Justia Delaware Supreme Court Opinion Summaries

Barley Mill, LLC appealed a Court of Chancery judgment invalidating a vote of the New Castle County Council on a rezoning ordinance. Barley Mill planned to develop a piece of property to house office space and a regional shopping mall. The increase in traffic associated with the development was of considerable concern to both the public and members of the Council itself. But the Council was advised that: (1) it could not obtain the traffic information and analysis that Barley Mill was required to provide to the Delaware Department of Transportation as part of the overall rezoning process before the Council exercised its discretionary authority to vote on the rezoning ordinance; and (2) that the traffic information was not legally relevant to the Council's analysis. That advice was incorrect and there were no legal barriers that prevented the Council from obtaining the information or considering it before casting its discretionary vote on the rezoning ordinance. After the rezoning ordinance was approved, nearby resident homeowners and Save Our County, Inc. challenged the zoning ordinance, arguing that not only was the Council allowed to consider the traffic information, but the New Castle County Unified Development Code required it to consider that information before its vote. They also argued that, even if the Council was not required to consider the information before the vote, the vote on the rezoning ordinance was arbitrary and capricious because the Council had received erroneous legal advice that the information was both unavailable and irrelevant at the time the Council cast its vote. The Court of Chancery held that the mistake of law caused the Council to vote without first obtaining the information, rendering the vote arbitrary and capricious. On appeal, Barley Mill argued that the Court of Chancery erred when it invalidated the Council's vote. Save Our County and New Castle County cross-appealed, arguing that the Court of Chancery erred in holding that neither 9 Del C. Sec. 2662 nor the UDC required the Council to consider a traffic analysis before casting its discretionary vote on the rezoning ordinance. Finding no reversible error, the Supreme Court affirmed the Court of Chancery's decision. View "Barley Mill, LLC v. Save Our County, Inc." on Justia Law

Defendant-appellant Donald Pellicone appealed a Superior Court judgment confirming that New Castle County had certain easements on Pellicone's property. The County sought the easements' validation to carry out a flood control project targeting Little Mill Creek in New Castle County. The issues on appeal to the Supreme Court were: (1) whether the Flood Control Project legally constituted a County project; (2) whether the County's condemnation of Pellicone's property fell within the County's statutory eminent domain authority; (3) whether the County's action was a taking of Pellicone's property for a public use as defined by law; and (4) whether the procedures set forth in Chapter 12, Article 7 adhered to. Answering all questions raised on appeal as "yes," the Supreme Court affirmed the Superior Court's judgment. View "Pellicone v. New Castle County" on Justia Law

Two certified questions came before the Delaware Supreme Court in this case. The questions centered on whether lease provisions for apartments of a public housing authority that restrict when residents, their household members, and guests may carry and possess firearms in the common areas violate the right to keep and bear arms guaranteed by Article I, Section 20 of the Delaware Constitution. The United States Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit found no violation of the Second Amendment or the Delaware Constitution. The certified questions were: (1) whether, under the Delaware Constitution, a public housing agency such as the WHA could adopt a firearms policy; and (2) whether under the Delaware Constitution, a public housing agency could require its residents, household members, and guests to have available for inspection a copy of any permit, license, or other documentation required by state, local, or federal law for the ownership, possession, or transportation of any firearm or other weapon, including a license to carry a concealed weapon. The Delaware court answered both questions in the negative. View "Doe, et al. v. Wilmington Housing Authority, et al." on Justia Law

Plaintiff-appellant Eldon Klaassen appealed a Court of Chancery judgment which held that Klaassen was not the de jure chief executive officer of Allegro Development Corporation. Klaassen claimed that the remaining Allegro directors, by removing him as CEO, violated an equitable notice requirement and also improperly employed deceptive tactics. After a trial and without addressing its merits, the Court of Chancery held that the claim was barred under laches and acquiescence. Upon review of the matter, the Supreme Court affirmed the Court of Chancery: to the extent that Klaassen’s claim was cognizable, it was equitable in nature. Furthermore, the Court concluded that the Court of Chancery properly found that Klaassen acquiesced in his removal as CEO, and was therefore barred from challenging removal. View "Klaassen v. Allegro Development Corporation, et al." on Justia Law

The issue before the Supreme Court in this matter centered on a Court of Chancery decision arising from a 2011 acquisition by MacAndrews & Forbes Holdings, Inc. (M&F), a 43% stockholder in M&F Worldwide Corp (MFW), of the remaining common stock of MFW. M&F’s proposal to take MFW private was made contingent upon two procedural conditions. Appellants initially sought to enjoin the transaction. They withdrew their request for injunctive relief after taking expedited discovery, including several depositions. Appellants then sought post-closing relief against M&F, Ronald Perelman, and MFW’s directors for breach of fiduciary duty. Defendants then moved for summary judgment, which the Court of Chancery granted. Appellants raised two arguments on appeal: (1) the Court of Chancery erred in concluding that no material disputed facts existed regarding the conditions precedent to business judgment review; and (2) the Court of Chancery erred, as a matter of law, in holding that the business judgment standard applied to controller freeze-out mergers where the controller’s proposal is conditioned on both Special Committee approval and a favorable majority-of-the-minority vote.The Supreme Court concluded Defendants’ motion for summary judgment was properly granted on all of those issues. The Court determined that the business judgment rule standard of review applied to this controlling stockholder buyout. View "Kahn, et al v. M&F Worldwide Corp., et al." on Justia Law

