Justia Delaware Supreme Court Opinion Summaries

Appellant Mary E. Spellman ("Spellman") petitioned the Industrial Accident Board (the "Board") for a workers' compensation award against her employer, Appellee Christiana Care Health Services ("Christiana"). The Board denied the petition and the Superior Court affirmed. Appellant worked as a home health aide, where she used her personal vehicle to attend to Christiana's clients at their homes. While Appellant was reimbursed for mileage between client appointments, she was not reimbursed for travel to the first appointment, from the last appointment, or "off the clock" when she attended to personal business. In the middle of her work day, Appellant was off the clock when her car hit a patch of ice causing Appellant to crash her car. She sustained injuries to her head and hip. In her petition, Appellant argued that her status as a traveling employee exempted her from the "going and coming" rule that precludes workers' compensation for injuries suffered while going or coming from work. Alternatively, Appellant argued her injuries were compensable because she was engaged in a "mixed purpose" trip at the time of her accident. Having "no difficulty" sustaining the judgment of the Superior Court, the Supreme Court affirmed. View "Spellman v. Christiana Care Health Services" on Justia Law

The issue before the Supreme Court in this matter was whether the Chancery Court was required to dismiss a Delaware derivative complaint after a California federal court entered final judgment dismissing the same complaint brought by different stockholders. The Chancery Court determined it was not required to give preclusive effect to the California judgment. Upon review, the Supreme Court held that the Chancery Court erred in its determination: (1) the lower court held as a matter of Delaware law that the stockholder plaintiffs in the two jurisdictions were not in privity with one another; (2) that the California stockholders were not adequate representatives of the defendant corporation; (3) California law controlled the issue, and derivative stockholders were in privity with one another because they acted on behalf of the corporation; and (4) the Chancery Court adopted a presumption of inadequacy without the record to support it. Accordingly, the Supreme Court reversed and remanded. View "Pyott v. Louisiana Municipal Police Employees' Retirement System" on Justia Law

Two employees of Connections CSP, Inc. were killed in an automobile collision during the course and scope of their employment. Connections owned the vehicle and had purchased underinsured motorist insurance (UIM) for the vehicle and also worker's compensation insurance which covered the employees. The UIM insurer paid its policy limit of $1,000,000. The worker's compensation insurer also paid benefits to the representatives of the decedents. The worker's compensation insurer then sought to enforce a lien upon the UIM payment equal to the worker's compensation benefits it paid. But the UIM policy specifically excluded the direct or indirect benefit of any insurer or self-insurer under a worker's compensation claim. Notwithstanding this exclusion, the Superior Court enforced the lien based upon its interpretation of 19 Del. C. 2363(e), which allows reimbursement of a worker's compensation carrier "from the third party liability insurer." The UIM insurer appealed. Upon review, the Supreme Court held that General Assembly eliminated the ability of a worker's compensation insurer to assert a lien against the UIM payments made pursuant to the employer's UIM policy. Because the Superior Court erred as a matter of law in enforcing a lien, the Supreme Court reversed its decision and remanded the case for further proceedings. View "Simendinger v. National Union Fire Insurance Co." on Justia Law

The issue before the Supreme Court in this case centered on whether a jury verdict in favor of a racing official should have been reinstated. The racing official, who had been suspended by the Delaware Harness Racing Commission, claimed that the Commission reneged on its promise to reinstate him. The jury agreed, but the trial court later determined that the racing official's claim failed as a matter of law. Upon review, the Supreme Court held that the racing official's promissory estoppel claim which was accepted by the jury, subjected the Commission to liability. The trial court also held that the jury verdict was excessive and against the great weight of the evidence, thereby justifying a new trial. The Supreme Court concluded that the trial court's entry of judgment in favor of the Commission was reversed, but disagreed that the verdict was excessive and reinstated the jury's verdict. View "Harmon v. Delaware" on Justia Law

Pro se appellant Holly Noel-Liszkiewicz appealed a superior court's decision to affirm the Industrial Accident Board's denial of her claim for worker's compensation benefits. Appellant was a customer service representative for Employer La-Z-Boy before being laid off. Almost two years after the lay off, Appellant petitioned the board seeking compensation for occupational asthma, pulmonary fibrosis, and respiratory failure allegedly caused by exposure to chemicals at La-Z-Boy’s facility. La-Z-Boy denied that Applicant suffered any illness or injury that was causally related to her work. Finding Appellant's arguments to be without merit, the Supreme Court affirmed both the Board and the superior court. View "Noel-Liszkiewicz v. La-Z-Boy" on Justia Law

