Justia Delaware Supreme Court Opinion Summaries

In 1997, David Silverman (“Husband”) and Michelle Silverman (“Wife”) signed a premarital agreement covering their financial affairs if they divorced or died. They married in 1997 and divorced in 2015. In the post-divorce property settlement, Husband sought to enforce the premarital agreement. The Family Court applied the statute governing premarital agreements and found that, although Wife voluntarily entered into the agreement, the disparity in wealth made the agreement unconscionable. Also, according to the Family Court, Husband failed to provide a fair and reasonable disclosure of his property or financial obligations before Wife signed the agreement. The court refused to enforce the agreement. The Delaware Supreme Court accepted Husband’s interlocutory appeal of the Family Court’s order, and determined under the premarital agreement statute, unconscionability alone did not invalidate a premarital agreement. Wife also had to prove that Husband did not provide a fair and reasonable disclosure of his property or financial obligations. Because the Family Court erred when it found Husband’s financial disclosure insufficient, the Supreme Court reversed and remanded to the Family Court to enforce the premarital agreement. View "Silverman v. Silverman" on Justia Law

Appellant Aaron Thompson appealed after a jury found him guilty of two counts of first degree murder, two counts of possession of a firearm during the commission of a felony, and first degree conspiracy. The charges arose from the double homicide of Joseph and Olga Connell, who were shot to death in 2013. The State’s theory of the case at trial was that Mr. Connell’s business partner, Chris Rivers, paid to have the Connells killed so he could collect on an insurance policy listing Mr. Connell as the insured and Rivers as the beneficiary. The theory was that Rivers paid Joshua Bey, who in turn hired Dominique Benson and Thompson to carry out the murders. The success of the State’s theory at Thompson’s trial largely depended on the testimony and credibility of Bey. Thompson contended throughout the trial that Bey was lying and made up the connection with Thompson to get himself a favorable plea deal. On appeal to the Delaware Supreme Court, Thompson argued: (1) two statements by the State during its rebuttal argument constituted prosecutorial misconduct that undermined the fairness of the trial; and (2) the trial court abused its discretion in allowing Bey’s recorded statement to the police to be played for the jury following his testimony, arguing that this was inadmissible hearsay not subject to an exception. The Supreme Court found no reversible error and affirmed Thompson's convictions. View "Thompson v. Delaware" on Justia Law

Appellant Kevin Walker appealed a Superior Court order finding that he violated the terms of his probation. Walker began probation on May 10, 2017, as a result of a felony driving- under-the-influence conviction. On June 1, the State received a tip from a past-proven reliable informant that Walker had heroin in his home that he planned to distribute. On June 5, Delaware probation officers conducted an administrative search of Walker’s residence pursuant to an administrative warrant. During the search, probation officers discovered 252 bags of heroin, drug paraphernalia, and a locked safe. When the safe was taken to the Delaware State Police, they found a loaded handgun, five doses of Suboxone, and five grams of marijuana. Walker was thereafter arrested and taken to the Sussex Correctional Institution; at the SCI facility, offers found 86 bags of heroin and nine grams of crack cocaine inside Walker's rectum. Walker moved to suppress all the evidence found as the result of the administrative search. The Superior Court determined the search was not conducted in accordance with 11 Del. C. 4321(d) and Procedure 7.19. In particular, it found there was a lack of detail concerning the informant’s tip and that no effort was made at all to corroborate the tip or consider the reason why the informant was supplying information. The State did not appeal the suppression order, instead, dismissing the criminal action against Walker, but continued to pursue a violation of probation. The Delaware Supreme Court found that probation officers are not required to “satisfy each technical requirement of the search and seizure regulations of the Department of Correction” for a search to be reasonable. The Court concluded that the "proper and orderly administration of justice called for suppression, and reversed the Superior Court. View "Walker v. Delaware" on Justia Law

In July 2015, police officers stopped Javier Ayala for driving a vehicle with a suspended license. During a search of his vehicle and a subsequent search of his home under a previously issued warrant, officers found a .22-caliber pistol and 1,286 bags of heroin. The net weight of the bags’ contents was approximately 15 grams. In separate trials, two juries convicted Ayala of multiple charges relating to the contraband police found in Ayala’s home and vehicle. Because Ayala had been previously convicted of four other felonies, the Superior Court declared Ayala to be a habitual offender and sentenced him to a mandatory minimum prison term of seven years and six months. On appeal, Ayala challenged his convictions and sentence, contending: (1) the Superior Court abused its discretion when it admitted evidence regarding the identity and weight of the substance in the bags seized from his home and vehicle because the chemist who tested the suspected heroin bags did not lay a proper foundation for the admission of her hypergeometric-testing results; and (2) as a matter of law, he should not have been adjudged a habitual offender because the offenses forming the basis of three of his predicate felony convictions were no longer felonies when he was sentenced in this case. Finding no abuse of discretion, and that the habitual offender sentence enhancement was properly applied, the Delaware Supreme Court affirmed Ayala's conviction and sentence. View "Ayala v. Delaware" on Justia Law

