Justia Delaware Supreme Court Opinion Summaries

Plaintiffs-Appellants worked on banana plantations in Costa Rica, Ecuador, and Panama. They sued the plantations in Delaware in 2012, claiming that while working on the plantations they suffered personal injuries from a pesticide known as 1, 2, Dibromo 3, Chloropropane (“DBCP”). Defendants-Appellees were numerous companies alleged to have caused the Plaintiffs’ exposure to DBCP and their resulting injuries. In 2013 the Superior Court dismissed the Plaintiffs’ complaint under what was sometimes referred to as Delaware’s McWane doctrine (the “Dismissal Order”). On December 31, 2018 Plaintiffs moved to vacate the Dismissal Order under Superior Court Civil Rule 60(b)(6). The Superior Court denied the Plaintiffs’ motion, finding that the motion was untimely and Plaintiffs failed to show extraordinary circumstances for vacating the judgment. Plaintiffs have appealed that order to the Delaware Supreme Court. Finding no reversible error, however, the Supreme Court affirmed the district court. View "Chaverri et al. v. Dole Food Company, et al." on Justia Law

As Delaware State Police (“DSP”) Trooper Brian Holl was on patrol in Kent County, he received a call from DSP Detective Thomas Macauley, a member of a “drug task force” in New Castle County. Detective Macauley’s and his brother Detective Michael Macauley’s were involved in a wiretap investigation known as “Operation Cutthroat.” Detective Thomas Macauley told Trooper Holl that the task force had been surveilling a blue Mazda that was, at the time of the call, southbound on Delaware State Route 1 heading towards Kent County. Detective Macauley shared with Detective Holl the reason for the surveillance of the Mazda: the surveilling officers had just “watched a drug transaction” between the occupants of the car and one of Operation Cutthroat’s targets. Because the Macauleys wished to maintain the secrecy of the ongoing wiretap investigation, they enlisted Trooper Holl’s assistance in the apprehension of the blue Mazda’s occupants. Detective Macauley’s instructions to Trooper Holl were: "To keep the integrity of the investigation of the wiretap investigation, I need a traffic stop. That means you need to . . . develop your own probable cause and go from there. Nothing about the wiretap can be revealed, obviously, for the integrity of the investigation." Trooper Holl believed he found one: according to his Affidavit of Probable Cause, the Mazda’s headlights were not activated despite “inclement weather.” Because of the perceived headlight infraction, Trooper Holl initiated a motor vehicle stop by activating his emergency lights. The stop lead to defendant Thomas Gordon's arrest, ultimately on drug trafficking-related charges. The issues this case presented for the Delaware Supreme Court's review centered on the "collective knowledge" doctrine, and whether the trial court’s consideration of the lawfulness of a warrantless detention and arrest was constrained by the facts alleged in a later filed arrest-warrant affidavit. The Supreme Court held that the trial court applied the correct legal standard when it determined that based on the collective knowledge of the officers involved, Trooper Holl had a reasonable suspicion the car in which defendant was traveling contained contraband, and was therefore subject to detention. In making this determination, the court did not err by considering facts extraneous to the subsequently filed arrest-warrant affidavit. View "Gordon v. Delaware" on Justia Law

The trustees of the Delaware Lawyers’ Fund for Client Protection (the “LFCP”) requested an advisory opinion from the Delaware Supreme Court regarding whether the trustees had discretion to consider paying claims involving misconduct by attorneys who were not members of the Delaware bar, but who were admitted pro hac vice or who had in the past received limited permission to practice. The question arose from the language of Supreme Court Rule 66(a)(ii), which stated that the purpose of the trust fund was to address “losses caused to the public by defalcations of members of the Bar;” subsections 1 and 2 of Rule 4(1) of the LFCP Rules, which provide that the Trustees will consider for reimbursement from the fund certain claims involving “a member of the Delaware Bar;” and subsection 3 of Rule 4(1) of the LFCP Rules, which provides that the trustees will consider for reimbursement certain claims involving a “member of the Bar.” The Supreme Court held that the trustees’ discretion was not limited to paying claims for reimbursement involving an attorney who was a member of the Delaware bar at the time of the defalcation that gave rise to the claim. View "IN RE: Request of the Trustees of the Lawyers' Fund for Client Protection for an Advisory Opinion" on Justia Law

Appellant-defendant John Trala was convicted by jury of driving under the influence. Trala contended the trial court erred in denying his motion for a mistrial after the State, in its rebuttal argument, asserted that defense counsel’s lack of evidentiary objections to certain witness testimony relating to Trala’s blood chemical analysis suggested that defense counsel had acknowledged the reliability of that incriminating evidence. He also claimed he was denied a fair trial because the prosecutor, in a rebuttal remark, expressed her favorable personal opinion as to the credibility of the arresting officer who was a key witness for the State. The Delaware Supreme Court determined the jury specifically found two independent theories of liability to support the same DUI charge. In light of that dual holding, which the Court found was supported by overwhelming evidence, any error arising from the prosecutor's misconduct was harmless. The Court therefore affirmed appellant's conviction. View "Trala v. Delaware" on Justia Law

