Justia Delaware Supreme Court Opinion Summaries

Harrison Sanders and Trinity Turner, divorced parents of two children, were involved in a legal dispute over compliance with a Family Court Order of Protection From Abuse (PFA Order) against Turner. The PFA Order required Turner to undergo evaluations by a certified treatment program and obtain a psychological evaluation. Turner failed to comply, leading to a contempt finding and a daily fine of $200 until compliance.The Family Court Commissioner found Turner in contempt twice. The first contempt order imposed a daily fine for noncompliance, and the second contempt order calculated the total fine at $51,200 for continued noncompliance. Initially, the Commissioner directed that the fine be paid to Sanders. Turner sought review by a Family Court Judge, who upheld the contempt finding and fine amount but ruled that the fine should be paid to the court, not Sanders. Sanders filed a motion for reargument, which the court denied, maintaining that the fine was to be paid to the court as it was intended to coerce compliance with the court's order.The Supreme Court of Delaware reviewed the case and affirmed the Family Court's decision. The court held that coercive contempt fines, unless compensatory in nature, should be paid to the court. The court reasoned that it is the court's authority being vindicated through such fines, not the rights of a private litigant. The court also addressed procedural arguments, concluding that the Family Court Judge had the authority to review and modify the Commissioner’s orders and that Sanders suffered no prejudice from the court’s decision to consider the payment recipient issue. The Supreme Court denied Sanders' request for attorneys' fees, affirming the Family Court's judgment. View "Sanders v. Turner" on Justia Law

A group of AIM ImmunoTech, Inc. stockholders believed the board was mismanaging the company and initiated a campaign to elect new directors. This effort included two felons convicted of financial crimes. The board rejected two nomination attempts under its bylaws, leading to a lawsuit. The Court of Chancery denied the insurgents' request for a preliminary injunction, citing factual disputes. The insurgents, led by Ted D. Kellner, made a third attempt to nominate directors. The board amended its bylaws to include new advance notice provisions and rejected Kellner's nominations for non-compliance. Kellner filed suit.The Court of Chancery invalidated four of the six main advance notice bylaws and reinstated a 2016 bylaw. The court upheld the board's rejection of Kellner's nominations for failing to comply with the remaining bylaws, including the reinstated 2016 provision. Kellner argued that the court improperly used the 2016 bylaw and that the amended bylaws were preclusive and adopted for an improper purpose. The defendants contended that the court erred in invalidating the bylaws and that they withstood enhanced scrutiny.The Delaware Supreme Court reviewed the case. It found that the AIM board identified a legitimate threat to its information-gathering function but acted inequitably by adopting unreasonable bylaws to thwart Kellner's proxy contest. The court held that the board's primary purpose was to interfere with Kellner's nominations and maintain control. Consequently, the court declared the amended bylaws unenforceable. The judgment of the Court of Chancery was affirmed in part and reversed in part, closing the case. View "Kellner v. AIM ImmunoTech Inc." on Justia Law

The case involves a challenge to two Delaware voting statutes: one allowing absentee voters to request "permanent absentee" status, and the other authorizing qualified, registered voters to vote in person at least 10 days before an election. The plaintiffs, a citizen who plans to serve as an election inspector and a Delaware State Senator, argued that these statutes conflict with the Delaware Constitution's provisions governing elections and voting.The case was initially filed in the Court of Chancery, which dismissed it on jurisdictional grounds. The plaintiffs then pursued their claims in the Superior Court. The Superior Court found that the plaintiffs had standing to bring the case and ruled in their favor, declaring the challenged statutes unconstitutional.On appeal, the Supreme Court of the State of Delaware reversed the Superior Court's decision. The Supreme Court found that neither plaintiff had standing to challenge the statutes. The court held that the State Senator, who was not up for re-election until 2026, did not face an imminent or particularized harm. The court also found that the citizen, who planned to serve as an election inspector, did not have standing because his role as an inspector did not give him the authority to turn away lawful voters based on his personal belief that the challenged statutes were invalid. Finally, the court rejected the plaintiffs' claim that they had standing as registered voters, finding that their alleged injury was a generalized grievance shared by all voters, not a particularized harm. As a result of these findings, the court did not address the merits of the plaintiffs' constitutional claims. View "Albence v. Mennella" on Justia Law

