Justia Delaware Supreme Court Opinion Summaries

A computer repair shop owner in Wilmington, Delaware, came into possession of a laptop and data belonging to Robert Hunter Biden in April 2019, after Biden left the device for repair and failed to retrieve it. The shop owner, John Paul Mac Isaac, eventually provided a copy of the data to an attorney for Rudy Giuliani, who then shared it with the New York Post. The Post published a story about the laptop in October 2020, which led to widespread media attention and public identification of Mac Isaac as the source. Subsequent media coverage included a Politico article summarizing a letter from former intelligence officials suggesting the laptop story had the hallmarks of Russian disinformation, and public statements by the Biden campaign and Hunter Biden himself, some of which Mac Isaac alleged were defamatory.Mac Isaac filed suit in the Delaware Superior Court against Politico, Hunter Biden, and the Biden campaign, alleging defamation and related claims. He later amended his complaint to add the Biden campaign as a defendant. The case was briefly removed to federal court and then remanded. The defendants moved to dismiss, and Hunter Biden also filed counterclaims for invasion of privacy, which Mac Isaac moved to dismiss.The Supreme Court of the State of Delaware reviewed the Superior Court’s dismissal of Mac Isaac’s claims and Hunter Biden’s counterclaims. The Court held that the allegedly defamatory statements did not concern Mac Isaac and were not actionable as defamation. It also found that the Superior Court properly dismissed Hunter Biden’s counterclaims as time-barred under the statute of limitations, given the facts known to him by October 2020. The Supreme Court affirmed the Superior Court’s order in all respects. View "Isaac v. Politico LLC, et al." on Justia Law

CVS Health Corporation sought insurance coverage from its insurers for thousands of lawsuits brought by government entities, hospitals, and third-party payors. These lawsuits alleged that CVS’s opioid dispensing practices contributed to the opioid epidemic, resulting in significant public health and economic costs. CVS’s insurance policies, issued by Chubb and AIG, generally covered damages that CVS became legally obligated to pay “because of bodily injury or property damage” caused by an “occurrence.” Some policies included endorsements related to pharmacist or druggist liability, which CVS argued broadened coverage.The insurers filed a declaratory judgment action in the Superior Court of the State of Delaware, seeking a declaration that they owed no duty to defend or indemnify CVS in these lawsuits. The Superior Court granted summary judgment in favor of the insurers, holding that the underlying lawsuits did not seek damages for specific, individualized bodily injury or property damage as required by the policies. Instead, the court found that the lawsuits sought recovery for the plaintiffs’ own economic losses, such as increased public spending and general harm to public health systems. The court also determined that the policy endorsements did not alter the requirement that damages must be “because of” bodily injury or property damage. The court further held that the insurers had no duty to indemnify CVS, as the underlying claims did not depend on proof of personal injury or property damage.On appeal, the Supreme Court of the State of Delaware affirmed the Superior Court’s decision. The Supreme Court held that the insurance policies and their endorsements did not provide coverage for the lawsuits at issue because the claims did not allege specific and individualized bodily injury or property damage. The court also concluded that the duty to indemnify was not triggered, as there were no unresolved factual issues that could lead to coverage. The judgment of the Superior Court was affirmed. View "In Re: CVS Opioid Insurance Litigation" on Justia Law

