Justia Delaware Supreme Court Opinion Summaries

In 2007, Marisco Superholdco, LLC and Marisco Superholdco Notes Corp. issued notes ("Superholdco Notes") through a private placement under an indenture between the Issuer and Wells Fargo Bank, N.A., as Trustee. In 2010, as part of a financial restructuring, the Issuer proposed amendments to the Indenture that were approved by a majority of the Superholdco noteholders. Appellees GS Mezzanine Partners 2009, L.P. and GS Mezzanine Partners V, L.P., who owned a majority of the Superholdco Notes, voted in favor of the amendments. Appellants Caspian Alpha Long Credit Fund L.P., Caspian Select Master Fund, LTD., Caspian Capital Partners, L.P., and Mariner LDC were Superholdco noteholders who sued, alleging they were injured by the amendments to the Indenture. GS Mezzanine moved to dismiss the claims against it under Court of Chancery Rule 12(b)(6), and the Court of Chancery granted that motion, finding that Section 6.06 of the Indenture could not reasonably have been read to provide Caspian with a basis to sue GS Mezzanine for voting to approve amendments to the Indenture. On appeal, Caspian argued that the Court of Chancery erred in its decision. Finding no reversible error, the Supreme Court affirmed the Court of Chancery’s dismissal of the claims Caspian brought against GS Mezzanine. View "Caspian Alpha Long Credit, Fund, L.P., et al. v. GS Mezzanine Partners 2006, L.P., et al." on Justia Law

Defendant-appellant Nathaniel Banks appealed his conviction by jury of assault in the third degree, carrying a concealed weapon and endangering the welfare of a child. He raised one issue on appeal to the Supreme Court: the trial court abused its discretion when it restricted his ability to call witnesses to testify about certain prior acts of the complainant, and thereby violated his federal Constitutional right to present a defense. Upon review, the Supreme Court concluded defendant's claim was without merit. Therefore, the Court affirmed Banks' conviction. View "Banks v. Delaware" on Justia Law

Defendant-appellant Keith Wynn appealed his conviction by jury of one count of Burglary in the Second Degree and two counts of Felony Theft. Wynn raised two claims on appeal: (1) the prosecutor committed misconduct by stating that Wynn was not permitted on the second floor of a dwelling; and (2) the prosecutor argued for an application of Delaware’s burglary statute that was not supported by the record evidence. Upon review, the Supreme Court concluded that both of Wynn’s arguments lacked merit. View "Wynn v. Delaware" on Justia Law

Defendant-appellant Jermaine Wright appealed a Superior Court order that denied his fourth motion for postconviction relief, and for reimposing Wright's conviction and sentence. Wright was convicted by jury in 1992 for first-degree murder, first-degree robbery and related weapons charges in connection with the death of a liquor store clerk. Wright was then sentenced to death. At trial, the State did not present any forensic evidence including fingerprints, shoe prints, or fibers placing Wright at the scene. Nor did the State present the murder weapon, shell casings, the getaway car, or eyewitnesses to identify Wright. Instead, a jury convicted Wright on his confession to the police while under the influence of heroin and the testimony (since recanted) of a prison informant who testified that Wright admitted the crime. In 2012, the Superior Court vacated Wright’s conviction and sentence because it had “no confidence in the outcome of the trial.” The Superior Court also found that Wright did not knowingly and intelligently waive his Miranda rights because police obtained his confession through defective warnings. The remaining claims were denied. The State appealed, and a majority of the Delaware Supreme Court reversed, ordering Wright’s conviction and sentence reimposed, because the Miranda issue was procedurally barred and that, given his confession, the evidence about the Brandywine attempted robbery would not have led to a different result. After a reinstatement of his conviction and sentence, Wright now appealed his remaining claims originally denied by the Superior Court. “[W]hen the State withholds from a criminal defendant evidence that is material to his guilt or punishment, it violates his right to due process of law in violation of the Fourteenth Amendment. This is exactly what happened here." The Supreme Court vacated Wright’s conviction and death sentence and remanded the case for a new trial. View "Wright v. Delaware" on Justia Law

