Justia Delaware Supreme Court Opinion Summaries

Articles Posted in Insurance Law
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Defendant-Appellant First Health Settlement Class appealed a superior court order that granted partial summary judgment in favor of plaintiff-appellee Chartis Specialty Insurance Company. This was one of a number of class action cases filed against First Health and others in the State of Louisiana. In those actions, medical service providers alleged that First Health violated notice provisions contained in a Louisiana statute known as the Preferred Provider Organizations Act. First Health ultimately entered into a settlement in which it resolved all of the Louisiana litigation. Chartis was First Health's errors and omissions insurance insurer. The policy had a number of exclusions, one of which was an exclusion for "penalties." The issue this case presented for the Delaware Supreme Court's review was whether the amount that First Health paid to settle the Louisiana litigation was a "penalty," and, therefore, not a covered loss under the insurance policy. The superior court concluded that the amount paid was a "penalty." The Delaware court disagreed, concluding that it was not a "penalty," and that the policy's exclusion for "penalties" did not apply. View "The First Health Settlement Class v. Chartis Speciality Insurance Co." on Justia Law

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Defendant-Appellant CorVel Corporation appealed a superior court order that granted partial summary judgment in favor of plaintiff-appellee Homeland Insurance Company of New York. This was one of a number of class action cases filed against CorVel and others in the State of Louisiana. In those actions, medical service providers alleged that CorVel violated notice provisions contained in a Louisiana statute known as the Preferred Provider Organizations Act. CorVel ultimately entered into a settlement in which it resolved all of the Louisiana litigation. Homeland was CorVel's errors and omissions insurance insurer. The policy had a number of exclusions, one of which was an exclusion for "penalties." The issue this case presented for the Delaware Supreme Court's review was whether the amount that CorVel paid to settle the Louisiana litigation was a "penalty," and, therefore, not a covered loss under the insurance policy. The superior court concluded that the amount paid was a "penalty." The Delaware court disagreed, concluding that it was not a "penalty," and that the policy's exclusion for "penalties" did not apply. View "Corvel Corporation v. Homeland Insurance Company of New York" on Justia Law

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Jose Campos was injured while working for Daisy Construction Company. While Campos was receiving total disability payments from Daisy, Daisy performed an investigation of his social security number at the request of its workers' compensation insurance carrier and discovered that Campos was an undocumented worker. When Campos could not provide a valid number, Daisy terminated his employment. Around the same time, Daisy hired a doctor to re-evaluate Campos' medical condition. The doctor concluded that although Campos remained partially disabled, he could perform "light duty" work with restrictions. Daisy then filed a petition with the Industrial Accident Board to terminate Campos' total disability benefit payments. The Board granted Daisy's petition because Campos was physically capable of working and therefore was not totally disabled. The Board also found that Campos was not eligible for partial disability benefits, reasoning that Daisy had met its burden of showing that Campos had no decrease in earning capacity by testifying that Campos would be eligible for light duty jobs at Daisy at his pre-injury wage rate if he could provide a valid social security number. The Superior Court affirmed the Board's decision. After its review, the Delaware Supreme Court concluded the Board erred when it found that Campos was not eligible for partial disability benefits: "If we were to hold that Daisy's testimony constituted sufficient proof of job availability, an employer could always hire an undocumented worker, have him suffer a workplace injury, and then avoid partial disability benefit payments by 'discovering' his immigration status, offering to re-employ him if he could fix it, and claiming that a job is available to him at no loss in wages. This outcome would be contrary to the Workers' Compensation Act and our case law interpreting it, [...] which prevents employers from depriving undocumented workers of employment benefits. [...]Accordingly, Daisy must continue to pay partial disability payments until it can demonstrate that Campos has no decrease in earning power from his workplace injury, or until the statutory period for partial disability benefit eligibility expires. Federal restrictions that prevent employers from hiring undocumented workers may make it more difficult for Daisy to prove job availability, but any difficulty is appropriately borne by it as the employer, who must take the employee, Campos, as it hired him." View "Campos v. Daisy Construction Co." on Justia Law

