Justia Delaware Supreme Court Opinion Summaries

A grand jury indicted Everett Urquhart for the armed robbery of a corner grocery store in Wilmington, Delaware. In the five months before trial, three different public defenders represented Urquhart at preliminary court hearings. A fourth public defender would be his trial counsel, assigned to defend Urquhart against charges carrying a lengthy minimum prison sentence. Because of a trial the preceding week, and other professional commitments before that, Urquhart’s trial counsel did not meet with Urquhart to prepare for trial. The morning of trial was also the first time trial counsel showed Urquhart the State’s key evidence against him. Before jury selection, Urquhart expressed frustration and confusion to the court about seeing his trial counsel for essentially the first time the morning of trial and seeing the State’s evidence against him. Trial went ahead, and a jury convicted Urquhart of all charges. The judge sentenced him to fifteen years in prison. The Delaware Supreme Court affirmed the convictions on direct appeal. Urquhart moved for post-conviction relief, claiming his trial counsel’s absence before trial denied him his Sixth Amendment right to the assistance of counsel. The Superior Court denied the motion. The question presented for the Delaware Supreme Court's review was whether a defendant’s Sixth Amendment right to the assistance of counsel in a serious felony trial requires more than the mere presence of a defense attorney the day of trial. The Court found that it did, reversed Urquhart’s conviction, and remanded for a new trial. View "Urquhart v. Delaware" on Justia Law

A jury returned a verdict in favor of plaintiff Monica Broughton, in a medical negligence suit she brought in the amount of $3 million. The case was brought by Ms. Broughton individually and as parent and natural guardian of her nine-year-old son, Amari Broughton-Fleming. The injury involved was a permanent injury to Amari’s right brachial plexus that occurred during birth. Defendants are Dr. Peter J. Wong and his medical practice, Dedicated To Women, OB-GYN, P.A. argued on appeal the superior court erred: (1) when it denied their motion in limine to exclude the opinion of plaintiff’s standard of care expert, which allowed an impermissible res ipsa loquitur opinion that resulting in the jury improperly presuming negligence from the fact that an injury occurred; (2) when it denied their motion in limine to exclude plaintiff’s causation expert, which they contended lacked a proper factual foundation, and constituted an impermissible res ipsa loquitur opinion; (3) when it permitted plaintiff to elicit statistical evidence from Dr. Wong and his experts to establish the rarity of brachial plexus injuries; and (4) when it refused to instruct the jury on “Actions Taken in Emergency.” The Delaware Supreme Court concluded the first and third contentions were directly addressed by the superior court in a ruling on post-trial motions; the second and fourth contentions, which were initially raised and denied before trial, were not reargued in the post-trial motions. Therefore, the Supreme Court affirmed as to defendants' four arguments on appeal. View "Wong v. Broughton" on Justia Law

Stockholder-plaintiff KT4 Partners LLC appealed the Court of Chancery’s post-trial order granting in part and denying in part KT4’s request to inspect various books and records of appellee Palantir Technologies Inc., a privately held technology company. The Court of Chancery found that KT4 had shown a proper purpose of investigating suspected wrongdoing in three areas: (1) “Palantir’s serial failures to hold annual stockholder meetings”; (2) Palantir’s amendments of its Investors’ Rights Agreement in a way that “eviscerated KT4’s (and other similarly situated stockholders’) contractual information rights after KT4 sought to exercise those rights”; and (3) Palantir’s potential violation of two stockholder agreements by failing to give stockholders notice and the opportunity to exercise their rights of first refusal, co-sale rights, and rights of first offer as to certain stock transactions. The Court ordered Palantir to produce the company’s stock ledger, its list of stockholders, information about the company’s directors and officers, year-end audited financial statements, books and records relating to annual stockholder meetings, books and records relating to any cofounder's sales of Palantir stock. The Court otherwise denied KT4's requests, including a request to inspect emails related to Investors' Rights Agreement amendments. Both sides appealed, but the Delaware Supreme Court was satisfied the Court of Chancery did not abuse its discretion with respect to all but two issues: (1) denying wholesale requests to inspect email relating to the Investors' Rights Agreement; (2) and requests to temper the jurisdictional use restriction imposed by the court. "Given that the court found a credible basis to investigate potential wrongdoing related to the violation of contracts executed in California, governed by California law, and among parties living or based in California, the basis for limiting KT4’s use in litigation of the inspection materials to Delaware and specifically the Court of Chancery was tenuous in the first place, and the court lacked reasonable grounds for denying the limited modifications that KT4 requested." View "KT4 Partners LLC v. Palantir Technologies, Inc." on Justia Law

