Justia Delaware Supreme Court Opinion Summaries

Defendant-appellant-cross-appellee R.T. Vanderbilt Company, Inc. appealed a Superior Court judgment on a jury verdict of $2,864,583.33 plus interest to Plaintiff-appellees-cross-appellant Darcel Galliher, individually and on behalf of the Estate of Michael Galliher. The decedent, Michael Galliher, contracted and died from mesothelioma as a result of exposure to asbestos or asbestiform material while employed by Borg Warner at a bathroom fixtures facility. Vanderbilt provided industrial talc to Borg Warner, which was alleged to be the source of the substance that caused Michael's illness. At trial, Vanderbilt denied causation and claimed that Borg Warner was responsible because it did not operate the facility in a manner that was safe for employees like Michael. Vanderbilt argued: (1) the trial court erred when it failed to instruct the jury on the duty of care required of Borg Warner, as Michael's employer; and (2) the trial court erred when it failed to grant a new trial based on the admission of unreliable and inflammatory evidence that previously was ruled inadmissible. Galliher argued on cross-appeal that the trial court erred as a matter of law when it disallowed post-judgment interest for a certain period of months. The Supreme Court found that the trial court erred when it failed to provide any instruction to the jury on Borg Warner's duty of care to Michael, despite Vanderbilt's request that it do so. The trial court also abused its discretion when it denied Vanderbilt's motion for a new trial based upon the substantial prejudice resulting from the admission of evidence, not subject to cross-examination, that it had engaged in criminal conduct. Accordingly, the Court reversed the judgment and remanded for a new trial. View "R.T. Vanderbilt Company, Inc., v. Galliher, et al." on Justia Law

Appellant-mother Amy O'Conner appealed three Family Court orders, all related to property division and child custody issues arising out of the her divorce from appellee-father Alvin O'Conner in 2012. After careful consideration, the Supreme Court dismissed Mother's appeals as untimely. However, the Court concluded the Family Court abused its discretion in refusing to reopen the custody proceedings because, under the circumstances of this case, the interests of the children justified reopening the custody proceeding (later events indicated that the Mother needed clear unilateral authority to make decisions on her children's behalf, given the Father's alleged refusal to fulfill even minimal parental responsibilities". In so ruling, the Supreme Court acknowledged the difficult circumstances the Family Court confronted in dealing with the Mother's motion to reopen. "Because the Mother was pro se, she did not point the Family Court to the appropriate rule or case law, leaving the Family Court to address the motion without adequate legal briefing." The Mother's appeal from the Family Court's orders dated July 22, 2013 and October 30, 2013 were dismissed as untimely, but the Family Court's judgment dated January 16, 2014 was reversed and remanded. View "O'Conner v. O'Conner" on Justia Law

James Cooke was convicted of, among other things, raping and murdering a 20-year-old University of Delaware student. Cooke appealed his convictions and the death sentence, seeking either a new trial, or at least a new penalty hearing. Cooke listed ten claims of error on appeal that "def[ied] brief summary. But what is common to all of Cooke's arguments is that none of them provides a basis for reversing the judgment of convictions and the death sentence that were entered against him." View "Cooke v. Delaware" on Justia Law