The plaintiff-appellants, Bruce Bermel and Pamela Jurga, as husband and wife, appealed the final judgment of the Superior Court granting the motion for summary judgment of the defendant-appellee, Liberty Mutual Fire Insurance Company. The appellants contended that the Superior Court erred by granting summary judgment in favor of Liberty. Bermel was injured in an automobile accident when his personal motorcycle was struck head-on by another driver. Bermel, then an employee of the Siemens Corporation, contended that the business policy issued to Siemens by Liberty on a company car that was assigned for his business and personal use, provided him with $100,000 in underinsured motorist coverage even when he was operating a non-work vehicle in circumstances unrelated to his employment. Bermel brought this action for underinsured benefits (“UIM”) against Liberty arguing: (1) that the Liberty Policy covering the company car he used was personal to him, even though Siemens was the named insured; (2) that he was entitled to personally access the Liberty Policy because Siemens automatically deducted a nominal fee from his paycheck for his personal use of the vehicle assigned to him that was insured by the Liberty Policy; and (3) that the Liberty Policy was ambiguously drafted and should have been construed in his favor. Upon review, the Supreme Court concluded that the Superior Court correctly found Siemens, and not Bermel, to be the named insured on the Liberty Policy, that the nominal fee charged to Bermel by Siemens for the use of the car did not make Bermel a named insured under the Liberty Policy, and that the Liberty Policy was unambiguous. Therefore, the judgments of the Superior Court were affirmed. View "Bermel v. Liberty Mutual Fire Insurance Co." on Justia Law

Appellant Reuben Cordero appealed a Superior Court order that affirmed an order of the Industrial Accident Board dismissing his petitions against a general contractor, Gulfstream Development Corporation, and a Gulfstream subcontractor, Delaware Siding Company. On appeal, Cordero argued that the Superior Court reversibly erred in interpreting 19 Del. C. sec. 2311(a)(5). Upon review, the Supreme Court disagreed and affirmed the Board's decision. View "Cordero v. Gulfstream Development Corporation" on Justia Law

Appellant George Sweeney appealed a superior court order that affirmed a Merit Employee Relations Board (MERB) order denying his appeal from the Delaware Department of Transportation’s (DelDOT) termination of his employment. While working as a Delaware government employee in a state government building, Sweeney made three postings on an internet forum about his personal political campaign. 29 Del. C. 5954 mandates that any government employee who engages in "political activity" at work must be terminated from his employment. Upon review, the Supreme Court affirmed that portion of the Superior Court order determining that Section 5954 did not violate Sweeney’s First Amendment right to free speech. However, the Court reversed and remanded the case back to the Superior Court for further proceedings to consider: (1) what constitutes "political activity" under Section 5954; and (2) whether Section 5954 is unconstitutionally overbroad or vague. View "Sweeney v. Dept. of Transportation" on Justia Law

DTC filed a complaint with the Court of Chancery against the Union and Harry Bruckner, a para-transit driver, in the nature of a declaratory judgment action (Complaint) pursuant to Title 1, Chapter 65. The Complaint sought an order vacating or modifying a labor arbitration award issued by a certain arbitrator pursuant to a collective bargaining agreement between DTC and the Union. The award reinstated Bruckner, who was terminated by DTC, with back pay less interim earnings. The Court of Chancery granted the Union's motion for summary judgment. DTC's sole argument on appeal was that the arbitrator's decision should be vacated due to the appearance of bias or partiality on the part of the arbitrator. The court held that the alleged bias or partiality which DTC attributed to the arbitrator failed to meet the "evident partiality" standard where the mere fact that an arbitrator may share a personal life experience with a party or a party's agent was legally insufficient to constitute a substantial relationship that a reasonable person would conclude was powerfully suggestive of bias. Accordingly, the judgment was affirmed. View "Delaware Transit Corp. v. Amalgamated Transit Union Local 842" on Justia Law

Plaintiff brought this action under 8 Del. C. 220 to inspect certain books and records of defendant. More specifically, plaintiff sought to inspect one document that defendant refused voluntarily to disclose: an interim report (Covington Report) prepared by defendant's outside counsel in connection with an internal investigation into sexual harassment allegations made against defendant's former CEO. The Court of Chancery denied plaintiff relief and held that plaintiff had not demonstrated a need to inspect the Covington Report sufficient to overcome the attorney-client privilege and work product immunity protections. The court affirmed, but on the alternative ground that plaintiff had not shown that the Covington report was essential to his stated purpose, which was to investigate possible corporate wrongdoing. View "Espinoza v. Hewlett-Packard Co." on Justia Law