Justia Delaware Supreme Court Opinion Summaries

Defendant Rondaiges Harper was convicted by jury of carjacking in the first degree, kidnapping in the first degree, and two counts of conspiracy in the second degree. On appeal he argued that his convictions should have been reversed because the crime of carjacking was completed by the time he joined the two teenagers who had stolen the victim's car and confined her in the trunk. After review, the Supreme Court concluded, based on the language and legislative history of Delaware's carjacking statute, that the crime of carjacking was not a continuing crime, but instead was completed at the point when all the elements of the crime have been satisfied. In this case, because the carjacking of the victim's vehicle was completed before Harper's involvement, and each of Harper's convictions depends upon carjacking as a predicate crime, the Court reversed his convictions and remanded for further proceedings. View "Harper v. Delaware" on Justia Law

Defendant Bruce Worthy allegedly threatened his mother and brother at gunpoint. Worthy’s mother, Valerie Coleman, called 911 to report the threat, leading to Worthy’s arrest and a number of criminal charges. At trial, Coleman was one of the State’s main witnesses. The State subpoenaed Coleman to testify, but she failed to appear. The State tracked her down and put her in jail on a material witness capias. When the State brought her from jail to testify, Coleman was uncooperative and tried to end her testimony by "plead[ing] the Fifth." The trial judge removed the jury and spoke with the prosecutor, who in response to prompting from the trial judge, said that the State was giving Coleman "full immunity . . . [o]n everything," including perjury. The trial judge instructed Coleman that "[e]ven if you commit a crime by your testimony the State has basically said that you cannot be prosecuted." Coleman reluctantly continued her testimony after the judge’s instruction. A jury found Worthy guilty of aggravated menacing against Coleman, but acquitted him on all other counts. On appeal, Worthy argued that the prosecutor erred in granting Coleman immunity against prosecution for perjury, and that the legal error was not harmless beyond a reasonable doubt. After review of the trial court record, the Supreme Court agreed, reversed and remanded for a new trial. View "Worthy v. Delaware" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court found no merit to defendant-appellant Melvin Morse’s arguments on appeal and affirmed his conviction by jury on child abuse charges. Defendant physically abused his step-daughter, A.M. The abuse spanned two years and consisted of, inter alia, suffocating and "waterboarding" A.M. as punishment for what he deemed to be misbehavior. On appeal, defendant argued: (1) the trial court abused its discretion by admitting evidence of other uncharged abusive acts against A.M. in violation of Delaware Rule of Evidence (“D.R.E.”) 403.6; and, (2) the trial court erred in allowing the jury to re-watch videotaped statements of A.M. and her younger sister, M.M., after the jury requested to view them during deliberations. In regard to defendant's second argument, the Supreme Court found that it was not an error to allow the jury to re-watch the statements, but used the occasion of this opinion to discuss a jury’s request to rehear a section 3507 statement during deliberations. A request to rehear such a statement is an exception to the general rule, and applies when the jury requests to rehear a section 3507 statement of its own accord. "This exception was created with the understanding that the request would be spontaneous in nature, not made at the encouragement of counsel. As the State admitted at oral argument before this Court, this action is not 'best practice,' and it should not be repeated in the future. Attorneys should not direct the jury to make requests to the trial judge to review testimonial evidence that is otherwise not permitted during deliberations." View "Morse v. Delaware" on Justia Law

Appellant Heather Rybicki was convicted by a jury of driving under the influence of alcohol (“DUI”). She was sentenced to two years of Level V incarceration, suspended after three months for one year and six months of Level IV home confinement, suspended after six months for one year of Level III probation. On appeal, Rybicki argued: (1) there was no probable cause to issue the search warrant to obtain a blood sample used to determine her BAC; (2) there was no probable cause for her warrantless arrest; (3) absent the BAC evidence, there was insufficient evidence for conviction; (4) the State did not lay a sufficient foundation for the BAC evidence; and (5) two jury instructions given by the trial court were improper comments on the evidence. Rejecting all of appellant's contentions on appeal, the Supreme Court affirmed. View "Rybicki v. State" on Justia Law

Defendants-appellants Hill International, Inc., David Richter, Camille Andrews, Brian Clymer, Alan Fellheimer, Irvin Richter, Steven Kramer and Gary Mazzucco sought review of Court of Chancery orders dated June 5, 2015 and June 16, 2015. In its June 5, 2015 Order, the Court of Chancery enjoined Hill from conducting any business at its June 9, 2015 Annual Meeting, other than convening the meeting for the sole purpose of adjourning it for a minimum of 21 days, in order to permit plaintiff-appellee Opportunity Partners L.P. to present certain items of business and director nominations at Hill’s 2015 Annual Meeting. On June 16, 2015, the Court of Chancery entered the Order dated June 5, 2015 as a partial final judgment pursuant to Court of Chancery Rule 54(b). This expedited appeal presented for the Supreme Court's resolution a dispute over the proper interpretation of certain provisions of Articles II and III of Hill’s Bylaws as Amended and Restated on November 12, 2007. The sections of the Bylaws at issue, specifically language in Sections 2.2 and 3.3, concerned the operative date for determining the time within which stockholders must give notice of any shareholder proposals or director nominees to be considered at Hill’s upcoming annual meeting. After review of the bylaws and the Court of Chancery's orders, the Supreme Court found reversible error and affirmed. View "Hill International, Inc., et al. v. Opportunity Partners, L.P." on Justia Law

