Justia Delaware Supreme Court Opinion Summaries

Defendant-appellant-cross-appellee R.T. Vanderbilt Company, Inc. appealed a Superior Court judgment on a jury verdict of $2,864,583.33 plus interest to Plaintiff-appellees-cross-appellant Darcel Galliher, individually and on behalf of the Estate of Michael Galliher. The decedent, Michael Galliher, contracted and died from mesothelioma as a result of exposure to asbestos or asbestiform material while employed by Borg Warner at a bathroom fixtures facility. Vanderbilt provided industrial talc to Borg Warner, which was alleged to be the source of the substance that caused Michael's illness. At trial, Vanderbilt denied causation and claimed that Borg Warner was responsible because it did not operate the facility in a manner that was safe for employees like Michael. Vanderbilt argued: (1) the trial court erred when it failed to instruct the jury on the duty of care required of Borg Warner, as Michael's employer; and (2) the trial court erred when it failed to grant a new trial based on the admission of unreliable and inflammatory evidence that previously was ruled inadmissible. Galliher argued on cross-appeal that the trial court erred as a matter of law when it disallowed post-judgment interest for a certain period of months. The Supreme Court found that the trial court erred when it failed to provide any instruction to the jury on Borg Warner's duty of care to Michael, despite Vanderbilt's request that it do so. The trial court also abused its discretion when it denied Vanderbilt's motion for a new trial based upon the substantial prejudice resulting from the admission of evidence, not subject to cross-examination, that it had engaged in criminal conduct. Accordingly, the Court reversed the judgment and remanded for a new trial. View "R.T. Vanderbilt Company, Inc., v. Galliher, et al." on Justia Law

Defendant-Appellant-Cross Appellee Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. appealed a final judgment of the Court of Chancery identifying specific steps Wal-Mart must take in searching for documents, and specific categories of documents Wal-Mart must produce, in response to a demand made by Plaintiff -Appellee-Cross Appellant Indiana Electrical Workers Pension Trust Fund IBEW pursuant to title 8, section 220 of the Delaware Code. The Court of Chancery conducted a Section 220 trial on the papers to determine whether Wal-Mart had produced all responsive documents in reply to IBEW’s demand. The Court of Chancery entered a Final Order and Judgment, requiring Wal-Mart to produce a wide variety of additional documents, including ones whose content was privileged or protected by the work-product doctrine. Wal-Mart appealed the Court of Chancery’s Final Order with regard to its obligations to provide the additional documents. IBEW filed a cross-appeal, arguing that the Court of Chancery erred in failing to require Wal-Mart to correct the deficiencies in its previous document productions and in granting in part Wal-Mart’s motion to strike its use of certain Whistleblower Documents. After its review of the matter, the Delaware Supreme Court concluded that all of the issues raised in this appeal and cross-appeal were without merit. Therefore, the judgment of the Court of Chancery was affirmed. View "Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. v. Indiana Electrical Workers Trust Fund IBEW" on Justia Law

The issue this case presented to the Delaware Supreme Court arose out of a situation where a police officer retired while his conduct was under investigation by his employing police force. After the officer retired, the Council on Police Training revoked his certification as a police officer in the State of Delaware on the grounds that the officer’s retirement itself constituted a knowing and voluntary waiver of his right to a hearing under the Law Enforcement Officer’s Bill of Rights. The Supreme Court concluded that because the plain language of section 8404(a)(4)(e) provided that the Council could only revoke the certification of a retired officer if the officer both retired pending the resolution of an investigation that could have resulted in his discharge from the police force and “knowingly and voluntarily waived” his right to a hearing under the Law Enforcement Officer’s Bill of Rights, the Council erred. The Superior Court’s reversal of the Council’s revocation of his certification was affirmed. View "Council on Police Training v. Delaware" on Justia Law

Claimant-appellee and cross-appellant-appellant Amanda Wyatt appealed a Superior Court judgment reversing an Industrial Accident Board finding that she had a compensable, work-related injury. The employer-appellant and cross-appellee-appellee is Wyatt’s former employer, Rescare Home Care. On appeal, Wyatt argued: (1) the Superior Court erred in reversing the Board’s decision that her injury was a compensable industrial accident, since the Board’s decision was based upon substantial evidence; and (2) the Board erred in denying the medical expenses for her emergency back surgery. After careful consideration, the Supreme Court concluded the Superior Court erred in reversing the Board’s decision that the Claimant had a compensable work related injury. Furthermore, the Court concluded the Board properly determined that her back surgery was not compensable. View "Wyatt v. Rescare Home Care" on Justia Law

