an interested transaction that is presumptively subject to entire fairness review, must plead a non-exculpated claim against the disinterested, independent directors to survive a motion to dismiss by those directors. The Court answered that question in the affirmative: a plaintiff seeking only monetary damages must plead non-exculpated claims against a director who is protected by an exculpatory charter provision to survive a motion to dismiss, regardless of the underlying standard of review for the board's conduct. The Court of Chancery in both of these cases denied the defendants' motions to dismiss because it read the Supreme Court's precedent to require doing so, regardless of the exculpatory provision in each company's certificate of incorporation. When the independent directors are protected by an exculpatory charter provision and the plaintiffs are unable to plead a non-exculpated claim against them, those directors are entitled to have the claims against them dismissed, in keeping with the Court's opinion in "Malpiede v. Townson" (and cases following that decision). Accordingly, the Court remanded both of these cases to allow the Court of Chancery to determine if the plaintiffs sufficiently pled non-exculpated claims against the independent directors. View "In Re Cornerstone Theraputics, Inc. Leal, et al. v. Meeks, et al." on Justia Law

This case came before the Supreme Court on appeal of a jury verdict which found that ev3, Inc., the buyer of Appriva Medical, Inc., breached its contractual obligations to Appriva’s former shareholders, who gave up their shares in the merger. The merger agreement between ev3 and Appriva provided for the bulk of the payments to the Appriva shareholders to be contingent upon the timely accomplishment of certain milestones toward the approval and marketability of a medical device that Appriva was developing. After it became clear that the milestones were not going to be achieved, the former Appriva shareholders sued. At many points during the trial, ev3 attempted to convince the Superior Court that a non-binding letter of intent should not be used to interpret or contradict the clear terms of the merger agreement, but the Superior Court adhered to the contrary view advocated by Appriva. Appriva was permitted to argue to the jury that ev3 not only failed to act in good faith under the agreement, but that it breached a “promise” to honor the Funding Provision contained in the non-binding letter of intent. The jury agreed that ev3 had breached its contractual obligations and determined that ev3 owed Appriva the full amount of the milestone payments, $175 million. On appeal, ev3 argued that the Superior Court erred by permitting Appriva to argue that the Funding Provision in the non-binding letter of intent continued to bind ev3, and also that the non-binding letter of intent modified the “sole discretion” standard set forth in the agreement. After review, the Supreme Court concluded that the Superior Court erred by accepting Appriva’s position that the non-binding Funding Provision within the letter of intent was admissible to affect the meaning of the merger agreement. The case was remanded for further proceedings. View "EV3, Inc. v. Lesh, M.D., et al." on Justia Law

This appeal stemmed from dispute in the Court of Chancery over the membership of the board of directors of Biolase, Inc. The Court of Chancery resolved the dispute by finding that the Biolase board of directors consisted of five directors, including Paul Clark. The Court of Chancery concluded that Clark was appointed to the Biolase board after a previous director, Alexander Arrow, resigned through oral statements at a board meeting. A press release issued by Biolase after the board meeting quoted Federico Pignatelli, Biolase's Chief Executive Officer and Chairman, as saying he was "thrilled" with Clark's appointment to the board. But Pignatelli quickly reversed course when he learned that Clark had aligned himself with a faction of the board that wanted to remove Pignatelli from his position as CEO. Pignatelli argued that because Arrow's resignation at the board meeting was given orally and was not reduced to writing before Clark was appointed to fill the vacancy created by Arrow's resignation, Clark had not been properly appointed to the board under 8 Del. C. section 141(b). Biolase's largest stockholder, appellee Oracle Partners, L.P., brought suit Biolase seeking a declaration that, among other things, Arrow had resigned from the Biolase board and been replaced by Clark at the board meeting. The Court of Chancery rejected the Pignatelli Faction's legal argument and held that section 141(b) was a permissive statute, that a director may resign by an oral statement, and that there was no requirement that a resignation be in writing. Because the Court of Chancery's holding that directors are permitted under section 141(b) to resign by oral statements was not legally erroneous and the Court of Chancery's determination that Arrow resigned at the board meeting was supported by substantial evidence, the Supreme Court affirmed the Court of Chancery's ruling that Clark was properly appointed to the Biolase board of directors. View "Biolase, Inc. v. Oracle Partners, L.P." on Justia Law