Christiana Ozdemir and Douglas Riley began a relationship in 2005. The couple had a son in 2007 and a daughter in early 2009. In June 2009, Ozdemir told Riley that she was going to New York for two weeks with the children. She and the children never returned. Riley filed a petition for custody in Delaware. In response, Ozdemir filed petitions for custody and for a protective order in New York. In November 2009, the Delaware Family Court and the New York court held a telephonic joint hearing, during which Ozdemir and Riley were present. The courts determined that Delaware had jurisdiction over the custody matter. Following the hearing, the Family Court entered an interim custody order awarding Ozdemir sole legal custody and primary residency of the children. Riley was given limited visitation rights. Ozdemir failed to bring the children to some of the scheduled visits, and the Family Court found her in contempt.In October 2010, the Family Court entered a temporary custody order awarding Ozdemir and Riley joint legal custody and shared residency on an alternating monthly basis. The trial court held a review hearing in April 2011, but Ozdemir failed to attend. At the review hearing, the Family Court entered another order awarding Riley sole legal custody and primary residency of the children. Riley attempted to enforce Order in New York, but the New York police did not help him. In March 2012, the Family Court appointed a guardian ad litem to represent the children. In January 2013, the Family Court held more hearings which Ozdemir did not attend. Because of Ozdemir kept thwarting of Court orders and the guardian ad litem’s recommendations, it was in the best interests of the children to be placed in Riley care. Ozdemir failed to appear on the day she was supposed to hand over the children. A warrant was issued for her arrest. The Federal Marshal’s Fugitive Task Force took Ozdemir into custody in Miami, Florida, and she was returned to Delaware. Her children were found in New York, and brought to Delaware in to face two counts of felony interference with custody.At trial, the State offered into evidence five unredacted Family Court orders to establish that Riley was entitled to custody of the children, and that Ozdemir had intentionally withheld the children from him. The jury found Ozdemir guilty on all counts. This appeal followed. The issue this case presented to the Supreme Court was whether Family Court records could be used in the Superior Court to prove that appellant committed the offense of interference with custody. The Supreme Court held that, without redaction, the Family Court records were inadmissible because they included hearsay. Accordingly, the Court reversed. View "Ozdemir v. State" on Justia Law

Defendant-Appellant-Cross Appellee Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. appealed a final judgment of the Court of Chancery identifying specific steps Wal-Mart must take in searching for documents, and specific categories of documents Wal-Mart must produce, in response to a demand made by Plaintiff -Appellee-Cross Appellant Indiana Electrical Workers Pension Trust Fund IBEW pursuant to title 8, section 220 of the Delaware Code. The Court of Chancery conducted a Section 220 trial on the papers to determine whether Wal-Mart had produced all responsive documents in reply to IBEW’s demand. The Court of Chancery entered a Final Order and Judgment, requiring Wal-Mart to produce a wide variety of additional documents, including ones whose content was privileged or protected by the work-product doctrine. Wal-Mart appealed the Court of Chancery’s Final Order with regard to its obligations to provide the additional documents. IBEW filed a cross-appeal, arguing that the Court of Chancery erred in failing to require Wal-Mart to correct the deficiencies in its previous document productions and in granting in part Wal-Mart’s motion to strike its use of certain Whistleblower Documents. After its review of the matter, the Delaware Supreme Court concluded that all of the issues raised in this appeal and cross-appeal were without merit. Therefore, the judgment of the Court of Chancery was affirmed. View "Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. v. Indiana Electrical Workers Trust Fund IBEW" on Justia Law

A Kent County Grand Jury returned an indictment against defendant-appellant Dashawn Ayers, defendant-appellant Michael Demby, Galen Brooks, and 11 other individuals. Ayers was charged with one count of Drug Dealing, one count of Aggravated Possession, and one count of Conspiracy Second Degree. Demby was charged with two counts of Drug Dealing, two counts of Aggravated Possession, two counts of Conspiracy Second Degree, one count of Criminal Solicitation Second Degree, and one count of Possession of Drug Paraphernalia. Before trial, Ayers and Demby unsuccessfully moved to suppress the wiretap evidence. Ayers also filed a Motion to Sever, which was denied. The jury convicted Ayers on all counts. Demby was convicted of one count of Drug Dealing, one count of Aggravated Possession, one count of Conspiracy Second Degree, and one count of Possession of Drug Paraphernalia. He was acquitted on the remaining charges. Ayers and Demby filed separate appeals, which were consolidated for consideration and decision. Defendants argued on appeal to the Supreme Court that the recordings were “testimonial” because two witnesses explained the meaning of the codes used in the recorded conversations, and appellants were unable to cross-examine the declarants about the coded language. The Court held that the wiretap recordings, used to prove that appellants committed the crime of conspiracy, were admissible. There was no constitutional violation, and defendants' remaining arguments lacked merit. Accordingly, the Court affirmed defendants' convictions. View "Ayers v. Delaware" on Justia Law

