Justia Delaware Supreme Court Opinion Summaries

Articles Posted in Delaware Supreme Court
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Defendant Raymond Blake was tried before a jury for Trafficking in Cocaine, Possession with Intent to Deliver ("PWID") Cocaine, PWID Heroin, and Maintaining a Vehicle for Keeping Controlled Substances. The jury found Defendant guilty of the lesser-included offenses of Possession of Cocaine and Possession of Heroin, not guilty of Maintaining a Vehicle, and could not agree unanimously on the trafficking charge. Prosecutors sought and obtained another indictment of Defendant, charging him with Trafficking in Cocaine and Trafficking in Heroin, based upon his possession of the same contraband he was convicted of possessing in the first trial. Defendant's motion to dismiss was denied and at the second trial he was convicted as charged. Defendant appealed, claiming the protection against Double Jeopardy under the Fifth Amendment of the United States Constitution barred the State from trying him on trafficking in a controlled substance charges when he had already been convicted of the lesser included offense of Possession based on the same conduct. Upon review, the Supreme Court agreed and accordingly reversed and remanded the case with instruction to vacate Defendant's trafficking convictions. View "Blake v. Delaware" on Justia Law

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Claimants Cecil Palomino, Salvador Avila-Hernandez and Julio Munoz were each injured in different work-related accidents. It was not disputed that their injuries were compensable under the Worker's Compensation Act and that payments of some worker's compensation have been made. After their doctors recommended certain treatments, their employers requested determinations of whether the treatment plans fell outside of the Health Care Practice ("HCAP") Guidelines through a utilization review ("UR"). The UR panel determined that portions of their treatments were not approved for coverage. Claimants petitioned the Industrial Accident Board for review of the UR determination after the 45 day time window prescribed by Department of Labor Regulation 5.5.1. The Board dismissed the petitions as untimely. Claimants appealed to the Superior Court, which determined that the 45 day limit of Regulation 5.5.1 was invalid because it conflicted with 19 Del. C. sec 2361. The employers appealed from the Superior Court's judgment. Finding no merit to the appeal, the Supreme Court affirmed. View "Christiana Care Health Services v. Palomino" on Justia Law

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Appellant Mary E. Spellman ("Spellman") petitioned the Industrial Accident Board (the "Board") for a workers' compensation award against her employer, Appellee Christiana Care Health Services ("Christiana"). The Board denied the petition and the Superior Court affirmed. Appellant worked as a home health aide, where she used her personal vehicle to attend to Christiana's clients at their homes. While Appellant was reimbursed for mileage between client appointments, she was not reimbursed for travel to the first appointment, from the last appointment, or "off the clock" when she attended to personal business. In the middle of her work day, Appellant was off the clock when her car hit a patch of ice causing Appellant to crash her car. She sustained injuries to her head and hip. In her petition, Appellant argued that her status as a traveling employee exempted her from the "going and coming" rule that precludes workers' compensation for injuries suffered while going or coming from work. Alternatively, Appellant argued her injuries were compensable because she was engaged in a "mixed purpose" trip at the time of her accident. Having "no difficulty" sustaining the judgment of the Superior Court, the Supreme Court affirmed. View "Spellman v. Christiana Care Health Services" on Justia Law

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The issue before the Supreme Court in this matter was whether the Chancery Court was required to dismiss a Delaware derivative complaint after a California federal court entered final judgment dismissing the same complaint brought by different stockholders. The Chancery Court determined it was not required to give preclusive effect to the California judgment. Upon review, the Supreme Court held that the Chancery Court erred in its determination: (1) the lower court held as a matter of Delaware law that the stockholder plaintiffs in the two jurisdictions were not in privity with one another; (2) that the California stockholders were not adequate representatives of the defendant corporation; (3) California law controlled the issue, and derivative stockholders were in privity with one another because they acted on behalf of the corporation; and (4) the Chancery Court adopted a presumption of inadequacy without the record to support it. Accordingly, the Supreme Court reversed and remanded. View "Pyott v. Louisiana Municipal Police Employees' Retirement System" on Justia Law

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The trial court precluded appellants' experts from testifying at trial because appellants failed to provide the experts' reports in accordance with the trial scheduling order. Without any expert testimony, appellants' claims failed as a matter of law, and judgment was entered for appellees. But appellants had requested a conference with the trial court six months before the trial date to discuss the need to revise the scheduling order. The trial court refused to meet with counsel or change the trial date. This case was one of four appeals to the Supreme Court where in each case, plaintiffs' claims were dismissed without being heard on the merits. Upon review, the Supreme Court held that the trial court abused its discretion. "the trial courts have been applying the factors set forth in 'Drejka v. Hitchens Tire Service Inc.' when deciding whether a case should be dismissed for the attorneys' failure to obey scheduling orders," the Court determined it necessary to refine the 'Drejka' analysis: "parties who ignore or extend scheduling deadlines without promptly consulting the trial court, will do so at their own risk. In other words, any party that grants an informal extension to opposing counsel will be precluded from seeking relief from the court with respect to any deadlines in the scheduling order. By the same token, if the trial court is asked to extend any deadlines in the scheduling order, the extension should not alter the trial date. Counsel may face a compressed time period to complete discovery, or the filing of dispositive motions, but the most important aspect of the scheduling order – the trial date – will be preserved. In the unusual circumstance where the trial court does decide to postpone the trial date, litigants should expect that the trial will be rescheduled after all other trials already scheduled on the court's docket." View "Christian v. Counseling Resource Associates, Inc." on Justia Law

