Justia Delaware Supreme Court Opinion Summaries
Fletcher v. Feutz
William Fletcher, Jr. challenged a Family Court denial of his petition to modify or terminate alimony payments to his ex-wife, Melissa Feutz. Fletcher argued the Family Court erred by ruling that: (1) Feutz was appropriately employed; (2) there was not a substantial change in circumstances that warranted the termination or modification of alimony; (3) Feutz was not cohabitating with her paramour; and (4) Feutz was entitled to the attorney’s fees awarded. After review, the Delaware Supreme Court held the Family Court did not err in finding that Feutz was properly employed and that she was not cohabitating with her paramour. The Court remanded the issue of whether there was a substantial change in circumstances. In addition, the Court found the Family Court erredin awarding Feutz attorney’s fees for the defense of Fletcher’s Motion to Modify or Terminate Alimony. View "Fletcher v. Feutz" on Justia Law
Posted in:
Family Law
Morris v. Spectra Energy Partners
After a $3.3 billion “roll up” of minority-held units involving a merger between Enbridge, Inc. and Spectra Energy Partners L.P. (“SEP”), Paul Morris, a former SEP minority unitholder, lost standing to litigate an alleged $661 million derivative suit on behalf of SEP against its general partner, Spectra Energy Partners (DE) GP, LP (“SEP GP”). Morris repeated the derivative claim dismissal by filing a new class action complaint that alleged the Enbridge/SEP merger exchange ratio was unfair because SEP GP agreed to a merger that did not reflect the material value of his derivative claims. The Court of Chancery granted SEP GP’s motion to dismiss the new complaint for lack of standing. The court held that, to have standing to bring a post-merger claim, Morris had to allege a viable and material derivative claim that the buyer would not assert and provided no value for in the merger. Focusing on the materiality requirement, the court first discounted the $661 million recovery to $112 million to reflect the public unitholders’ beneficial interest in the derivative litigation recovery. The court then discounted the $112 million further to $28 million to reflect what the court estimated was a one in four chance of success in the litigation. After the discounting, the $28 million, less than 1% of the merger consideration, was immaterial to a $3.3 billion merger. On appeal, Morris argued the trial court should not have dismissed the plaintiff’s direct claims for lack of standing. After its review, the Delaware Supreme Court agreed with Morris finding that, on a motion to dismiss for lack of standing, he sufficiently pled a direct claim attacking the fairness of the merger itself for SEP GP’s failure to secure value for his pending derivative claims. The Court of Chancery’s judgment was reversed and the matter remanded for further proceedings. View "Morris v. Spectra Energy Partners" on Justia Law
Wharton v. Delaware
Dai'yann Wharton was found guilty after a bench trial on several charges, led by a count of first-degree murder for the death of Yaseem Powell. Wharton appealed, contending her conviction should have been reversed because the State identified a group of highly incriminating text messages less than two weeks prior to trial, though the messages themselves had been contained in a digital discovery disclosure made by the State to Wharton more than a year earlier. Because of the State’s earlier disclosure, and because the Delaware Supreme Court rejected Wharton’s assertions that the State engaged in any discovery violations or other misconduct, it held the superior court was within its discretion to deny Wharton’s motion to exclude the text messages. Accordingly, Wharton's conviction and judgment of sentence were affirmed. View "Wharton v. Delaware" on Justia Law
Posted in:
Constitutional Law, Criminal Law
Backer v. Palisades Growth Capital
Appellant Alex Bäcker was the co-founder and majority common stockholder of QLess, Inc. In June 2019, the Company’s board removed Alex as CEO following an internal investigation into workplace complaints. Alex eventually relented to the change and expressed support for his successor, Kevin Grauman. In the week leading up to the November 15, 2019 board meeting, the Company’s outside counsel circulated board resolutions that, among other things, would appoint Grauman to the board. Alex made a series of statements that collectively represented support for Grauman’s appointment. On the eve of the board meeting, the Company’s independent director unexpectedly resigned, giving Alex a board majority. Alex leapt into action, devising a secret counter agenda to fire Grauman and lock-in Alex’s control of the Company. Alex caught his fellow directors by surprise at the meeting, passing his counter agenda over objections and seizing control of the Company. Palisades Growth Capital II, L.P., the majority owner of the Company’s Series A preferred stock, filed a complaint in the Court of Chancery seeking to reverse Alex’s actions. Following a paper trial, the court held that, even if technically legal, the board’s actions were invalid as a matter of equity because Alex affirmatively deceived a fellow director to establish a quorum. After review of the parties briefs and the record on appeal, the Delaware Supreme Court held the Court of Chancery's finding of affirmative deception was not clearly erroneous. The Supreme Court also held that the Court of Chancery did not impose an equitable notice requirement for regular board meetings, that Appellants failed to properly raise an equitable participation defense below, and that the Court of Chancery did not exercise its equitable powers to grant relief for a de facto breach of contract claim. Accordingly, the Supreme Court affirmed the Court of Chancery’s March 26, 2020 Memorandum Opinion. View "Backer v. Palisades Growth Capital" on Justia Law
Posted in:
Business Law, Corporate Compliance
Chaverri et al. v. Dole Food Company, et al.
