Justia Delaware Supreme Court Opinion Summaries

The plaintiffs both have policies with State Farm Mutual Automobile Insurance Company and both submitted claims that State Farm failed to pay within the statutory thirty-day period. The plaintiffs earlier alleged that State Farm had failed to make the required statutory interest payments to them and other claimants whose PIP claims had not been processed within thirty days. When that theory did not pan out and they faced summary judgment, the plaintiffs reformulated their pursuit of class-wide relief by proposing to file an amended complaint seeking a declaratory judgment from the Superior Court that State Farm must process all PIP claims within thirty days. The Superior Court denied the motion for leave to amend, reasoning that amending the complaint would be futile because no case or controversy existed because the plaintiffs had been paid the required statutory interest. The court then granted summary judgment to State Farm. In this appeal, the plaintiffs alleged that the Superior Court was wrong to dismiss their claim, arguing that they have a ripe disagreement with State Farm over its failure to comply invariably with the thirty-day deadline set forth in 21 Del. C. 2118B(c). After review, the Supreme Court affirmed the Superior Court, but on a somewhat different ground. The plaintiffs were correct that absent declaratory (or injunctive) relief, it may be that they and other class members will have a claim in the future processed by State Farm in more than thirty days. But, the Court agreed with the Superior Court that the amended complaint is futile because as plainly written, section 2118B(c) did not impose an invariable standard that every PIP claim must be processed within thirty days and, in fact, contemplated that will not be the case by establishing a statutory consequence for the failure to do so. View "Clark v. State Farm Mutual Automobile Insurance Co." on Justia Law

In 1992 Jermaine Wright was convicted of first degree murder, first degree robbery, and related weapons offenses for his involvement in what was known as the "Hi-Way Inn murder/robbery." The Superior Court imposed the death penalty for his murder conviction. Prior to trial, Wright moved to suppress a statement he had given to police. He alleged that his waiver of Miranda rights was invalid and his statement was involuntary because he was high on heroin at the time. The Superior Court denied the motion, finding that Wright had been given the Miranda rights three times, by three different police officers, and that the State had “met its burden of proof by a preponderance of the evidence that the Defendant’s waiver of his Miranda rights was voluntary, knowing and intelligent, and that his confession was voluntarily made.” Wright then filed a second pretrial motion to suppress his confession on other grounds. In its opinion denying that motion, the Superior Court again found that Wright had been given his Miranda rights three times. The confession was admitted into evidence at trial. On direct appeal, Wright’s convictions and sentences were affirmed. Between then and 2009, Wright filed four motions for post conviction relief. In the second postconviction proceeding, the Superior Court again rejected Wright’s contention that his waiver of Miranda rights was not valid. In 2014, in the fourth postconviction proceeding, the Delaware Supreme Court reversed Wright’s convictions on the ground that the State violated his rights under "Brady v. Maryland." The case was remanded to the Superior Court for a new trial. By the time the fourth motion for postconviction relief was filed, the original trial judge had retired and the case had been assigned to her successor. In the new trial proceedings, the successor judge granted a motion to suppress Wright’s confession on the ground that the Miranda rights he was given were inadequate, and that his waiver was, therefore, not valid. The last ruling was presented for the Delaware Supreme Court's review. The Court concluded that the original Superior Court judge’s determination that Wright’s waiver of his Miranda rights was voluntary, knowing, and intelligent necessarily included an implied determination that the warnings were adequately given. Those determinations are the law of the case. For this reason, the successor judge erred in reviewing the admissibility of Wright’s confession. The State also appeals the successor judge’s denial of a motion that he recuse himself. At oral argument, the State conceded that the Supreme Court did not have jurisdiction under 10 Del. C. 9902 to review that order. Therefore, the Court did not address the Superior Court’s ruling on recusal or express any opinion on recusal. View "Delaware v. Wright" on Justia Law

