Justia Delaware Supreme Court Opinion Summaries

Barbara Mammarella sued her radiologist, Alan Evantash, M.D., her OB/GYN, Christine Maynard, M.D., and All About Women of Christiana Care, Inc. for medical malpractice. To establish her claim, Mammarella needed to present expert testimony that could support a jury verdict that the alleged negligence, which was a six-month delay in her breast cancer diagnosis, was the proximate cause of her injury, which was an alleged change in treatment that required Mammarella to undergo chemotherapy. Upon review of this case, the Supreme Court concluded that the testimony of Mammarella's sole medical expert on causation could not support a jury verdict because the expert did not testify to a reasonable degree of medical probability that Mammarella's treatment options had changed as a result of the alleged negligence. Therefore, the Supreme Court affirmed the Superior Court's grant of judgment as a matter of law in favor of the health care providers. View "Mammarella v. Evantash, M.D., et al." on Justia Law

This case was one of thirty-two cases filed against defendant-appellee E.I. DuPont de Demours and Company, Inc. (DuPont) by Argentine nationals who claimed they were exposed to asbestos while working in textile plants in Argentina. Plaintiff-appellant Maria Elena Martinez, widow of an Argentine plant worker, alleged her husband suffered injuries from the asbestos exposure. The Superior Court dismissed plaintiff's complaint for inadequate pleading, failing to state a claim, failing to join necessary parties, and for forum non conveniens. Plaintiff appealed to the Delaware Supreme Court, arguing the Superior Court erred in its ruling. Finding no error, the Supreme Court affirmed the Superior Court. View "Martinez, et al. v. E.I. duPont de Nemours & Company, Inc." on Justia Law

Plaintiffs-appellants Marlene and Paul Dabaldo, Jr. filed a complaint against nineteen defendants, including defendant-appellee, URS Energy & Construction, f/k/a/ Washington Group International, as successor to Raytheon Constructors, f/k/a/ Catalytic, Inc. and Crane Co. Plaintiffs alleged that Mr. DaBaldo developed pulmonary asbestosis as a result of exposure to asbestos from defendants' companies and sought recovery for those alleged injuries. After the completion of discovery, the defendants moved for summary judgment arguing that the DaBaldos' claims were barred under the two-year statute of limitations applicable to personal injury claims. The Superior Court ruled from the bench that the DaBaldos' claims were time-barred. Plaintiffs argued on appeal that their 2009 complaint was timely filed. The Supreme Court concluded the trial court record supported plaintiffs' assertion. Therefore, the judgment of the Superior Court was reversed. View "Dabaldo v. URS Energy & Construction, et al." on Justia Law

Claimant-appellee and cross-appellant-appellant Amanda Wyatt appealed a Superior Court judgment reversing an Industrial Accident Board finding that she had a compensable, work-related injury. The employer-appellant and cross-appellee-appellee is Wyatt’s former employer, Rescare Home Care. On appeal, Wyatt argued: (1) the Superior Court erred in reversing the Board’s decision that her injury was a compensable industrial accident, since the Board’s decision was based upon substantial evidence; and (2) the Board erred in denying the medical expenses for her emergency back surgery. After careful consideration, the Supreme Court concluded the Superior Court erred in reversing the Board’s decision that the Claimant had a compensable work related injury. Furthermore, the Court concluded the Board properly determined that her back surgery was not compensable. View "Wyatt v. Rescare Home Care" on Justia Law

The issue before the Supreme Court in this case centered on whether Delaware’s personal injury protection (PIP) statute requires insurers to reserve PIP benefits for lost wages when requested. The plaintiff suffered severe injuries as a passenger in a car accident. While he was in a coma, his mother signed an assignment of insurance benefits in favor of the hospital. Plaintiff did not challenge the validity of the assignment. The hospital was promptly paid by the insurance company. When plaintiff later requested the insurers to reserve his PIP benefits for his past and future lost wages, he was informed that the benefits had been exhausted by the payment to the hospital. The Superior Court held sua sponte that the unchallenged assignment to the healthcare provider was invalid. Upon review of the facts of this case, the Supreme Court concluded the Superior Court erred as a matter of law in deciding that uncontested issue. Because the assignment on behalf of the plaintiff resulted in the exhaustion of his PIP benefits before the plaintiff requested the reservation of PIP benefits for his lost wages, the legal issue of whether the insurer was required to reserve PIP benefits for lost wages is moot. View "State Farm Mutual Automobile Insurance Co. v. Davis" on Justia Law

