Justia Delaware Supreme Court Opinion Summaries

Defendant-appellant Kalvin Peterson a Superior Court judgment convicting him of one count of Possession of a Firearm by a Person Prohibited. Peterson's claim of error was that collateral estoppel and double jeopardy barred his conviction: that the bench trial conviction was precluded because at a concurrent trial, a jury acquitted him of both Possession of a Firearm During the Commission of a Felony, and the underlying felony of Assault in the First Degree. Upon review, the Supreme Court concluded that Peterson's arguments were without merit. View "Peterson v. Delaware" on Justia Law

Defendant-appellant Ronald Jones appealed his bench trial conviction on one count of Failing to Reregister as a Sex Offender. Jones raised one claim on appeal: that the evidence failed to show beyond a reasonable doubt that Jones had knowingly or recklessly failed to re-register as a homeless sex offender. Finding Jones' argument without merit, the Supreme Court affirmed his conviction. View "Jones v. Delaware" on Justia Law

Defendant Michael Neal appealed the denial of his motion for post-conviction relief. The issue before the Supreme Court in this matter was whether defendant received ineffective assistance of both trial and appellate counsel. Defendant was arrested after a series of robberies on New Year’s Eve 2008. Defendant argued that his trial and appellate counsel were ineffective for failing to request at trial, and for failing to argue on direct appeal: (1) the inclusion of a "Bland" instruction in connection with certain accomplice testimony; and (2) the admission of certain out-of-court statements under Delaware Rule of Evidence 804(b)(3). Ultimately, the Supreme Court held that the defendant's trial and appellate counsel were not ineffective in their representation. View "Neal v. Delaware" on Justia Law

Appellant Quadrant Structured Products Company appealed the Court of Chancery's dismissal of its complaint. Quadrant holds certain Notes issued by Athilon Capital Corp., an allegedly insolvent Delaware corporation. The Notes are long term obligations covered by two separate trust indentures that are governed by New York law. Defendants EBF & Associates, LP, Athilon Structured Investment Advisors ('ASIA'), an affiliated EBF entity, Athilon's board of directors, and Athilon itself, all which indirectly own 100% of Athilon's equity. The Court of Chancery granted defendants' motion to dismiss Quadrant's complaint on the ground that all claims alleged were barred for failure to comply with the 'no-action' clauses in the Athilon trust indentures. In both cases the cited by the Court of Chancery applied New York law, and held that those bondholder actions were barred by the no-action clauses of the respective trust indentures that governed the bonds at issue. Quadrant appealed to the Delaware Supreme Court. The Delaware Court remanded the case to the Court of Chancery with directions to analyze the significance under New York law (if any) of the differences between the wording of the no-action clauses at issue in the two cited cases and in this case. In its Report, the Court of Chancery held that: (i) 'the language of the Athilon no-action clause distinguishe[d] this case from [the two cited cases],' and (ii) the motion to dismiss should have been denied except as to two (and part of a third) of the ten Counts of the Quadrant complaint. After its re-review, the Delware Supreme Court concluded that the resolution of this case depended on dispositive and unsettled questions of New York law that, in its view, were properly answered in the first instance by the New York Court of Appeals. View "Quadrant Structured Products Co., Ltd. v. Vertin, et al." on Justia Law

The issue before the Supreme Court in this case centered on whether Delaware’s personal injury protection (PIP) statute requires insurers to reserve PIP benefits for lost wages when requested. The plaintiff suffered severe injuries as a passenger in a car accident. While he was in a coma, his mother signed an assignment of insurance benefits in favor of the hospital. Plaintiff did not challenge the validity of the assignment. The hospital was promptly paid by the insurance company. When plaintiff later requested the insurers to reserve his PIP benefits for his past and future lost wages, he was informed that the benefits had been exhausted by the payment to the hospital. The Superior Court held sua sponte that the unchallenged assignment to the healthcare provider was invalid. Upon review of the facts of this case, the Supreme Court concluded the Superior Court erred as a matter of law in deciding that uncontested issue. Because the assignment on behalf of the plaintiff resulted in the exhaustion of his PIP benefits before the plaintiff requested the reservation of PIP benefits for his lost wages, the legal issue of whether the insurer was required to reserve PIP benefits for lost wages is moot. View "State Farm Mutual Automobile Insurance Co. v. Davis" on Justia Law

Robert McKinley and Michele Casson were involved in a motor vehicle accident McKinley’s motorcycle collided with the back of Casson’s SUV. McKinley, who was not wearing a motorcycle helmet, sustained serious injuries. The issue before the Supreme Court centered on several evidentiary rulings made by the trial court. Among other things, appellant contended the trial court erred in denying him access to the appellee’s medical records, and that the jury should not have been allowed to learn that he was not wearing a helmet at the time of the accident. The Supreme Court agreed, and reversed and remanded for a new trial. View "McKinley v. Casson" on Justia Law

