Justia Delaware Supreme Court Opinion Summaries

The issue on appeal in this case came from a decision that dismissed a complaint against a foreign business entity for lack of personal jurisdiction. The foreign company allegedly conspired with other defendants to divest appellant of his interest in a lucrative joint venture. That plan was accomplished, in part, by causing the dissolution of a Delaware limited liability company co-founded by appellant. Under the "conspiracy theory" of personal jurisdiction, a plaintiff must allege facts from which one can infer that a foreign defendant knew or should have known that the conspiracy would have a Delaware nexus. The trial court found that the foreign company did not know about the Delaware connection until after the limited liability company had been dissolved. As a result, the trial court dismissed for lack of personal jurisdiction. Upon review, the Supreme Court reversed finding that the trial court's analysis was flawed in two respects: (1) the applicable standard is whether the foreign entity knew or should have known that it was conducting activity in Delaware (here, even if the record facts did not establish that appellee knew about the dissolution before it occurred, they established that appellee should have known that it was dealing with a Delaware company); (2) the conspiracy did not begin or end with the dissolution of the Delaware company (appellee learned that its business partner had been a Delaware entity shortly after the dissolution, and the alleged conspiracy continued long after that date). View "Matthew v. Flakt Woods Group SA" on Justia Law

Defendant-Appellant Solomon Collins appealed his convictions by a jury of Murder First Degree, two counts of Possession of a Firearm During the Commission of a Felony, and three counts of Reckless Endangering First Degree. Collins was charged with the shooting death of Tommear Tinnin. At trial, the State offered into evidence two out-of-court statements that identified Collins as the shooter of Tinnin. The declarants, Violet Gibson and Shakira Romeo, denied making the statements during their in-court testimony. The statements were admitted into evidence based upon the testimony of Detective Patrick Conner, the officer who interviewed Gibson and Romeo. After eleven hours of deliberation, the jury reported to the trial judge that they were deadlocked. The trial judge gave an "Allen" charge and instructed the jury to deliberate further. Two hours later, the jury returned the guilty verdicts. Collins raised three claims on appeal: (1) there was an insufficient foundation to admit into evidence the out-of-court statement of Gibson; (2) there was an insufficient foundation to admit into evidence the out-of-court statement of Romeo; and (3) that the trial judge erred in administering an Allen charge, which, as administered, was coercive. "Gibson and Romeo were classic turncoat witnesses." The Supreme Court concluded that the testimony at trial presented a sufficient foundation for the admission of their out of-court statements: the record showed that their out-of-court statements were given voluntarily, they were each subject to cross examination at trial, and their in-court testimony touched on both the events perceived and the content of their prior statements. The Court also concluded that there was no abuse of discretion by the trial judge in giving an Allen charge. Accordingly, the Court affirmed. View "Collins v. Delaware" on Justia Law

In resolving this dispute between the controlling member–manager and the minority investors of a Delaware Limited Liability Company (LLC), the Supreme Court interpreted the LLC's governing instrument as a contract that adopted the equitable standard of entire fairness in a conflict of interest transaction between the LLC and its manager. The Court held that the manager violated that contracted-for fiduciary duty by refusing to negotiate with a third-party bidder and then by causing the company to be sold to himself at an unfair price in a flawed auction that the manager himself engineered. The Court affirmed the trial court's damages award solely on contractual grounds, and affirmed the court’s award of attorneys' fees. View "Gatz Properties, LLC v. Auriga Capital Corp., et al." on Justia Law

Defendant-Appellant Cookie A. Hunter appealed his judgments of conviction, after a Superior Court jury trial, of Assault in the Second Degree, Resisting Arrest with Force or Violence, and Driving Under the Influence, First Offense. Defendant raised two issues in his direct appeal to the Supreme Court: (1) it was error for the trial judge to admit the results of his blood alcohol content (BAC) blood test into evidence because the foundational requirements necessary to admit that scientific evidence were not met; (2) the trial judge erred by not granting his motions for judgments of acquittal on the Assault and Resisting Arrest charges, because the State failed to preserve the videotape that recorded the events that led to those charges. Upon review, the Supreme Court concluded that the results of the BAC test were erroneously admitted into evidence. Therefore, the DUI judgment of conviction was reversed. Furthermore, the Court determined that Defendant's motions for judgments of acquittal on the Assault and Resisting Arrest charges were properly denied. Consequently, the judgments of the Superior Court were affirmed in part and reversed in part. The case was remanded for further proceedings. View "Hunter v. Delaware" on Justia Law

Defendant-Appellant Pablo Melendez appealed his convictions after a Superior Court jury trial stemming from numerous actual and attempted robberies. Defendant was convicted of: eighteen counts of Robbery in the First Degree, thirty-three counts of Possession of a Firearm During the Commission of a Felony, eleven counts of Wearing a Disguise, six counts of Conspiracy in the Second Degree, six counts of Aggravated Menacing, eight counts of Attempted Robbery in the First Degree, and one count of Reckless Endangering in the First Degree. In this appeal, Defendant claimed that the trial judge erred by admitting "improper witness bolstering and needlessly cumulative evidence when, despite their lack of personal knowledge, [two] police [officers] were allowed to provide their own interpretations and opinions of what happened during the [crimes]." Upon review, the Supreme Court concluded that Defendant waived his claim by failing to raise it at trial. Therefore, the judgments of the Superior Court were affirmed. View "Damiani-Melendez v. Delaware" on Justia Law

