Justia Delaware Supreme Court Opinion Summaries

In this case, the Supreme Court of the State of Delaware reversed the decision of the Superior Court of the State of Delaware. The case centered around an insurance dispute involving Verizon Communications, Inc. and several of its insurers. The dispute arose after Verizon settled a lawsuit brought by a litigation trust, which was pursuing claims against Verizon arising out of a transaction Verizon had made with FairPoint Communications Inc. The litigation trust had alleged that Verizon made fraudulent transfers in the course of the transaction, which harmed FairPoint's creditors. After settling the lawsuit, Verizon sought coverage for the settlement payment and defense costs from its insurers.The insurers denied coverage, arguing that the litigation trust's claims did not qualify as a "Securities Claim" under the relevant insurance policies. The Superior Court disagreed, ruling that the litigation trust's claims were brought derivatively on behalf of FairPoint by a security holder of FairPoint, as required to qualify as a Securities Claim under the policies.The Supreme Court of Delaware reversed this decision, finding that the litigation trust's claims were direct, not derivative. The court reasoned that the trust's claims were brought on behalf of the creditors, not FairPoint or its subsidiary, and the relief sought would benefit the creditors, not the business entity. Therefore, the claims did not meet the definition of a Securities Claim under the insurance policies. Consequently, the Supreme Court held that the insurers were not obligated to cover Verizon's settlement payment and defense costs. View "In re Fairpoint Insurance Coverage Appeals" on Justia Law

The case before the Supreme Court of the State of Delaware concerned an appeal by Carrah LeBoon Odell against an order from the Superior Court of the State of Delaware. The order affirmed a decision made by the Unemployment Insurance Appeal Board (UIAB) that upheld decisions by an appeals referee concluding that Odell was liable to repay overpaid unemployment benefits totaling $7,139.Odell had originally filed a claim for unemployment insurance benefits after her employer, Allied Universal, reduced her hours. She later obtained a second job at Rater Labs and reported income from both employers to the Department of Labor. She received traditional unemployment benefits and Federal Pandemic Unemployment Compensation under the CARES Act for a period. It was later determined that Odell’s total income during the period was too high to qualify for unemployment benefits, and the benefits she received were therefore an overpayment subject to recoupment by the Department.Odell appealed the overpayment determinations, admitting that she was ineligible for traditional unemployment benefits during the period in question because her income was too high. She requested a waiver of the obligation to repay the benefits, arguing that she met the conditions for a repayment waiver established by the US Department of Labor’s instructions to states regarding processing overpayment waivers under the CARES Act.The UIAB affirmed the appeals referee’s decision. Odell then appealed to the Superior Court, which also affirmed the Board’s decision.Odell appealed to the Supreme Court of the State of Delaware, which concluded that the Board’s decision was supported by substantial evidence and free from legal error. The Supreme Court ruled that Odell was liable for repayment, regardless of the cause of the overpayment. Her arguments concerning the Department’s computer system and discovery relating to that system did not establish reversible error. Furthermore, her argument that her repayment obligation should have been waived did not establish reversible error as repayment waivers were not available at the time of the proceedings below.Therefore, the Supreme Court affirmed the judgment of the Superior Court. View "Odell v. Unemployment Insurance Appeal Board" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court of the State of Delaware examined the Adult Expungement Reform Act and the Clean Slate Act, which expanded eligibility for expungement and created an automatic expungement process for certain Delaware criminal records. The Acts are applicable to "all criminal cases brought and convictions entered in a court in this State" and limit expungement to individuals with "no prior or subsequent convictions." The three petitioners, Alex Osgood, Osama Qaiymah, and Eric Fritz, requested expungement of their criminal records. However, the Superior Court denied their requests due to their prior or subsequent misdemeanor convictions from other states.The issue the Supreme Court had to decide was whether the phrase "prior or subsequent convictions" in the Acts includes out-of-state convictions. The court ruled that "prior or subsequent convictions" refers only to Delaware convictions, not to out-of-state convictions. The court reversed the Superior Court's decision and remanded the case for further proceedings in line with its opinion.In reaching its decision, the court considered the specific language of the Acts, their purpose and legislative intent, as well as practical considerations. The court also noted that including out-of-state convictions could lead to inconsistencies and impracticalities. View "Osgood v. State" on Justia Law

