Justia Delaware Supreme Court Opinion Summaries

Walter A. Winshall, as representative of the former stockholders of Harmonix Music Systems, Inc., sued to block the merger between Harmonix and Viacom International, Inc. The Court of Chancery dismissed Winshall's complaint against Viacom and Harmonix for failing to state a legally cognizable claim for relief, declared that Viacom was not entitled to indemnification from the selling shareholders for alleged breaches of representations and warranties contained in the Merger Agreement, and ordered payment of the escrowed portion of the merger cash consideration owed by Viacom to the shareholders. Winshall appealed the portion of the final judgment dismissing Count I of his complaint. Viacom cross-appealed the portion of the judgment relating to Counts II and III of the complaint, in which the court determined that Viacom was not entitled to indemnification and directed that the escrowed funds be paid to the shareholders. Finding no error or abuse of discretion, the Supreme Court affirmed the judgment of the Court of Chancery in its entirety. View "Winshall v. Viacom International, Inc., et al." on Justia Law

Petitions regarding several Peires family Trusts all requested that the Court of Chancery: (1) approve the resignation of the current trustees; (2) confirm the appointment of Northern Trust Company as the sole trustee; (3) determine that Delaware law governed the administration of each Trust; (4) confirm Delaware as the situs for each Trust; (5) reform the trusts' administrative scheme; and (6) accept jurisdiction over the Trusts. The Peierls' Petitions stemmed from their general frustration with Bank of America's lack of communication and responsiveness regarding the handling of Trust assets. Accompanying the Petitions were resignations of the Trusts' current trustees, all expressly conditioned upon approval by the Court of Chancery. The appointment of a new corporate trustee is also expressly conditioned upon approval by the Court of Chancery. In case number 11,2013, the Supreme Court upheld the Vice Chancellor's decision not to address the Petition in so far as it related to the 1960 Trusts, because New Jersey retained primary supervision over those Trusts. The Court held that the Vice Chancellor erred in determining that he could not exercise jurisdiction over the 1969 Trusts and address the Petition's merits. In case 12,2013: The Supreme Court concluded the Vice Chancellor properly concluded that no actual controversy existed relating to the approval of trustee resignations, the appointment of a new corporate trustee, the confirmation of Delaware as the situs, or the declaration that Delaware law governed the administration of the Trust at issue. Furthermore, the Court concluded the Vice Chancellor properly denied the requests to reform the Trust Agreement, and to retain jurisdiction over the Trust. In case 13,2013: because the Trusts were not then-currently being administered in Delaware, there was no basis to conclude that Delaware law would apply to the Trusts' administration. Therefore, whether the Court of Chancery could properly reform the Trust Instruments was a matter governed by the laws of the Trusts' administration. In this case, the laws were of Texas for the 1953 Trusts and New York law for the 1957 and 1975 Trusts. Because the Vice Chancellor properly concluded that he was "not in a position to address the requests for reformation," the Supreme Court affirmed the Vice Chancellor's decision to refrain granting reformation relief. View "Matter of: Ethel F. Peierls Charitable Lead Unitrust" on Justia Law

Sheriff of Sussex County plaintiff-appellant Jeffrey Christopher sought a declaratory judgment regarding the powers of the sheriff in Delaware, particularly the Sheriff in Sussex County. He also sought a determination that recently enacted House Bill 325 ("HB 325") was unconstitutional. The nature of the Sheriff's complaint centered on whether he had arrest powers in criminal cases as a core or fundamental tool to perform his constitutional designation as a "conservator of the peace." The Superior Court issued a Memorandum Opinion granting Summary Judgment to Sussex County and the State, holding "that the common law authority and responsibilities of the Sheriff are subject to modification and restriction" by statutory enactments of the General Assembly, therefore HB 325 was constitutional. On appeal to the Supreme Court, the Sheriff argued that the phrase "sheriff shall be the conservator of the peace" contains a constitutional right under the Delaware Constitution, and that arrest power is a core tool of the "conservator of the peace" as it applies to the sheriff because a peace officer cannot "[conserve] the peace" without the ability to arrest. By stripping him of arrest powers, the General Assembly violated the Delaware Constitution because it took away a tool indispensable to his constitutional obligation to act as a "conservator of the peace." The Supreme Court held that the General Assembly may not abrogate a constitutional office or take away the core duties of a constitutional officer without enacting an amendment pursuant to the Delaware Constitution. However, the Court also held that because the common law arrest power of a sheriff was not fundamental, but was merely incidental, to his role as a "conservator of the peace" when the 1776, 1792, 1831, and 1897 Delaware Constitutions were adopted, the arrest power can be modified or even eliminated by statute. Therefore, the Superior Court's judgment was affirmed on that basis. View "Christopher v. Sussex County, et al." on Justia Law