Plaintiff appealed a Court of Chancery order that granted summary judgment and dismissed his suit on laches grounds. The underlying dispute arose over capital investments plaintiff made in two companies. Upon review, the Supreme Court concluded plaintiff's arguments made on appeal lacked merit, however, the Court reversed and remanded on different grounds. View "Levey v. Brownstone Asset Management, LLP, et al." on Justia Law

Claimant-appellant Stephen Arrants appealed a superior court order that affirmed an Industrial Accident Board's order granting employer-appellee Home Depot's petition to terminate appellant's total disability benefits. Appellant raised two claims on appeal: (1) the Board's decision was in error because all experts agreed that his condition had not improved since the 2007 Board finding of total disability; and (2) the Board's decision was not supported by competent evidence in the record. Upon review, the Supreme Court concluded that both arguments were without merit, and affirmed the superior court. View "Arrants v. Home Depot" on Justia Law

Claimants Cecil Palomino, Salvador Avila-Hernandez and Julio Munoz were each injured in different work-related accidents. It was not disputed that their injuries were compensable under the Worker's Compensation Act and that payments of some worker's compensation have been made. After their doctors recommended certain treatments, their employers requested determinations of whether the treatment plans fell outside of the Health Care Practice ("HCAP") Guidelines through a utilization review ("UR"). The UR panel determined that portions of their treatments were not approved for coverage. Claimants petitioned the Industrial Accident Board for review of the UR determination after the 45 day time window prescribed by Department of Labor Regulation 5.5.1. The Board dismissed the petitions as untimely. Claimants appealed to the Superior Court, which determined that the 45 day limit of Regulation 5.5.1 was invalid because it conflicted with 19 Del. C. sec 2361. The employers appealed from the Superior Court's judgment. Finding no merit to the appeal, the Supreme Court affirmed. View "Christiana Care Health Services v. Palomino" on Justia Law

Appellant Mary E. Spellman ("Spellman") petitioned the Industrial Accident Board (the "Board") for a workers' compensation award against her employer, Appellee Christiana Care Health Services ("Christiana"). The Board denied the petition and the Superior Court affirmed. Appellant worked as a home health aide, where she used her personal vehicle to attend to Christiana's clients at their homes. While Appellant was reimbursed for mileage between client appointments, she was not reimbursed for travel to the first appointment, from the last appointment, or "off the clock" when she attended to personal business. In the middle of her work day, Appellant was off the clock when her car hit a patch of ice causing Appellant to crash her car. She sustained injuries to her head and hip. In her petition, Appellant argued that her status as a traveling employee exempted her from the "going and coming" rule that precludes workers' compensation for injuries suffered while going or coming from work. Alternatively, Appellant argued her injuries were compensable because she was engaged in a "mixed purpose" trip at the time of her accident. Having "no difficulty" sustaining the judgment of the Superior Court, the Supreme Court affirmed. View "Spellman v. Christiana Care Health Services" on Justia Law

The issue before the Supreme Court in this matter was whether the Chancery Court was required to dismiss a Delaware derivative complaint after a California federal court entered final judgment dismissing the same complaint brought by different stockholders. The Chancery Court determined it was not required to give preclusive effect to the California judgment. Upon review, the Supreme Court held that the Chancery Court erred in its determination: (1) the lower court held as a matter of Delaware law that the stockholder plaintiffs in the two jurisdictions were not in privity with one another; (2) that the California stockholders were not adequate representatives of the defendant corporation; (3) California law controlled the issue, and derivative stockholders were in privity with one another because they acted on behalf of the corporation; and (4) the Chancery Court adopted a presumption of inadequacy without the record to support it. Accordingly, the Supreme Court reversed and remanded. View "Pyott v. Louisiana Municipal Police Employees' Retirement System" on Justia Law

Two employees of Connections CSP, Inc. were killed in an automobile collision during the course and scope of their employment. Connections owned the vehicle and had purchased underinsured motorist insurance (UIM) for the vehicle and also worker's compensation insurance which covered the employees. The UIM insurer paid its policy limit of $1,000,000. The worker's compensation insurer also paid benefits to the representatives of the decedents. The worker's compensation insurer then sought to enforce a lien upon the UIM payment equal to the worker's compensation benefits it paid. But the UIM policy specifically excluded the direct or indirect benefit of any insurer or self-insurer under a worker's compensation claim. Notwithstanding this exclusion, the Superior Court enforced the lien based upon its interpretation of 19 Del. C. 2363(e), which allows reimbursement of a worker's compensation carrier "from the third party liability insurer." The UIM insurer appealed. Upon review, the Supreme Court held that General Assembly eliminated the ability of a worker's compensation insurer to assert a lien against the UIM payments made pursuant to the employer's UIM policy. Because the Superior Court erred as a matter of law in enforcing a lien, the Supreme Court reversed its decision and remanded the case for further proceedings. View "Simendinger v. National Union Fire Insurance Co." on Justia Law