Justia Delaware Supreme Court Opinion Summaries

Defendant-appellant Stanley Taylor appealed his convictions on: eighteen counts of Unlawful Sexual Conduct Against a Child by a Sex Offender; one count of Attempted Unlawful Sexual Conduct Against a Child by a Sex Offender; and two counts of Endangering the Welfare of a Child. The indictment was based on allegations that Defendant engaged in unlawful sexual conduct with his two minor step-granddaughters. To avoid prejudice to Defendant, the sex offender element of his crimes was redacted from the indictment and a separate bench trial was held on that element after the jury returned its verdict. The State dismissed five counts at the close of the evidence. The jury was ultimately left to consider the following charges: four counts of Rape in the First Degree; four counts of Rape in the Second Degree; seven counts of Sexual Exploitation of a Child; one count of Continuous Sexual Abuse of a Child; and one count of Endangering the Welfare of a Child. Defendant was found guilty of all of the offenses presented to the jury. Thereafter, in a bench trial, the Superior Court found that Defendant was a registered sex offender at the time of the offenses, resulting in guilty verdicts on all of the sex offender charges. Defendant was sentenced to eight life sentences, plus an additional 225 years of incarceration. Defendant has raised four arguments in his direct appeal to the Supreme Court: (1) that the prosecutor made an improper closing argument that jeopardized the fairness and integrity of his trial; (2) that the trial judge abused his discretion and violated Defendant's right to a fair trial when, despite Defendant's request, he refused to strike allegedly irrelevant and highly prejudicial testimonial evidence by a nurse; (3) the trial judge abused his discretion when he allowed the jury to view one of the complainant's out-of-court statements; and (4) the cumulative impact of all of the errors amounts to plain error. Upon review, the Supreme Court concluded that each of Defendant's first three assignments of error were without merit. Accordingly, there was no cumulative impact amounting to plain error. View "Taylor v. Delaware" on Justia Law

Defendant-appellant Jason Gallaway appealed his conviction for Murder by Abuse or Neglect in the First Degree, in connection to the death of his daughter. Defendant raised one claim of error in this direct appeal: the Superior Court abused its discretion by permitting the State to admit into evidence a YouTube video of Defendant performing a prank as part of a radio contest, several months after his daughter’s death. Upon review, the Supreme Court concluded that the YouTube video was properly admitted as rebuttal evidence. View "Gallaway v. Delaware" on Justia Law

Defendant Omari Clark was convicted for manslaughter. The issue before the Supreme Court was whether a trial judge improperly commented on the evidence when he instructed the jury and whether a defendant was entitled to a justification jury instruction for a crime that requires a reckless mental state. Upon review, the Court reaffirmed that jury instructions must be construed as a whole to determine whether a trial judge commented on the evidence and conclude that the trial judge's statements were proper. Furthermore, the Court held that 11 Del. C. sec. 470(a) does not bar a justification instruction for crimes requiring a reckless mental state and that judges should give a justification instruction, where appropriate, for those charges. Therefore the Court reversed the Superior Court's judgment and remanded the case for a new trial. View "Clark v. Delaware" on Justia Law

Defendant-appellant Steven Schwan directly appealed his conviction to the Supreme Court after a jury convicted him of two counts of Unlawful Sexual Contact in the Second Degree, and a bench trial resulted in an additional conviction for Unlawful Sexual Conduct by a Sex Offender Against a Child. Defendant argued that the trial judge committed reversible error by not excluding, for cause, a juror who was acquainted with a prosecutor, although that same prosecutor was not involved in Defendant's case. Upon review, the Supreme Court concluded that the trial judge erred by failing to exclude the juror, in the absence of a determination that the juror could render a fair and impartial verdict. The Court reversed and remanded the case for a new trial. View "Schwan v. Delaware" on Justia Law

Defendant Raymond Blake was tried before a jury for Trafficking in Cocaine, Possession with Intent to Deliver ("PWID") Cocaine, PWID Heroin, and Maintaining a Vehicle for Keeping Controlled Substances. The jury found Defendant guilty of the lesser-included offenses of Possession of Cocaine and Possession of Heroin, not guilty of Maintaining a Vehicle, and could not agree unanimously on the trafficking charge. Prosecutors sought and obtained another indictment of Defendant, charging him with Trafficking in Cocaine and Trafficking in Heroin, based upon his possession of the same contraband he was convicted of possessing in the first trial. Defendant's motion to dismiss was denied and at the second trial he was convicted as charged. Defendant appealed, claiming the protection against Double Jeopardy under the Fifth Amendment of the United States Constitution barred the State from trying him on trafficking in a controlled substance charges when he had already been convicted of the lesser included offense of Possession based on the same conduct. Upon review, the Supreme Court agreed and accordingly reversed and remanded the case with instruction to vacate Defendant's trafficking convictions. View "Blake v. Delaware" on Justia Law