The Delaware Department of Natural Resources and Environmental Control reviewed wastewater treatment facility construction permit applications under regulations adopted in 1999. In 2014, DNREC revised its regulations and adopted new requirements. In this appeal, the issue presented for the Delaware Supreme Court was whether Artesian Wastewater Management, Inc.’s 2017 construction permit application, which Artesian characterized as an amendment to its existing 2013 wastewater treatment facility construction permit, had to comply with the new requirements of the 2014 regulations. The Environmental Appeals Board and the Superior Court decided Artesian did not have to comply with the new requirements. The Supreme Court agreed and affirmed. View "Keep Our Wells Clean, et al. v. DNREC" on Justia Law

Dwayne White faced a lengthy sentence of incarceration at Level V, followed by various levels of probation after a jury convicted him of twenty-one felony charges. On appeal, White challenged his conviction and sentence on a number of grounds that were not raised in the proceedings below. Before the Delaware Supreme Court, White contended: (1) several of the counts of which he was convicted and separately sentenced merged under the Double Jeopardy Clauses of the Delaware and United States Constitutions; (2) the trial court committed plain error by placing the accomplice liability instructions at the end of the instructions for the felony conspiracy offenses; (3) his conviction for conspiracy to commit Drug Dealing Cocaine was invalid because it relied on an indictment containing a numbering error; (4) the trial court erred by failing to bar the State from eliciting testimony from White’s attorney regarding the scope of the attorney’s representation of members of the criminal enterprise; and (5) the trial court abused its discretion by failing to specify adequately its reasons for imposing a sentence in excess of the SENTAC guidelines and by relying upon certain factual predicates which he challenges on various grounds. Finding no reversible error, the Supreme Court affirmed White's conviction. View "White v. Delaware" on Justia Law

The Court of Chancery issued a memorandum opinion in an action brought under Delaware's Corporation Law, section 220 (the "DGCL"). The opinion ordered AmerisourceBergen Corporation to produce certain books and records to Lebanon County Employees Retirement Fund and Teamsters Local 443 Health Services & Insurance Plan (“Plaintiffs”) and granting Plaintiffs leave to take a Rule 30(b)(6) deposition “to explore what types of books and records exist and who has them.” The Company claimed Plaintiffs’ inspection demand, which, among other things, was aimed at investigating possible breaches of fiduciary duty, mismanagement, and other wrongdoing, was fatally deficient because it did not disclose Plaintiffs’ ultimate objective, which was what they intended to do with the books and records in the event that they confirmed their suspicion of wrongdoing. The Company also contended the Court of Chancery erred by holding Plaintiffs were not required to establish a credible basis to suspect actionable wrongdoing. And finally, the Company argued the Court of Chancery erred as a matter of law when it allowed Plaintiffs to take a post-trial Rule 30(b)(6) deposition. After review, the Delaware Supreme Court held that when a Section 220 inspection demand stated a proper investigatory purpose, it did not need to identify the particular course of action the stockholder will take if the books and records confirm the stockholder’s suspicion of wrongdoing. In addition, the Court held that, although the actionability of wrongdoing can be a relevant factor for the Court of Chancery to consider when assessing the legitimacy of a stockholder’s stated purpose, an investigating stockholder was not required in all cases to establish the wrongdoing under investigation was actionable. Finally, the Court found the Court of Chancery’s allowance of the post-trial deposition was not an abuse of discretion. View "Amerisourcebergen Corp v. Lebanon County Employees' Retirement Fund" on Justia Law