The case involves Carl Fowler, an employee at Perdue, Inc., who contracted COVID-19 and sought compensation from his employer. Fowler worked at Perdue from January 2020 until late March 2020. In March 2020, Fowler developed COVID-19 symptoms and was later diagnosed with the virus. He was hospitalized for over two months and suffered severe health complications. Fowler claimed that he contracted the virus at work, specifically in the company's cafeteria, which he described as crowded and likened to a "sardine can."The Industrial Accident Board of the State of Delaware initially denied Fowler's claim, finding that he failed to present sufficient evidence that COVID-19 was a compensable occupational disease. The Superior Court affirmed this decision. Fowler then appealed to the Supreme Court of the State of Delaware.The Supreme Court affirmed the lower court's decision. The court found that while Fowler had established that the cafeteria at Perdue presented a hazard greater than that attending employment in general, he failed to show that the cafeteria was a hazard "distinct from" that attending employment in general. The court concluded that Fowler failed to establish the necessary relationship between his work environment at Perdue and COVID-19 as a "natural incident to" that employment. Therefore, the court held that Fowler's COVID-19 infection was not an occupational disease under these circumstances. View "Fowler v. Perdue, Inc." on Justia Law

In December 2017, Antoine Terry was found dead from multiple gunshot wounds in New Castle, Delaware. The police arrested Terry’s friend, Shaheed Matthews, for the murder. In 2019, Matthews was tried for murder and possession of a firearm during the commission of a felony. The State's case relied on circumstantial evidence, including evidence from Matthews’s cellphone, witness testimony, video camera footage, and gunshot residue found on Matthews’s jacket. Matthews was convicted and sentenced to life plus three years in prison.Matthews appealed his conviction, arguing that his trial counsel was ineffective for failing to move to suppress evidence obtained from his cellphone. The Superior Court denied Matthews’s motion, concluding that Matthews had provided valid consent for the search of his cellphone and that the cellphone evidence had no bearing on the outcome of the case. Matthews appealed this decision to the Supreme Court of the State of Delaware.The Supreme Court of the State of Delaware reversed the Superior Court's decision. The court found that Matthews did not provide valid consent for the search of his cellphone and that the warrant obtained by police to search Matthews’s cellphone was an unconstitutional general warrant. The court also found that the cellphone evidence was material and significant to the State's case. Therefore, the court concluded that Matthews’s trial counsel’s failure to move to suppress the evidence obtained from his cellphone constituted deficient performance and prejudiced Matthews. The court vacated Matthews’s convictions and remanded the case to the Superior Court for a new trial. View "Matthews v. State" on Justia Law

The case involves a plaintiff who was bitten by a dog at a facility operated by an animal welfare organization. The plaintiff filed a lawsuit against the organization, invoking Delaware's "dog bite statute," which imposes strict liability on a dog owner for any injury caused by the dog. The Superior Court of Delaware granted summary judgment in favor of the organization, ruling that the statute does not apply to animal welfare organizations. The court reasoned that the statute was intended to target irresponsible dog owners who keep vicious dogs as pets, not organizations like the defendant.The Superior Court's decision was based on its interpretation of the legislative intent behind the dog bite statute. The court also held that the plaintiff could not establish negligence on the part of the organization without expert testimony, as the standard of care applicable to animal shelters was outside the common knowledge of laypersons.The plaintiff appealed the decision to the Supreme Court of the State of Delaware. The Supreme Court disagreed with the lower court's interpretation of the dog bite statute. It found that the statute unambiguously imposes strict liability on any person who owns, keeps, harbors, or is the custodian of a dog, without any exception for animal welfare organizations. The court also disagreed with the lower court's requirement for expert testimony to establish negligence, ruling that the standard of care in handling a domestic animal with known vicious propensities is within the common knowledge of laypersons. The Supreme Court reversed the Superior Court's decision and remanded the case for further proceedings. View "Riad v. Brandywine Valley SPCA, Inc." on Justia Law

The case involves Ferrellgas Partners L.P. and its subsidiaries (collectively "Ferrellgas") and Zurich American Insurance Company ("Zurich"). Ferrellgas had an insurance policy with Zurich, which included a provision for the advancement of defense costs for litigation. Ferrellgas was involved in a separate lawsuit with Eddystone Rail Company, LLC ("Eddystone") over a breach of contract. Ferrellgas sought to have Zurich cover the defense costs for the Eddystone litigation under their insurance policy.In the lower court, the Superior Court of the State of Delaware, Ferrellgas filed a motion for summary judgment seeking a declaratory relief obligating Zurich to advance defense costs for the Eddystone litigation. Zurich also filed a motion for summary judgment seeking a declaration that it had no obligation to advance defense costs. The Superior Court denied Ferrellgas' motion and granted Zurich's motion, finding that the Eddystone litigation was excluded from coverage under the Zurich policy.On appeal, the Supreme Court of the State of Delaware affirmed the decision of the Superior Court. The Supreme Court found that the Eddystone litigation was a claim seeking relief for a breach of contract that occurred after the commencement of the Run-Off Coverage Period in the Zurich policy. As such, Zurich had no duty to advance defense costs for this matter due to the Run-Off Exclusion in the policy. The court also found that Ferrellgas' appeal was timely filed. View "Ferrellgas Partners, L.P. v. Zurich American Insurance Company" on Justia Law

