Justia Delaware Supreme Court Opinion Summaries

McArthur Risper was convicted by jury of first-degree murder, first degree conspiracy, and possession of a firearm during the commission of a felony for his role in the May 2018 shooting death of Corey Bailey. The superior court sentenced Risper to life plus 30 years in prison. The theory of the prosecution was that Risper intentionally killed Bailey as revenge for Bailey’s theft of drugs and a firearm belonging to Risper. Risper claimed that the evidence of Bailey’s theft and Risper’s subsequent efforts to recover the stolen drugs and firearm was prior-misconduct evidence, and therefore inadmissible under Delaware rules of evidence. Furthermore, Risper claimed he did not receive a fair trial because the State did not disclose in a timely manner evidence that was favorable to the defense as required under Brady v. Maryland and its progeny. According to Risper, the State’s belated disclosures (one on the day before trial was to begin and the other on the fourth day of trial) fundamentally undermined the fairness of his trial. The Delaware Supreme Court agreed with Risper as to his second contention, concluding that the State’s failure to produce, until the afternoon before Risper’s trial was to begin, a recorded interview of an individual who told the chief investigating officer that another person had confessed to her that he had killed Bailey and showed her the gun used in the shooting was a violation of the State’s obligations under Brady. "And because that violation undermines our confidence in the outcome of Risper’s trial, we reverse and remand to the Superior Court for a new trial." View "Risper v. Delaware" on Justia Law

A Delaware superior court affirmed decisions by the Delaware Secretary of State (the “Secretary”) and the Delaware Board of Medical Licensure and Discipline (the “Board”) to revoke Dr. Nihar Gala’s medical license and controlled substance registration (“CSR”). The court upheld the Board’s and Secretary’s decisions after finding that substantial evidence existed to support the issued discipline. On appeal, Gala argued: (1) the Board’s decision to deliberate “behind closed doors” rendered the record incomplete for judicial review; (2) the Board and the Secretary were biased; and (3) the Board’s and the Secretary’s decisions to revoke his medical license and CSR were not supported by substantial evidence. The Delaware Supreme Court found the the Board and Secretary's decisions were supported by substantial evidence and were free from legal error. Accordingly, it affirmed the superior court. View "Gala v. Bullock" on Justia Law

Defendant Damon Anderson was convicted by jury on five felonies for his involvement in a Wilmington drug dealing enterprise. The Superior Court declared Anderson an habitual offender and sentenced him to an aggregate thirty-two years of incarceration. Anderson argued on appeal: (1) the trial court erred when it denied his motion to sever his case from that of co-defendants Eric Lloyd and Dwayne White; (2) the trial court should not have admitted gun evidence seized from a co-defendant’s apartment; (3) the trial court erred by denying his motions to suppress evidence discovered following search warrants for his home, car, and cell phones; and (4) the trial court erred in denying his motion for judgment of acquittal on two charges. The Delaware Supreme Court found no merit to any of these contentions and affirmed the Superior Court. View "Anderson v. Delaware" on Justia Law

Eric Lloyd was convicted by jury of six felonies stemming from his involvement in a Wilmington drug dealing enterprise. The Superior Court sentenced Lloyd to an aggregate of thirty years of incarceration without the possibility of early release. On appeal, Lloyd challenged his convictions and sentence, contending: (1) the trial court erred when it denied his motion to sever his case from that of co-defendant Dwayne White; (2) the trial court erred when it denied his motion for a mistrial after an eyewitness to a shooting misidentified Lloyd as the gunman; (3) the trial court should not have admitted gun evidence seized from a co-defendant’s apartment and rap music videos created by other enterprise members; (4) the trial court erred by allowing testimony from Lloyd’s former attorney’s secretary about a drug transaction. Finally, Lloyd argued the trial court violated his rights under the Eighth Amendment by imposing consecutive sentences, resulting in thirty years of incarceration, without the option for early release. Finding no merit to these claims, the Delaware Supreme Court affirmed Lloyd's convictions. View "Lloyd v. Delaware" on Justia Law

