Justia Delaware Supreme Court Opinion Summaries

In 2013, defendant-appellant Darnell Martin received an unconditional gubernatorial pardon for his previous criminal convictions, which included several felony convictions. Several years later, Martin was arrested and charged with new offenses. After his convictions for those charges were affirmed on direct appeal, he filed a motion for postconviction relief, arguing that his trial counsel was ineffective. More than two years passed as the parties briefed Martin’s motion and the trial court considered it. During that time, Martin served his prison sentence and his term of probation. He was discharged from probation while the postconviction motion was under advisement with the Superior Court. After Martin’s probation was discharged, the Superior Court dismissed his postconviction motion as moot, concluding that he no longer was “in custody” as required by Rule 61(a) and, given his extensive criminal history, he would not suffer any collateral consequences as a result of the convictions he was challenging. When the Superior Court dismissed the motion, it was not aware that Martin’s previous convictions had been pardoned. Martin appealed, and the Delaware Supreme Court remanded to the Superior Court to further consider the effect of Martin’s pardon, including whether a pardoned defendant suffers collateral consequences in the same manner as a first-time felon and therefore should not have his postconviction motion mooted if he is released from custody before the motion is resolved. The Superior Court concluded the collateral consequences doctrine, which the Supreme Court adopted more than 50 years ago based on United States Supreme Court precedent, has no continuing application in postconviction proceedings in Delaware. Martin’s appeal then returned to the Supreme Court, where he again challenged dismissal of his motion and the Superior Court’s application of the mootness doctrine. Having carefully considered the Superior Court’s decision and the parties’ submissions, the Delaware Supreme Court concluded the Superior Court erred in dismissing Martin’s postconviction motion as moot. View "Martin v. Delaware" on Justia Law

The issue this case presented for the Delaware Supreme Court's review stemmed from a failed, multibillion-dollar merger (the “Merger”) of two fuel pipeline giants - The Williams Companies, Inc. (“Williams”) and Energy Transfer LP (“ETE”). The parties spent a decade litigating over various fees to which they argued they were entitled under the Merger Agreement. ETE continued to assert its entitlement to a $1.48 billion breakup fee, despite being the party who terminated the Merger. It also disputed that it had to pay Williams a $410 million reimbursement fee, which it was required to pay if the Merger failed and certain conditions were met. Finally, ETE argued a related $85 million attorney’s fee award was unreasonable. But the Supreme Court found no error with the Court of Chancery’s opinions that held ETE was not entitled to an over-one-billion-dollar fee and find that ETE had to pay Williams the $410 million reimbursement fee and the related $85 million in attorney’s fees. View "Energy Transfer, LP v. The Williams Companies, Inc." on Justia Law

Guaranteed Rate, Inc., a mortgage lender, purchased two types of insurance policies from ACE American Insurance Company: management liability and professional liability. Guaranteed Rate sought coverage under the policies for an investigation and eventual settlement of claims brought by the federal government under the False Claims Act. ACE denied coverage under both policies. According to ACE, the Professional Liability Policy expressly excluded False Claims Act charges. ACE also contended that the False Claims Act charges arose from Guaranteed Rate’s professional services, which were excluded under the Management Liability Policy. Only the Management Liability Policy was at issue in this appeal. In Guaranteed Rate’s suit against ACE, a Delaware superior court held that the False Claims Act investigation and settlement did not arise out of Guaranteed Rate’s professional services. Instead, it arose out of false certifications made to the government. Thus, the Management Liability Policy covered the loss. To this, the Delaware Supreme Court agreed with the superior court. View "ACE American Insurance Company v. Guaranteed Rate, Inc." on Justia Law

Respondent-appellant Michael Killen appealed a Family Court order awarding alimony to his ex-wife, Candice Alben, and directing Killen to maintain a pre-existing life insurance policy during the alimony period with Alben as the sole beneficiary. Killen challenged aspects of both rulings on appeal. With respect to the alimony award, Killen argued the Family Court designated the incorrect date for his payment obligations to begin. The parties continued to reside in the marital residence after their divorce and through the date of trial. Before the matter was submitted, the parties agreed to sell the home and to divide the proceeds at the court’s direction. The court’s order directed the parties to continue to split household expenses while they resided together and required Killen to begin making alimony payments upon the residence’s sale. Killen argues that his alimony obligations instead should commence on the divorce date. With respect to the insurance policy, Killen argues the Family Court directed the policy’s continued maintenance based on an inadequate record: the Family Court ordered the policy’s maintenance sua sponte. Regarding Killen's first contention, the Delaware Supreme Court concluded the Family Court did not abuse its discretion. On the other hand, the Family Court did not have a sufficient factual record to order Killen to maintain the policy with Alben as the sole beneficiary. The case was remanded for further proceedings. View "Killen v. Alben" on Justia Law

