Justia Delaware Supreme Court Opinion Summaries

The issue on appeal in this case stemmed from the Superior Court’s dismissal of appellant’s complaint for failure to provide discovery to appellees. Appellant was acting pro se for the first 18 months after she filed the complaint. During that time appellees, who had filed a counterclaim, filed several motions to compel answers to interrogatories and production of documents. The trial court held hearings on the motions; explained exactly what appellant needed to do in responding to the discovery; and warned that failure to comply with the court’s order could result in sanctions and dismissal. Appellant ignored the trial court’s warnings, and the court dismissed the complaint. She appealed, arguing the Superior Court abused its discretion in dismissing her case. Applying the "Drejka" factors, the Supreme Court found no abuse of discretion and affirmed. View "Adams v. Aidoo" on Justia Law

The issue before the Supreme Court in this case was whether the Superior Court abused its discretion in refusing to reopen a summary judgment entered against appellants after they missed the deadline for filing a response to appellees’ motion. Appellants mistakenly believed that they had 20 additional days to respond because appellees filed supplemental materials two weeks after filing their motion. The trial court apparently accepted the fact that appellants had made a mistake, but refused to reopen the case because appellants were unable to justify their mistake. Upon review, the Court concluded that the trial court failed to give adequate weight to the policy in favor of deciding cases on the merits, and reversed. View "Keener v. Isken" on Justia Law

Defendant-Appellant Branden Wallace appealed his convictions on counts of trafficking cocaine, possession with intent to deliver a narcotic schedule II controlled substance, and possession of a firearm by a person prohibited. On appeal to the Supreme Court, Defendant argued that the superior court erred in denying his motion to suppress evidence seized by police after they conducted a routine probation and parole home compliance check at his home. Defendant contended that the search was unconstitutional and that all the evidence obtained should have been suppressed. The Supreme Court reviewed the superior court record and concluded that Defendant's arguments were without merit. Accordingly, the Court affirmed the superior court's judgment and Defendant's convictions. View "Wallace v. Delaware" on Justia Law

Appellant BVF Partners L.P. ("BVF") appealed a Chancery Court certification of Appellee New Orleans Employees' Retirement System ("NOERS") as class representative in this action challenging the acquisition of Celera Corporation ("Celera") by Quest Diagnostics, Inc. ("Quest"). BVF also appealed the Court of Chancery's approval of a class action settlement without an opt out right for BVF between NOERS and Defendants-Appellees Richard H. Ayers, Jean-Luc Belingard, William G. Green, Peter Barton Hutt, Gail M. Naughton, Kathy Ordonez, Wayne I. Roe, Bennett M. Shapiro, Celera Corporation, Quest Diagnostics Incorporated, and Spark Acquisition Corporation ("Spark"). BVF contended that the Court of Chancery erred in certifying NOERS as the class representative, because NOERS lacked standing to represent the class. BVF argued that when NOERS sold its stock in Celera on the public market (before the merger was actually consummated and nearly a year before the Court of Chancery certified the class) NOERS no longer had a legally cognizable stake in the outcome of the litigation. BVF raised multiple other grounds for why the Court of Chancery erred in certifying NOERS as class representative, including that NOERS was uniquely susceptible to equitable defenses and was therefore an improper class representative. Even if that certification was proper, BVF argued that the Court of Chancery should have exercised its discretionary powers to allow BVF to opt out of the class in order to pursue its individual claims for monetary damages against the defendants. Upon review, the Supreme Court agreed with the Court of Chancery that NOERS had standing to represent the class. The Court declined to adopt a rule of law that a shareholder class representative in a breach of fiduciary duty action must own stock in the corporation continuously through the final class certification. With regard to BVF's other arguments regarding NOERS' certification as class representative, the Court found them "unconvincing." The Court concluded that the Court of Chancery did not abuse its discretion in certifying the class, however, there was merit to BVF's claim that the Court of Chancery should have exercised its discretion to allow BVF to opt out of the shareholder class under the circumstances of this case. Accordingly, the Court affirmed in part and reversed in part. View "In Re Celera Corporation Shareholder Litigation, et al. v. New Orleans Employees' Retirement System, et al." on Justia Law