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Appellant North River Insurance Company challenged the Court of Chancery’s denial of its request for permanent injunctive relief. This multi-forum litigation concerns policies issued by North River to a safety products company, Mine Safety Appliances Company (MSA). North River issued thirteen policies to MSA covering periods from 1972 through 1986. MSA defended against thousands of personal injury claims allegedly caused by defects in its mine safety equipment. MSA seeks coverage under North River’s policies as well as from several other insurers. The issue this case presented for the Supreme Court's review was whether North River’s coverage under these policies was "triggered" (as a matter of Pennsylvania law), and was being litigated, along with its claims against other insurers in federal and state courts in Pennsylvania, the Delaware Superior Court and in certain later-filed cases in West Virginia. North River requested that the Court of Chancery permanently enjoin MSA from prosecuting the later-filed claims in West Virginia and from assigning to any tort claimants the right to recover under any insurance policy issued by North River to MSA. During the course of this appeal, North River narrowed its focus to the assignment issue. Finding no reversible error to the Court of Chancery's decision, the Delaware Supreme Court affirmed. View "The North River Insurance Co. v. Mine Safety Appliances Co." on Justia Law

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Appellant North River Insurance Company appealed the Court of Chancery’s denial of its request for permanent injunctive relief. This multi-forum litigation concerned policies issued by North River to a safety products company, Mine Safety Appliances Company (“MSA”). North River issued thirteen policies to MSA covering periods from August 28, 1972 through April 1, 1986. MSA was defending against thousands of personal injury claims allegedly caused by defects in its mine safety equipment. MSA sought coverage under North River’s policies as well as from several other insurers. The issue this case presented for review was whether North River’s coverage under these policies was “triggered” (a matter of Pennsylvania law) was being litigated, along with its claims against other insurers, in federal and state courts in Pennsylvania, the Delaware Superior Court and in certain later-filed cases in West Virginia. North River requested that the Delaware Court of Chancery permanently enjoin MSA from prosecuting the later-filed claims in West Virginia and from assigning to any tort claimants the right to recover under any insurance policy issued by North River to MSA. During the course of this appeal, North River narrowed its focus to the assignment issue. Finding no reversible error in the Court of Chancery's denial, the Delaware Supreme Court affirmed that decision. View "The North River Insurance Co. v. Mine Safety Appliances Co." on Justia Law

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The issue this case presented to the Delaware Supreme Court centered on whether coverage existed under certain management liability insurance policies. A bankruptcy trust sought a determination that those insurance policies covered potential future expenses and liabilities that might have arisen out of pre-bankruptcy wrongful acts allegedly committed by the insured debtor company’s directors and officers. XL Specialty Insurance Company and certain excess insurance carriers, appealed a Superior Court order denying their motion to dismiss the action. They claimed that the plaintiff-appellee, WMI Liquidating Trust lacked standing to prosecute its coverage claims, and, that the dispute did not present a ripe "actual controversy" susceptible of adjudication. Because the Supreme Court held that the Trust’s complaint must be dismissed on ripeness grounds, it did not reach the issue of standing. The parties’ dispute was not ripe because it has not yet assumed a concrete or final form. View "XL Specialty Insurance Co., et al. v. WMI Liquidating Trust" on Justia Law