Plaintiff-appellant Eldon Klaassen appealed a Court of Chancery judgment which held that Klaassen was not the de jure chief executive officer of Allegro Development Corporation. Klaassen claimed that the remaining Allegro directors, by removing him as CEO, violated an equitable notice requirement and also improperly employed deceptive tactics. After a trial and without addressing its merits, the Court of Chancery held that the claim was barred under laches and acquiescence. Upon review of the matter, the Supreme Court affirmed the Court of Chancery: to the extent that Klaassen’s claim was cognizable, it was equitable in nature. Furthermore, the Court concluded that the Court of Chancery properly found that Klaassen acquiesced in his removal as CEO, and was therefore barred from challenging removal. View "Klaassen v. Allegro Development Corporation, et al." on Justia Law

The issue before the Supreme Court in this matter centered on a Court of Chancery decision arising from a 2011 acquisition by MacAndrews & Forbes Holdings, Inc. (M&F), a 43% stockholder in M&F Worldwide Corp (MFW), of the remaining common stock of MFW. M&F’s proposal to take MFW private was made contingent upon two procedural conditions. Appellants initially sought to enjoin the transaction. They withdrew their request for injunctive relief after taking expedited discovery, including several depositions. Appellants then sought post-closing relief against M&F, Ronald Perelman, and MFW’s directors for breach of fiduciary duty. Defendants then moved for summary judgment, which the Court of Chancery granted. Appellants raised two arguments on appeal: (1) the Court of Chancery erred in concluding that no material disputed facts existed regarding the conditions precedent to business judgment review; and (2) the Court of Chancery erred, as a matter of law, in holding that the business judgment standard applied to controller freeze-out mergers where the controller’s proposal is conditioned on both Special Committee approval and a favorable majority-of-the-minority vote.The Supreme Court concluded Defendants’ motion for summary judgment was properly granted on all of those issues. The Court determined that the business judgment rule standard of review applied to this controlling stockholder buyout. View "Kahn, et al v. M&F Worldwide Corp., et al." on Justia Law

The Court of Chancery dismissed a class action complaint that objected to the merger of a limited partnership with its general partner's controller. The plaintiff-limited partner's complaint alleged that the general partner (its controller) and its directors took actions during and preceding the merger negotiations that breached the contractual duties the partnership agreement. Upon review, the Supreme Court concluded that the plaintiff's allegations that the independent directors failed to negotiate effectively did not permit a reasonable inference that the independent directors breached their duty to act with subjective good faith. Therefore the Supreme Court affirmed dismissal of the complaint. View "Allen v. Encore Energy Partners, L.P., et al." on Justia Law

Plaintiff Joel Gerber held limited partnership (LP) units in Enterprise GP Holdings, L.P. He sued on behalf of two classes of former public holders of LP units in Enterprise, challenging the sale of a subsidiary and a merger with another. Defendants successfully moved the trial court to dismiss Plaintiff's complaint, and Plaintiff appealed. Upon review, the Supreme Court concluded the trial court erred in dismissing the complaint. The Court affirmed in part, reversed in part, and remanded the case for further proceedings.View "Gerber v. Enterprise Products Holdings,LLC " on Justia Law

The issue before the Supreme Court in this case was whether the Court of Chancery erred in dismissing a derivative and class action complaint against the general partner and other managers of a limited partnership. The governing limited partnership agreement provided that appellees had no liability for money damages as long as they acted in good faith. The Court of Chancery dismissed the complaint because it failed to allege facts that would support a finding of bad faith. After remand, the Court of Chancery held that appellants waived their alternative claims for reformation or rescission. Upon review of the matter, the Supreme Court affirmed.View "Brinckerhoff v. Enbridge Energy Company, Inc." on Justia Law