In 1994, the Delaware General Assembly enacted a statute, applicable to both criminal and civil proceedings, that eased the evidentiary burden on the proponent of controlled-substance-testing evidence. The statute, "Subchapter III," allowed for the admission of, and a favorable presumption relating to, written reports from a forensic toxicologist or forensic chemist, without the necessity of their appearance in court, so long as the report complied with certain requirements. After Stephen Hairston was indicted on several criminal offenses, including serious drug offenses, he served a written demand on the State, which, by the unambiguous terms of the statute, required the presence at trial of, among other individuals, the officer who seized and packaged the substances that formed the basis of Hairston’s drug offenses. Upon the State’s pretrial motion in limine, however, the Superior Court, believing that the seizing and packaging officer was unavailable, relieved the State of its obligation to produce him and permitted another officer who was present at the scene of Hairston’s apprehension to appear in the seizing and packaging officer’s stead. The Superior Court’s ruling, according to Hairston, erroneously relieved the State of a mandatory statutory duty and violated Hairston’s rights under the Confrontation Clause of the Sixth Amendment of the United States Constitution. The Delaware Supreme Court held the Superior Court’s interpretation of the statute in question was erroneous as a matter of law and that, absent the appearance of the witness identified in Hairston’s demand, it was error for the court to admit the forensic chemist’s report and testimony. Judgment was reversed and the matter remanded for further proceedings. View "Hairston v. Delaware" on Justia Law

In 2011, Appellants Eric Monzo and Dana Spring Monzo purchased a homeowners insurance policy issued by Appellee Nationwide Property & Casualty Co. (“Nationwide”). The policy contained standard exclusions for water damage and earth movement, along with optional water backup coverage. In July 2017, a heavy thunderstorm destroyed a pedestrian bridge and retaining wall located at the Monzos’ residence. A pair of engineering reports prepared after the storm indicated that a combination of water backups from drainage systems, scouring of supporting earth embankments, heavy rain, and tree debris caused the damage. The Monzos filed a claim with Nationwide, seeking coverage under the homeowners insurance policy. Nationwide denied coverage, and the Monzos sued. The court granted summary judgment for Nationwide, holding that the policy’s earth movement and water damage exclusions applied. The Monzos appealed, arguing the Superior Court erred by granting summary judgment too early in the discovery process, misinterpreting the policy, and denying a motion for post-judgment relief. Having reviewed the briefs and record on appeal, the Delaware Supreme Court: (1) affirmed the Superior Court’s holding that Nationwide was entitled to summary judgment regarding the collapsed bridge; (2) reversed the Superior Court’s holding that Nationwide was entitled to summary judgment regarding the retaining wall; and (3) affirmed the Superior Court’s denial of the Monzos’ post-judgment motion. View "Monzo v. Nationwide Property & Casualty Insurance Co." on Justia Law

In 2014, appellant and cross-appellee LCT Capital, LLC (“LCT”) helped appellee and cross-appellants NGL Energy Partners, LP and NGL Energy Holdings LLC (collectively, “NGL”) acquire TransMontaigne, a refined petroleum products distributor. LCT played an "unusually" valuable role in the transaction. The transaction generated $500 million in value for NGL, more than double the $200 million price that NGL paid to acquire TransMontaigne. NGL’s CEO Mike Krimbill represented on several occasions that LCT would receive an unusually large investment banking fee, but the parties failed to reach an agreement on all of the material terms. After negotiations broke down completely, LCT filed suit seeking compensation for its work under several theories, including quantum meruit and common law fraud. At trial, LCT presented a unitary theory of damages that focused on the value of the services that it provided, measured by the fee that Krimbill proposed for LCT’s work. Nonetheless, the jury verdict sheet had two separate lines for damages awards, one for the quantum meruit claim and another for the fraud claim. The jury found NGL liable for both counts, awarded LCT an amount of quantum meruit damages equal to a standard investment banking fee, and awarded LCT a much larger amount of fraud damages approximately equal to the unusually large fee that Krimbill proposed. Following post-trial briefing, the superior court set aside the jury’s awards and ordered a new trial on damages. LCT and NGL both filed interlocutory appeals of the superior court’s order. On appeal, LCT argued that benefit-of-the-bargain damages were available without an enforceable contract. On cross-appeal, NGL argued the superior court erred by ordering a new trial on damages because the jury’s quantum meruit award fully compensated LCT for its harm. NGL also argued it was entitled to judgment as a matter of law on the fraud claim. Finally, NGL argued the superior court provided the jury with erroneous fraudulent misrepresentation jury instructions. After review, the Delaware Supreme Court found LCT was not entitled to benefit-of-the-bargain damages and that the Superior Court did not abuse its discretion by ordering a new trial on quantum meruit damages. Nonetheless, the Supreme Court also held the superior court abused its discretion by ordering a new trial on fraud damages because LCT did not assert any independent damages to support its fraud claim. Accordingly, the Court affirmed in part and reversed in part the superior court’s judgment. View "LCT Capital, LLC v. NGL Energy Partners LP" on Justia Law

