Justia Delaware Supreme Court Opinion Summaries

Lisa Davis and her son, Brandon Zoladkiewicz, were involved in a car accident with an uninsured drunk driver, resulting in Davis's death and Brandon's serious injuries. Davis and her husband, Mark Ginsberg, had separate but nearly identical insurance policies from the same carrier, each with uninsured motorist coverage of $100,000 per person and $300,000 per accident. Ginsberg, individually and as executor of Davis's estate, and Ron Zoladkiewicz, as guardian ad litem for Brandon, sought coverage from both policies. The insurance carrier agreed to pay the coverage limit for one policy but refused to combine or stack the two policies.The Superior Court of Delaware dismissed the plaintiffs' complaint, agreeing with the insurance carrier that the Delaware Insurance Code limited coverage to one policy when the policies were issued by the same insurer to insureds in the same household. The court found that the statute allowed anti-stacking provisions and that the policies' provisions were not ambiguous enough to permit stacking.The Supreme Court of Delaware reversed the Superior Court's decision. The court held that the Delaware Insurance Code does not prohibit stacking of underinsured/uninsured motorist coverage policies issued by the same carrier to insureds in the same household. Instead, the Code requires that the court limit coverage to the highest limit of liability set by either insurance policy. The court found that the policies were ambiguous because they contained conflicting provisions regarding stacking. Interpreting the ambiguity in favor of the insureds, the court allowed stacking of the policies. Additionally, the court determined that the releases signed by Ginsberg and Brandon Zoladkiewicz did not preclude recovery under the Ginsberg Policy. The case was remanded to the Superior Court to determine the amount recoverable under the Ginsberg Policy. View "Ginsberg v. Harleysville Worcester Insurance Company" on Justia Law

The case involves Ferrellgas Partners L.P. and its subsidiaries (collectively "Ferrellgas") and Zurich American Insurance Company ("Zurich"). Ferrellgas had an insurance policy with Zurich, which included a provision for the advancement of defense costs for litigation. Ferrellgas was involved in a separate lawsuit with Eddystone Rail Company, LLC ("Eddystone") over a breach of contract. Ferrellgas sought to have Zurich cover the defense costs for the Eddystone litigation under their insurance policy.In the lower court, the Superior Court of the State of Delaware, Ferrellgas filed a motion for summary judgment seeking a declaratory relief obligating Zurich to advance defense costs for the Eddystone litigation. Zurich also filed a motion for summary judgment seeking a declaration that it had no obligation to advance defense costs. The Superior Court denied Ferrellgas' motion and granted Zurich's motion, finding that the Eddystone litigation was excluded from coverage under the Zurich policy.On appeal, the Supreme Court of the State of Delaware affirmed the decision of the Superior Court. The Supreme Court found that the Eddystone litigation was a claim seeking relief for a breach of contract that occurred after the commencement of the Run-Off Coverage Period in the Zurich policy. As such, Zurich had no duty to advance defense costs for this matter due to the Run-Off Exclusion in the policy. The court also found that Ferrellgas' appeal was timely filed. View "Ferrellgas Partners, L.P. v. Zurich American Insurance Company" on Justia Law

This case revolves around a dispute between insurance companies Zurich American Insurance Company and American Guarantee and Liability Insurance Company (collectively, “Zurich”), and Syngenta Crop Protection, LLC (“Syngenta”), a company that manufactures and sells paraquat, a chemical compound used in herbicides that has been linked to the onset of Parkinson's disease. Zurich had issued primary commercial general liability policies and umbrella policies to Syngenta covering periods from January 1, 2017 to January 1, 2020.In January 2016, before the Zurich policies took effect, Syngenta received a letter from a law firm representing numerous victims of Parkinson’s disease who alleged they had been exposed to paraquat. The letter, while threatening future litigation, did not identify any individual claimants or specify any damages. The law firm did not file any lawsuits until after the inception of the Zurich policies.Zurich denied coverage for the lawsuits, arguing that the 2016 letter constituted a “claim for damages" that fell outside the policy period. Syngenta disagreed, arguing that the letter was too unclear and amorphous to constitute a claim for damages. The Superior Court of the State of Delaware sided with Syngenta, holding that the letter did not constitute a "claim for damages" under the Zurich policies.The Supreme Court of the State of Delaware affirmed the lower court's decision. The Court held that a “claim for damages” is a demand or request for monetary relief by or on behalf of an identifiable claimant. The Court found that the letter did not constitute a claim for damages because it did not identify any claimants or demand any monetary relief. The Court also upheld the lower court's dismissal of Syngenta's bad-faith counterclaim against Zurich, finding that Zurich had reasonable grounds to deny coverage at the time of the denial. View "Zurich American Insurance Company v. Syngenta Crop Protection LLC" on Justia Law