A group of Texas plaintiffs alleged that a corporation exposed two employees to chemicals that caused two of the employees' children to suffer from birth defects. The Superior Court judge excluded expert testimony as irrelevant under Delaware law because it would have been insufficient as a matter of Texas law. The judge did not reach the testimony's reliability under Delaware law. Because the plaintiffs waived their argument that California or Delaware substantive law applied, the Supreme Court affirmed the Superior Court judge's ruling that Texas substantive law applies. But before the Court could address whether a judge may consider substantive sufficiency when analyzing procedural admissibility, the case was remanded for the Superior Court judge to determine in the first instance whether the testimony at issue is excludable on reliability grounds.View "Tumlinson, et al. v. Advanced Micro Devices, Inc." on Justia Law

Appellant John Nichols appealed a final Superior Court judgment affirming the order of the State Coastal Zone Industrial Board granting motions to dismiss filed by appellees Diamond State Generation Partners LLC and the Delaware Department of Natural Resources and Environmental Control in response to Nichols' appeal of the grant of a Coastal Zone industrial permit application. Nichols raised two claims on appeal: (1) the Board's vote on whether Nichols had standing to pursue the appeal failed due to the lack of a five-vote majority; and (2) that he possessed standing under the "any person aggrieved" standard of title 7, section 7007(b) of the Delaware Code, or, in the alternative, as a matter of common law. Upon review, the Supreme Court concluded both of Nichols' arguments lacked merit and therefore affirmed the Superior Court.View "Nichols v. State Coastal Zone Industrial Control Board, et al." on Justia Law

Employee-appellant, Gary Andreason appealed a Superior Court judgment affirming two Industrial Accident Board decisions. The first decision awarded compensation to Andreason for his work-related knee and right shoulder injuries, but denied compensation for a separate and unrelated lower back injury. The second decision denied Andreason's reargument motion challenging the Board's denial of compensation for his lower back injury. Andreason argued on appeal to the Supreme Court: (1) the Board erred as a matter of law when it determined that there was no implied agreement to compensate him for his lower back injury; (2) that title 19, section 2322(h) does not apply when compensation is paid as the result of a unilateral mistake. The Court concluded all of Andreason's arguments were without merit. View "Andreason v. Royal Pest Control" on Justia Law

In a medical malpractice action, the issue before the Supreme Court centered on whether the Superior Court erred by denying appellants' motion for judgment as a matter of law, and by excluding certain evidence. Dr. Jennifer Barlow performed a Caesarean section on Laura Cooney-Koss to deliver her baby. There were no apparent complications from the delivery, and Laura was discharged from the hospital three days later. A month later, Laura experienced heavy vaginal bleeding, and she returned to the hospital. In an attempt to slow or stop her bleeding, a hospital physician determined that Laura would need a dilation and evacuation (D&E) procedure. Dr. A. Diane McCracken performed the D&E; further attempts to stop the bleeding were unsuccessful. McCracken decided to perform a hysterectomy, believing that Laura would die otherwise. The doctor removed Laura's uterus, and Laura eventually stopped bleeding. Laura and her husband, Jerome Koss, filed a complaint against McCracken, Barlow, their employer, All About Women of Christiana Care, Inc., and Christiana Care Health Services, Inc., alleging that McCracken negligently failed to undertake an appropriate number of conservative treatment options to stop Laura's bleeding before performing the hysterectomy, which was unnecessary. After trial, the jury returned a verdict in favor of the Kosses. The Superior Court denied McCracken's motions for judgment as a matter of law or for a new trial. Upon review of the Koss' arguments on appeal, the Supreme Court concluded that the trial court correctly determined that appellees' medical expert evidence supported a verdict in their favor. Thus, its denial of the motion for judgment as a matter of law is affirmed. The trial court's evidentiary rulings, however, constituted an abuse of discretion requiring a new trial. View "Cooney-Koss v. Barlow" on Justia Law

Plaintiff-appellant RBC Capital Markets, LLC (RBC) appealed a Superior Court judgment dismissing its claims against the defendant-appellees U.S. Education Loan Trust IV, LLC and Education Loan Trust IV. RBC sued the Defendants in the Court of Chancery in 2011, alleging that Defendants had been paying excessive fees from the Trust. The court dismissed the Chancery action as barred by the Trust Indenture’s "no-action" clause. Then in 2012, RBC filed this case, claiming that the Defendants had unlawfully failed to pay interest owed to RBC under the Issuer notes that RBC held. The Superior Court dismissed, finding: (1) the complaint failed to state a claim upon which relief can be granted; and (2) that the earlier Court of Chancery judgment of dismissal precluded RBC’s claim as res judicata. Upon review, the Supreme Court concluded the Superior Court erred in dismissing the case. The Court held that RBC’s complaint satisfied Delaware’s "reasonable conceivability" pleading standard, that the claim was not barred by the Trust Indenture’s no-action clause, and that on the current record it could not be determined as a matter of law that RBC’s Superior Court claim was precluded as res judicata. View "RBC Capital Markets, LLC, et al. v. Education Loan Trust IV, et al." on Justia Law