Barbara Mammarella sued her radiologist, Alan Evantash, M.D., her OB/GYN, Christine Maynard, M.D., and All About Women of Christiana Care, Inc. for medical malpractice. To establish her claim, Mammarella needed to present expert testimony that could support a jury verdict that the alleged negligence, which was a six-month delay in her breast cancer diagnosis, was the proximate cause of her injury, which was an alleged change in treatment that required Mammarella to undergo chemotherapy. Upon review of this case, the Supreme Court concluded that the testimony of Mammarella's sole medical expert on causation could not support a jury verdict because the expert did not testify to a reasonable degree of medical probability that Mammarella's treatment options had changed as a result of the alleged negligence. Therefore, the Supreme Court affirmed the Superior Court's grant of judgment as a matter of law in favor of the health care providers. View "Mammarella v. Evantash, M.D., et al." on Justia Law

ATP Tour, Inc. (ATP) operates a global professional men’s tennis tour. Its members include professional men’s tennis players and entities that own and operate professional men’s tennis tournaments. Two of those entities are Deutscher Tennis Bund (DTB) and Qatar Tennis Federation. ATP is governed by a seven-member board of directors, of which three are elected by the tournament owners, three are elected by the player members, and the seventh directorship is held by ATP’s chairman and president. In 2007, ATP’s board voted to change the Tour schedule and format. Under the board’s “Brave New World” plan, the Hamburg tournament, which the Federations owned and operated, was downgraded from the highest tier of tournaments to the second highest tier, and was moved from the spring season to the summer season. Displeased by these changes, the Federations sued ATP and six of its board members in the United States District Court for the District of Delaware, alleging both federal antitrust claims and Delaware fiduciary duty claims. After a ten-day jury trial, the District Court granted ATP’s and the director defendants’ motion for judgment as a matter of law on all of the fiduciary duty claims, and also on the antitrust claims brought against the director defendants. The jury then found in favor of ATP on the remaining antitrust claims. Four questions of Delaware law were certified to the Supreme Court from the U.S. District Court for the District of Delaware when the Federations appealed. The questions centered on the validity of a fee-shifting provision in a Delaware non-stock corporation’s bylaws. The provision, which the directors adopted pursuant to their charter-delegated power to unilaterally amend the bylaws, shifts attorneys’ fees and costs to unsuccessful plaintiffs in intra-corporate litigation. The federal court found that the bylaw provision’s validity was an open question under Delaware law and asked under what circumstances such a provision was valid and enforceable. Although the Delaware Supreme Court could not directly address the bylaw at issue, it held that fee-shifting provisions in a non-stock corporation’s bylaws could be valid and enforceable under Delaware law. In addition, bylaws normally apply to all members of a non-stock corporation regardless of whether the bylaw was adopted before or after the member in question became a member. View "ATP Tour, Inc., et al. v. Deutscher Tennis Bund, et al." on Justia Law

In 2013, the Supreme Court dismissed without prejudice a condemnation proceeding by plaintiff-appellee, the State of Delaware Department of Transportation (“DelDOT”), against the defendants-appellants, Jack and Mary Ann Lawson. Thereafter, the Lawsons moved for an award of litigation expenses and costs, which the Superior Court denied. The Lawsons appealed that order, claiming they were entitled to reimbursement for the litigation expenses they incurred by virtue of the condemnation proceeding, under both the Real Property Acquisition Act, and the common law bad faith exception to the so-called “American Rule.” They also claimed they were statutorily entitled to an award of costs. As a matter of first impression, the Supreme Court construed certain language in 29 Del. C. 9503, and held that that provision required reimbursement for litigation expenses related to a condemnation proceeding where a court determines that the subject property cannot be acquired by the governmental entity’s particular exercise of its underlying eminent domain power in that specific proceeding. Accordingly, the Court determined that the Superior Court erred by denying the Lawsons' motion for litigation expenses under 29 Del. C. 9503. The Court also concluded, however, that the Superior Court correctly determined that the Lawsons were not entitled to litigation expenses under the bad faith exception to the American Rule. Finally, the Court held that the Superior Court erred by not addressing the Lawsons' application for costs. View "Lawson v. Delaware" on Justia Law