Plaintiffs-Appellants worked on banana plantations in Costa Rica, Ecuador, and Panama. They sued the plantations in Delaware in 2012, claiming that while working on the plantations they suffered personal injuries from a pesticide known as 1, 2, Dibromo 3, Chloropropane (“DBCP”). Defendants-Appellees were numerous companies alleged to have caused the Plaintiffs’ exposure to DBCP and their resulting injuries. In 2013 the Superior Court dismissed the Plaintiffs’ complaint under what was sometimes referred to as Delaware’s McWane doctrine (the “Dismissal Order”). On December 31, 2018 Plaintiffs moved to vacate the Dismissal Order under Superior Court Civil Rule 60(b)(6). The Superior Court denied the Plaintiffs’ motion, finding that the motion was untimely and Plaintiffs failed to show extraordinary circumstances for vacating the judgment. Plaintiffs have appealed that order to the Delaware Supreme Court. Finding no reversible error, however, the Supreme Court affirmed the district court. View "Chaverri et al. v. Dole Food Company, et al." on Justia Law
Gordon v. Delaware
As Delaware State Police (“DSP”) Trooper Brian Holl was on patrol in Kent County, he received a call from DSP Detective Thomas Macauley, a member of a “drug task force” in New Castle County. Detective Macauley’s and his brother Detective Michael Macauley’s were involved in a wiretap investigation known as “Operation Cutthroat.” Detective Thomas Macauley told Trooper Holl that the task force had been surveilling a blue Mazda that was, at the time of the call, southbound on Delaware State Route 1 heading towards Kent County. Detective Macauley shared with Detective Holl the reason for the surveillance of the Mazda: the surveilling officers had just “watched a drug transaction” between the occupants of the car and one of Operation Cutthroat’s targets. Because the Macauleys wished to maintain the secrecy of the ongoing wiretap investigation, they enlisted Trooper Holl’s assistance in the apprehension of the blue Mazda’s occupants. Detective Macauley’s instructions to Trooper Holl were: "To keep the integrity of the investigation of the wiretap investigation, I need a traffic stop. That means you need to . . . develop your own probable cause and go from there. Nothing about the wiretap can be revealed, obviously, for the integrity of the investigation." Trooper Holl believed he found one: according to his Affidavit of Probable Cause, the Mazda’s headlights were not activated despite “inclement weather.” Because of the perceived headlight infraction, Trooper Holl initiated a motor vehicle stop by activating his emergency lights. The stop lead to defendant Thomas Gordon's arrest, ultimately on drug trafficking-related charges. The issues this case presented for the Delaware Supreme Court's review centered on the "collective knowledge" doctrine, and whether the trial court’s consideration of the lawfulness of a warrantless detention and arrest was constrained by the facts alleged in a later filed arrest-warrant affidavit. The Supreme Court held that the trial court applied the correct legal standard when it determined that based on the collective knowledge of the officers involved, Trooper Holl had a reasonable suspicion the car in which defendant was traveling contained contraband, and was therefore subject to detention. In making this determination, the court did not err by considering facts extraneous to the subsequently filed arrest-warrant affidavit. View "Gordon v. Delaware" on Justia Law
Posted in:
Constitutional Law, Criminal Law
IN RE: Request of the Trustees of the Lawyers’ Fund for Client Protection for an Advisory Opinion