Plaintiffs-appellants were two of three founding owners, investors, and directors of Energy Efficient Equity, Inc. (“E3” or the “Corporation”), a Delaware corporation operating in the property-assessed, clean-energy financing industry. After a series of financing transactions with WR Capital Partners, LLC (“WR Capital”), plaintiffs filed suit against WR Capital and its representatives. Among other claims, plaintiffs alleged that defendants breached their fiduciary duties and were unjustly enriched when they negotiated and approved the financing transactions that allowed them to take control of E3 from the founders. During the litigation, plaintiffs entered into a settlement agreement and two stock repurchase agreements. Plaintiffs settled with some of the defendants in exchange for payments and the sale of the plaintiffs’ stock to E3. The Settlement Agreement contained a release, but carved out claims that the plaintiffs wanted to continue to pursue against the non-settling WR Capital and its representatives. An inconsistency between the agreements arose, however, because the Stock Repurchase Agreements transferred “all of Seller’s right, title, and interest” in E3 stock while only the Settlement Agreement contained a carve out for claims against the non-settling defendants (the “Release Carve Out”). After the partial settlement, the Court of Chancery granted defendants’ motion to dismiss, finding plaintiffs could not import the Settlement Agreement’s Release Carve Out into the Stock Repurchase Agreements; plaintiffs lost standing to pursue their direct breach of fiduciary duty claims when they sold their E3 stock; and plaintiffs’ unjust enrichment claims were duplicative of their breach of fiduciary duty claims and traveled with the sale of E3 stock. On appeal, plaintiffs argued the Court of Chancery should have found that the Stock Repurchase Agreements incorporated by reference the Settlement Agreement. If that was the case, plaintiffs claimed they could preserve their claims against the remaining defendants. In the alternative, plaintiffs fell back on the argument that their breach of fiduciary duty claims were personal and did not attach to the stock sold as part of the settlement. In addition, they argued the unjust enrichment claims were independent of the breach of fiduciary duty claims. The Delaware Supreme Court affirmed the Court of Chancery: while plaintiffs had an argument that the parties intended to treat the three agreements as a unitary transaction through incorporation by reference, the Settlement Agreement’s Release Carve Out confilcted with the complete transfer of all right, title, and interest in the plaintiffs’ E3 stock under the Stock Repurchase Agreements. In the event of a conflict, the Stock Repurchase Agreements plainly stated their terms controlled. Plaintiffs’ remaining claims were also part of the rights accompanying the E3 stock sale, and the unjust enrichment claim traveled with the E3 stock when repurchased by E3. View "Urdan v. WR Capital Partners, LLC" on Justia Law

Appellant Reginald Waters appealed his convictions for various offenses relating to the death of Clifton Thompson. According to Waters,the Superior Court erred in three ways: (1) in applying an incorrect legal standard when considering his motion for a new trial and improperly denied the motion; (2) in denying his motion to exclude certain prison phone calls that were obtained in violation of his Fourth Amendment rights; and (3) in denying a continuance of his trial to allow his counsel time to review certain evidence, which compromised his right to a fair trial. The Delaware Supreme Court found the Superior Court did not abuse its discretion by denying Waters’ motion for a new trial. Nor did the court err in allowing the prison phone calls to be used at trial. Lastly, the Supreme Court determined the trial court did not abuse its discretion by denying Waters’ continuance of trial. Therefore, judgment was affirmed. View "Waters v. Delaware" on Justia Law

In January 2019, 15-year old Heather Juliano was a passenger in a sport-utility vehicle driven by Shakyla Soto in the vicinity of the Capital Green development in Dover, Delaware. Corporal Robert Barrett of the Dover Police Department was patrolling the area, accompanied by Probation Officer Rick Porter, as part of the Department’s Safe Streets program. Corporal Barrett spotted Soto’s SUV exiting Capital Green and noticed that the occupant of the front passenger seat was not wearing a seat belt. Corporal Barrett decided to pull the vehicle over. Almost immediately after Barrett initiated contact with the driver, he heard Porter say “1015 which means take . . . everybody into custody.” Three other Dover Police Department officers arrived on the scene in very short order. All four occupants of the SUV were removed from the vehicle and handcuffed in response to Porter’s order. The SUV was then searched, but no contraband was found. One officer searched backseat passenger Keenan Teat and found a knotted bag containing crack cocaine in one of his pants pockets. Another officer searched passenger Zion Saunders and found both marijuana and heroin in his jacket pockets. But when Officer Johnson searched Juliano, he found no contraband, but $245.00 in cash. Juliano was later taken to the police station, and strip-searched. Officers found marijuana and a bag of cocaine in her pants. Juliano was charged with Tier 1 possession of narcotics plus an aggravating factor (aggravated possession of cocaine), drug dealing, and possession of marijuana. The Delaware Supreme Court determined there was nothing unreasonable in a motor vehicle stop based on an officer's reasonable suspicion the operator or occupant of the vehicle committed a violation of the law - here, traffic laws. "Equally so, we are not prepared to say that, once a vehicle is lawfully stopped, the police must ignore evidence of other criminal activity when that evidence itself is lawfully uncovered." Rejecting Juliano's appellate claims with regard to the initial traffic stop and the suppression od evidence, the Supreme Court felt compelled to address "certain conspicuous irregularities" in the trial court's order denying Juliano's motion to suppress: (1) the trial court did not articulate a basis for finding a reasonable suspicion sufficient to justify the extension of the traffic stop to investigate the vehicle's occupants; and (2) the court's order did not explain the basis upon which the custodial arrest and threatened strip search were justified. The matter was remanded to the trial court for more complete statements of the factual and legal bases with respect to Juliano's search and subsequent arrest. View "Juliano v. Delaware" on Justia Law