Justia Delaware Supreme Court Opinion Summaries

Plaintiff-Appellant Heather Turner appealed a superior court judgment that ruled in favor of Defendants-Appellees Michael Conway, M.D., Eric Kalish, M.D. and their practice, Delaware Surgical Group. Plaintiff sued defendants over what was initially an appendectomy, but ended with a "mass" on her liver from "something that had spilled out from prior surgeries" performed by the two doctor defendants. Plaintiff argued that the trial court abused its discretion in improperly admitting defendants' expert evidence . Upon review, the Supreme Court agreed and remanded the case for a new trial. View "Turner v. Delaware Surgical Group, P.A., et al." on Justia Law

A group of Dewey Beach property owners appealed the dismissal of their lawsuit against the Town. They sued to challenge the town's authority to enter into what they characterized as a "private zoning arrangement" to violate certain longstanding zoning requirements. The Court of Chancery dismissed the complaint finding it was not filed within 60 days of the notice given following approval of the developer's record plan. Finding that the Court of Chancery lacked jurisdiction, the Supreme Court affirmed. View "Murray v. Town of Dewey Beach" on Justia Law

Before the Supreme Court, a matter of first impression: "does Delaware recognize cross-jurisdictional tolling?" Plaintiff Jose Blanco was allegedly exposed to a toxic pesticide manufactured by Defendant Dow Chemical Corporation in 1979-1980. In 1993, he entered a class action lawsuit against Defendant in Texas. The case stalled in procedure, with class certification being ultimately denied. Defendants moved to dismiss, citing the run of the two-year statute of limitations. Plaintiff contended on appeal that the putative Texas action tolled the statute of limitations. The Delaware superior court concluded that Delaware recognized the doctrine of cross-jurisdictional class action tolling. Defendants filed for an interlocutory appeal with the Delaware Supreme Court. The Supreme Court held that until class action certification is denied, individual claims are tolled under Delaware law. Accordingly the Court answered the question in the affirmative, and remanded the case for further proceedings. View "The Dow Chemical Corp. v. Blanco" on Justia Law

The issue on appeal before the Supreme Court in this case was the denial of a postconviction relief motion. Specifically, the issue was whether defense counsel were ineffective during a defendant's first-degree murder trial. Upon review, the Court held that the attorneys' alleged failure to consult with a forensic pathologist or toxicologist, to present more evidence regarding the victim's dominant hand, to investigate ballistics issues, appeal certain issues, and to object to the dismissal of jurors who indicated that they could not impose the death penalty did not prejudice the defendant during his trial's guilt phase. During the penalty phase, however, the postconviction hearing judge failed to reweigh the aggravating evidence against the total mix of mitigating evidence in determining whether the attorneys' failure to present additional evidence during the penalty phase prejudiced the defendant. Accordingly, the Court affirmed in part, and remanded in part so that the postconviction judge could supplement his opinion for further review.View "Ploof v. Delaware" on Justia Law

Defendant-Appellant Parris Hamilton appealed his conviction on two counts of Murder First Degree, two counts of Attempted Murder First Degree, two counts of Kidnapping First Degree, one count of Burglary First Degree, and seven counts of Possession of a Firearm During the Commission of a Felony. On appeal, defendant argued: (1) that the trial court erred when it allowed a nonlegal expert witness to make a misstatement of the law and failed to give a timely and adequate curative instruction; and (2) that the State failed to prove every element of the burglary charge. Finding no merit to Hamilton's claims, the Supreme Court affirmed. View "Hamilton v. Delaware" on Justia Law

Carlyle Investment Management L.L.C. (CIM) and TC Group, L.L.C. (collectively, Plaintiffs) filed suit against defendant-appellant National Industries Group (NIG). Plaintiffs sought a declaratory judgment to enforce the terms of a forum selection clause contained in a Subscription Agreement between Carlyle Capital Corporation, Ltd. (CCC) and NIG. Specifically, they sought an injunction against NIG from proceeding with litigation that it filed against CCC in Kuwait in December, 2009. The Court of Chancery entered a Default Judgment against NIG. As part of the Default Judgment, the Court of Chancery issued an anti-suit injunction. NIG filed a Motion to Vacate the Default Judgment and to Dismiss the Complaint approximately one year later. The Court of Chancery denied the motion. NIG raised several related issues on appeal to the Supreme Court: (1) that the Court of Chancery erred in refusing to vacate the Default Judgment because the Default Judgment was void due to lack of subject matter and personal jurisdiction; (2) that the Court of Chancery's limited subject matter jurisdiction did not encompass actions for which a remedy at law is available or from which no irreparable harm could result; and (3) that the Court of Chancery erred in refusing to vacate the Default Judgment because, in so doing, the court effectively denied NIG the opportunity to litigate its claims against Carlyle. Upon review, the Supreme Court concluded that all of NIG's claims of error were all without merit, and affirmed the Court of Chancery's judgment.View "National Industries Group v. Carlyle Investment Management, L.L.C." on Justia Law