The trustees of the Delaware Lawyers’ Fund for Client Protection (the “LFCP”) requested an advisory opinion from the Delaware Supreme Court regarding whether the trustees had discretion to consider paying claims involving misconduct by attorneys who were not members of the Delaware bar, but who were admitted pro hac vice or who had in the past received limited permission to practice. The question arose from the language of Supreme Court Rule 66(a)(ii), which stated that the purpose of the trust fund was to address “losses caused to the public by defalcations of members of the Bar;” subsections 1 and 2 of Rule 4(1) of the LFCP Rules, which provide that the Trustees will consider for reimbursement from the fund certain claims involving “a member of the Delaware Bar;” and subsection 3 of Rule 4(1) of the LFCP Rules, which provides that the trustees will consider for reimbursement certain claims involving a “member of the Bar.” The Supreme Court held that the trustees’ discretion was not limited to paying claims for reimbursement involving an attorney who was a member of the Delaware bar at the time of the defalcation that gave rise to the claim. View "IN RE: Request of the Trustees of the Lawyers' Fund for Client Protection for an Advisory Opinion" on Justia Law
Posted in:
Government & Administrative Law, Legal Ethics
Trala v. Delaware
Appellant-defendant John Trala was convicted by jury of driving under the influence. Trala contended the trial court erred in denying his motion for a mistrial after the State, in its rebuttal argument, asserted that defense counsel’s lack of evidentiary objections to certain witness testimony relating to Trala’s blood chemical analysis suggested that defense counsel had acknowledged the reliability of that incriminating evidence. He also claimed he was denied a fair trial because the prosecutor, in a rebuttal remark, expressed her favorable personal opinion as to the credibility of the arresting officer who was a key witness for the State. The Delaware Supreme Court determined the jury specifically found two independent theories of liability to support the same DUI charge. In light of that dual holding, which the Court found was supported by overwhelming evidence, any error arising from the prosecutor's misconduct was harmless. The Court therefore affirmed appellant's conviction. View "Trala v. Delaware" on Justia Law
Posted in:
Constitutional Law, Criminal Law
Keep Our Wells Clean, et al. v. DNREC
The Delaware Department of Natural Resources and Environmental Control reviewed wastewater treatment facility construction permit applications under regulations adopted in 1999. In 2014, DNREC revised its regulations and adopted new requirements. In this appeal, the issue presented for the Delaware Supreme Court was whether Artesian Wastewater Management, Inc.’s 2017 construction permit application, which Artesian characterized as an amendment to its existing 2013 wastewater treatment facility construction permit, had to comply with the new requirements of the 2014 regulations. The Environmental Appeals Board and the Superior Court decided Artesian did not have to comply with the new requirements. The Supreme Court agreed and affirmed. View "Keep Our Wells Clean, et al. v. DNREC" on Justia Law
White v. Delaware
Dwayne White faced a lengthy sentence of incarceration at Level V, followed by various levels of probation after a jury convicted him of twenty-one felony charges. On appeal, White challenged his conviction and sentence on a number of grounds that were
not raised in the proceedings below. Before the Delaware Supreme Court, White contended: (1) several of the counts of which he was convicted and separately sentenced merged under the Double Jeopardy Clauses of the Delaware and United States Constitutions; (2) the trial court committed plain error by placing the accomplice liability instructions at the end of the instructions for the felony conspiracy offenses; (3) his conviction for conspiracy to commit Drug Dealing Cocaine was invalid because it relied on an indictment containing a numbering error; (4) the trial court erred by failing to bar the State from eliciting testimony from White’s attorney regarding the scope of the attorney’s representation of members of the criminal enterprise; and (5) the trial court abused its discretion by failing to specify adequately its reasons for imposing a sentence in excess of the SENTAC guidelines and by relying upon certain factual predicates which he challenges on various grounds. Finding no reversible error, the Supreme Court affirmed White's conviction. View "White v. Delaware" on Justia Law
Posted in:
Constitutional Law, Criminal Law