Plaintiffs Kylie and Michael D. Shuba appealed the Superior Court's denial of their cross-motion for summary judgment and its grant of summary judgment in favor of Defendant United Services Automobile Association's ("USAA") motion for summary judgment. The Shuba's sought to be covered persons for the wrongful death of their mother under an insurance policy issued by USAA and held by the Shubas' step-mother. It was undisputed that their mother was not a named insured under the policy or a resident of the stepmother's household as the Shubas were. The Shubas claimed the trial court erred in finding the Shubas could not recover uninsured motorist benefits under the USAA policy. In making their claim, the Shubas asked the Supreme Court to overrule two Superior Court cases, "Temple v. Travelers Indemnity Co" and "Adams-Baez v. General Accident Co.," the latter of which the Supreme Court affirmed based on the trial court opinion. The Supreme Court declined to overrule those cases as precedent, and affirmed the Superior Court's judgment. View "Shuba v. United Services Automobile Association" on Justia Law

Dawn Locke, on behalf of minor appellant, Kimberly Foth, appealed a Superior Court final judgment in favor of Foth and minor appellee, John Barlow, III, and an order that granted Barlow's motion to enforce the parties' settlement agreement wherein Foth and Barlow would each receive $7,500. The Supreme Court had vacated the Superior Court's Order entering final judgment and remanded the case for a minors' settlement hearing. On remand, the Superior Court considered testimony from both minors and their mothers, and reviewed the minors' medical records. Then the court issued a Report on Remand in which determined that an equal division of the $15,000 settlement proceeds between the minors was fair and reasonable. The Supreme Court reversed and remanded, finding that the Superior Court's focus should have been on whether the division of funds was fair (i.e., enforcing the settlement agreement: "Title 12, section 3926 mandates that court approval of a minor settlement always starts with a 'clean slate' by providing that no person dealing with the receiver of a minor can rely upon the receiver's authority to settle tort claims. The statute requires an independent judicial determination about whether the settlement agreement for a minor should be approved and specifically rejects the concept that such an agreement can be specifically enforced if the court has reservations." In this case, the record reflected that the Superior Court did not make an independent determination because it stated that, if it disregarded the settlement agreement and started on a "clean slate," it would have awarded Foth $10,000 instead of the $7,500 in the settlement agreement. View "Barlow, et al. v. Finegan, et al." on Justia Law

At issue in this case (among other things) was the constitutionality of the state's gang participation statute (11 Del. C. 616). Appellants argued the statute was unconstitutionally vague because it did not define the term "actively participates." Furthermore, they argued the statute was overbroad because it impinged on the right of free association. The Supreme Court held both arguments lacked merit. "A person of ordinary intelligence can understand what it means to actively participate in a criminal street gang's criminal conduct, and there is no constitutional right to assemble for the purpose of committing a crime." View "Taylor v. Delaware" on Justia Law

Robert Burns was convicted by a jury on several counts of varying degrees of sexual assault against children. The Supreme court previously affirmed Burns' conviction on direct appeal. Burns sought post-conviction relief, arguing that he received inadequate assistance of counsel in violation of his Sixth Amendment rights when trial counsel: did not affirmatively recommend Burns take an plea deal; elicited testimony from an adverse witness that could have implied Burns invoked his Fifth Amendment right to silence; waived certain foundational requirements to out-of-court statements; permitted a characterization of the complaining witnesses as "victims;" and failed to object to the State's summation. Burns claimed that the cumulative effect of his defense counsel's actions therefore resulted in an unfair trial. The Superior Court denied Burns' motion for post-conviction relief. Finding no abuse of discretion, the Supreme Court affirmed. View "Burns v. Delaware" on Justia Law

In a direct appeal, defendant raised one claim of error. In defendant's view, although he was charged with and convicted of felony Promoting Prison Contraband, the record reflected there was a rational basis for the jury to find him guilty of the lesser-included offense of misdemeanor Promoting Prison Contraband. Defendant argued the trial judge's failure to give that lesser-included instruction was reversible error. Upon review, the Supreme Court concluded that defendant's argument was meritless. View "Mays v. Delaware" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court previously rejected defendant Gary Ploof's claims arising from his trial's guilt phase, but remanded the penalty phase claims for the post-conviction judge to reweigh aggravating circumstances against the mitigating circumstances established at trial and in the post-conviction proceedings. Defendant contended his attorneys were ineffective because they failed to uncover evidence that the defendant's father sexually abused foster children staying with defendant's family and also physically abused defendant himself. Upon careful review, the Supreme Court held that defendant's attorneys should have investigated certain "red flags" indicating that defendant's childhood home was not as benign as initially portrayed. However, the Court concluded that the attorneys' failures did not prejudice defendant. Therefore, the Court affirmed the trial judge's denial of defendant's post-conviction relief petition. View "Ploof v. Delaware" on Justia Law

The issue before the Supreme Court in this case was whether the State of Delaware could be held liable for tortious conduct by an on-duty Delaware State Police Officer. The officer was supposed to take a woman accused of shop-lifting to court. Instead, the officer allegedly coerced her to engage in oral sex in the front seat of the police car. The trial court granted summary judgment to the State based on its conclusion that no reasonable jury could find that the officer was acting within the scope of his employment. The trial court focused only on the officer's tortious conduct, which was not within his job description. But the nature of the tortious conduct was not dispositive. There were other factors used to determine whether one is acting within the scope of employment, and the jury must make that decision. Accordingly, the Supreme Court reversed and remanded the case for further proceedings. View "Doe v. Delaware" on Justia Law