The issue before the Supreme Court in this case was whether the Court of Chancery erred in dismissing a derivative and class action complaint against the general partner and other managers of a limited partnership. The governing limited partnership agreement provided that appellees had no liability for money damages as long as they acted in good faith. The Court of Chancery dismissed the complaint because it failed to allege facts that would support a finding of bad faith. After remand, the Court of Chancery held that appellants waived their alternative claims for reformation or rescission. Upon review of the matter, the Supreme Court affirmed.View "Brinckerhoff v. Enbridge Energy Company, Inc." on Justia Law

Defendant Tyrone Guy appealed the denial of his application for postconviction relief. The issue before the Supreme Court in this case centered on how the procedural bars of Superior Court Criminal Rule 61 applied to his claims, including a claim of ineffective assistance of postconviction counsel. Defendant argued on appeal: (1) that the Superior Court erred during his trial by failing to give the "modified 'Bland'" jury instruction on accomplice testimony mandated by the Supreme Court's 2012 decision in "Brooks v. Delaware"; and (2) that his appointed counsel was ineffective in his first postconviction proceeding for failing to present ten out of eleven claims of ineffective assistance of trial counsel. Upon review, the Court concluded that defendant's claims were untimely and that his first claim was previously adjudicated. Defendant failed to meet the procedural burdens. Accordingly, the Court affirmed the Superior Court's judgment in this case, although it did so on independent and alternative grounds. View "Guy v. Delaware" on Justia Law

Petitioners-Appellants, tort claimants in lawsuits pending against Krafft-Murphy Company, Inc. in other jurisdictions, sought the appointment of a receiver to enable them lawfully to pursue those claims against the company in those other courts. The company argued argued that because it held no assets other than unexhausted liability insurance policies, Delaware law did not authorize the appointment of a receiver and that it was not necessary to appoint one. The Court of Chancery granted summary judgment in favor of the company. The Petitioners appealed. The case raised two questions of first impression in for the Delaware Court, plus a third question directly addressed by settled Delaware law: (1) does a contingent contractual right, such as an insurance policy, constitute "property"?; (2) does Delaware's statutory corporate dissolution scheme contain a generally applicable statute of limitations that time-bars claims against a dissolved corporation by third parties after the limitations period expires?; and (3) after a three year winding-up period expires, does a dissolved corporation have the power to act absent a court-appointed receiver or trustee? Upon review, the Supreme Court concluded: (1) under 8 Del. C. 279, contingent contractual rights, such as unexhausted insurance policies, constitute "property" of a dissolved corporation, so long as those rights are capable of vesting; (2) Delaware's dissolution statutes impose no generally applicable statute of limitations that would time-bar claims against a dissolved corporation by third parties; and (3) the existence of the "body corporate" continues beyond the expiration of the statutory winding-up period of 8 Del. C. sec. 278 for purposes of conducting litigation commenced before the expiration of that period. But, for litigation commenced after the expiration of that statutory period, a dissolved corporation may act only through a receiver or appointed trustee. Because the judgment of the Court of Chancery rested on legal determinations inconsistent with these holdings, the Supreme Court reversed the judgment and remanded the case for further proceedings. View "Anderson v. Krafft-Murphy Co. Inc." on Justia Law

Plaintiff-Appellants asserted various tort claims against Advanced Micro Devices, Inc. (AMD). AMD moved to exclude certain expert testimony under Delaware Rule of Evidence 702, which the Superior Court granted after determining that the evidence was not relevant. Plaintiff-Appellants appealed to the Supreme Court, which remanded the case to the Superior Court for further findings related to the expert testimony’s admissibility. On remand, the Superior Court found that the expert testimony was unreliable and therefore inadmissible. After review of that decision, the Supreme Court concluded that the Superior Court did not abuse its discretion in finding the expert testimony unreliable, and affirmed its judgment. View "Tumlinson, et al. v. Advanced Micro Devices, Inc." on Justia Law