A grand jury indicted Everett Urquhart for the armed robbery of a corner grocery store in Wilmington, Delaware. Urquhart needed a public defender. In the five months before trial, three different public defenders represented Urquhart at preliminary court hearings. A fourth public defender served as trial counsel, assigned to defend Urquhart against charges carrying a lengthy minimum prison sentence. The morning of trial was the first time trial counsel met with and showed Urquhart the State’s key evidence against him. Before jury selection, Urquhart expressed frustration and confusion to the court about seeing his trial counsel for essentially the first time the morning of trial and seeing the State’s evidence against him. Trial went ahead, and a Superior Court jury convicted Urquhart of all charges. The judge sentenced him to fifteen years in prison. The Delaware Supreme Court affirmed the convictions on direct appeal. Urquhart moved for post-conviction relief, and claimed that his trial counsel’s absence before trial denied him his Sixth Amendment right to the assistance of counsel. The Superior Court denied the motion. The Delaware Supreme Court concluded a defendant’s Sixth Amendment right to the assistance of counsel in a serious felony trial requires more than the mere presence of a defense attorney the day of trial. Urquhart’s conviction was reversed, and the matter remanded for a new trial. View "Urquhart v. Delaware" on Justia Law

Two of Oxbow Carbon LLC’s minority Members, Crestview Partners, L.P. and Load Line Capital LLC, attempted to force a sale of Oxbow over the objection of Oxbow’s majority Members, William Koch and his affiliates (the “Koch Parties”). This dispute centered on the proper interpretation of the governing Third Amended and Restated Limited Liability Company Agreement (the “LLC Agreement”). Although the Court of Chancery found that the minority investors affiliated with Koch, Ingraham Investments LLC and Oxbow Carbon Investment Company LLC (collectively, the “Small Holders”), could block the sale unless it met certain payment conditions, the court nonetheless found a contractual gap in the LLC Agreement because the Board did not specify the terms and conditions under which the Small Holders acquired their units. Using the implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing, the Court of Chancery filled that gap by implying a “Top-Off” option for the Small Holders’ units, effectively stripping them of the right to block the proposed transaction. On appeal, Oxbow claimed that: (1) the trial court improperly applied the implied covenant; (2) there was no contractual gap; (3) Oxbow did not breach the LLC Agreement; and (4) the court’s rulings on remedies were made in error. The Delaware Supreme Court determined the Court of Chancery correctly interpreted the LLC Agreement’s plain language, but erred by finding a contractual gap concerning the admission of the Small Holders. Thus, the Court affirmed in part, reversed in part, and remanded the Court of Chancery’s February 12, 2018, decision, and vacated its August 1, 2018, decision on remedies. View "Oxbow Carbon & Minerals Holdings, Inc., et al. v. Crestview-Oxbow Acquisition, LLC, et al." on Justia Law

Defendant Justin Parker appealed his conviction and sentence for theft of a motor vehicle, felony theft, and two counts of possession of a firearm during the commission of a felony. All of the charges against Parker stemmed from one night where Parker and another man entered a lot that housed various vehicles, pointed a gun at the guard and locked him in a portable toilet, and then loaded a container with several vehicles, which they then stole. On appeal, Parker argued his sentences for both theft of a motor vehicle and felony theft violated double jeopardy because the vehicles at issue in each count were stolen on the same occasion and were part of one course of action by Parker. The Delaware Supreme Court was presented with two issues for resolution by this appeal: (1) as a general matter, whether theft of a motor vehicle and felony theft the “same offense” for double jeopardy purposes; and (2) even if they were, can the two charges be separated in this particular case because they were associated with different stolen items, even though the items were stolen at the same time and place? The Court held theft of a motor vehicle was indeed the same offense as felony theft for double jeopardy purposes and that the two charges could not be separated in this case. The Court therefore vacated Parker’s sentence and remanded for resentencing. View "Parker v. Delaware" on Justia Law

Defendant Rydell Mills appealed his convictions and sentence for various offenses, including cocaine and heroin drug dealing and two counts of resisting arrest with force or violence. These convictions arose from a single incident in which two police officers caught Mills in a dark alley with a digital scale in his hands, Mills resisted the two officers’ arrest, and the police ultimately found a substantial amount of cocaine and smaller amount of heroin nearby. Mills argued on appeal: (1) when a defendant resists the attempt of multiple officers to arrest him, the multiplicity doctrine prohibits the State from dividing the resisting arrest offense into separate counts for each officer, as what occurred in this case; (2) convictions for resisting arrest with force or violence and heroin drug dealing could not stand because the State used the resisting arrest offense as an aggravating factor to elevate the drug dealing offense to a higher felony grade; and (3) the trial court erred by omitting from its jury instruction for heroin drug dealing the required element that he intended to deliver the heroin. The Delaware supreme Court held that convicting a defendant of separate counts of resisting arrest with force or violence based solely on the number of arresting officers violated the multiplicity doctrine drawn from the Double Jeopardy Clauses of the United States and Delaware Constitutions; the Delaware General Assembly intended one count per arrest, not one count per officer. It was therefore multiplicitous to convict Mills twice when the charges arose solely from two officers’ joint attempt to arrest him at the same time and place. Furthermore, the Court held a defendant could be sentenced for both resisting arrest with force or violence and aggravated drug dealing, even when the resisting arrest offense is a necessary aggravating factor for the drug dealing conviction. As to the last issue, the Court held the omission in the jury instruction was plain error, “[a]lthough it is regrettable that defense counsel missed the mistake below, this omission of a critical element of the drug dealing offense is glaring and fundamental enough to require reversal even under a plain error standard of review, especially given that the omission was prejudicial under the circumstances of this case.” The Court therefore affirmed in part and reversed in part defendant’s convictions, vacated his sentence, and remanded to the Superior Court for further proceedings. View "Mills v. Delaware" on Justia Law