A corporate parent acquired several subsidiaries that had previously developed and sold earplugs, which later became the subject of extensive products-liability litigation. The lawsuits, consolidated in federal multidistrict litigation and Minnesota state court, alleged hearing injuries from defective earplug design. While defending these suits, the subsidiaries and the parent incurred substantial legal costs. During the litigation, the subsidiaries filed for Chapter 11 bankruptcy, but the bankruptcy court found they were financially healthy and dismissed the petitions. Subsequently, the parent and subsidiaries reached a global settlement of the lawsuits.After the bankruptcy dismissal, the subsidiaries and their parent sought insurance coverage from the subsidiaries’ insurers for defense costs. The relevant insurance policies, issued by Twin City Fire Insurance Company, ACE American Insurance Company, and MS Transverse Specialty Insurance Company, contained self-insured retention (SIR) provisions requiring the “Named Insured” to pay a specified amount before coverage was triggered. The parent company was not a “Named Insured” under any policy. The Superior Court of the State of Delaware held that only payments made by the “Named Insured” could satisfy the SIRs, and payments made by the parent did not trigger the insurers’ coverage obligations. The court also rejected the argument that the policies’ maintenance clauses entitled the insureds to coverage for all defense costs minus the SIR, finding those clauses inapplicable.On appeal, the Supreme Court of the State of Delaware reviewed the Superior Court’s summary judgment decision and interpretation of the insurance contracts de novo. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the policies unambiguously required the “Named Insured” to satisfy the SIRs and that the parent’s payments did not trigger coverage. The Court further held that the maintenance clauses did not apply to excuse satisfaction of the SIRs or create a setoff in this context. The judgment for the insurers was affirmed. View "In Re Aearo Technologies LLC Insurance Appeals" on Justia Law

On the evening of December 18, 2022, a witness observed Kevin Stevens driving erratically in Wilmington, Delaware, nearly hitting another car and colliding with a parked vehicle. The witness followed Stevens, who eventually parked across two spaces at a shopping center and appeared disoriented before entering a Rite Aid pharmacy. Inside, Stevens was seen slumped over and fell to the floor, prompting the store manager to call the police. When Trooper Setting arrived, he noted that Stevens did not show signs of alcohol intoxication but appeared incoherent and unable to complete field sobriety tests. Stevens was arrested on suspicion of driving under the influence of drugs. Blood tests later revealed the presence of flubromazepam, a benzodiazepine derivative, and fentanyl.The Superior Court of the State of Delaware conducted a jury trial in March 2024. Stevens testified in his own defense, denying the erratic driving and claiming physical limitations prevented him from performing sobriety tests. He also challenged the admissibility of the State’s toxicology evidence, arguing that the State failed to provide sufficient foundation for the blood test results because it did not introduce calibration records for the testing machines. The trial judge overruled these objections, finding that the State’s expert witnesses provided adequate testimony regarding the machines’ calibration and reliability. Stevens was convicted of driving under the influence of drugs and driving with a suspended license. His motion for a new trial, based on similar evidentiary arguments, was denied.On appeal, the Supreme Court of the State of Delaware reviewed whether the Superior Court erred in admitting the toxicology evidence without calibration records. The Supreme Court held that there is no bright-line rule requiring the State to introduce calibration documents when expert witnesses testify to the reliability and calibration of laboratory equipment. The Court found no abuse of discretion in the Superior Court’s evidentiary rulings and affirmed Stevens’s convictions. View "Stevens v. State" on Justia Law

An eleven-year-old girl, I.G., accused her 22-year-old cousin, Marckenley Gustave, of repeated sexual assaults while they lived together in Delaware. I.G. testified that Gustave assaulted her on five occasions when they were alone, describing specific acts and referencing text messages and gifts related to the abuse. After I.G. disclosed the abuse to her mother, she was taken to a hospital, where both she and Gustave tested positive for chlamydia. Gustave was interviewed by police, during which he made incriminating statements, and then evaded law enforcement for several weeks before being arrested.A New Castle County grand jury indicted Gustave on multiple counts, including Rape First Degree and Unlawful Sexual Contact First Degree. During the Superior Court jury trial, the State played two short video clips from Gustave’s police interview—first to impeach his trial testimony and later as substantive evidence through a detective’s testimony. The State moved to admit the clips as exhibits after the close of evidence, and the trial court marked them as court exhibits, not to be sent to the jury. Due to a clerical error, the clips were mistakenly provided to the jury during deliberations. The court promptly removed them and issued a curative instruction. Gustave’s motions for a mistrial and a new trial, based on this error, were denied. The jury convicted him on several counts, and he was sentenced to 81 years.On appeal, the Supreme Court of the State of Delaware reviewed whether the Superior Court abused its discretion in denying the motions. The Supreme Court held that the trial court applied the correct legal standards, found no actual or inherent prejudice from the error, and that the curative instruction was sufficient. The convictions were affirmed. View "Gustave v. State" on Justia Law