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RB Entertainment is one of a complicated web of at least seventeen different companies that Appellant Jeffrey Cohen allegedly owns and controls. Central to this appeal was one issue: whether the delinquency proceedings for Indemnity Insurance Corporation, RRG violated the constitutional due process rights of Cohen or Co-Appellant RB Entertainment Ventures. Co-Appellant IDG Companies, LLC (Indemnity's managing general agent), was also one of the Cohen-affiliated entities. After uncovering evidence that Cohen had committed fraud in his capacity as Indemnity's CEO and that Indemnity might be insolvent, the Delaware Insurance Commissioner petitioned the Court of Chancery for a seizure order. The Delaware Uniform Insurers Liquidation Act. Based on the detailed allegations and supporting evidence presented by the Commissioner, the Court of Chancery granted that seizure order, which, among other things, prohibited anyone with notice of the proceedings from transacting the business of Indemnity, selling or destroying Indemnity’s assets, or asserting claims against Indemnity in other venues without permission from the Commissioner. The seizure order also prohibited anyone with notice of the proceedings from interfering with the Commissioner in the discharge of her duties. Cohen, who founded Indemnity and had served as its President, Chairman, and CEO, resigned from Indemnity's board during the ensuing investigation and the board removed him from his managerial positions. After his resignation, Cohen interfered with the Commissioner's efforts to operate Indemnity in various ways. The Commissioner returned to the Court of Chancery several times, first seeking an amendment to the seizure order to address Cohen's behavior and then seeking sanctions against him. The Court of Chancery entered a series of orders that increased the restrictions on Cohen's behavior and imposed stiffer sanctions upon him. Cohen argued that he was denied due process at several junctures during the Court of Chancery proceedings. Because Cohen's claims alleged violations of his right to due process, the focus of the Supreme Court's opinion was on whether Cohen was given notice of the allegations against him and a fair opportunity to present his side of the dispute. Having carefully examined the record in this case, the Court concluded that he was given that opportunity: no violation of Cohen's or the affiliated entities' due process rights occurred. View "Cohen, et al. v. State of Delaware, et al." on Justia Law

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A plaintiff who was injured in an accident sought PIP benefits from an insurance carrier. The Superior Court applied Delaware's current three-part test and analyzed: (1) "whether the vehicle was an 'active accessory' in causing the injury," (2) "whether there was an act of independent significance that broke the causal link between use of the vehicle and the injuries inflicted," and (3) "whether the vehicle was used for transportation purposes." After concluding that the insured vehicle was not used for transportation purposes, the court granted the insurance carrier's motion for summary judgment. Upon reexamination of the statutory framework for PIP coverage, the Supreme Court concluded that the test's "transportation purposes" element should have been rejected. Therefore, the Court reversed the Superior Court judgment and remanded the case for further proceedings.View "Kelty v. State Farm Mutual Automobile Insurance Co." on Justia Law

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The Superior Court dismissed the underlying complaint in this case based solely upon its determination that a 2011 Settlement Agreement barred the Plaintiffs’ claims as constituting an impermissible collateral attack on a 2009 Insurance Agreement. The Superior Court did not address the sufficiency of the Plaintiffs’ allegations supporting their claims. In this appeal, Plaintiffs contended that the Superior Court should not have dismissed their claims because the 2011 Settlement Agreement was reasonably susceptible to the Plaintiffs’ interpretation. Therefore, extrinsic evidence of the parties’ intent was necessary to resolve any dispute over the 2011 Settlement Agreement’s terms. After its review, the Supreme Court concluded the Superior Court erred in holding that, as a matter of law, the 2011 Settlement Agreement unambiguously precluded the Plaintiffs from asserting the claims that are at issue in this action. The intent of the parties in negotiating the 2011 Settlement Agreement was a factual question inappropriate for resolution on a Rule 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss. View "Nicholas, et al. v. National Union Fire Insurance Co. of Pittsburgh, PA, et al." on Justia Law

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Claimant-appellee and cross-appellant-appellant Amanda Wyatt appealed a Superior Court judgment reversing an Industrial Accident Board finding that she had a compensable, work-related injury. The employer-appellant and cross-appellee-appellee is Wyatt’s former employer, Rescare Home Care. On appeal, Wyatt argued: (1) the Superior Court erred in reversing the Board’s decision that her injury was a compensable industrial accident, since the Board’s decision was based upon substantial evidence; and (2) the Board erred in denying the medical expenses for her emergency back surgery. After careful consideration, the Supreme Court concluded the Superior Court erred in reversing the Board’s decision that the Claimant had a compensable work related injury. Furthermore, the Court concluded the Board properly determined that her back surgery was not compensable. View "Wyatt v. Rescare Home Care" on Justia Law