Robert McKinley and Michele Casson were involved in a motor vehicle accident McKinley’s motorcycle collided with the back of Casson’s SUV. McKinley, who was not wearing a motorcycle helmet, sustained serious injuries. The issue before the Supreme Court centered on several evidentiary rulings made by the trial court. Among other things, appellant contended the trial court erred in denying him access to the appellee’s medical records, and that the jury should not have been allowed to learn that he was not wearing a helmet at the time of the accident. The Supreme Court agreed, and reversed and remanded for a new trial. View "McKinley v. Casson" on Justia Law

Plaintiffs Kylie and Michael D. Shuba appealed the Superior Court's denial of their cross-motion for summary judgment and its grant of summary judgment in favor of Defendant United Services Automobile Association's ("USAA") motion for summary judgment. The Shuba's sought to be covered persons for the wrongful death of their mother under an insurance policy issued by USAA and held by the Shubas' step-mother. It was undisputed that their mother was not a named insured under the policy or a resident of the stepmother's household as the Shubas were. The Shubas claimed the trial court erred in finding the Shubas could not recover uninsured motorist benefits under the USAA policy. In making their claim, the Shubas asked the Supreme Court to overrule two Superior Court cases, "Temple v. Travelers Indemnity Co" and "Adams-Baez v. General Accident Co.," the latter of which the Supreme Court affirmed based on the trial court opinion. The Supreme Court declined to overrule those cases as precedent, and affirmed the Superior Court's judgment. View "Shuba v. United Services Automobile Association" on Justia Law

The issue before the Supreme Court in this case was whether the State of Delaware could be held liable for tortious conduct by an on-duty Delaware State Police Officer. The officer was supposed to take a woman accused of shop-lifting to court. Instead, the officer allegedly coerced her to engage in oral sex in the front seat of the police car. The trial court granted summary judgment to the State based on its conclusion that no reasonable jury could find that the officer was acting within the scope of his employment. The trial court focused only on the officer's tortious conduct, which was not within his job description. But the nature of the tortious conduct was not dispositive. There were other factors used to determine whether one is acting within the scope of employment, and the jury must make that decision. Accordingly, the Supreme Court reversed and remanded the case for further proceedings. View "Doe v. Delaware" on Justia Law

Claimant-appellant Stephen Arrants appealed a superior court order that affirmed an Industrial Accident Board's order granting employer-appellee Home Depot's petition to terminate appellant's total disability benefits. Appellant raised two claims on appeal: (1) the Board's decision was in error because all experts agreed that his condition had not improved since the 2007 Board finding of total disability; and (2) the Board's decision was not supported by competent evidence in the record. Upon review, the Supreme Court concluded that both arguments were without merit, and affirmed the superior court. View "Arrants v. Home Depot" on Justia Law

Appellant Mary E. Spellman ("Spellman") petitioned the Industrial Accident Board (the "Board") for a workers' compensation award against her employer, Appellee Christiana Care Health Services ("Christiana"). The Board denied the petition and the Superior Court affirmed. Appellant worked as a home health aide, where she used her personal vehicle to attend to Christiana's clients at their homes. While Appellant was reimbursed for mileage between client appointments, she was not reimbursed for travel to the first appointment, from the last appointment, or "off the clock" when she attended to personal business. In the middle of her work day, Appellant was off the clock when her car hit a patch of ice causing Appellant to crash her car. She sustained injuries to her head and hip. In her petition, Appellant argued that her status as a traveling employee exempted her from the "going and coming" rule that precludes workers' compensation for injuries suffered while going or coming from work. Alternatively, Appellant argued her injuries were compensable because she was engaged in a "mixed purpose" trip at the time of her accident. Having "no difficulty" sustaining the judgment of the Superior Court, the Supreme Court affirmed. View "Spellman v. Christiana Care Health Services" on Justia Law