A stockholder of Amazon.com, Inc. sent a letter to the company demanding to inspect its books and records under Section 220 of the Delaware General Corporation Law. The stockholder aimed to investigate potential wrongdoing and mismanagement by Amazon, believing the company engaged in anticompetitive activities in the U.S. and Europe. When the stockholder and Amazon could not agree on certain conditions for producing the records, the stockholder filed an action in the Court of Chancery.A Magistrate in Chancery conducted a one-day trial and concluded that the stockholder did not meet its burden to prove a "credible basis" for inferring possible wrongdoing by Amazon. The stockholder took exceptions to the final report. A Vice Chancellor adopted the final report's conclusion but did not reach its credible basis analysis, instead finding the scope of the stockholder's stated purpose to be "facially improper" and not "lucid."On appeal, the Supreme Court of the State of Delaware found that the Vice Chancellor erred in interpreting the scope of the stockholder's purpose and was required to engage with the evidence presented. The court determined that the evidence, including a complaint filed by the Federal Trade Commission against Amazon for alleged antitrust violations that largely survived a motion to dismiss, established a credible basis from which a court could infer possible wrongdoing by Amazon. The Supreme Court reversed the judgment of the Court of Chancery and remanded for further proceedings to determine the scope and conditions of production consistent with its decision. View "Roberta Ann K.W. Wong Leung Revocable Trust v. Amazon.com, Inc." on Justia Law

The plaintiff, Colleen Ryan, was injured in a parking lot owned by Sea Colony Recreational Association, Inc. while attending an event organized by Operation SEAs the Day, Inc. Before the event, Ryan signed a liability waiver that covered the event organizer and its agents. Upon arrival, she was directed to park in Sea Colony's lot, where she tripped in a hole and injured her ankle. The relationship between the event organizer and the parking lot owner was not clear from the pleadings.The Superior Court of Delaware granted judgment on the pleadings in favor of Sea Colony, concluding that Sea Colony was an agent of the event organizer based on the fact that the parking lot was used for the event. The court found the waiver unambiguous and applicable to Sea Colony, and that Ryan's injuries fell within its scope. Ryan's motion for reargument, which included new information that she was a registered guest at Sea Colony, was denied.The Supreme Court of Delaware reviewed the case and reversed the Superior Court's decision. The Supreme Court held that the Superior Court erred in finding an agency relationship between Sea Colony and the event organizer based solely on the use of the parking lot. The Supreme Court noted that the pleadings did not contain sufficient facts to establish an agency relationship and that other reasonable inferences could be drawn, such as a license agreement or public use of the lot. The case was remanded for further proceedings to determine whether the waiver covered Sea Colony and whether Ryan's injuries fell within its scope. View "Ryan v. Sea Colony Recreational Association, Inc." on Justia Law

Origis USA LLC and Guy Vanderhaegen (the Insureds) appealed a decision by the Superior Court of Delaware, which dismissed their claims against two sets of insurers: the 2021 Insurers and the 2023 Insurers. The Insureds sought coverage for defense costs and potential liabilities arising from an underlying lawsuit filed by former investors in Origis USA’s parent company, alleging fraudulent conduct and breaches of fiduciary duty.The Superior Court dismissed the claims against the 2021 Insurers based on a No Action Clause in the insurance policies, which required a final determination of the Insureds’ liability before any action could be taken against the insurers. The court also dismissed the claims against the 2023 Insurers, concluding that the allegations in the underlying lawsuit did not constitute a separate claim under the 2023 policies and were barred by Prior Acts Exclusions, which excluded coverage for wrongful acts occurring before November 18, 2021.The Delaware Supreme Court affirmed the Superior Court’s decision regarding the 2023 Insurers, agreeing that the allegations did not constitute a separate claim and were excluded by the Prior Acts Exclusions. However, the Supreme Court remanded the case for further consideration regarding the 2021 Insurers. The court noted that the Superior Court needed to more fully analyze the relationship between the No Action Clause, the Advancement and Allocation provisions, and how they function together, especially given the absence of a duty by the insurers to defend. The Supreme Court emphasized the need for a more in-depth analysis of the contract provisions and their intended function. View "Origis USA v. Great American Insurance" on Justia Law

