Justia Delaware Supreme Court Opinion Summaries

This case arose from the murder of Jamier Vann-Robinson at an after-prom house party in Dover, Delaware on May 12, 2018. On May 14, 2018, Appellant Ahmir Bailey and codefendant Eugene Riley were arrested in connection with the crime. Bailey was indicted on 16 offenses, including Murder in the First Degree and Attempted Murder in the First Degree. The charges against defendants were severed so that each could be tried separately. Bailey appealed his convictions of Murder in the First Degree and related offenses, claiming only that the Superior Court erred by refusing to admit into evidence a witness’s juvenile adjudication of delinquency for Carrying a Concealed Deadly Weapon (“CCDW”), and the witness’s probationary status resulting therefrom. This error, he claimed, violated his constitutional right to confront the witness. The Delaware Supreme Court rejected Bailey’s claim and affirmed the Superior Court. View "Bailey v. Delaware" on Justia Law

Adria Brock (“Mother”) appealed a Family Court decision terminating her parental rights over her daughter (“K.C.” or “child”). In its decision, the Family Court found that the Department of Services for Children, Youth, and Their Families (“DSCYF”) established one of the statutory grounds for terminating the Mother’s parental rights: that the Mother’s parental rights over K.C.’s siblings were involuntarily terminated in a prior proceeding. At the time of the termination hearing, this statutory ground was found at 13 Del. C. 1103(a)(6) and provided for termination where “[t]he respondent’s parental rights over a sibling of the child who is the subject of the petition [had] been involuntarily terminated in a prior proceeding.” The Family Court also found that termination of the Mother’s parental rights was in the best interests of the child. On appeal, Mother argued Section 1103(a)(6) violated her right to due process under the federal and state constitutions because “it creates a presumption that she is unfit to parent any child presently solely because her parental rights [over] older children were previously terminated in North Carolina.” Mother also claimed that “[t]he statutory ‘best interest’ of the child factors set out under 13 Del. C. 722 do not sufficiently address a parent’s present ability to provide adequate care for the child”; that “DSCYF did not present evidence or argument during the trial to support a finding under 11 Del. C. 1103(a)(6) that the Appellant was unfit and that termination of parental rights was in the child’s best interest”; and that “[t]here is insufficient evidence under the clear and convincing standard to demonstrate that the parent is unfit under a best interest of the child analysis.” After considering each of Mother’s arguments, the Delaware Supreme Court concluded that the Family Court’s decision should have been affirmed. View "Brock v. Department of Services for Children, Youth, and their Families" on Justia Law

Defendant Brian Wilson was convicted by jury of first-degree murder for hiring someone to kill Allen Cannon. On appeal, Wilson argued: (1) the trial court abused its discretion when it refused to allow testimony about a witness’s reputation as a snitch introduced to counter the witness’s incriminatory statement about Wilson and the murder; (2) the court erred when it overruled a hearsay objection and admitted text messages that infer Wilson was the person responsible for Cannon’s murder; and (3) the State committed a Brady violation when it failed to disclose a witness’s agreement with federal prosecutors to testify in Wilson’s trial in exchange for a possible lighter sentence. Finding no reversible error, the Delaware Supreme Court affirmed Wilson’s convictions. View "Wilson v. Delaware" on Justia Law