Defendant-appellant Larry Martin appealed the sentence he received after pleading guilty to one count of Stalking and two counts of Non-Compliance with Bond (“NCB”). The trial court entered its first sentencing order on August 12, 2022, followed by three corrected sentencing orders, entered on September 8, September 21, and October 17, 2022, respectively. It was undisputed that the trial court’s first sentencing order was illegal because it imposed a sentence that exceeded the maximum lawful sentence for Stalking, which was three years at Level V supervision. In an email dated August 29, 2022, Martin’s trial counsel informed the trial court of the illegality of the sentence, and that the State recommended that the trial court fix its error by redistributing Martin’s five-year prison sentence across the Stalking conviction and the two NCB convictions. In a corrected sentencing order, issued on September 8, 2022, the trial court reduced Martin’s sentence for Stalking to three years of incarceration at Level V supervision, to bring it in line with the lawful maximum sentence. The trial court then added one year of incarceration at Level V supervision, suspended for probation, to the suspended fines for each NCB conviction. It was undisputed that if this had been the original sentence, Martin’s sentence would have been lawful. Martin appealed the trial court’s sentencing order insofar as it modified his sentence for the NCB convictions, arguing that by increasing his sentence for the NCB convictions, the trial court effectively resentenced him for those convictions despite the fact that he had already served them. This was because those sentences consisted solely of fines that were suspended when imposed and as such, were completed as of the date of the sentence. According to Martin, he completed his sentence for both NCB convictions on August 12, 2022, and any subsequent resentencing was barred by principles of double jeopardy. The Delaware Supreme Court was not persuaded by this argument and affirmed the sentence imposed by the trial court in its September 8, 2022 sentencing order, as modified by the September 21, 2022 and October 17, 2022 sentencing orders. View "Martin v. Delaware" on Justia Law

After arresting Aaron Garnett in whose care were three young children, the police promptly sought to locate the children’s parent or guardian. This search, initiated before sunrise on a cold and rainy day, led the police to a house where they were told the children’s mother lived and was sleeping. Once there, the police knocked, then banged, on the front door and loudly announced their presence. When no one answered, one of the officers went to the rear of the house where, after another round of knocking and announcing, the officer noticed the back door was unlocked. He pushed open the unlocked door and, peering into the interior of the residence with the benefit of a flashlight, saw a motionless body under a blanket at the foot of a stairway. Joined now by fellow officers, he entered the residence and found the lifeless body of Naquita Hill, the mother of one of the children whose welfare had motivated the police’s visit. Seven or so hours later, Garnett confessed that, during a heated argument, he had choked Hill until she slumped to the floor and beat her with his fist after that. After a jury trial, Garnett was convicted of Naquita Hill’s murder. He appealed, but the Delaware Supreme Court found no reversible error and affirmed Garnett's conviction. View "Garnett v. Delaware" on Justia Law

A Delaware Family Court terminated Carter Ralston’s parental rights in his daughter who, at the time, had been in the State’s custody for over a year. The court’s decision was based primarily on Ralston’s failure to make progress on a case plan established by the Department of Services for Children, Youth, and Their Families (the “Department”). Ralston was incarcerated throughout most of the proceedings, but the case plan aimed to reunify him with his daughter. After the court terminated his parental rights, Ralston moved for relief from the order on the grounds that, since the order’s issuance, he had been released from prison and had completed the requirements of his case plan. The Family Court denied that motion, concluding that evidence of Ralston’s post-termination compliance with the case plan did not constitute “newly discovered evidence” under Family Court Civil Rule 60. Ralston appealed. Having considered each of Ralston’s arguments, the Delaware Supreme Court concluded the Family Court’s decision should be affirmed. "Although disposing of the guardianship petition before terminating Mr. Ralston’s parental rights would have been the better practice, the procedural sequence was not so deficient that it violated Mr. Ralston’s due process rights. As to the remaining issues, the Family Court correctly applied the law and did not abuse its discretion." View "Ralston v. Division of Services for Children, Youth and Their Families" on Justia Law