In the first appeal, the Supreme Court upheld the Court of Chancery’s finding that SIGA Technologies, Inc. in bad faith breached its contractual obligation to negotiate a license agreement consistent with the parties’ license agreement term sheet, known throughout this litigation as the “LATS.” The Supreme Court also held that where parties have agreed to negotiate in good faith, and would have reached an agreement but for the defendant’s bad faith conduct during the negotiations, the plaintiff could recover contract expectation damages, so long as the plaintiff can prove damages with reasonable certainty. Because the Court of Chancery ruled out expectation damages in its first decision, the case was remanded for consideration of damages to SIGA ("SIGA I”). On remand, the Court of Chancery reevaluated the evidence, and held that PharmAthene, Inc. met its burden of proving with reasonable certainty expectation damages and awarded PharmAthene $113 million. The parties once again appealed to the Supreme Court. SIGA raised two claims of error in this appeal: (1) the Court of Chancery was not free to reconsider its prior holding that lump-sum expectation damages were too speculative; and (2) if reconsideration was permitted, the expectation damages awarded following remand were too speculative. After careful consideration of SIGA’s arguments, the Supreme Court found that the law of the case doctrine did not preclude the Court of Chancery from reconsidering its earlier determination that lump-sum expectation damages were too speculative. The Court also found that the court did not abuse its discretion when it awarded PharmAthene lump-sum expectation damages, and its factual findings supporting its new damages determination were not clearly erroneous. Accordingly, the Court affirmed the judgment of the Court of Chancery. View "SIGA Technologies, Inc. v. PharmAthene" on Justia Law

A masked gunman went into a Wilmington barbershop, shot his intended victim, and also shot and killed a five-year-old boy. The police arrested Chauncey Starling one month after the shooting, when the State’s key witness, Alfred Gaines, identified Starling as the shooter. In 2003, the State tried Starling for first degree murder, conspiracy, and related weapons charges. No physical evidence linked Starling to the crime. Instead, the State relied primarily on Gaines’ testimony and statements made to police by Starling’s brother and girlfriend. The State also relied on testimony from the victim’s girlfriend, who identified Starling as the shooter based on his eyes. A Superior Court jury convicted Starling of all charges, and the judge sentenced him to death. On direct appeal, the Delaware Supreme Court affirmed the conviction but remanded the case for resentencing. After remand, the Superior Court again sentenced Starling to death. The Supreme Court again affirmed the death sentences. Starling then moved for postconviction relief, claiming that his trial counsel was ineffective, that the State failed to disclose exculpatory evidence and that the prosecution engaged in misconduct at trial. Following years of discovery, evidentiary hearings, and briefing, the Superior Court denied Starling’s motion and this appeal followed. Starling renewed the same constitutional arguments on appeal. The Delaware Supreme Court's review of the record lead it to conclude that mistakes were made that "undermine[d] confidence in the fairness of the trial." The cumulative effect of these errors lead the Court to conclude that there was a reasonable probability that the outcome of the trial would have been different without the errors. Therefore Starling’s conviction was reversed and his case remanded for a new trial. View "Starling v. Delaware" on Justia Law

Husband Gary Glanden appealed a Family Court order dividing marital property and granting alimony to Wife Terry Quirk following their divorce after twenty-two years of marriage. The court divided the non-retirement assets 65% in Wife’s favor, and divided the remaining marital property equally. The court awarded alimony for an indefinite period.Husband argued the trial judge erred by including in the marital estate part of a January 2013 payment from his law firm received after the couple separated. Husband also claimed that the court abused its discretion by dividing the couple’s assets favorably to Wife, and in awarding Wife alimony. After review, the Supreme Court found that Husband’s argument about his law firm payment was at odds with the plain language of his employment agreement, where the disputed payment represented “the balance of [Husband’s] prior year’s base compensation,” and therefore was partially includable in the marital estate. The Court also found that Husband’s other arguments essentially asked for reconsideration of Family Court decisions which were amply supported by the evidence entered into the record. Accordingly, the Supreme Court affirmed the Family Court's decision. View "Glanden v. Quirk" on Justia Law

Ramon Ruffin was charged in an eleven-count indictment: one count of Attempted Robbery First Degree; three counts of Possession of a Firearm During Commission of a Felony (“PFDCF”); one count of Assault First Degree; one count of Aggravated Menacing; two counts of Possession of a Firearm by a Person Prohibited (“PFBPP”); one count of Receiving a Stolen Firearm; one count of Disregarding a Police Officer’s Signal and one count of Resisting Arrest. A jury found Ruffin guilty of Assault Second Degree, the lesser included offense of Assault First Degree. He was convicted him, as charged, of all other counts. Ruffin was declared a habitual offender and sentenced to be incarcerated for a minimum of 113 years. Ruffin raised four claims on appeal: (1) the trial court erred in admitting the Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco, Firearms and Explosives (“ATF”) trace report into evidence because it was inadmissible hearsay; (2) he was denied a fair trial due to improper, suggestive eyewitness identification; (3) the trial court erred in denying his request for a "Lolly" instruction regarding the State’s failure to test allegedly exculpatory evidence; and (4) he was prejudiced by cumulative error. The Supreme Court found, after review, no merit to any of Ruffin's claims, and affirmed his convictions and sentence. View "Ruffin v. Delaware" on Justia Law

