Justia Delaware Supreme Court Opinion Summaries

In 2001, Alonzo Cannon was convicted by jury on offenses related to possession of cocaine and marijuana. At trial, the State introduced evidence that after being read his Miranda rights, Cannon confessed to police that the drugs were his and also where he obtained them. The trial judge sentenced Cannon to eighteen years unsuspended jail time followed by decreasing levels of supervision. The Delaware Supreme Court affirmed his convictions and sentence on direct appeal. The Superior Court denied Cannon’s first motion for postconviction relief, and the Supreme Court dismissed his appeal of the first motion as untimely filed. In 2015, with the assistance of counsel, Cannon filed a second motion for postconviction relief, claiming that the State’s failure to disclose misconduct in the Office of the Chief Medical Examiner (“OCME”) violated the State’s obligation under "Brady v. Maryland," and that an evidentiary hearing was required to explore the Brady issue further. The motion was a lengthy form motion filed in a number of cases raising misconduct at the OCME. The Superior Court summarily dismissed the motion, and found there was no evidence to support Cannon’s contention that the misconduct at the OCME was ongoing during his trial in 2001, or that the misconduct involved false chemical analysis reporting as opposed to theft. Cannon appealed again. The State responded that Cannon’s motion was barred by amended Superior Court Criminal Rule 61, and in any event, Cannon admitted to the crimes, and the drugs field tested positive for illegal substances, so the motion should be denied. After careful review of the record, the Supreme Court found that the issues on appeal were not fairly raised before the Superior Court, and Rule 61 barred Cannon’s claims because he did not allege actual innocence. "Even if we reached the merits of his claims, they would be barred due to the overwhelming evidence of guilt presented at trial. Therefore we affirm the Superior Court’s judgment." View "Cannon v. Delaware" on Justia Law

This appeal stems from an incident that took place in 2008 between defendant David Chianese and his then-girlfriend, Heather Barron. Barron alleged that Chianese dragged her out of his house, causing her to sustain injuries that required medical treatment and caused her to miss work. Chianese insisted that he never touched Barron and alleged that he asked her to leave his house, helped her carry her things to his truck, and drove her home. As a result of the incident, Chianese was arrested and later agreed to probation before judgment guilty plea to offensive touching (an offense that did not have as an element that Chianese caused Barron any injury). Barron submitted a Victim’s Loss Statement to the Court of Common Pleas Investigative Services Office (“ISO”). ISO referred Barron to the Victims’ Compensation Assistance Program (VCAP), and then ISO received a revised restitution request. Chianese violated the terms of his probation by testing positive on multiple occasions for illegal substances. Although the State had sought restitution as part of the original plea order, and the court staff was actively investigating restitution at the time of the violation of parole hearing, the State did not raise the issue of restitution, and the court discharged Chianese from probation as “unimproved” without addressing restitution. VCAP awarded Barron $12,107.35 to cover her out-of-pocket medical expenses and lost wages. The Court of Common Pleas investigator then sent Chianese a letter recommending that Chianese pay restitution to VCAP. Chianese refused to reimburse VCAP and demanded a hearing, denying causing any injury to Barron. The Court of Common Pleas denied the State’s request for restitution because it ruled that it could only award restitution to the victims of crimes, not third parties, and because it did not have custody or control over the defendant’s funds. The Superior Court affirmed. The Supreme Court agreed, and affirmed. View "Delaware v. Chianese" on Justia Law

Appellant Xavier Broomer appealed the Superior Court’s March 2015 bench ruling denying his post-verdict Motion for Judgment of Acquittal. Broomer raised one argument on appeal. The jury acquitted Broomer of Aggravated Possession and Drug Dealing. However, the jury convicted Broomer of Conspiracy in the Second Degree. Broomer argued that his acquittal on the underlying offense of Drug Dealing precludes his conviction on Conspiracy in the Second Degree. After review, the Supreme Court disagreed and affirmed. View "Broomer v. Delaware" on Justia Law

The issue common for forty-five defendants (whose cases were consolidated for this opinion) was whether a defendant who pled guilty after a colloquy and admitted to crimes involving the possession of illegal narcotics should have her conviction vacated because she was unaware of serious problems at the Office of the Chief Medical Examiner (the “OCME”) involving the handling of narcotics evidence. The Superior Court answered that question no, and held that the defendants were bound by their pleas. A 2014 investigation by the Delaware State Police and the Department of Justice revealed that some OCME employees had stolen drug evidence stored at the OCME due in large part to flawed oversight and security. To date, those problems, although including substantial evidence of sloppiness and allegations of “drylabbing,” did not involve evidence-planting. Much of the uncovered misconduct seemed to be inspired by the reality that the evidence seized from defendants in fact involved illegal narcotics, and the temptation this provided to certain employees to steal some of that evidence for their personal use and for resale. In prior decisions, the Delaware Supreme Court made clear that if a defendant knowingly pled guilty to a drug crime, he could not escape his plea by arguing that had he known that the OCME had problems, he would not have admitted to his criminal misconduct in possessing illegal narcotics. In those prior decisions, the Court found that defendants' please did not invalidate their freely-made pleas. The Court reached the same conclusion after review of this case, and affirmed the Superior Court. View "Aricidiacono,et al. v. Delaware" on Justia Law