Defendant-appellant Mark Zambrana was convicted by the Superior Court following a bench trial on two counts of Sexual Solicitation of a Child. On appeal, he argued that his admitted misconduct of soliciting his 15 year old neighbor, S.Z., to remove her shirt and bra while he surreptitiously watched her did not qualify as sexual solicitation. He argues that 11 Del. C. 1112A required a defendant to create a physical “depiction” of the victim’s nudity in order to be convicted, and that he created no such “depiction” here. The Supreme Court disagreed and affirmed the conviction: "[a]lthough the term 'depiction' has multiple definitions, we find that for the purposes of section 1112A, 'depiction' encompasses not only tangible manifestations such as photographs and videos, but also includes live conduct. This definition best accords with the statute as a whole and the legislative purpose in enacting it. Applying this definition to the facts before us, we conclude that Zambrana’s actions constituted Sexual Solicitation of a Child." View "Zambrana v. Delaware" on Justia Law

This case arose when Henry and Mary Lou Black and Blackball Properties, LLC (collectively, the “Blacks”), challenged the Department of Land Use's decision to grant a change of use certificate to neighboring property owners, Gary Staffieri and Adria Charles-Staffieri, to the New Castle County Board of License, Inspection and Review. The Staffieris had rented out the property for use as office space for approximately ten years before deciding to open an automobile detailing shop on the premises, which required them to obtain a change of use certificate from the Department. When the Staffieris first received their certificate from the Department, the Blacks successfully appealed and the Board reversed the Department's decision. But the Staffieris reapplied, the Department once again issued their certificate, and this time, the Board affirmed the Department's decision. The Blacks were unable to appeal the Board's decision to a reviewing court because the General Assembly chose not to provide that right to parties aggrieved by a Board decision. The Blacks therefore sought review by writ of certiorari filed at the Superior Court. The Superior Court granted the writ and affirmed the Board. The Supreme Court, after its review, found no reversible error and affirmed the Superior Court. View "Black v. New Castle Cty. Bd. of License, Inspection & Review" on Justia Law

The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit certified a question of Delaware law arising out of an appeal from a decision issued by the U.S. District Court for the Southern District of New York. The question pertained to contract interpretation. Plaintiff-appellant NAF Holdings secured a contractual commitment of its contracting counterparty, defendant Li & Fung (Trading) Limited, to render a benefit to a third party. The counterparty breached that commitment. Could "the promisee-plaintiff bring a direct suit against the promisor for damages suffered by the plaintiff resulting from the promisor's breach, notwithstanding that (i) the third-party beneficiary of the contract is a corporation in which the plaintiff-promisee owns stock; and (ii) the plaintiff-promisee's loss derives indirectly from the loss suffered by the third-party beneficiary corporation; or must the court grant the motion of the promisor-defendant to dismiss the suit on the theory that the plaintiff may enforce the contract only through a derivative action brought in the name of the third-party beneficiary corporation?" The Delaware Supreme Court answered that under Delaware law, a party to a commercial contract who sues to enforce its contractual rights can bring a direct contract action under Delaware law. "Although the relationship of that party to the third-party beneficiary might well have relevance in determining whether the contract claim is viable as a matter of contract law, nothing in Delaware law requires the promisee-plaintiff's contract claim to be prosecuted as a derivative action. " View "NAF Holdings, LLC v. LI & Fung (Trading) Limited" on Justia Law

In August 2013, officers from New Castle County Police Operation Safe Streets searched a home in Bear. During the search, the officers found Mark Smolka inside the house and a Taurus .38 special revolver in a closet. Smolka, who was a person prohibited from possessing a firearm, admitted at the scene that he had moved the gun to a closet and placed a lock on it. Smolka was arrested and charged with, among other offenses, possession of a firearm by a person prohibited. Before trial, Smolka moved to suppress evidence he claimed was illegally obtained during the search as well as his statements to the officers. The Superior Court denied Smolka's motion because Smolka failed to appear at the suppression hearing. The State then introduced at trial the evidence subject to the suppression motion. The jury found Smolka guilty of the firearm possession offense, and the trial judge sentenced him to three years imprisonment at Level 5 suspended for six months at Level 4 home confinement and one year at Level 3 probation supervision. Smolka claimed on appeal that the trial court erred when it found that he waived his right to suppress the evidence in question because he failed to appear at the suppression hearing. Upon review, the Supreme Court held that a defendant's voluntary failure to appear at a suppression hearing waived his right to be present at the hearing, but did not waive the defendant's constitutional right to challenge evidence as unlawfully obtained. The Court therefore remanded the case to Superior Court to conduct a suppression hearing. View "Smolka v. Delaware" on Justia Law

A jury convicted Anzara Brown on various drug dealing and drug possession charges. In his direct appeal to the Delaware Supreme Court, Brown challenged three decisions of the Superior Court regarding the admissibility of certain evidence used against him at trial. Because the Supreme Court found that the Superior Court acted within its discretion to deny Brown's suppression motions and admit the evidence, the Supreme Court affirmed his judgment of convictions. View "Brown v. Delaware" on Justia Law