Ashlee Oldham and Robert Prunckun (collectively, “Recipients”) were the only two Delaware Medicaid recipients housed at Judge Rotenberg Center (“JRC”), a facility in Massachusetts and the only facility in the United States known to use electric shock therapy as part of their comprehensive behavioral treatment plans. These services were covered by Medicaid with the knowledge and approval of Delaware’s Department of Health and Social Services (“DHSS”). in 2012, the Center for Medicare and Medicaid Services (“CMS”) advised the Massachusetts state agency responsible for Medicaid administration that continued use of electric shock therapy would place that state’s waiver program in jeopardy of losing federal funding. Following CMS’s letter to Massachusetts, Delaware took measures to avoid placing its own Home and Community Based Services (“HCBS”) waiver program at risk. DHSS finally terminated JRC as a qualified provider after JRC refused to cease using electric shock therapy. Although the procedural history was complex, the gist of Appellants’ challenge on appeal to the Delaware Supreme Court was that they were denied due process because Delaware’s administrative hearing officer bifurcated proceedings to address what she concluded was a threshold issue, namely, whether electric shock therapy was a covered Medicaid service under the Medicaid HCBS Waiver program. Instead, Recipients contended they should have been allowed to introduce evidence that electric shock therapy was medically necessary, and that by removing shock services, DHSS threatened Recipients’ ability to remain in a community-based setting (a conclusion they desired to prove through evidence and expert testimony). The Supreme Court determined the hearing officer's determination that electric shock therapy was not a covered service under federal and state law was supported by substantial evidence and free from legal error, and affirmed the district court. View "Prunckun v. Delaware Dept. of Health & Social Services" on Justia Law

This appeal concerned a dispute over which party to a failed commercial real estate sale is entitled to the buyer’s deposit. The seller, 913 Market, LLC, claims that it was entitled to the deposit because the buyer failed to close the deal on the agreed date, and brought this action against the buyer claiming breach of contract and seeking a declaratory judgment regarding its rights under the purchase agreement. The buyer, Kamal Bathla, made two reasons why the deposit is rightfully his: (1) 913 Market could not convey title free and clear of all liens and encumbrances, as required by the purchase agreement, due to potential claims by a previous potential buyer of the building that had also failed to close; and (2) one of the conditions precedent was not satisfied because the title insurance commitment he received contained an exception, relating to litigation risk from the previous potential buyer, that did not exist in 913 Market’s existing title insurance policy. In either case, Bathla maintained, he was relieved of any obligation to close, and therefore had a right to get his money back. The Superior Court granted summary judgment for 913 Market. In rejecting Bathla’s first argument, the court reasoned that potential claims by the previous failed buyer did not cloud title because the previous buyer “had not perfected (nor did it seek to perfect) a lis pendens claim.” In rejecting Bathla’s second argument, the court read the purchase agreement as establishing a test based not on “what exceptions the Purchaser’s title insurance carrier might insist upon,” but rather on “whether Seller was able to convey satisfactory title, which it did.” The Delaware Supreme Court affirmed the Superior Court’s decision. "Contrary to Bathla’s exhortations, the mere possibility that a previous potential buyer who failed to close might later claim an interest in the building does not constitute a lien or encumbrance under the purchase agreement, and the condition precedent identified by Bathla does not require that he obtain a title commitment with exceptions that mirror those of 913 Market’s existing policy. And ultimately, the basic premise of Bathla’s case - that there was a genuine risk that the previous potential buyer would sue Bathla over the property - is implausible and does not provide a basis under the contract to avoid the obligation to close." View "Bathla v. 913 Market, LLC" on Justia Law

Appellant Brandon Ways appealed after a jury found him guilty of Aggravated Possession of Heroin in a Tier 5 Quantity, Drug Dealing in a Tier 4 Quantity, and Conspiracy in the Second Degree. These charges were the result of a year-long investigation by the Delaware State Police and the Seaford Police Department into a large-scale drug trafficking operation of Ways and his associate, Torontay Mann. Ways’s co-defendant, Angeline Metelus, was also charged with these same crimes as a result of the investigation. Through their investigation, the police had been informed that Ways bought a large amount of cocaine and heroin every two weeks from sources in New Jersey. They also knew from experience that New Jersey was a source for drugs transported into Delaware. Metelus was stopped and the jeep she was driving was searched pursuant to a search warrant. Approximately 1,300 grams of heroin were found in a hidden compartment. On appeal, Ways argued: (1) the Superior Court abused its discretion by denying his motion to suppress all evidence derived from the State’s use of a mobile tracking device (“MTD”) to track the jeep in the State of New Jersey; and (2) the Superior Court erred by denying his motion for judgment of acquittal, arguing that the State failed to prove the predicate element of venue for any charge in the indictment. Finding no reversible error, the Delaware Supreme Court affirmed Ways' convictions. View "Ways v. Delaware" on Justia Law