Justia Delaware Supreme Court Opinion Summaries

After being out of prison for two days and while on probation, defendant Phillip Rossi was spotted at a department store with a woman who was believed to have stolen almost $200 of merchandise. Rossi was the suspected lookout. The alleged scheme culminated in Rossi supposedly returning the stolen items to a different store for store credit later that same day. Criminal charges followed soon after the incident. And although the State entered a nolle prosequi on all charges against Rossi subject to certain conditions, it nonetheless sought to revoke Rossi's probation, and the Superior Court found that Rossi had violated terms of his probation by shoplifting. On appeal, Rossi argued that the Superior Court could not find that he violated probation by shoplifting because the evidence was insufficient to support the violation. "The State's burden to prove a violation of probation is much lighter than it is to convict a defendant of a crime. All that the State must do is prove by a preponderance of the evidence that the 'conduct of the probationer has not been as good as required by the conditions of probation.'" The only piece of competent evidence the State produced showed that Rossi was at the store on the key date in question. But, the State did not introduce any competent evidence that showed a crime had been committed there. Finding that was insufficient to support revocation of Rossi's probation, the Supreme Court reversed. View "Rossi v. Delaware" on Justia Law

Defendant-appellant Gerald Masarone appealed a Superior Court order denying his motion for postconviction relief. He raised two issues as grounds for appeal: (1) that his trial counsel was ineffective by not advising him that he had a right to wear street clothes, rather than a prison uniform, at his trial, and by failing to provide him with street clothes; and (2) the Superior Court erred by failing to hold an evidentiary hearing on his first claim. On this record, the Delaware Supreme Court could not conclude that Masarone was compelled to go to trial in a prison uniform. In addition, given the nature of the evidence against Masarone, no arguable error on this point or on the lack of an evidentiary hearing caused Masarone harm or prejudice. The Superior Court's order was affirmed. View "Masarone v. Delaware" on Justia Law

Earl Bradley petitioned the Supreme Court for postconviction relief. He was convicted on fourteen counts of first-degree rape, five counts of second-degree assault and five counts of sexual exploitation of a child. Bradley was sentenced to fourteen mandatory life sentences and 164 years at Level V imprisonment. In a 2012 direct appeal, Bradley argued that the search warrant for his former medical practice, BayBees Pediatrics, P.A., was defective because the affidavit in support of the search warrant application did not allege facts establishing probable cause that the medical files of certain patients would be found in a white outbuilding on the BayBees Pediatrics property, would be contained in digital format, or would relate to the crimes described in the search warrant application. Bradley also asserted that the police exceeded the scope of the search warrant by proceeding with a general search to locate and seize evidence without probable cause. The Delaware Supreme Court rejected those claims. Bradley raised three issues in this appeal: (1) the Superior Court erred when it denied his request for an evidentiary hearing and held that State action did not deprive him of his right to choice of counsel; (2) the Superior Court erred when it held that his trial and appellate counsel were not ineffective when they failed to object to the presentation of evidence outside of the four corners of the search warrant; and (3) the Superior Court erred in finding that his trial and appellate counsel litigated, in an effective and professionally reasonable manner, the claim that the police had performed an unrestricted search of his property in violation of the federal and state Constitutions. Finding no reversible error, the Supreme Court affirmed the Superior Court's denial of postconviction relief. View "Bradley v. Delaware" on Justia Law

Christina Connelly appealed the dismissal of her claim against State Farm Mutual Automobile Insurance Company. She contended that a claim accrued only when the insured suffers a judgment in excess of policy limits, and that judgment becomes final and non-appealable. Connelly's appeal raised this question as it pertained to the applicable statute of limitations on Connelly's insurance claim. State Farm contended that the claim accrued when the insurer allegedly acts in bad faith and breaches its duty to the insured. Although the Delaware Supreme Court had never addressed that precise issue, courts in other states that have considered it, and the weight of expert authority on insurance law, were in accord that a bad-faith failure-to-settle claim accrued when an excess judgment became final and non-appealable. "That approach conserves litigant and judicial resources. It also properly aligns the incentives of the insurer and its insured by allowing them to join efforts in defending the underlying third-party insurance claim without a stayed breach-of-contract claim causing a conflict of interest between them. Further, to state a claim that the insurer breached its implied duty to act in good faith, the insured must plead damages, which she cannot do before there is a final excess judgment against her." In view of these considerations, the Delaware Court found that a claim against an insurer for acting in bad faith by failing to settle a third-party insurance claim accrued when an excess judgment against an insured becomes final and non-appealable. Accordingly, it reversed the Superior Court's decision. View "Connelly v. State Farm Mutual Automobile Insurance Co." on Justia Law