Plaintiff-appellant Dr. Carter Page, a public figure with ties to President Trump’s 2016 campaign, claimed that defendant-appellee Oath Inc.’s online news organizations published eleven defamatory articles about him in 2016 and 2017. Michael Isikoff authored a Yahoo! News article that formed the backbone of the amended complaint (the “Isikoff Article”). Three other articles were written by employees at TheHuffingtonPost.com (“HuffPost”) and refer to the Isikoff Article (the “Employee Articles”). The remaining seven articles were written by HuffPost non-employee “contributors” (the “Contributor Articles”). The articles discussed an “intelligence report” from a “well-placed Western intelligence source” with information that Page met with senior Russian officials and discussed potential benefits to Russia if Donald Trump won the presidential election. The Superior Court granted Oath’s motion to dismiss, finding that the Isikoff Articles and Employee Articles were either true or substantially true; Page was at least a limited purpose public figure, meaning he was required to plead actual malice by the individuals responsible for publication, and he failed to meet that standard; the fair report privilege for government proceedings applied; and Oath was protected for the Contributor Articles under the federal Communications Decency Act. Page appealed the judgment except the superior court’s ruling that the Employee Articles were true. After review, the Delaware Supreme Court affirmed, finding that "[a]t a minimum, the article is substantially true, and as such, Page did not state a claim for defamation based on that article." Page also failed to state a claim for defamation with respect to the remaining articles. Page also failed to allege that the individuals responsible for publication of those articles acted with actual malice. Finally, Page did not contest the superior court’s holding that the Employee Articles were true. Because these grounds dispose of Page’s defamation claims, the Supreme Court did not address any of the trial court's other grounds for dismissal. View "Page v. Oath Inc." on Justia Law

In 2019, defendant Kevin Miller was convicted of first-degree murder for killing Jeremiah McDonald. Miller appealed, arguing that the State committed prosecutorial misconduct by: (1) misrepresenting to the jury that Miller asserted at least two separate alibis for McDonald’s murder; and (2) interfering with his constitutional right to testify. He also claimed the Superior Court abused its discretion by admitting a witness’s out-of-court statements on the grounds of forfeiture by wrongdoing. After review, the Delaware Supreme Court affirmed the Superior Court’s judgment. The Supreme Court concluded it could not conclude that the State knew that the two alibis referred to two separate murders. Furthermore, the State’s actions regarding Miller’s constitutional right to testify had the effect of reinforcing his right, not interfering with it. Finally, any error by the Superior Court was harmless. View "Miller v. Delaware" on Justia Law

Appellees, Rite Aid Corporation, Rite Aid Hdqtrs. Corp., and Rite Aid of Maryland, Inc. (collectively, “Rite Aid”), held a general liability insurance policy underwritten by defendany Chubb, Limited ("Chubb"). Rite Aid and others were defendants in multi-district litigation before the United States District Court for the Northern District of Ohio (the “MDL Opioid Lawsuits”). Plaintiffs in that suit filed over a thousand suits in the MDL Opioid Lawsuits against companies in the pharmaceutical supply chain for their roles in the national opioid crisis. Certain suits were bellwether suits - including the complaints of Summit and Cuyahoga Counties in Ohio (“the Counties”) which were at issue here. The question this case presented for the Delaware Supreme Court was whether insurance policies covering lawsuits “for” or “because of” personal injury required insurers to defend their insureds when the plaintiffs in the underlying suits expressly disavowed claims for personal injury and sought only their own economic damages. The Superior Court decided that Rite Aid’s insurance carriers were required to defend it against lawsuits filed by two Ohio counties to recover opioid-epidemic-related economic damages. As the court held, the lawsuits sought damages “for” or “because of” personal injury because there was arguably a causal connection between the counties’ economic damages and the injuries to their citizens from the opioid epidemic. The Supreme Court reversed, finding the plaintiffs, governmental entities, sought to recover only their own economic damages, specifically disclaiming recovery for personal injury or any specific treatment damages. Thus, the carriers did not have a duty to defend Rite Aid under the governing insurance policy. View "ACE American Insurance Company v. Rite Aid Corporation" on Justia Law

Defendant-appellant Cameron Pierce was convicted after a bench trial on two counts of Robbery First Degree, two counts of Wearing a Disguise During the Commission of a Felony, and two counts of Felony Theft. The Superior Court sentenced Pierce to a total of 60 years at Level 5 incarceration, suspended after 6 years, to be followed by probation. Pierce appealed, arguing: (1) the superior court erred in admitting palmprint evidence because it lacked the requisite foundation for admission; and (2) the superior court’s verdict was not supported by evidence sufficient to identify Pierce as the suspect who robbed Silverside Discount Liquors. Finding no merit in either of Pierce’s claims of error, the Delaware Supreme Court affirmed the judgment of conviction. View "Pierce v. Delaware" on Justia Law

