Justia Delaware Supreme Court Opinion Summaries

Defendant-Appellant Tiffany Parker was convicted of second-degree assault. She appealed that conviction, arguing the Superior Court erred in admitting statements posted on her Facebook profile. Defendant urged the Supreme Court to adopt Maryland's approach to admitting this kind of evidence: social media evidence could only be authenticated through the testimony of the creator, documentation of the internet history or hard drive of the purported creator's computer, or information obtained directly from the social networking site. Under this approach, social media evidence is only authenticated and admissible where the proponent can convince the trial judge that the social media post was not falsified or created by another user. The State argued the Delaware Court adopt the Texas approach: the proponent could authenticate social media evidence using any type of evidence so long as he or she could demonstrate to the trial judge that a jury could reasonably find that the proffered evidence was authentic. The Superior Court adopted the Texas approach and found that Defendant's social media post was sufficiently authenticated by circumstantial evidence and by testimony explaining how the post was obtained. On appeal, Defendant contended that social media evidence requires greater scrutiny. The Delaware Supreme Court concluded that the Texas approach better conformed to the requirements of Rule 104 and Rule 901 of the Delaware Rules of Evidence. The Court therefore found no abuse of discretion by the trial court in admitting the social media evidence in accordance with the Delaware Rules of Evidence, and affirmed. View "Parker v. Delaware" on Justia Law

The issue before the Supreme Court in this case centered on whether a minority stockholder in a closely held corporation had a right to a non-conflicted board decision on whether to repurchase her shares. That stockholder argued that such a right exists, under common law fiduciary duty principles and under the implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing. The Court of Chancery found that the common law did not impose any duties on directors to consider buying out minority stockholders. The trial court also found that, given the language in the repurchase provision of the stockholders agreement, the implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing did not create any duty to negotiate a reasonable repurchase price. The Supreme Court agreed and affirmed the trial court. View "Blaustein v. Lord Baltimore Capital Corp." on Justia Law

A vice principal of an elementary school asked a Delaware State Trooper to come to the school give a talk about bullying to four or five fifth grade students who were under “in-school suspension.” The next day, the principal was told that there had been a bullying incident involving an autistic student whose money had been taken from him on the school bus by "AB." The principal told AB’s mother about the incident, and asked her permission to have the officer talk to AB. AB’s mother consented. The officer arrived and was told what happened. The principal and officer went to a room where AB was waiting. The principal was called away, leaving the officer alone with AB. The officer got AB to admit that he had the money (one dollar), but AB claimed that another student had taken the money. AB said that he did not know that other student’s name, but that the student was seated with AB on the school bus. Without discussing the matter with the principal, the officer followed up on AB’s claim despite being virtually certain that AB was the perpetrator. The officer obtained the bus seating chart, found AB's seat-mate, brought the two students together and questioned that student in the same manner as AB. According to the other child, the officer used a mean voice and told him 11 or 12 times that he had the authority to arrest the children and place them in jail if they did not tell the truth. AB finally admitted to taking the money from the autistic student. When he got home from school, the seat-mate told his mother what had happened. The child withdrew from school and was home schooled for the rest of that school year. The mother filed suit on her son’s behalf, as well as individually, against the Cape Henlopen School District, the Board of Education of Cape Henlopen School District, the principal, the State, the Department of Safety and Homeland Security, the Division of the Delaware State Police, and the officer, Trooper Pritchett (collectively, Pritchett). Charges against all but the officer were eventually settled or dismissed; Pritchett successfully moved for summary judgment, and this appeal followed. Viewing the record in the light most favorable to the child, the Supreme Court held that there was sufficient evidence to raise issues of material fact on all claims against the officer except a battery claim. Accordingly, the Court affirmed in part and reversed in part. View "Hunt v. Delaware" on Justia Law

In 2011, the Board of Cosmetology and Barbering suspended Petitioner Randall Richardson's license due to his leasing work space to his wife who Petitioner knew did not have a valid license. A Hearing Officer recommended a fine and a 90-day suspension of Petitioner's license. The Board voted to adopt the Hearing Officer’s recommendations. The Superior Court affirmed the Board’s decision. On appeal, Petitioner argued: (1) the Board failed to create a complete record for the Supreme Court to review on appeal; (2) the Board failed to properly appoint the Hearing Officer to his case; (3) the Board failed to consider exceptions to the Hearing Officer’s recommendation; (4) the Board erred in suspending Petitioner's license because he only violated the requirements of his Shop License; and (5) the Hearing Officer lacked statutory authority to conduct hearings involving potential license suspensions. Upon review, the Supreme Court concluded that the Hearing Officer had the authority to act and that the Board had the authority to suspend Petitioner's License. However, the Court agreed that the Board created an insufficient record for appellate review. Accordingly, the Superior Court's judgment was vacated and the matter remanded for further proceedings.View "Richardson v. Board of Cosmetology & Barbering" on Justia Law