Appellant T.A.H. First, Inc. had a default judgment entered against it because it failed to answer appellee Clifton Leasing Company, Inc., t/a Delmarva Kenworth's complaint in a timely manner. T.A.H. First moved the Superior Court to vacate the default judgment. The Superior Court denied that motion, and specifically held that not only was T.A.H. First not entitled to defend the claims brought by Clifton against it, but T.A.H. First also was prohibited from pressing counterclaims against Clifton because those counterclaims were not filed in a timely manner. The Superior Court agreed to hold an inquisition hearing to quantify the amount of the default judgment against T.A.H. First. But Clifton eventually concluded that T.A.H. First was likely judgment proof and that it did not want to waste further resources or those of the Superior Court by holding an inquisition hearing. Clifton sought to dismiss the case with prejudice as to all claims that any party to the case was required to have raised in a timely pleading in the case. The Superior Court granted Clifton’s request and dismissed the case. T.A.H. First appealed, arguing that the Superior Court abused its discretion by denying the motion to vacate the default judgment. Because Clifton had dismissed the case without seeking to quantify the default judgment and impose a duty upon T.A.H. First to pay a sum certain, the Supreme Court was concerned that it was addressing a moot point and that there might not be proper grounds for appeal. After receiving supplemental submissions, the Court entered an order that, "in candor, was confusing and can be read as contradictory. In essence, the Order contains language that can be read as both affirming the Superior Court’s denial of T.A.H. First’s motion to vacate the default judgment, while simultaneously reviving T.A.H. First’s ability to file counterclaims that it had not timely filed." After the Superior Court granted summary judgment on T.A.H. First’s claims on remand, T.A.H. First again appealed, arguing that the Supreme Court's prior mandate required the Superior Court to allow T.A.H. First to press its claims, despite the default judgment T.A.H. First had earlier suffered. Upon re-review of the matter, the Supreme Court concluded the Superior Court did not abuse its discretion or commit an error of law in its rulings in this case. View "T.A.H. First, Inc. v. Clifton Leasing Company, Inc." on Justia Law

Defendant-appellant Christiana Mall, LLC appealed the Superior Court’s finding of substantial prejudice. Plaintiff-appellee Emory Hill and Company appealed the Superior Court’s finding of excusable neglect and a meritorious defense with respect to the claim of quantum meruit. Upon review of the dispute, the Supreme Court concluded that Christiana’s failure to file a timely answer to the Complaint was not due to excusable neglect. The Court affirmed the trial court's order but on different reasons. View "Christiana Mall, LLC v. Emory Hill and Company" on Justia Law

RB Entertainment is one of a complicated web of at least seventeen different companies that Appellant Jeffrey Cohen allegedly owns and controls. Central to this appeal was one issue: whether the delinquency proceedings for Indemnity Insurance Corporation, RRG violated the constitutional due process rights of Cohen or Co-Appellant RB Entertainment Ventures. Co-Appellant IDG Companies, LLC (Indemnity's managing general agent), was also one of the Cohen-affiliated entities. After uncovering evidence that Cohen had committed fraud in his capacity as Indemnity's CEO and that Indemnity might be insolvent, the Delaware Insurance Commissioner petitioned the Court of Chancery for a seizure order. The Delaware Uniform Insurers Liquidation Act. Based on the detailed allegations and supporting evidence presented by the Commissioner, the Court of Chancery granted that seizure order, which, among other things, prohibited anyone with notice of the proceedings from transacting the business of Indemnity, selling or destroying Indemnity’s assets, or asserting claims against Indemnity in other venues without permission from the Commissioner. The seizure order also prohibited anyone with notice of the proceedings from interfering with the Commissioner in the discharge of her duties. Cohen, who founded Indemnity and had served as its President, Chairman, and CEO, resigned from Indemnity's board during the ensuing investigation and the board removed him from his managerial positions. After his resignation, Cohen interfered with the Commissioner's efforts to operate Indemnity in various ways. The Commissioner returned to the Court of Chancery several times, first seeking an amendment to the seizure order to address Cohen's behavior and then seeking sanctions against him. The Court of Chancery entered a series of orders that increased the restrictions on Cohen's behavior and imposed stiffer sanctions upon him. Cohen argued that he was denied due process at several junctures during the Court of Chancery proceedings. Because Cohen's claims alleged violations of his right to due process, the focus of the Supreme Court's opinion was on whether Cohen was given notice of the allegations against him and a fair opportunity to present his side of the dispute. Having carefully examined the record in this case, the Court concluded that he was given that opportunity: no violation of Cohen's or the affiliated entities' due process rights occurred. View "Cohen, et al. v. State of Delaware, et al." on Justia Law