Defendants-appellants and cross-appellees, Gregory Holifield (“Holifield”) and GH Blue Holdings, LLC (“Blue”), appealed a Court of Chancery memorandum opinion in favor of plaintiff- appellee and cross-appellant, XRI Investment Holdings LLC (“XRI”). The issue this case presented was whether Holifield validly transferred his limited liability membership units in XRI to Blue on June 6, 2018. The resolution of that issue bore on the ultimate dispute between the parties (not at issue here) on whether XRI validly delivered to Holifield a strict foreclosure notice purporting to foreclose on the XRI membership units, or whether such notice was incorrectly delivered to him because Blue was, in fact, the owner of the units following the transfer. Following a one-day trial, the Court of Chancery determined that the transfer of the units from Holifield to Blue was invalid because it was not a permitted transfer under XRI’s limited liability company agreement, which provided that noncompliant transfers of XRI interests were “void.” The trial court, in interpreting the Delaware Supreme Court's holding in CompoSecure, L.L.C. v. CardUX, LLC, 206 A.3d 807 (Del. 2018), held that the use of the word “void” in XRI’s LLC agreement rendered the transfer incurably void, such that affirmative defenses did not apply. Despite this holding, the trial court, in dicta, further found that XRI had acquiesced in the transfer. The Delaware Supreme Court affirmed Court of Chancery’s judgment with respect to the Blue Transfer, but reversed the judgment insofar as it precluded XRI’s recovery for breach of contract damages and recoupment of legal expenses advanced to Holifield. The Court held that the trial court’s finding of acquiescence as to only one of the alleged breaches did not bar either remedy, and the Court remanded the case for the trial court to make further determinations. View "Holifield v. XRI Investment Holdings LLC" on Justia Law

In a previous action between these parties, the Delaware Supreme Court addressed whether the exclusive-remedies provision in the workers’ compensation act precluded an injured employee from pursuing recovery from an uninsured motorist policy. After the Court held that the exclusive-remedies provision did not apply, the employer and its workers’ compensation carrier sought a declaratory judgment that they were permitted to assert a lien against any recovery the employee might obtain for injuries already compensated under the workers’ compensation act. The employee and the uninsured motorist insurer contended that any such lien was barred by statute, relying on the Court’s decision in Simendinger v. National Union Fire Insurance Co., 74 A.3d 609 (Del. 2013). The superior court followed that binding precedent as it was required to do and dismissed the declaratory judgment claim. After review however, the Delaware Supreme Court concluded Simendinger was decided in error. The Court therefore reversed the superior court’s decision and held that the workers’ compensation act expressly allowed the employer and its workers’ compensation carrier to assert a subrogation lien against benefits paid to the employee under the employer’s uninsured motorist policy. View "Horizon Services, Inc. v. Henry" on Justia Law