Defendant Christopher Wheeler petitioned the Delaware Supreme Court to overturn his conviction of Dealing in Child Pornography. He raised two issues: (1) he challenged a 2014 Superior Court denial of his Amended and Superseding Motion to Suppress, arguing that the nature of “general warrants” were overly broad in scope, and the execution of which violated his federal and State Constitutional rights; and (2) he challenged a second Superior Court denial of his motion for Judgment of Acquittal, arguing insufficient evidence to convict him because the State could not establish that he was aware of the existence of the offending images on his computer, stored in his “newsgroup cache.” Wheeler was sentenced to 50 years at Level V. Throughout these proceedings, Wheeler asserted that the State used charges of witness tampering stemming from his admission in 2013 that he had molested two brothers in Pennsylvania in the 1980’s as a pretext to search broadly for child pornography. The challenged warrants in this case were the witness tampering warrants: not the later-obtained child pornography warrant. The State admitted that the challenged witness tampering warrants were virtual copies of an off-the-shelf warrant for child pornography. Because the Supreme Court agreed that the challenged witness tampering warrants were in the nature of “general warrants” in violation of the United States and Delaware Constitutions, it reversed the judgments of the Superior Court and remanded this matter for further proceedings. View "Wheeler v. Delaware" on Justia Law

The issue in this case was whether defendant-appellant William Morrison’s waiver of his right to trial counsel was “knowing, intelligent and voluntary.” Morrison was arrested on suspicion of trespassing or burglary. At the conclusion of a hearing, Morrison stated he wished to terminate his representation by appointed counsel. The trial judge conducted an inquiry and declined the request. The trial judge informed Morrison that he could either continue to be represented by the appointed defense counsel, or proceed pro se. After reviewing the “incomplete” colloquy between the the trial judge and Morrison, the Supreme Court concluded that Defendant did not waive his right to counsel “knowingly.” Morrison’s conviction was reversed and the matter remanded for a new trial. View "Morrison v. Delaware" on Justia Law

Canadian resident Marc Hazout was the President, CEO, Principal Financial and Accounting Officer, and a director of a Delaware corporation, Silver Dragon Resources, Inc. He was sued for acts taken in his official capacity on behalf of the corporation based in Canada. As alleged in the complaint, Hazout was the lead negotiator for Silver Dragon in negotiating a capital infusion from a group of affiliated investors including Tsang Mun Ting and other residents of Hong Kong. That capital infusion when consummated would have required a change of control of Silver Dragon from Hazout and certain others to Tsang and his fellow investors, who would have achieved the right to control Silver Dragon‘s board. Hazout and two other Silver Dragon directors signed the agreement, but a fourth refused. Rather than return $1 million to Tsang, however, Hazout not only caused Silver Dragon to keep it, but also had Silver Dragon send $750,000 of it to Travellers International, Inc., a corporation that Hazout controlled. Tsang therefore brought this suit in the Superior Court of Delaware against Silver Dragon, Hazout, and Travellers for unjust enrichment, fraud, and fraudulent transfer in violation of the Delaware Uniform Fraudulent Transfer Act. Hazout moved to dismiss on the ground that there was no basis for the exercise of personal jurisdiction over him in Delaware because Tsang was not suing Hazout as a stockholder of Silver Dragon for breach of any fiduciary or other duty owed to Silver Dragon as an entity or Tsang as a stockholder. The Superior Court disagreed and found Delaware law provided a proper basis for personal jurisdiction. The Delaware Supreme Court accepted a certified interlocutory appeal on the personal jurisdiction question from the Superior Court and affirmed: “there is no rational argument that the terms of [10 Del C. sec.] 3114(b) are not satisfied.” View "Hazout v. Ting" on Justia Law

This appeal arose from a sexual assault complaint against a Delaware State Police Officer. After the officer, Joshua Giddings, arrested plaintiff-appellant Jane Doe for shoplifting, he threatened to throw her in jail unless she had sex with him. Doe filed suit against Giddings and the State of Delaware. Doe alleged that the superior court erred by: (1) granting the State's motion for summary judgment on sovereign immunity grounds; (2) denying Doe's motion for partial summary judgment on respondeat superior grounds; and (3) granting a motion to dismiss by Giddings' estate. The Supreme Court concluded after review that the State waived sovereign immunity, and therefore, the superior court erred in granting the State's motion for summary judgment. Furthermore, the Supreme Court concluded Doe's two other arguments were without merit. The case was affirmed in part, reversed in part, and the case remanded for further proceedings. View "Sherman v. Delaware" on Justia Law