Plaintiff-Appellant Keila Rodriguez Alvarez appealed a Superior Court order granting defendant's Motion for Summary Judgment. The case arose from an automobile accident that occurred in 2010. On appeal, Plaintiff argued that the trial court by granting the motion erred as a matter of law because the parties had made a mutual mistake of fact about the existence and scope of her injuries resulting from an automobile accident. The record reflected that the unambiguous language of the release executed by Plaintiff was controlling and that there was no mutual mistake. Therefore, the judgment of the Superior Court was affirmed. View "Alvarez v. Castellon" on Justia Law

Appellant George Sweeney appealed a superior court order that affirmed a Merit Employee Relations Board (MERB) order denying his appeal from the Delaware Department of Transportation’s (DelDOT) termination of his employment. While working as a Delaware government employee in a state government building, Sweeney made three postings on an internet forum about his personal political campaign. 29 Del. C. 5954 mandates that any government employee who engages in "political activity" at work must be terminated from his employment. Upon review, the Supreme Court affirmed that portion of the Superior Court order determining that Section 5954 did not violate Sweeney’s First Amendment right to free speech. However, the Court reversed and remanded the case back to the Superior Court for further proceedings to consider: (1) what constitutes "political activity" under Section 5954; and (2) whether Section 5954 is unconstitutionally overbroad or vague. View "Sweeney v. Dept. of Transportation" on Justia Law

Riverbend Community, LLC and Parkway Gravel, Inc. jointly owned a parcel of land (the Property), which they intended to develop into residential real estate. Before purchasing the Property, Riverbend and Green Stone Engineering, LLC signed a August 2005 Contract, which required Green Stone to perform four tasks: (1) Site Evaluation and Regulatory Review, (2) Wetlands Restoration Conceptual Design, (3) Wetland Enhancement Conceptual Layout, and (4) Regulatory Meetings and Presentation. In March 2006, the parties signed a second contract which required Green Stone to provide design services for the site and roadways, the stormwater collection and conveyance systems, the sanitary sewer system, the water supply piping system, the stormwater management plans, the sediment and erosion control plans, and the landscape plans. Green Stone left the project in late 2007. Riverbend hired a new engineering firm to complete the work, but the new firm needed Green Stone's work product. Green Stone would not release its work product unless Riverbend executed a release. In 2009, the U.S. Army Corps of Engineers issued two Cease and Desist Letters against Riverbend because of the work in the wetlands. Meanwhile, the Delaware Department of Natural Resources and Environmental Control filed a complaint against Riverbend too. As a result of the federal and state issues, Riverbend could not sell houses, and its lender foreclosed on and purchased the Property at a sheriff's sale in April 2012. Riverbend sued Green Stone for breach of contract, professional negligence, and simple negligence. Green Stone moved for summary judgment on the grounds that the economic loss doctrine barred the tort claims and the general release barred all claims. The trial judge granted the motion, and Riverbend appealed. Upon review, the Supreme Court interpreted the release as a general release, and did not address the application of the economic loss doctrine. Because the Court found the release was a general release that unambiguously waived all claims, the Court affirmed the grant of summary judgment below on both the tort and contract claims. View "Riverbend Community, LLC, et al. v. Green Stone Engineering, LLC, et al." on Justia Law

In this appeal, the issue before the Supreme Court was whether a contractor's bid was responsive to the Delaware Department of Transportation's (DelDOT) Request for Proposals (RFP). The contractor's bid did not include required paint certifications. In addition, the bid reflected the contractor's plan to use new steel beams, rather than refurbish the existing ones, as required by the RFP. The contractor chose to submit a bid that did not conform to the project specifications. The Supreme Court concluded that the contractor therefore did so at its own risk. DelDOT's decision that the bid was non-responsive was not arbitrary or capricious. Accordingly, the Court affirmed the trial court's entry of summary judgment in DelDOT's favor. View "Julian v. Delaware Dep't. of Transportation" on Justia Law

The Court of Chancery held that Defendants-Appellants, Americas Mining Corporation (AMC), a subsidiary of Southern Copper Corporation's (Southern Peru) controlling shareholder, and affiliate directors of Southern Peru, breached their fiduciary duty of loyalty to Southern Peru and its minority stockholders by causing Southern Peru to acquire the controller’s 99.15% interest in a Mexican mining company, Minera Mexico, S.A. de C.V., for much more than it was worth (at an unfair price). The Plaintiff challenged the transaction derivatively on behalf of Southern Peru. The Court of Chancery found the trial evidence established that the controlling shareholder through AMC, "extracted a deal that was far better than market" from Southern Peru due to the ineffective operation of a special committee. To remedy the Defendants' breaches of loyalty, the Court of Chancery awarded the difference between the value Southern Peru paid for Minera ($3.7 billion) and the amount the Court of Chancery determined Minera was worth ($2.4 billion). The Court of Chancery awarded damages in the amount of $1.347 billion plus pre- and postjudgment interest, for a total judgment of $2.0316 billion. The Court of Chancery also awarded the Plaintiff's counsel attorneys' fees and expenses in the amount of 15% of the total judgment, which amounts to more than $304 million. Defendants raised five issues on appeal pertaining to their perceived errors at trial, the valuation of the shares and companies involved and the awarding of attorneys fees. Upon review, the Supreme Court determined that all of the Defendants' arguments were without merit. Therefore, the judgment of the Court of Chancery was affirmed. View "Americas Mining Corp. v. Theriault Southern Copper Corp." on Justia Law