In 2019, Tyrese Burroughs was convicted of felony drug dealing. As one consequence of that conviction, Burroughs was, from then on, prohibited from possessing a firearm or ammunition. According to an affidavit of probable cause, on November 25, 2020, police caught Burroughs engaging in a hand-to-hand drug transaction while in possession of a “Smith and Wesson Walther .380 firearm loaded with seven live rounds.” Burroughs was arrested and charged with six felonies, relevant here: possession of a firearm during the commission of a felony, possession of a firearm by a person prohibited, possession of ammunition by a person prohibited, two counts of drug dealing, carrying a concealed deadly weapon. Together, these charges carried a minimum-mandatory of eight years and a statutory maximum of 77 years in prison. Burroughs filed a “Motion for Modification of Bail,” in which he requested, “[d]ue to his inability to post bail, . . . that his bail be converted to an unsecured or lower secured amount.” The State argued his financial conditions of release should be maintained because, in its view, there was strong evidence supporting his conviction and ample facts demonstrating that he posed a serious safety risk to the public. Burroughs filed a “Motion for Review of Commissioner’s Order,” arguing that the Commissioner erred by failing to test his motion under the strict-scrutiny standard of review on the grounds that he either fell into a suspect class by virtue of his indigency or that his pretrial detention deprived him of his fundamental liberty right under substantive-due-process principles. If the Commissioner had properly conducted a strict-scrutiny review, Burroughs contended, then the State would have had to prove by clear and convincing evidence that “no other non-monetary conditions of release [could] accomplish” its “compelling interest in preventing crime.” The Delaware Supreme Court was asked to decide whether, in light of Delaware's constitutional right to bail, it was permissible to attach unaffordable financial conditions to a dangerous defendant’s pretrial release on bail and, if it was, what procedural protections had to be observed when such bail is considered. The Court responded: (1) strict scrutiny, answering in the affirmative; and (2) the determination to set cash bail had to be supported by clear and convincing evidence that: the defendant is a flight risk or poses a substantial risk to the community and nonmonetary conditions of release would not alleviate that risk. Because these answers were consistent with, and yielded the same result as, the Superior Court’s decision on appeal, the Supreme Court affirmed. View "Burroughs v. Delaware" on Justia Law

The Third Circuit Court of Appeals certified a question of law to the Delaware Supreme Court. The question arose in connection with a toxic tort class action in the federal district court for the District of Delaware that was appealed to the Third Circuit. Delaware resident Catherine Baker filed suit individually and on behalf of fellow residents who lived near Atlas Point, a chemical plant that regularly used and emitted ethylene oxide, a dangerous chemical. The question asked whether an increased risk of illness, without present manifestation of a physical harm, was a cognizable injury under Delaware law. Put another way: did an increased risk of harm only constitute a cognizable injury once it manifested in a physical disease? To this, the Supreme Court answered: an increased risk of illness without present manifestation of a physical harm is not a cognizable injury under Delaware law. View "Baker v. Croda Inc." on Justia Law

Appellant City of Newark sought review of a superior court order resolving appellees’ contractual indemnification obligations. The City sought a declaration from the superior court that appellees breached a settlement agreement between the parties and, under the terms of that settlement agreement, appellees had to indemnify the City for all its fees and costs associated with a 2019 subpoena and a separate declaratory judgment action appellees filed in 2019. The superior court held that appellees had to indemnify the City for the subpoena, but not the 2019 action. On appeal, the City contended the settlement agreement’s plain language obligated appellees to indemnify the City for the 2019 action, and the superior court erred in concluding otherwise. The indemnification provision at issue broadly required appellees to indemnify the City for any fees and costs it incurred in any proceeding related to appellees’ separate litigation against a third party in Pennsylvania. Appellees filed the 2019 action to clarify the City's obligation to cooperate with, and provide discovery in, that Pennsylvania litigation. In its summary judgment decision, the superior court denied the City's indemnification claim without expressly addressing whether the 2019 action was “related to” the Pennsylvania litigation. Because the City was entitled to indemnification under the plain terms of the parties' agreement, the Delaware Supreme Court reversed the superior court's decision. View "City of Newark v. Durkin, et al." on Justia Law

The statute at issue in this appeal, 19 Del. C. § 2322F, provided a mechanism for employers and their workers’ compensation carriers to challenge proposed or provided health care services relating to compensable work injuries. An employer sought review of a superior court opinion reversing a decision by the Industrial Accident Board (the “IAB” or “Board”) regarding the reasonableness of a prescribed course of treatment. The IAB initially dismissed this case as moot, but the superior court reversed and remanded that decision in 2019. On remand, the IAB held that the claimant-employee’s ongoing narcotics treatment after June 2017 was unreasonable, unnecessary, and therefore not compensable under the Workers’ Compensation Act. The superior court then reversed the IAB again, holding there was no justiciable issue before the Board because the claimant employee had not submitted any medical claims to his employer for ongoing treatment. The employer argued the superior court erred as a matter of law in concluding that the IAB could not consider the compensability of an employee’s ongoing narcotics treatment until the employee submitted invoices for payment to the employer and the employer disputed those invoices in the statutory review process. Because the superior court incorrectly interpreted 19 Del. C. § 2322F with respect to the justiciability of the employer’s petition, the Delaware Supreme Court reversed the superior court’s decision, vacated the attorneys’ fees award, and reinstated the IAB’s determination. View "This and That Services Co. Inc. v. Nieves" on Justia Law