Defendant-appellant Shamayah Thomas (“Thomas”) was convicted after a bench trial of Stalking and related acts of intimidation and harassment. Before his bench trial, Thomas filed a pro se Motion to Dismiss Current Counsel and/or to Appoint New Counsel on grounds that his then-current counsel was not following his instructions regarding his pretrial defense (the “First Motion to Dismiss Current Counsel”). Also before trial, Thomas’ counsel filed a motion to suppress digital evidence (the “Motion to Suppress”) collected from Thomas’s pink iPhone (“Pink iPhone”), alleging that law enforcement seized the phone without a warrant and, alternatively, that the search warrant issued following the seizure of the Pink iPhone (“Search Warrant”) was constitutionally defective. The trial court denied Thomas’ motion for new counsel pursuant to Superior Court Rule 47; the court granted in part, and denied in part, the Motion to Suppress, ultimately admitting certain evidence extracted from the Pink iPhone. After trial, but before his sentencing, Thomas filed a second motion to dismiss current counsel and/or appoint new counsel. Although the Superior Court prothonotary’s office failed to direct the second motion to dismiss counsel to defense counsel or to the trial judge, the trial court addressed the motion at Thomas’ sentencing hearing. Given the option of either delaying sentencing and proceeding pro se, or proceeding with his then-current counsel, Thomas chose to proceed with sentencing as scheduled, represented by his then-current counsel. On appeal, Thomas argued the Superior Court: (1) erred when it categorized the Pink iPhone Search Warrant as an overbroad warrant as opposed to an unconstitutional general warrant; and (2) failed to adequately address Thomas’ Motions to Dismiss Counsel. Thomas asked the Delaware Supreme Court to reverse his convictions and remand for a new trial. Finding no reversible error, the Supreme Court affirmed the trial court. View "Thomas v. Delaware" on Justia Law

In 2013, defendant-appellant Darnell Martin received an unconditional gubernatorial pardon for his previous criminal convictions, which included several felony convictions. Several years later, Martin was arrested and charged with new offenses. After his convictions for those charges were affirmed on direct appeal, he filed a motion for postconviction relief, arguing that his trial counsel was ineffective. More than two years passed as the parties briefed Martin’s motion and the trial court considered it. During that time, Martin served his prison sentence and his term of probation. He was discharged from probation while the postconviction motion was under advisement with the Superior Court. After Martin’s probation was discharged, the Superior Court dismissed his postconviction motion as moot, concluding that he no longer was “in custody” as required by Rule 61(a) and, given his extensive criminal history, he would not suffer any collateral consequences as a result of the convictions he was challenging. When the Superior Court dismissed the motion, it was not aware that Martin’s previous convictions had been pardoned. Martin appealed, and the Delaware Supreme Court remanded to the Superior Court to further consider the effect of Martin’s pardon, including whether a pardoned defendant suffers collateral consequences in the same manner as a first-time felon and therefore should not have his postconviction motion mooted if he is released from custody before the motion is resolved. The Superior Court concluded the collateral consequences doctrine, which the Supreme Court adopted more than 50 years ago based on United States Supreme Court precedent, has no continuing application in postconviction proceedings in Delaware. Martin’s appeal then returned to the Supreme Court, where he again challenged dismissal of his motion and the Superior Court’s application of the mootness doctrine. Having carefully considered the Superior Court’s decision and the parties’ submissions, the Delaware Supreme Court concluded the Superior Court erred in dismissing Martin’s postconviction motion as moot. View "Martin v. Delaware" on Justia Law

The issue this case presented for the Delaware Supreme Court's review stemmed from a failed, multibillion-dollar merger (the “Merger”) of two fuel pipeline giants - The Williams Companies, Inc. (“Williams”) and Energy Transfer LP (“ETE”). The parties spent a decade litigating over various fees to which they argued they were entitled under the Merger Agreement. ETE continued to assert its entitlement to a $1.48 billion breakup fee, despite being the party who terminated the Merger. It also disputed that it had to pay Williams a $410 million reimbursement fee, which it was required to pay if the Merger failed and certain conditions were met. Finally, ETE argued a related $85 million attorney’s fee award was unreasonable. But the Supreme Court found no error with the Court of Chancery’s opinions that held ETE was not entitled to an over-one-billion-dollar fee and find that ETE had to pay Williams the $410 million reimbursement fee and the related $85 million in attorney’s fees. View "Energy Transfer, LP v. The Williams Companies, Inc." on Justia Law

Guaranteed Rate, Inc., a mortgage lender, purchased two types of insurance policies from ACE American Insurance Company: management liability and professional liability. Guaranteed Rate sought coverage under the policies for an investigation and eventual settlement of claims brought by the federal government under the False Claims Act. ACE denied coverage under both policies. According to ACE, the Professional Liability Policy expressly excluded False Claims Act charges. ACE also contended that the False Claims Act charges arose from Guaranteed Rate’s professional services, which were excluded under the Management Liability Policy. Only the Management Liability Policy was at issue in this appeal. In Guaranteed Rate’s suit against ACE, a Delaware superior court held that the False Claims Act investigation and settlement did not arise out of Guaranteed Rate’s professional services. Instead, it arose out of false certifications made to the government. Thus, the Management Liability Policy covered the loss. To this, the Delaware Supreme Court agreed with the superior court. View "ACE American Insurance Company v. Guaranteed Rate, Inc." on Justia Law