In this case before the Supreme Court of the State of Delaware, the plaintiff, First State Orthopaedics, P.A., sought a declaration that a billing code used by the defendants (a group of insurance companies operating under the Liberty Mutual Group) to deny insurance coverage violated Delaware's workers' compensation law. The defendant companies had stopped using the challenged code six months before the plaintiff filed its complaint and none of the codes in their new billing system contained the same challenged language. The Superior Court held that the discontinuation of the code did not remove the plaintiff's standing to bring the case because the defendants might resume using the code in the future and because they had not "corrected" their response to 19 invoices for which they had previously denied coverage using the challenged code. On appeal, the Supreme Court of Delaware overturned the lower court's decision, ruling that the plaintiff lacked standing to bring the case because the defendants had stopped using the challenged code before the plaintiff filed its complaint, and therefore, the plaintiff's request for a declaration that the code violated workers' compensation law did not seek to address an actual or imminent injury. The court also ruled that the defendants' alleged failure to correct their responses to 19 invoices could not confer standing because the prospective relief that a declaratory judgment affords would not redress the injury caused by the statements already issued to the plaintiff's patients. View "Employers Insurance Company of Wasau v. First State Orthopaedics, P.A." on Justia Law

In this case, the Supreme Court of the State of Delaware reversed the decision of the Superior Court of the State of Delaware. The case centered around an insurance dispute involving Verizon Communications, Inc. and several of its insurers. The dispute arose after Verizon settled a lawsuit brought by a litigation trust, which was pursuing claims against Verizon arising out of a transaction Verizon had made with FairPoint Communications Inc. The litigation trust had alleged that Verizon made fraudulent transfers in the course of the transaction, which harmed FairPoint's creditors. After settling the lawsuit, Verizon sought coverage for the settlement payment and defense costs from its insurers.The insurers denied coverage, arguing that the litigation trust's claims did not qualify as a "Securities Claim" under the relevant insurance policies. The Superior Court disagreed, ruling that the litigation trust's claims were brought derivatively on behalf of FairPoint by a security holder of FairPoint, as required to qualify as a Securities Claim under the policies.The Supreme Court of Delaware reversed this decision, finding that the litigation trust's claims were direct, not derivative. The court reasoned that the trust's claims were brought on behalf of the creditors, not FairPoint or its subsidiary, and the relief sought would benefit the creditors, not the business entity. Therefore, the claims did not meet the definition of a Securities Claim under the insurance policies. Consequently, the Supreme Court held that the insurers were not obligated to cover Verizon's settlement payment and defense costs. View "In re Fairpoint Insurance Coverage Appeals" on Justia Law

Guaranteed Rate, Inc., a mortgage lender, purchased two types of insurance policies from ACE American Insurance Company: management liability and professional liability. Guaranteed Rate sought coverage under the policies for an investigation and eventual settlement of claims brought by the federal government under the False Claims Act. ACE denied coverage under both policies. According to ACE, the Professional Liability Policy expressly excluded False Claims Act charges. ACE also contended that the False Claims Act charges arose from Guaranteed Rate’s professional services, which were excluded under the Management Liability Policy. Only the Management Liability Policy was at issue in this appeal. In Guaranteed Rate’s suit against ACE, a Delaware superior court held that the False Claims Act investigation and settlement did not arise out of Guaranteed Rate’s professional services. Instead, it arose out of false certifications made to the government. Thus, the Management Liability Policy covered the loss. To this, the Delaware Supreme Court agreed with the superior court. View "ACE American Insurance Company v. Guaranteed Rate, Inc." on Justia Law

In a previous action between these parties, the Delaware Supreme Court addressed whether the exclusive-remedies provision in the workers’ compensation act precluded an injured employee from pursuing recovery from an uninsured motorist policy. After the Court held that the exclusive-remedies provision did not apply, the employer and its workers’ compensation carrier sought a declaratory judgment that they were permitted to assert a lien against any recovery the employee might obtain for injuries already compensated under the workers’ compensation act. The employee and the uninsured motorist insurer contended that any such lien was barred by statute, relying on the Court’s decision in Simendinger v. National Union Fire Insurance Co., 74 A.3d 609 (Del. 2013). The superior court followed that binding precedent as it was required to do and dismissed the declaratory judgment claim. After review however, the Delaware Supreme Court concluded Simendinger was decided in error. The Court therefore reversed the superior court’s decision and held that the workers’ compensation act expressly allowed the employer and its workers’ compensation carrier to assert a subrogation lien against benefits paid to the employee under the employer’s uninsured motorist policy. View "Horizon Services, Inc. v. Henry" on Justia Law