In October, 2014, a Superior Court jury convicted Irvan Adams of possession of a firearm by a person prohibited, possession of ammunition by a person prohibited, carrying a concealed deadly weapon, and conspiracy second degree. The Superior Court judge sentenced Adams to five years at Level V on the conviction for possession of a firearm by a person prohibited, and suspended the terms of imprisonment on the remaining offenses for probation. On appeal. Adams argued the Superior Court abused its discretion when it refused to admit into evidence a prior consistent statement of Adams's brother, Javan Cale. Adams claimed the affidavit supported Cale's exculpatory testimony at trial and rebutted the State's implication of recent fabrication on Cale's part. The trial judge refused to admit the affidavit, ruling it was superfluous. The Supreme Court found that the trial court erred when it sustained the State's objection and excluded the affidavit from evidence, and that the exclusion was not harmless error beyond a reasonable doubt. The Court therefore reversed Adams's conviction and remanded for further proceedings. View "Adams v. Delaware" on Justia Law

Defendant-appellant Akeem Cropper was indicted on multiple firearms possession charges. He filed a motion to suppress, which was denied after a hearing. Following a bench trial, the Superior Court found defendant guilty of Possession of a Firearm by a Person Prohibited and Possession of Ammunition By a Person Prohibited. On appeal, defendant argued the warrantless seizure and pat-down search was not supported by reasonable suspicion, and the evidence seized from him should have been suppressed. After review of the superior court record, the Supreme Court concluded defendant's argument on appeal lacked merit, and affirmed his conviction. View "Cropper v. Delaware" on Justia Law

Defendant Rondaiges Harper was convicted by jury of carjacking in the first degree, kidnapping in the first degree, and two counts of conspiracy in the second degree. On appeal he argued that his convictions should have been reversed because the crime of carjacking was completed by the time he joined the two teenagers who had stolen the victim's car and confined her in the trunk. After review, the Supreme Court concluded, based on the language and legislative history of Delaware's carjacking statute, that the crime of carjacking was not a continuing crime, but instead was completed at the point when all the elements of the crime have been satisfied. In this case, because the carjacking of the victim's vehicle was completed before Harper's involvement, and each of Harper's convictions depends upon carjacking as a predicate crime, the Court reversed his convictions and remanded for further proceedings. View "Harper v. Delaware" on Justia Law

Defendant Bruce Worthy allegedly threatened his mother and brother at gunpoint. Worthy’s mother, Valerie Coleman, called 911 to report the threat, leading to Worthy’s arrest and a number of criminal charges. At trial, Coleman was one of the State’s main witnesses. The State subpoenaed Coleman to testify, but she failed to appear. The State tracked her down and put her in jail on a material witness capias. When the State brought her from jail to testify, Coleman was uncooperative and tried to end her testimony by "plead[ing] the Fifth." The trial judge removed the jury and spoke with the prosecutor, who in response to prompting from the trial judge, said that the State was giving Coleman "full immunity . . . [o]n everything," including perjury. The trial judge instructed Coleman that "[e]ven if you commit a crime by your testimony the State has basically said that you cannot be prosecuted." Coleman reluctantly continued her testimony after the judge’s instruction. A jury found Worthy guilty of aggravated menacing against Coleman, but acquitted him on all other counts. On appeal, Worthy argued that the prosecutor erred in granting Coleman immunity against prosecution for perjury, and that the legal error was not harmless beyond a reasonable doubt. After review of the trial court record, the Supreme Court agreed, reversed and remanded for a new trial. View "Worthy v. Delaware" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court found no merit to defendant-appellant Melvin Morse’s arguments on appeal and affirmed his conviction by jury on child abuse charges. Defendant physically abused his step-daughter, A.M. The abuse spanned two years and consisted of, inter alia, suffocating and "waterboarding" A.M. as punishment for what he deemed to be misbehavior. On appeal, defendant argued: (1) the trial court abused its discretion by admitting evidence of other uncharged abusive acts against A.M. in violation of Delaware Rule of Evidence (“D.R.E.”) 403.6; and, (2) the trial court erred in allowing the jury to re-watch videotaped statements of A.M. and her younger sister, M.M., after the jury requested to view them during deliberations. In regard to defendant's second argument, the Supreme Court found that it was not an error to allow the jury to re-watch the statements, but used the occasion of this opinion to discuss a jury’s request to rehear a section 3507 statement during deliberations. A request to rehear such a statement is an exception to the general rule, and applies when the jury requests to rehear a section 3507 statement of its own accord. "This exception was created with the understanding that the request would be spontaneous in nature, not made at the encouragement of counsel. As the State admitted at oral argument before this Court, this action is not 'best practice,' and it should not be repeated in the future. Attorneys should not direct the jury to make requests to the trial judge to review testimonial evidence that is otherwise not permitted during deliberations." View "Morse v. Delaware" on Justia Law

Appellant Heather Rybicki was convicted by a jury of driving under the influence of alcohol (“DUI”). She was sentenced to two years of Level V incarceration, suspended after three months for one year and six months of Level IV home confinement, suspended after six months for one year of Level III probation. On appeal, Rybicki argued: (1) there was no probable cause to issue the search warrant to obtain a blood sample used to determine her BAC; (2) there was no probable cause for her warrantless arrest; (3) absent the BAC evidence, there was insufficient evidence for conviction; (4) the State did not lay a sufficient foundation for the BAC evidence; and (5) two jury instructions given by the trial court were improper comments on the evidence. Rejecting all of appellant's contentions on appeal, the Supreme Court affirmed. View "Rybicki v. State" on Justia Law