This appeal arose from a dispute over a Stock Purchase Agreement (“SPA”) formed between Valley Joist BD Holdings, LLC (“VJ Holdings”) and EBSCO, Industries Inc. (“EBSCO”). In December 2017, EBSCO sold all of its stock in Valley Joist, Inc. to VJ Holdings. After closing, VJ Holdings discovered structural defects in one of the buildings acquired as part of the transaction. In July 2018, VJ Holdings sought indemnification from EBSCO through the procedure outlined in the SPA. Two years after receiving no response to the notice, VJ Holdings filed suit in the Superior Court for breach of contract and fraud in the inducement. The Superior Court granted EBSCO’s motion to dismiss the fraud claim for failure to plead sufficient facts to satisfy Superior Court Civil Rule 9(b). The court also dismissed the breach of contract claim as barred under the SPA’s one-year contractual statute of limitations. VJ Holdings appealed: (1) challenging whether it pled sufficient facts to show pre-closing knowledge of fraud; and (2) challenged whether the Superior Court properly relied on a bootstrapping doctrine to dismiss the fraud claim. The Delaware Supreme Court reversed, finding that the allegations in the complaint, when viewed in the light most favorable to the non-moving party, lead to a reasonable inference that EBSCO knew of the structural defects in the building at the time of closing the SPA, contrary to its representation in the SPA that the building was in good operating condition and repair. As for the bootstrapping argument, the Supreme Court determined the Superior Court did not rely on a bootstrapping doctrine to dismiss the fraud claim. View "Valley Joist BD Holdings, LLC v. EBSCO Industries, Inc." on Justia Law

After a jury trial, Noranda Aluminum Holding Corporation, an aluminum-products manufacturer, won a judgment against its insurance companies for more than $28 million. The Delaware Supreme Court affirmed, and the Superior Court awarded Noranda post-judgment interest at 6 percent (the same rate as pre-judgment interest) because that was the legal rate in effect when the insurance liability first arose. On appeal, Noranda argued the Superior Court should have used an interest rate of 7.5 percent, which was the legal rate on the date judgment was entered. To this, the Supreme Court agreed, holding that, in 6 Del. C. section 2301(a)'s final sentence, the judgment entered by the Superior Court in Noranda’s favor “shall, from the date of the judgment, bear post-judgment interest of 5% over the Federal Reserve discount rate[.]” Because the Federal Reserve discount rate was 2.5 percent on October 17, 2019, the date the Superior Court entered judgment, the Supreme Court reversed and remanded with instructions to award Noranda post-judgment interest at 7.5 percent. View "Noranda Aluminum Holding Corporation v. XL Insurance America, Inc." on Justia Law

At the heart of the State’s prosecution of defendant Karieem Howell for numerous drug and weapons offenses was the testimony of Brian Caldwell: a witness who had agreed to cooperate with the prosecution in return for a favorable plea agreement. During Howell’s trial, the trial judge instructed Howell’s jurors, at the beginning of Caldwell’s damning testimony, that they could not consider Caldwell’s agreement with the prosecution in weighing his credibility. The State conceded the court’s instruction was legally erroneous. But, because Howell’s lawyer did not object to the instruction, the Delaware Supreme Court was limited to review the mistake for plain error - an error that so affected Howell’s substantial rights that his failure to object would be excused. The State contended that the strength of the evidence independent of Caldwell’s testimony and the correct instructions regarding witness credibility provided to the jury at the close of evidence suffice to erase any prejudice that Howell might have suffered because of the erroneous instruction. The Supreme Court's review of the trial record persuaded it otherwise, finding Caldwell’s testimony was "pivotal evidence" upon which the jury’s determination of key elements of the crimes charged likely turned. "Without Caldwell’s testimony, the prosecution’s case was susceptible to doubt; with it - if the jury found it credible - the likelihood of conviction increased dramatically. The trial court’s instruction, however, unduly restricted the jury’s assessment of Caldwell’s credibility and undermined the fairness of Howell’s trial." Therefore, the Court reversed Howell's convictions and remanded to the Superior Court for a new trial. View "Howell v. Delaware" on Justia Law