Sathiyaselvam Thangavel and Sasikala Muthusamy were tenants who leased an apartment from Seaford Apartment Ventures, LLC. The complaint filed by Seaford Apartment’s insurer, Donegal Mutual Insurance Company, alleged that the tenants hit a sprinkler head while they flew a drone inside the apartment. Water sprayed from the damaged sprinkler head and caused damage to the apartment building. Seaford Apartment filed an insurance claim with Donegal, who paid $77,704.06 to repair the water damage. Donegal then brought this action against the tenants through subrogation and alleged that the tenants were negligent and breached the property’s rules and regulations. Donegal sought to recover the repair costs from the tenants. Under the "Sutton" rule, landlords and tenants are co-insureds under the landlord’s fire insurance policy unless a tenant’s lease clearly expresses an intent to the contrary. If the Sutton rule applies, the landlord’s insurer cannot pursue the tenant for the landlord’s damages by way of subrogation. In this case, a Delaware superior court ruled in the tenants’ favor at summary judgment that the Sutton rule applied because the lease did not clearly express an intent to hold the tenants liable for the landlord’s damages. To this the Delaware Supreme Court agreed and affirmed. View "Donegal Mutual Insurance Company v. Thangavel" on Justia Law

Wilmington Trust National Association, acting as securities intermediary for Viva Capital Trust, was the downstream purchaser of two high- value life insurance policies issued by Sun Life Assurance Company of Canada. After the insureds died, Sun Life, believing that the policies were “stranger originated life insurance” ("STOLI") policies that lacked an insurable interest, filed suit in the Superior Court, seeking declaratory judgments that the policies were void ab initio. Sun Life sought to avoid paying the death benefits and to retain the premiums that had been paid on the policies. Wilmington Trust asserted affirmative defenses and counterclaims, alleging that Sun Life had flagged the policies as potential STOLI years before Wilmington Trust acquired them. Wilmington Trust sought to obtain the death benefits or, in the alternative, a refund of all the premiums that it and former owners of the policies had paid on the policies. Sun Life countered that allowing Wilmington Trust to recover the death benefits would constitute enforcing an illegal STOLI policy and that Wilmington Trust could not recover the premiums because, among other arguments, Wilmington Trust knew that it was buying and paying premiums on illegal STOLI policies. The trial court denied Wilmington Trust’s bid to secure the death benefits, but ordered Sun Life to reimburse, without prejudgment interest, all premiums “to the party that paid them.” The Delaware Supreme Court agreed with the trial court’s disallowance of Wilmington Trust’s death-benefit claim, accomplished in part by an earlier dismissal of Wilmington Trust’s promissory- estoppel counterclaim and the striking of certain of its equitable defenses, finding it was consistent with STOLI precedents. But its application of an “automatic premium return” rule—that is, ordering all premiums to be returned without conducting the fault-based analysis we adopted in Geronta Funding v. Brighthouse Life Ins. Co., 284 A.3d 47 (Del. 2022)—was not. Nor was the trial court’s denial of prejudgment interest. Therefore, the Supreme Court affirmed in part, reversed in part, and remanded to the superior court for reconsideration of its ruling on Wilmington Trust’s premium-return claim, including its claim for prejudgment interest. View "Wilmington Trust National Association v. Sun Life Assurance Company of Canada" on Justia Law

Stillwater Mining Company filed suit against its directors’ and officers’ liability insurers to recover the expenses it incurred defending a Delaware stockholder appraisal action. The superior court granted the insurers’ motions to dismiss after it found that Delaware law applied to the dispute and the Delaware Supreme Court’s decision in In re Solera Ins. Coverage Appeals (“Solera II”) precluded coverage for losses incurred in a stockholder appraisal action under a similar D&O policy. The primary issue on appeal was whether Delaware or Montana law applied to the claims in Stillwater’s amended complaint. Stillwater argued that the superior court should have applied Montana law because Montana had the most significant relationship to the dispute and the parties. If Montana law applied, according to Stillwater, it could recover its defense costs because Montana recognized coverage by estoppel, meaning the insurers were estopped to deny coverage when they failed to defend Stillwater in the appraisal action. Before the Delaware Supreme Court issued Solera II, the Solera I court held that D&O insureds could recover losses incurred in a stockholder appraisal action. Taking advantage of that favorable ruling, Stillwater argued in its complaint that Delaware law applied to the interpretation of the policies. Then when Solera II was issued, Stillwater reversed position and claimed that Montana law applied to the policies. Its amended complaint dropped all indemnity claims for covered losses in favor of three contractual claims for the duty to advance defense costs and a statutory claim under Montana law. In the Supreme Court's view, Stillwater’s amended claims raised the same Delaware interests that Stillwater identified in its original complaint – applying one consistent body of law to insurance policies that cover comprehensively the insured’s directors’, officers’, and corporate liability across many jurisdictions. It then held the superior court did not abuse its discretion when it denied Stillwater's motions. View "Stillwater Mining Company v. National Union Fire Insurance Company of Pittsburgh, PA" on Justia Law