The Superior Court in this personal injury action sua sponte excluded a medical expert witness' testimony that it was possible plaintiff's permanent injury might have improved depending on the results of further recommended testing. The jury awarded plaintiff $292,330; defendant moved for a new trial. The court granted defendant's motion. In the second trial, the jury heard the expert's testimony and returned a lesser, $7,500 verdict. Plaintiff appealed the trial court's grant of a new trial. Upon review, the Supreme Court concluded that the trial judge initially made the right decision to exclude the expert; it was an abuse of discretion to order a new trial. Accordingly, the Supreme Court vacated the judgment granting a new trial and all attendant rulings, and remanded the case to reinstate the original jury verdict. View "O'Riley v. Rogers" on Justia Law

The Superior Court dismissed the underlying complaint in this case based solely upon its determination that a 2011 Settlement Agreement barred the Plaintiffs’ claims as constituting an impermissible collateral attack on a 2009 Insurance Agreement. The Superior Court did not address the sufficiency of the Plaintiffs’ allegations supporting their claims. In this appeal, Plaintiffs contended that the Superior Court should not have dismissed their claims because the 2011 Settlement Agreement was reasonably susceptible to the Plaintiffs’ interpretation. Therefore, extrinsic evidence of the parties’ intent was necessary to resolve any dispute over the 2011 Settlement Agreement’s terms. After its review, the Supreme Court concluded the Superior Court erred in holding that, as a matter of law, the 2011 Settlement Agreement unambiguously precluded the Plaintiffs from asserting the claims that are at issue in this action. The intent of the parties in negotiating the 2011 Settlement Agreement was a factual question inappropriate for resolution on a Rule 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss. View "Nicholas, et al. v. National Union Fire Insurance Co. of Pittsburgh, PA, et al." on Justia Law

Defendant-appellant Izzy Whitehurst appealed his conviction on First Degree Assault, Robbery in the First Degree, Burglary in the First Degree, Conspiracy in the Second Degree, three counts of Possession of a Firearm During the Commission of a Felony, and three counts of Tampering with a Witness. Defendant argued on appeal: (1) that the trial court erred in denying a motion to suppress his prison telephone calls because the State lacked a legal basis to collect them; and (2) that the admission of those prison telephone calls improperly tainted his trial. Finding no merit to his first contention, the Supreme Court did not address defendant's second contention, and affirmed his conviction. View "Whitehurst v. Delaware" on Justia Law

Tenant-Defendant Bhole, Inc. terminated its commercial lease before the lease expired. Before the end of the lease, Plaintiff-landlord Shore Investments, Inc. filed suit to recover the entire unpaid rent for the balance of the term. The lease agreement did not contain an acceleration clause. Upon review of the matter, the Supreme Court found that though defendants breached the lease, the trial court erred by not considering the lease did not have an acceleration clause. The trial court's award of damages and attorney's fees was inappropriate, and its decision regarding the landlord's claim for tortious interference with the lease (with a punitive damages award) was also made in error. The Supreme Court reversed the trial court and remanded the case for further proceedings.View "Bhole, Inc., at al. v. Shore Investments, Inc." on Justia Law

Plaintiffs-Appellees Carl and Pamela Morton filed a petition for guardianship against Defendant-Appellant Terry Hanson. An in-house attorney who did not carry malpractice insurance was appointed by the Family Court to represent Defendant. The Family Court certified a question to the Supreme Court concerning in-house attorneys appointed to represent indigent parties. Upon review, the Supreme Court held that in-house counsel appointed by the Family Court had qualified immunity under the Delaware Tort Claims Act. Furthermore, lack of malpractice insurance is not "good cause" for an attorney to withdraw from court-appointed representation.View "Hanson v. Morton" on Justia Law

Plaintiff Joel Gerber held limited partnership (LP) units in Enterprise GP Holdings, L.P. He sued on behalf of two classes of former public holders of LP units in Enterprise, challenging the sale of a subsidiary and a merger with another. Defendants successfully moved the trial court to dismiss Plaintiff's complaint, and Plaintiff appealed. Upon review, the Supreme Court concluded the trial court erred in dismissing the complaint. The Court affirmed in part, reversed in part, and remanded the case for further proceedings.View "Gerber v. Enterprise Products Holdings,LLC " on Justia Law