The case revolves around Deonta Carney, who was indicted for crimes stemming from three separate incidents. In one of these incidents, Carney and an accomplice allegedly robbed a man named Angelo Flores of his dirt bikes. Although Carney did not physically hold the firearm used in the robbery, he was charged with possession of a firearm by a person prohibited due to his involvement in the crime. Initially, Carney rejected a plea offer from the State, but he changed his mind and accepted a revised plea offer on the morning of the trial when he learned that the victim had appeared to testify. However, before sentencing, Carney attempted to withdraw his guilty plea, arguing that he was "legally innocent" of the firearm possession charge because he did not physically hold the gun during the robbery.The Superior Court of the State of Delaware denied Carney's motion to withdraw his guilty plea. The court found no procedural defects in the plea colloquy and determined that Carney's plea was entered knowingly, intelligently, and voluntarily. The court also concluded that Carney had effective legal counsel throughout the proceedings and that granting the motion would prejudice the State. Regarding Carney's claim of innocence, the court found that Carney's plea colloquy statements were inconsistent with his later innocence assertion. The court also determined that there was sufficient factual basis to convict Carney of the firearms charge because he had constructive possession of the firearm during the robbery.Carney appealed to the Supreme Court of the State of Delaware, arguing that the Superior Court exceeded its discretion when it denied his motion to withdraw his guilty plea. However, the Supreme Court affirmed the Superior Court's judgment, concluding that the lower court did not exceed its discretion when it found that Carney did not present a fair and just reason to withdraw his guilty plea. The Supreme Court agreed with the lower court's assessment that Carney's claim of innocence was weak and that his involvement in the robbery was sufficient to establish constructive possession of the firearm. View "Carney v. State" on Justia Law

The case involves NGL Energy Partners LP and NGL Energy Holdings LLC (collectively, "NGL") and LCT Capital, LLC ("LCT"). NGL, entities in the energy sector, engaged LCT, a financial advisory services provider, for services related to NGL's 2014 acquisition of TransMontaigne Inc. However, the parties failed to agree on payment terms, leading LCT to file a lawsuit in 2015. The Superior Court held a jury trial in July 2018, which resulted in a $36 million verdict in LCT's favor.NGL appealed the Superior Court's decision, challenging the $36 million final judgment and a set of evidentiary rulings. LCT cross-appealed, contesting the Superior Court's methodology for computing post-judgment interest. NGL argued that the Superior Court erred by admitting evidence and arguments about the value/benefit supposedly gained by NGL in the Transaction, asserting that such evidence is prejudicial and irrelevant to a quantum meruit claim. NGL also argued that the Superior Court erred by admitting evidence of benefit-of-the-bargain or expectancy damages when assessing the quantum meruit value of LCT’s services.The Supreme Court of the State of Delaware affirmed the Superior Court’s evidentiary rulings and rejected NGL's contention that the Superior Court incorrectly allowed LCT to recover benefit-of-the bargain/expectancy damages. However, the Supreme Court disagreed with the Superior Court’s post-judgment interest determination. The Supreme Court held that prejudgment interest is part of the judgment upon which post-judgment interest accrues under Section 2301(a). Therefore, the Supreme Court reversed the Superior Court as to this issue and remanded the case to the Superior Court for entry of judgment consistent with its opinion. View "NGL Energy Partners LP v. LCT Capital, LLC" on Justia Law

The case involves BitGo Holdings, Inc. and Galaxy Digital Holdings Ltd., who entered into a merger agreement. BitGo, a technology company, was required to submit audited financial statements to Galaxy, the acquirer, by a specified date. When BitGo submitted the financial statements, Galaxy claimed they were deficient because they did not apply recently published guidance from the Securities and Exchange Commission’s staff. BitGo disagreed, but submitted a second set of financial statements. Galaxy found fault with the second submission and terminated the merger agreement. BitGo then sued Galaxy for wrongful repudiation and breach of the merger agreement.The Court of Chancery sided with Galaxy and dismissed the complaint. The court found that the financial statements submitted by BitGo did not comply with the requirements of the merger agreement, providing Galaxy with a valid basis to terminate the agreement.On appeal, the Supreme Court of Delaware reversed the decision of the Court of Chancery. The Supreme Court found that the definition of the term “Company 2021 Audited Financial Statements” in the merger agreement was ambiguous. The court concluded that both parties had proffered reasonable interpretations of the merger agreement’s definition. Therefore, the court remanded the case for the consideration of extrinsic evidence to resolve this ambiguity. View "BitGo Holdings, Inc. v. Galaxy Digital Holdings Ltd., et al." on Justia Law