Appellant-defendant Steven Baynum and Manisha Baynum married in 2009. In 2012, the couple experimented with having an “open marriage” and shared an intimate experience with Dakota Holdren (“Dakota”). Thereafter, Manisha was romantically involved with Dakota. In 2013, Manisha filed for divorce. Manisha was granted a Family Court Order affording her exclusive use a property owned by Steven's grandparents. The Order prohibited Baynum from accessing the residence and, as a result, he often stayed with his grandparents at another residence, located on the same property the house now occupied by Manisha. In the early hours of October 24, Dakota and Manisha were at Manisha's home. Interested in “check[ing] out the place,” Baynum communicated with Manisha via text messages and phone calls regarding whether he could come. After being dissuaded by Manisha, Baynum temporarily refrained from going to the house, although he “decided to put a ladder at the base of [28 Harvest Lane’s] driveway . . . .” Later that evening, Manisha was awakened by noises emanating from the bathroom, later discovering Baynum, who jumped on the bed, pulled a blanket off of Dakota, and started punching him. After convincing Baynum to join her in the kitchen, Manisha dialed 9-1-1, but was unable to speak with an operator because Baynum “took the phone out of [her] hands” and “took the battery out of the phone.” Thereafter, Baynum “dragged” Manisha back to the bedroom, where he proceeded to “tie up” Dakota utilizing an ethernet cord. Baynum then pushed Manisha onto her stomach and attempted to tie her hands together using an iPhone charging cord. Manisha testified that she bit Baynum on his arm during the struggle. Baynum responded by punching her in the face and holding a knife to her throat. New Castle County police officers were dispatched to Manisha's house. The next day, Baynum appeared at his grandparents’ residence, explaining to his grandmother that “he had beat the crap out of the man that was living -- sleeping with his wife. And [Baynum] said [he] was just trying to defend [his] -- [his] wedding vows, reaffirming his marriage.” After Baynum left, his grandmother informed the police. The Superior Court denied Baynum’s Motion in Limine prior to his trial on charges stemming from the incident at Manisha's house. The ruling was issued following an evidentiary hearing conducted in connection with Baynum’s Motion, which sought dismissal of his case before trial or, in the alternative, a "Lolly" jury instruction, on the theory that the State failed to collect or preserve potentially material evidence. Baynum appealed his convictions and argued that the Superior Court erred in denying his Motion. Finding no reversible error, the Supreme Court affirmed the Superior Court. View "Baynum v. Delaware" on Justia Law

While off-duty, out of uniform, driving his own car, and under the influence of alcohol, Wilmington Police Officer Michael Spencer ran a red light and collided with a car driven by Morgan McCaffrey. After the accident, Officer Spencer asked McCaffrey to handle the matter without police involvement and to move their damaged cars out of the roadway and into parking spaces in front of McCaffrey’s nearby apartment. Officer Spencer and McCaffrey then went into the apartment, where Officer Spencer undressed and made sexual advances toward McCaffrey, which she refused. McCaffrey called the police after Officer Spencer passed out in her bed. The responding officers took Officer Spencer to the hospital, and later to the police station, where after a delay of five hours, Officer Spencer supposedly passed field tests for intoxication. The Wilmington Police Department (WPD) disciplined Officer Spencer for his conduct that evening. McCaffrey filed suit against Officer Spencer, the WPD, and others, including former Chief of Police Michael Szczerba, stemming from the car accident and Officer Spencer’s admitted inappropriate conduct with McCaffrey. In a series of opinions, the Superior Court dismissed all claims against the defendants other than Officer Spencer, and entered a final judgment excluding Officer Spencer. McCaffrey raised two issues on appeal: (1) the Superior Court erred by dismissing Count I of her complaint arguing that she sufficiently alleged that Spencer was acting within the scope of his employment as a Wilmington Police Officer when he ran into McCaffrey’s car and made inappropriate sexual advances after the accident; (2) that the Superior Court erred in dismissing Count IV, against Chief Szczerba and the City because the County and Municipal Tort Claims Act did not immunize them from suit for Officer Spencer’s actions. Finding no reversible error, the Supreme Court affirmed the Superior Court. View "McCaffrey v. City of Wilmington, et al." on Justia Law