A grand jury indicted Everett Urquhart for the armed robbery of a corner grocery store in Wilmington, Delaware. In the five months before trial, three different public defenders represented Urquhart at preliminary court hearings. A fourth public defender would be his trial counsel, assigned to defend Urquhart against charges carrying a lengthy minimum prison sentence. Because of a trial the preceding week, and other professional commitments before that, Urquhart’s trial counsel did not meet with Urquhart to prepare for trial. The morning of trial was also the first time trial counsel showed Urquhart the State’s key evidence against him. Before jury selection, Urquhart expressed frustration and confusion to the court about seeing his trial counsel for essentially the first time the morning of trial and seeing the State’s evidence against him. Trial went ahead, and a jury convicted Urquhart of all charges. The judge sentenced him to fifteen years in prison. The Delaware Supreme Court affirmed the convictions on direct appeal. Urquhart moved for post-conviction relief, claiming his trial counsel’s absence before trial denied him his Sixth Amendment right to the assistance of counsel. The Superior Court denied the motion. The question presented for the Delaware Supreme Court's review was whether a defendant’s Sixth Amendment right to the assistance of counsel in a serious felony trial requires more than the mere presence of a defense attorney the day of trial. The Court found that it did, reversed Urquhart’s conviction, and remanded for a new trial. View "Urquhart v. Delaware" on Justia Law

A jury returned a verdict in favor of plaintiff Monica Broughton, in a medical negligence suit she brought in the amount of $3 million. The case was brought by Ms. Broughton individually and as parent and natural guardian of her nine-year-old son, Amari Broughton-Fleming. The injury involved was a permanent injury to Amari’s right brachial plexus that occurred during birth. Defendants are Dr. Peter J. Wong and his medical practice, Dedicated To Women, OB-GYN, P.A. argued on appeal the superior court erred: (1) when it denied their motion in limine to exclude the opinion of plaintiff’s standard of care expert, which allowed an impermissible res ipsa loquitur opinion that resulting in the jury improperly presuming negligence from the fact that an injury occurred; (2) when it denied their motion in limine to exclude plaintiff’s causation expert, which they contended lacked a proper factual foundation, and constituted an impermissible res ipsa loquitur opinion; (3) when it permitted plaintiff to elicit statistical evidence from Dr. Wong and his experts to establish the rarity of brachial plexus injuries; and (4) when it refused to instruct the jury on “Actions Taken in Emergency.” The Delaware Supreme Court concluded the first and third contentions were directly addressed by the superior court in a ruling on post-trial motions; the second and fourth contentions, which were initially raised and denied before trial, were not reargued in the post-trial motions. Therefore, the Supreme Court affirmed as to defendants' four arguments on appeal. View "Wong v. Broughton" on Justia Law

Stockholder-plaintiff KT4 Partners LLC appealed the Court of Chancery’s post-trial order granting in part and denying in part KT4’s request to inspect various books and records of appellee Palantir Technologies Inc., a privately held technology company. The Court of Chancery found that KT4 had shown a proper purpose of investigating suspected wrongdoing in three areas: (1) “Palantir’s serial failures to hold annual stockholder meetings”; (2) Palantir’s amendments of its Investors’ Rights Agreement in a way that “eviscerated KT4’s (and other similarly situated stockholders’) contractual information rights after KT4 sought to exercise those rights”; and (3) Palantir’s potential violation of two stockholder agreements by failing to give stockholders notice and the opportunity to exercise their rights of first refusal, co-sale rights, and rights of first offer as to certain stock transactions. The Court ordered Palantir to produce the company’s stock ledger, its list of stockholders, information about the company’s directors and officers, year-end audited financial statements, books and records relating to annual stockholder meetings, books and records relating to any cofounder's sales of Palantir stock. The Court otherwise denied KT4's requests, including a request to inspect emails related to Investors' Rights Agreement amendments. Both sides appealed, but the Delaware Supreme Court was satisfied the Court of Chancery did not abuse its discretion with respect to all but two issues: (1) denying wholesale requests to inspect email relating to the Investors' Rights Agreement; (2) and requests to temper the jurisdictional use restriction imposed by the court. "Given that the court found a credible basis to investigate potential wrongdoing related to the violation of contracts executed in California, governed by California law, and among parties living or based in California, the basis for limiting KT4’s use in litigation of the inspection materials to Delaware and specifically the Court of Chancery was tenuous in the first place, and the court lacked reasonable grounds for denying the limited modifications that KT4 requested." View "KT4 Partners LLC v. Palantir Technologies, Inc." on Justia Law

