Justia Delaware Supreme Court Opinion Summaries

Plaintiff sued defendant for injuries she suffered when she slipped and fell on an icy parking lot on defendant's premises. At issue was whether the superior court erred in granting summary judgment for defendant where immunity, pursuant to Title 14, section 1056(h) of the Delaware Code, did not apply to negligence for failing to inspect the premises and failing to warn of known and existing dangers. Also at issue was whether the superior court erred in granting summary judgment for defendant where defendant waived, or should be estopped from asserting, section 1056(h) immunity. The court held that section 1056(h) provided defendant with immunity where there was no legal distinction between the failure to maintain a reasonably safe parking lot free of ice and snow and the failure to warn of a slippery parking lot. The court also held that defendant did not waive, and was not estopped from asserting, that immunity where the record did not reflect that plaintiff was aware of any insurance coverage, the record did not show that plaintiff relied on the conduct of defendant, or that plaintiff changed her position as a result of her reliance. Therefore, the judgment of the superior court was affirmed.

Appellant filed requests with appellee for refunds of taxes that appellant paid on premiums derived from certain life insurance policies, for tax years 2001 to 2003. The Delaware Insurance Commissioner ("Commissioner") denied appellant's request on the basis that appellant could not aggregate the premium income from those insurance policies into one unitary "case" for tax purposes under section 702 of the Delaware Insurance Code. At issue on appeal was the meaning of the term "case," which appeared in section 702. The court held that the plain meaning of section 702(c)(2)b, both pre- and post-amendment, was that the premiums received from insurance policies could be aggregated into one "case" only if those policies were issued through the same private placement memorandum. Therefore, appellant could not aggregate the seven insurance policies that were issued via separate private placements into one "case."

Defendant was charged with nineteen counts in a final re-indictment related to charges of attempted murder, reckless endangering, firearm charges related to attempted murder charges, aggravated menacing by a firearm, aggravated intimidation of a witness, criminal solicitation, disregarding a police officer, resisting arrest, and reckless driving. At issue was whether the trial judge abused his discretion when he decided that a single complaint by the jury during trial, that some members had difficulty hearing one videotaped section 3507 statement, justified departure from the general default rule that such statements did not go into the jury during deliberations. The court held that the jury certainly should not be permitted to "work through" the recorded section 3507 statement during their deliberations until it was understandable and the undue emphasis placed upon the section 3507 evidence by its unwarranted admission into the jury's deliberative process was not harmless beyond a reasonable doubt. Therefore, the court reversed the judgment and remanded for a new trial.

Respondent, the wife, appealed from the Family Court's July 27, 2009 entry from divorce from petitioner, the husband, who initiated the divorce proceedings on January 16, 2009. At issue was whether the Family Court erred by concluding that the husband had completed the applicable Parent Education Program ("PEP") as required by 13 Del. C. 1507(h) because he should have been required to complete a PEP that had a domestic violence course component. Also at issue was whether the Family Court erred in holding that the PEP requirement of section 1507(h) did not have to be satisfied before entry of the divorce decree. The court held that the Family Court did not err by entering the final divorce decree on July 27, 2009 where, because the court never found that husband was required to attend a PEP that had a domestic violence education course component, the husband's earlier completion of the April 2009 PEP course satisfied the requirements of section 1507(h). The court also held that, even if the husband was required to complete a PEP which included a domestic violence education course component, completion of that PEP was not a condition precedent to the Family Court's entry of the divorce decree. Therefore, the judgment of the Family Court was affirmed.

ConAgra Foods, Inc. ("ConAgra") sued Lexington Insurance, Co. ("Lexington") alleging breach of contract and breach of the implied duty of good faith and fair dealing. ConAgra's claims arose from the alleged 2007 contamination of certain Peter Pan and Great Value peanut butter products that ConAgra manufactured. ConAgra subsequently sought coverage under its insurance policy with Lexington for personal injury claims arising from its contaminated products and Lexington denied coverage. At issue was whether the provision in the insurance policy provided coverage in light of the "lot or batch" provision in the policy. The court held that the "lot or batch" provision was ambiguous where, under one of the two reasonable interpretations, Lexington's duties to defend and indemnify were triggered. The court also held that, because the policy arguably provided coverage to ConAgra, Lexington's duty to defend was thereby triggered when ConAgra satisfied the applicable "retained limit" for a single "occurrence." Accordingly, the court reversed and remanded to ascertain the intent underlying the ambiguous policy language for purposes of determining whether there was ultimate policy coverage.

Defendant appealed a conviction for driving under the influence of alcohol when she was arrested by police officers and performed field sobriety tests. At issue was whether defendant's motion to suppress intoxilyzer test results was erroneously denied where defendant asserted that her success on the field sobriety tests constituted "overwhelming evidence" that she was not impaired by alcohol. The court held that the motion was properly denied where the Superior Court applied a proper totality of the circumstances analysis in deciding to deny the motion and where the performance results of field sobriety tests could either eliminate or elevate suspicion into probable cause but had insufficient evidentiary weight to eliminate probable cause that was already established by the totality of the circumstances before the tests were performed.

Defendant-Appellant Hubbard appeals the lower courtâs denial of his motion to suppress his custodial statement, arguing that his waiver of Miranda rights was not knowing, intelligent or voluntary. Defendant was convicted on twelve offenses, including attempted murder, carjacking, conspiracy and possession of a deadly weapon. He was sentenced to twelve life terms. Defendant argues that he was not able to âfully comprehend the nature of his Miranda rights and the consequences of abandoning those rightsâ because he was âdrunk and high.â On review of the interrogation transcript, the Court held that Defendant made an express waiver of his Miranda rights by his words and actions, and that Defendantâs motion to suppress was properly denied.