Capice Johnson was convicted of attempted murder in the first degree, reckless endangering in the first degree, and two counts of possession of a firearm during the commission of a felony. The incident involved a drive-by shooting in Middletown, Delaware, where a masked man on an orange dirt bike fired at least 17 shots at Siyona Jones and Thomas Haye, critically injuring Jones. Surveillance footage and other evidence, including images from Johnson’s cell phones, linked him to the crime. Johnson was sentenced to 75 years of incarceration, suspended after 30 years for probation.In the Superior Court of the State of Delaware, Johnson was found guilty on all counts except for carrying a concealed deadly weapon without a license. His defense strategy was to create reasonable doubt about the identity of the shooter. The State’s key witness, Detective Joshua Stafford, provided testimony while surveillance videos were played to the jury. Johnson did not request a limiting instruction regarding Stafford’s narration of the videos, and the jury was instructed that they were the sole judges of the facts and witness credibility.The Supreme Court of the State of Delaware reviewed the case and affirmed the Superior Court’s judgment. The court held that the trial judge did not err in failing to provide a limiting instruction sua sponte regarding Stafford’s testimony. The court found that Stafford’s testimony was a neutral explanation of the surveillance footage and did not constitute lay-opinion identification testimony. Additionally, the jury was properly instructed on their role as fact-finders. Even if the failure to give a limiting instruction was considered an error, it did not rise to the level of plain error that would have affected the outcome of the trial. View "Johnson v. State" on Justia Law

The case involves nearly 75,000 plaintiffs who filed personal injury claims in the Delaware Superior Court, alleging that their ingestion of ranitidine, marketed under the brand name Zantac, caused them to develop various types of cancer. The plaintiffs claim that ranitidine contains or degrades into N-Nitrosodimethylamine (NDMA), a likely carcinogen. The defendants in the case include GlaxoSmithKline LLC, Boehringer Ingelheim Pharmaceuticals, Inc., Sanofi US Services Inc., Pfizer Inc., and Patheon Manufacturing Services, LLC.The Superior Court of Delaware denied the defendants' motions to exclude the plaintiffs' expert testimony, which supported the claim that ranitidine causes cancer. The court concluded that the general causation question could focus on NDMA rather than ranitidine itself and that Delaware law does not require a "threshold dose" for general causation. The court also applied a "liberal thrust" favoring the admissibility of expert testimony, viewing challenges to the experts' methodologies as questions for the jury.The Supreme Court of Delaware reviewed the case and reversed the Superior Court's decision. The Supreme Court held that the Superior Court erred in interpreting Delaware Rule of Evidence 702 by applying a "liberal thrust" favoring admissibility and by concluding that Delaware's standard for admissibility is distinct from the federal standard. The Supreme Court emphasized that the proponent of expert testimony must establish its admissibility by a preponderance of the evidence, and the trial court must act as a gatekeeper to ensure the reliability and sufficiency of the expert's methodology and application.The Supreme Court also found that the Superior Court erred in defining the general causation question as focusing on NDMA rather than the product at issue, ranitidine. The court concluded that the plaintiffs' experts did not reliably link the NDMA studies to the exposure caused by ranitidine, failing to establish the necessary scientific connection between the product and the alleged harm. Consequently, the Supreme Court reversed the Superior Court's decision and remanded the case for further proceedings consistent with its opinion. View "In re Zantac (Ranitidine) Litigation" on Justia Law