An excess insurer under a directors’ and officers’ liability insurance policy sought a declaration from the superior court that coverage under the policy was not available to fund the settlement of two lawsuits: a breach of fiduciary duty action in the Court of Chancery, and a federal securities action in the United States District Court for the District of Delaware. In a series of decisions, the superior court rejected the insurer’s claims and entered judgment in favor of the insureds. Aggrieved, the insurer contended the superior court committed several errors: whether the insurance policy, which insured a Delaware corporation and its directors and officers but which was negotiated and issued in California, should have been interpreted under Delaware law; whether the policy, to the extent that it appeared to cover losses occasioned by one of the insureds’ fraud, was unenforceable as contrary to the public policy of Delaware; whether a policy provision that excluded coverage for fraudulent actions defeats coverage; and whether the superior court properly applied the policy’s allocation provision. Finding no reversible error, the Delaware Supreme Court affirmed the superior court. View "RSUI Indemnity Co. v. Murdock, et al." on Justia Law

Glaxo Group Limited and Human Genome Sciences, Inc. (collectively, “GSK”) owned patents covering Benlysta, a lupus treatment drug. GSK filed a patent application with the United States Patent and Trademark Office (“PTO”) claiming a method for treating lupus. Biogen Idec MA Inc. (“Biogen”) held an issued patent covering a similar method for treating lupus. When parties dispute who was first to discover an invention, the PTO declares an interference. Rather than suffer the delay and uncertainty of an interference proceeding, the parties agreed to settle their differences through a patent license and settlement agreement (“Agreement”). GSK ended up with its issued patent. The PTO cancelled Biogen’s patent, and Biogen received upfront and milestone payments and ongoing royalties for Benlysta sales. Under the Agreement GSK agreed to make royalty payments to Biogen until the expiration of the last “Valid Claim” of certain patents, including the lupus treatment patent. The Agreement defined a Valid Claim as an unexpired patent claim that has not, among other things, been “disclaimed” by GSK. GSK paid Biogen royalties on Benlysta sales. After Biogen assigned the Agreement to DRIT LP - an entity that purchased intellectual property royalty streams - GSK filed a statutory disclaimer that disclaimed the patent and all its claims. GSK notified DRIT that there were no longer any Valid Claims under the Agreement and stopped paying royalties on Benlysta sales. DRIT sued GSK in the Superior Court for breach of contract and breach of the implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing for failing to pay royalties under the Agreement. The court dismissed DRIT’s breach of contract claim but allowed the implied covenant claim to go to a jury trial. The jury found for DRIT, and the court awarded damages. On appeal, GSK argued the superior court should have granted it judgment as a matter of law on the implied covenant claim. On cross-appeal, DRIT claimed that, if the Court reversed the jury verdict on the implied covenant claim, it should reverse the superior court’s ruling dismissing the breach of contract claim. The Delaware Supreme Court found the superior court properly dismissed DRIT’s breach of contract claim, but should have granted GSK judgment as a matter of law on the implied covenant claim. Thus, the superior court's judgment was reversed. View "Glaxo Group Limited, et al. v. DRIT LP" on Justia Law

Walter Hines appealed his conviction and sentence for second-degree assault, possession of a deadly weapon during the commission of a felony (“PDWDCF”), and two counts of endangering the welfare of a child (“EWC”). Hines’s issue on appeal related to an incident that occurred on September 27, 2018. At that time, Hines lived with Valeah Lewis, her mother Juliann Congo, and Lewis’s children D.L. and T.L. Michael Gibbs was Lewis’s ex-boyfriend and was D.L.’s father. As Lewis and Hines were leaving for work, Gibbs and his girlfriend, Putrice Barnes, arrived at the Lewis residence to pick up D.L. After a verbal exchange, Hines and Lewis drove a short way down the street then stopped. Barnes testified that she “flipped the bird” as Lewis drove past. Hines, Lewis, Barnes, and Gibbs all agree that an altercation ensued shortly thereafter, but their accounts differ regarding the key details. Lewis asserted that Gibbs swung a tire iron at Hines, while Hines asserted Gibbs did not take the tire iron from Barnes but instead tried to punch him. Both Hines and Lewis agreed Hines retrieved a baseball bat from the back seat and used it defensively against Gibbs in response to Barnes’s and Gibbs’s aggression. On appeal, Hines claimed the Superior Court committed plain error when it permitted the State’s final cross-examination question about his prior convictions for Possession with Intent to Deliver a Controlled Substance (“PWID”) and Possession of a Firearm by a Person Prohibited (“PFBPP”). Finding no reversible error, the Delaware Supreme Court affirmed Hines' convictions. View "Hines v. Delaware" on Justia Law