A grand jury indicted Everett Urquhart for the armed robbery of a corner grocery store in Wilmington, Delaware. Urquhart needed a public defender. In the five months before trial, three different public defenders represented Urquhart at preliminary court hearings. A fourth public defender served as trial counsel, assigned to defend Urquhart against charges carrying a lengthy minimum prison sentence. The morning of trial was the first time trial counsel met with and showed Urquhart the State’s key evidence against him. Before jury selection, Urquhart expressed frustration and confusion to the court about seeing his trial counsel for essentially the first time the morning of trial and seeing the State’s evidence against him. Trial went ahead, and a Superior Court jury convicted Urquhart of all charges. The judge sentenced him to fifteen years in prison. The Delaware Supreme Court affirmed the convictions on direct appeal. Urquhart moved for post-conviction relief, and claimed that his trial counsel’s absence before trial denied him his Sixth Amendment right to the assistance of counsel. The Superior Court denied the motion. The Delaware Supreme Court concluded a defendant’s Sixth Amendment right to the assistance of counsel in a serious felony trial requires more than the mere presence of a defense attorney the day of trial. Urquhart’s conviction was reversed, and the matter remanded for a new trial. View "Urquhart v. Delaware" on Justia Law

Two of Oxbow Carbon LLC’s minority Members, Crestview Partners, L.P. and Load Line Capital LLC, attempted to force a sale of Oxbow over the objection of Oxbow’s majority Members, William Koch and his affiliates (the “Koch Parties”). This dispute centered on the proper interpretation of the governing Third Amended and Restated Limited Liability Company Agreement (the “LLC Agreement”). Although the Court of Chancery found that the minority investors affiliated with Koch, Ingraham Investments LLC and Oxbow Carbon Investment Company LLC (collectively, the “Small Holders”), could block the sale unless it met certain payment conditions, the court nonetheless found a contractual gap in the LLC Agreement because the Board did not specify the terms and conditions under which the Small Holders acquired their units. Using the implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing, the Court of Chancery filled that gap by implying a “Top-Off” option for the Small Holders’ units, effectively stripping them of the right to block the proposed transaction. On appeal, Oxbow claimed that: (1) the trial court improperly applied the implied covenant; (2) there was no contractual gap; (3) Oxbow did not breach the LLC Agreement; and (4) the court’s rulings on remedies were made in error. The Delaware Supreme Court determined the Court of Chancery correctly interpreted the LLC Agreement’s plain language, but erred by finding a contractual gap concerning the admission of the Small Holders. Thus, the Court affirmed in part, reversed in part, and remanded the Court of Chancery’s February 12, 2018, decision, and vacated its August 1, 2018, decision on remedies. View "Oxbow Carbon & Minerals Holdings, Inc., et al. v. Crestview-Oxbow Acquisition, LLC, et al." on Justia Law

Defendant Justin Parker appealed his conviction and sentence for theft of a motor vehicle, felony theft, and two counts of possession of a firearm during the commission of a felony. All of the charges against Parker stemmed from one night where Parker and another man entered a lot that housed various vehicles, pointed a gun at the guard and locked him in a portable toilet, and then loaded a container with several vehicles, which they then stole. On appeal, Parker argued his sentences for both theft of a motor vehicle and felony theft violated double jeopardy because the vehicles at issue in each count were stolen on the same occasion and were part of one course of action by Parker. The Delaware Supreme Court was presented with two issues for resolution by this appeal: (1) as a general matter, whether theft of a motor vehicle and felony theft the “same offense” for double jeopardy purposes; and (2) even if they were, can the two charges be separated in this particular case because they were associated with different stolen items, even though the items were stolen at the same time and place? The Court held theft of a motor vehicle was indeed the same offense as felony theft for double jeopardy purposes and that the two charges could not be separated in this case. The Court therefore vacated Parker’s sentence and remanded for resentencing. View "Parker v. Delaware" on Justia Law