A Superior Court jury found Defendant–Appellant Davear Whittle guilty of Murder in the Second Degree, Possession of a Firearm During the Commission of a Felony, Reckless Endangering in the First Degree, and Possession of a Firearm by a Person Prohibited. On appeal, he challenged his convictions, contending the prosecutor improperly vouched for the credibility of three witnesses in his closing argument, by stating that they were "right" or "correct" at least 20 times. Upon review, the Supreme Court concluded that the prosecutor's amounted to improper vouching and constituted plain error. Therefore, the Court reversed the Superior Court and remanded the case for a new trial. View "Whittle v. Delaware" on Justia Law

Walter A. Winshall, as representative of the former stockholders of Harmonix Music Systems, Inc., sued to block the merger between Harmonix and Viacom International, Inc. The Court of Chancery dismissed Winshall's complaint against Viacom and Harmonix for failing to state a legally cognizable claim for relief, declared that Viacom was not entitled to indemnification from the selling shareholders for alleged breaches of representations and warranties contained in the Merger Agreement, and ordered payment of the escrowed portion of the merger cash consideration owed by Viacom to the shareholders. Winshall appealed the portion of the final judgment dismissing Count I of his complaint. Viacom cross-appealed the portion of the judgment relating to Counts II and III of the complaint, in which the court determined that Viacom was not entitled to indemnification and directed that the escrowed funds be paid to the shareholders. Finding no error or abuse of discretion, the Supreme Court affirmed the judgment of the Court of Chancery in its entirety. View "Winshall v. Viacom International, Inc., et al." on Justia Law

Petitions regarding several Peires family Trusts all requested that the Court of Chancery: (1) approve the resignation of the current trustees; (2) confirm the appointment of Northern Trust Company as the sole trustee; (3) determine that Delaware law governed the administration of each Trust; (4) confirm Delaware as the situs for each Trust; (5) reform the trusts' administrative scheme; and (6) accept jurisdiction over the Trusts. The Peierls' Petitions stemmed from their general frustration with Bank of America's lack of communication and responsiveness regarding the handling of Trust assets. Accompanying the Petitions were resignations of the Trusts' current trustees, all expressly conditioned upon approval by the Court of Chancery. The appointment of a new corporate trustee is also expressly conditioned upon approval by the Court of Chancery. In case number 11,2013, the Supreme Court upheld the Vice Chancellor's decision not to address the Petition in so far as it related to the 1960 Trusts, because New Jersey retained primary supervision over those Trusts. The Court held that the Vice Chancellor erred in determining that he could not exercise jurisdiction over the 1969 Trusts and address the Petition's merits. In case 12,2013: The Supreme Court concluded the Vice Chancellor properly concluded that no actual controversy existed relating to the approval of trustee resignations, the appointment of a new corporate trustee, the confirmation of Delaware as the situs, or the declaration that Delaware law governed the administration of the Trust at issue. Furthermore, the Court concluded the Vice Chancellor properly denied the requests to reform the Trust Agreement, and to retain jurisdiction over the Trust. In case 13,2013: because the Trusts were not then-currently being administered in Delaware, there was no basis to conclude that Delaware law would apply to the Trusts' administration. Therefore, whether the Court of Chancery could properly reform the Trust Instruments was a matter governed by the laws of the Trusts' administration. In this case, the laws were of Texas for the 1953 Trusts and New York law for the 1957 and 1975 Trusts. Because the Vice Chancellor properly concluded that he was "not in a position to address the requests for reformation," the Supreme Court affirmed the Vice Chancellor's decision to refrain granting reformation relief. View "Matter of: Ethel F. Peierls Charitable Lead Unitrust" on Justia Law

Sheriff of Sussex County plaintiff-appellant Jeffrey Christopher sought a declaratory judgment regarding the powers of the sheriff in Delaware, particularly the Sheriff in Sussex County. He also sought a determination that recently enacted House Bill 325 ("HB 325") was unconstitutional. The nature of the Sheriff's complaint centered on whether he had arrest powers in criminal cases as a core or fundamental tool to perform his constitutional designation as a "conservator of the peace." The Superior Court issued a Memorandum Opinion granting Summary Judgment to Sussex County and the State, holding "that the common law authority and responsibilities of the Sheriff are subject to modification and restriction" by statutory enactments of the General Assembly, therefore HB 325 was constitutional. On appeal to the Supreme Court, the Sheriff argued that the phrase "sheriff shall be the conservator of the peace" contains a constitutional right under the Delaware Constitution, and that arrest power is a core tool of the "conservator of the peace" as it applies to the sheriff because a peace officer cannot "[conserve] the peace" without the ability to arrest. By stripping him of arrest powers, the General Assembly violated the Delaware Constitution because it took away a tool indispensable to his constitutional obligation to act as a "conservator of the peace." The Supreme Court held that the General Assembly may not abrogate a constitutional office or take away the core duties of a constitutional officer without enacting an amendment pursuant to the Delaware Constitution. However, the Court also held that because the common law arrest power of a sheriff was not fundamental, but was merely incidental, to his role as a "conservator of the peace" when the 1776, 1792, 1831, and 1897 Delaware Constitutions were adopted, the arrest power can be modified or even eliminated by statute. Therefore, the Superior Court's judgment was affirmed on that basis. View "Christopher v. Sussex County, et al." on Justia Law