Defendant-appellant Ronald Luttrell appealed his convictions for one count of Attempted Rape in the First Degree, three counts of Unlawful Sexual Contact in the First Degree, one count of Attempted Unlawful Sexual Contact in the First Degree, and two counts of Indecent Exposure. Luttrell raised two claims in a direct appeal to the Supreme Court: (1) the Superior Court abused its discretion when it failed to grant his motion for a bill of particulars, because the indictment did not clearly delineate the acts for which he was being prosecuted or when they occurred, and therefore it did not allow him to adequately prepare a defense or protect him from double jeopardy; and (2) the Superior Court committed plain error when it allowed impermissible "vouching" evidence to be presented to the jury. Upon review, the Supreme Court concluded the Superior Court abused its discretion in denying Luttrell’s motion for a bill of particulars. Furthermore, the Court concluded that the admission of vouching evidence constituted plain error. The matter was remanded for a new trial. View "Luttrell v. Delaware" on Justia Law

This appeal arose from the robbery of a Family Dollar store in Dover in 2012 three men. The State charged defendant Cameron Norwood as one of the three. But Norwood denied being the third man. Norwood sought to create a reasonable doubt about his guilt by arguing that another man, Khalil Dixon, had been the third man who robbed the store. In support of that defense, Norwood tried to introduce evidence that Dixon and the same two perpetrators had also robbed the same Family Dollar earlier that same year, and attempted to rob it again a few days later. The State objected, and the Superior Court excluded the evidence at the State's request. The Supreme Court concluded that the Superior Court's decision to exclude the evidence was an abuse of discretion, given the substantial similarities between the prior crimes and this one. The Superior Court's decision was reversed and the case remanded for a new trial. View "Norwood v. Delaware" on Justia Law

Defendant-appellant Lamonte Butler appealed his convictions of Attempted Robbery First Degree, Assault Second Degree, Possession of a Firearm During the Commission of a Felony, Conspiracy Second Degree, Carrying a Concealed Deadly Weapon, Resisting Arrest, Possession of a Firearm by a Person Prohibited, and misdemeanor drug possession. Butler raised two claims on appeal: (1) that his convictions were barred by the Double Jeopardy Clause because the trial judge took a series of improper actions that impelled defense counsel to move for a mistrial; and (2) the Trial Judge abused her discretion by denying his post-trial Motion for Recusal without conducting the analysis required by "Los v. Los." The Supreme Court concluded that: (1) the Trial Judge did not intend to preside over Butler's trial before the already empaneled jury; and (2) the Trial Judge took a series of actions intended to ensure that the trial would not take place. For those reasons, Butler's convictions were reversed. "In so concluding, we note that this appeal presents aberrational circumstances that markedly depart from the serious priority the Superior Court gives to trying felony criminal cases. . . . The outcome is regrettable, but it is dictated by the need to respect Butler's constitutional right." View "Butler v. Delaware" on Justia Law

In 2003, a default judgment was entered in the Court of Common Pleas against appellant Sharon Knott, in favor of appellee LVNV Funding, LLC. The Creditor did not attempt to execute on the judgment for more than nine years, until the Creditor moved to refresh the judgment in 2012. Throughout the proceedings, Knott argued that 10 Del. C. sec. 5072 acted acts as a statute of limitations that requires the holder of a judgment to seek to execute on the judgment within the first five years after the judgment is entered. The Superior Court rejected that argument, relying on a decision of a Commissioner finding that the five year limit in 5072 did not operate as a statute of limitations, but was merely a time period after which a judgment creditor had to affirmatively ask the Superior Court to refresh the judgment in its discretion, rather than the judgment creditor being entitled to execute on the judgment as of right. At oral argument on appeal, the parties acknowledged for the first time that perhaps the relevant statute was actually 10 Del. C. sec. 5073. But Knott argued that the result was the same under either statute, because both statutes imposed a five year period of limitations on the collection of judgments. Disagreeing with Knott's argument, the Supreme Court affirmed the Superior Court. View "Knott v. LVNV Funding, LLC" on Justia Law