Defendant-appellant Carlton Gibbs was the target of the Capital Area Regional Fugitive Task Force. He had been wanted for a year prior to the Task Force's eventual arrest of Gibbs in April 2014. Gibbs was arrested for multiple charges, most of which stemmed from the car chase that ensued with members of the Task Force leading to Gibbs' arrest. Gibbs appealed the denial of his motion for judgment of acquittal on his eventual conviction on those multiple charges; Gibbs maintained: (1) he could not be found guilty of failing to stop at the command of a police officer because deputy United States Marshals did not qualify as police officers; and (2) he could not be found guilty of Title 21 offenses because he was on private property when they were alleged to have occurred. Finding no error, the Delaware Supreme Court affirmed Gibbs' convictions. View "Gibbs v. Delaware" on Justia Law

The Court of Chancery issued four opinions which were appealed to the Delaware Supreme Court. In sum, the appeal and cross-appeal in this case centered on the Chancery Court’s final judgment finding that RBC Capital Markets, LLC aided and abetted breaches of fiduciary duty by former directors of Rural/Metro Corporation ("Rural" or the "Company") in connection with the sale of the Company to an affiliate of Warburg Pincus LLC, a private equity firm. RBC raised six issues on appeal, namely: (1) whether the trial court erred by holding that the board of directors breached its duty of care under an enhanced scrutiny standard; (2) whether the trial court erred by holding that the board of directors violated its fiduciary duty of disclosure by making material misstatements and omissions in Rural’s proxy statement, dated May 26, 2011; (3) whether the trial court erred by finding that RBC aided and abetted breaches of fiduciary duty by the board of directors; (4) whether the trial court erred by finding that the board of directors’ conduct proximately caused damages; (5) whether the trial court erred in applying the Delaware Uniform Contribution Among Tortfeasors Act ("DUCATA"); and (6) whether the trial court erred in calculating damages. After careful consideration of each of RBC’s arguments on appeal, the Supreme Court found no reversible error and affirmed the "principal legal holdings" of the Court of Chancery. View "RBC Capital Markets, LLC v. Jervis" on Justia Law

Defendant-Below, Appellant, Christopher Spence, appealed a Superior Court Order denying his Motion for a Mistrial. This case arose out of a shooting that occurred during an event at a party venue in Wilmington. During the shooting, Spence shot and killed Kirt Williams, and shot and wounded Kelmar Allen. Because Spence admitted to shooting Williams and Allen, the case centered on: (1) whether the State could prove each element of the indicted charges beyond a reasonable doubt; (2) whether Spence was guilty of lesser included offenses; and (3) whether Spence had a viable justification defense, either self-defense or defense of others. Moments before closing argument, the State provided defense counsel with a black and white copy of the PowerPoint presentation it intended to use during summation. The version of the PowerPoint presentation displayed to the jury was in color. At the end of closing arguments, Spence’s counsel moved for a mistrial based on the alleged instances of prosecutorial misconduct. The trial court reserved ruling on the motion until after trial. In the Motion and the Memorandum, Spence raised, for the first time, objections to: (1) two PowerPoint slides which referred to the victims as “helpless;” (2) PowerPoint slides containing alleged misstatements of the justification defenses; and (3) a PowerPoint slide containing the statement that “[t]he defendant is guilty of all the charges against him[.]” The trial court denied the Motion. After review, the Supreme Court affirmed the ultimate holding of the trial court “based largely upon the well-reasoned Order denying Spence’s Motion.” View "Spence v. Delaware" on Justia Law

Defendant-appellant Kesler Stevens appealed a Superior Court Opinion affirming a Court of Common Pleas bench trial verdict which found him guilty of Driving Under the Influence (“DUI”). On appeal to the Supreme Court, Stevens argued: (1) the trial court erred in denying his motion for judgment of acquittal because there was insufficient evidence to convict him of DUI; and (2) Delaware’s DUI law violated the Equal Protection Clause of the United States Constitution because it provided for a harsher punishment than Delaware’s Reckless Driving–Alcohol Related law even though both laws punish identical conduct. The Supreme Court found no merit to Stevens’ appeal and affirmed. View "Stevens v. Delaware" on Justia Law