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Two employees of Connections CSP, Inc. were killed in an automobile collision during the course and scope of their employment. Connections owned the vehicle and had purchased underinsured motorist insurance (UIM) for the vehicle and also worker's compensation insurance which covered the employees. The UIM insurer paid its policy limit of $1,000,000. The worker's compensation insurer also paid benefits to the representatives of the decedents. The worker's compensation insurer then sought to enforce a lien upon the UIM payment equal to the worker's compensation benefits it paid. But the UIM policy specifically excluded the direct or indirect benefit of any insurer or self-insurer under a worker's compensation claim. Notwithstanding this exclusion, the Superior Court enforced the lien based upon its interpretation of 19 Del. C. 2363(e), which allows reimbursement of a worker's compensation carrier "from the third party liability insurer." The UIM insurer appealed. Upon review, the Supreme Court held that General Assembly eliminated the ability of a worker's compensation insurer to assert a lien against the UIM payments made pursuant to the employer's UIM policy. Because the Superior Court erred as a matter of law in enforcing a lien, the Supreme Court reversed its decision and remanded the case for further proceedings. View "Simendinger v. National Union Fire Insurance Co." on Justia Law

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In 2006, a German bank organized two affiliated entities under Delaware law. One sold a class of securities (Trust Preferred Securities) as part of the bank's effort to raise capital. In 2009, the bank acquired a second German bank by merger, whereby the bank assumed an obligation of the acquired bank to make certain payments with respect to a class of the acquired bank's securities. The bank made those payments in 2009 and 2010. In 2010, Plaintiff, who is the Property Trustee for the holders of the acquiror bank's Trust Preferred Securities sued claiming the 2009 and 2010 payments on the acquired bank's securities (which was a "Parity Security") triggered a contractual obligation by the bank to make comparable payments on the Trust Preferred Securities. The bank argued that it had no such contractual obligation. On cross motions for summary judgment, the Court of Chancery rejected the Trustee's claim on the basis that, because the 2009 and 2010 payments were not made on "Parity Securities," the bank had no obligation to make payments on the Trust Preferred Securities. Because the Supreme Court disagreed and concluded that the Court of Chancery erred, the Court reversed and remanded with instructions to enter final judgment for the Trustee. View "Bank of New York Mellon v. Commerzbank Capital Funding Trust II" on Justia Law

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Defendant-Appellant Thomas Sammons appealed several final superior court judgments after he was convicted by jury of second-degree burglary, second-degree robbery and criminal mischief. Defendant raised two issues on appeal to the Supreme Court: (1) that the trial judge erred in declaring Defendant an habitual offender pursuant to title 11, section 4214(b) of the Delaware Code based on a prior conviction in the State of Florida for burglary; and (2) that the trial judge erred in declaring Defendant an habitual offender, where the issue of rehabilitation, in light of his "organic dysfunctions," was not addressed. Upon review, the Supreme Court that both of Defendant's arguments were without merit. View "Sammons v. Delaware" on Justia Law

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Defendant-Appellant Ewelina Kulowiec appealed her conviction for third-degree assault. Defendant elected to have a non-jury trial, after which she was acquitted of Aggravated Menacing, a firearm offense, and Terroristic Threatening, but was convicted of assault. Defendant was sentenced to one year of imprisonment at Level 5, suspended for one year of probation at Level 2. On appeal, Defendant argued that the State did not prove beyond a reasonable doubt that she inflicted "physical injury" upon her then-husband. Upon review, the Supreme Court concluded that the record did not support Defendant's argument. Therefore, the superior court's judgment was affirmed. View "Kulowiec v. Delaware" on Justia Law

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Defendant-Appellant Leshawn Washington was convicted by jury on four counts of first-degree assault, second-degree assault, twelve counts of possession of a firearm during the commission of a felony and six counts of first-degree reckless endangerment. He appealed his convictions, arguing that the superior court abused its discretion by permitting the admission of certain evidence that the jury ultimately used to convict him. Upon review of the trial court record, the Supreme Court found no merit to Defendant's arguments, and affirmed his convictions. View "Washington v. Delaware" on Justia Law