Claimants Cecil Palomino, Salvador Avila-Hernandez and Julio Munoz were each injured in different work-related accidents. It was not disputed that their injuries were compensable under the Worker's Compensation Act and that payments of some worker's compensation have been made. After their doctors recommended certain treatments, their employers requested determinations of whether the treatment plans fell outside of the Health Care Practice ("HCAP") Guidelines through a utilization review ("UR"). The UR panel determined that portions of their treatments were not approved for coverage. Claimants petitioned the Industrial Accident Board for review of the UR determination after the 45 day time window prescribed by Department of Labor Regulation 5.5.1. The Board dismissed the petitions as untimely. Claimants appealed to the Superior Court, which determined that the 45 day limit of Regulation 5.5.1 was invalid because it conflicted with 19 Del. C. sec 2361. The employers appealed from the Superior Court's judgment. Finding no merit to the appeal, the Supreme Court affirmed. View "Christiana Care Health Services v. Palomino" on Justia Law

Appellant Mary E. Spellman ("Spellman") petitioned the Industrial Accident Board (the "Board") for a workers' compensation award against her employer, Appellee Christiana Care Health Services ("Christiana"). The Board denied the petition and the Superior Court affirmed. Appellant worked as a home health aide, where she used her personal vehicle to attend to Christiana's clients at their homes. While Appellant was reimbursed for mileage between client appointments, she was not reimbursed for travel to the first appointment, from the last appointment, or "off the clock" when she attended to personal business. In the middle of her work day, Appellant was off the clock when her car hit a patch of ice causing Appellant to crash her car. She sustained injuries to her head and hip. In her petition, Appellant argued that her status as a traveling employee exempted her from the "going and coming" rule that precludes workers' compensation for injuries suffered while going or coming from work. Alternatively, Appellant argued her injuries were compensable because she was engaged in a "mixed purpose" trip at the time of her accident. Having "no difficulty" sustaining the judgment of the Superior Court, the Supreme Court affirmed. View "Spellman v. Christiana Care Health Services" on Justia Law

The issue before the Supreme Court in this matter was whether the Chancery Court was required to dismiss a Delaware derivative complaint after a California federal court entered final judgment dismissing the same complaint brought by different stockholders. The Chancery Court determined it was not required to give preclusive effect to the California judgment. Upon review, the Supreme Court held that the Chancery Court erred in its determination: (1) the lower court held as a matter of Delaware law that the stockholder plaintiffs in the two jurisdictions were not in privity with one another; (2) that the California stockholders were not adequate representatives of the defendant corporation; (3) California law controlled the issue, and derivative stockholders were in privity with one another because they acted on behalf of the corporation; and (4) the Chancery Court adopted a presumption of inadequacy without the record to support it. Accordingly, the Supreme Court reversed and remanded. View "Pyott v. Louisiana Municipal Police Employees' Retirement System" on Justia Law

The trial court precluded appellants' experts from testifying at trial because appellants failed to provide the experts' reports in accordance with the trial scheduling order. Without any expert testimony, appellants' claims failed as a matter of law, and judgment was entered for appellees. But appellants had requested a conference with the trial court six months before the trial date to discuss the need to revise the scheduling order. The trial court refused to meet with counsel or change the trial date. This case was one of four appeals to the Supreme Court where in each case, plaintiffs' claims were dismissed without being heard on the merits. Upon review, the Supreme Court held that the trial court abused its discretion. "the trial courts have been applying the factors set forth in 'Drejka v. Hitchens Tire Service Inc.' when deciding whether a case should be dismissed for the attorneys' failure to obey scheduling orders," the Court determined it necessary to refine the 'Drejka' analysis: "parties who ignore or extend scheduling deadlines without promptly consulting the trial court, will do so at their own risk. In other words, any party that grants an informal extension to opposing counsel will be precluded from seeking relief from the court with respect to any deadlines in the scheduling order. By the same token, if the trial court is asked to extend any deadlines in the scheduling order, the extension should not alter the trial date. Counsel may face a compressed time period to complete discovery, or the filing of dispositive motions, but the most important aspect of the scheduling order – the trial date – will be preserved. In the unusual circumstance where the trial court does decide to postpone the trial date, litigants should expect that the trial will be rescheduled after all other trials already scheduled on the court's docket." View "Christian v. Counseling Resource Associates, Inc." on Justia Law

Two employees of Connections CSP, Inc. were killed in an automobile collision during the course and scope of their employment. Connections owned the vehicle and had purchased underinsured motorist insurance (UIM) for the vehicle and also worker's compensation insurance which covered the employees. The UIM insurer paid its policy limit of $1,000,000. The worker's compensation insurer also paid benefits to the representatives of the decedents. The worker's compensation insurer then sought to enforce a lien upon the UIM payment equal to the worker's compensation benefits it paid. But the UIM policy specifically excluded the direct or indirect benefit of any insurer or self-insurer under a worker's compensation claim. Notwithstanding this exclusion, the Superior Court enforced the lien based upon its interpretation of 19 Del. C. 2363(e), which allows reimbursement of a worker's compensation carrier "from the third party liability insurer." The UIM insurer appealed. Upon review, the Supreme Court held that General Assembly eliminated the ability of a worker's compensation insurer to assert a lien against the UIM payments made pursuant to the employer's UIM policy. Because the Superior Court erred as a matter of law in enforcing a lien, the Supreme Court reversed its decision and remanded the case for further proceedings. View "Simendinger v. National Union Fire Insurance Co." on Justia Law