The plaintiff-appellants, Bruce Bermel and Pamela Jurga, as husband and wife, appealed the final judgment of the Superior Court granting the motion for summary judgment of the defendant-appellee, Liberty Mutual Fire Insurance Company. The appellants contended that the Superior Court erred by granting summary judgment in favor of Liberty. Bermel was injured in an automobile accident when his personal motorcycle was struck head-on by another driver. Bermel, then an employee of the Siemens Corporation, contended that the business policy issued to Siemens by Liberty on a company car that was assigned for his business and personal use, provided him with $100,000 in underinsured motorist coverage even when he was operating a non-work vehicle in circumstances unrelated to his employment. Bermel brought this action for underinsured benefits (“UIM”) against Liberty arguing: (1) that the Liberty Policy covering the company car he used was personal to him, even though Siemens was the named insured; (2) that he was entitled to personally access the Liberty Policy because Siemens automatically deducted a nominal fee from his paycheck for his personal use of the vehicle assigned to him that was insured by the Liberty Policy; and (3) that the Liberty Policy was ambiguously drafted and should have been construed in his favor. Upon review, the Supreme Court concluded that the Superior Court correctly found Siemens, and not Bermel, to be the named insured on the Liberty Policy, that the nominal fee charged to Bermel by Siemens for the use of the car did not make Bermel a named insured under the Liberty Policy, and that the Liberty Policy was unambiguous. Therefore, the judgments of the Superior Court were affirmed. View "Bermel v. Liberty Mutual Fire Insurance Co." on Justia Law

Appellant Broadmeadow Investment, LLC appealed a Superior Court judgment that dismissed its appeal of a Delaware Health Resources Board decision. The Board granted HealthSouth Middletown Rehabilitation Hospital, LLC a Certificate of Public Review (CPR). The Superior Court held that Broadmeadow lacked standing to appeal under 16 Del. C. section 9305(8). Broadmeadow sought the Supreme Court's review to reverse the Superior Court and remand the matter for its appeal to go forward on the merits. Upon review of Broadmeadow's arguments raised on appeal, the Supreme Court concluded that the Superior Court erred by dismissing Broadmeadow’s appeal on the basis it lacked standing under 16 Del. C. section 9305: "[w]e hold that reading the entire statutory scheme in pari materia, Broadmeadow does have the right to appeal the Board’s decision." View "Broadmeadow Investment, LLC v. Delaware Health Resources Board, et al." on Justia Law

Defendant-appellant Rashid Roy directly appealed his convictions of Murder in the First Degree, Possession of a Deadly Weapon by a Person Prohibited, Assault in the Third Degree, and Terroristic Threatening to the Supreme Court. Defendant argued: (1) that police lacked the articulable suspicion necessary to detain him for an investigatory stop and therefore lacked probable cause to arrest him; and (2) that even though he stipulated to the introduction of his drug usage at trial, the State erroneously failed to connect that drug usage to any of the purposes permitted by the Delaware Rules of Evidence. Upon review, the Supreme Court concluded that both of Defendant's arguments were without merit. View "Roy v. Delaware" on Justia Law

The issue before the Supreme Court on appeal in this case was the meaning of the term "regularly residing" as used in Delaware’s alimony statute. The Family Court denied appellant's petition to terminate alimony, finding that appellee and her companion were not permanently or continuously residing together. The trial court focused on the fact that appellee and her companion maintained separate homes, and the absence of evidence as to whether they spent the majority of their free time together. Upon review, the Supreme Court held that that the trial court applied an incorrect standard in evaluating the evidence: (1) the term "regularly residing" means "liv[ing] together with some degree of continuity . . . .;" (2) the fact that appellee and her companion were retirees did not change the analysis of whether they were regularly residing together; and (3) two people may be regularly residing together even though they maintain separate homes. View "Paul v. Paul" on Justia Law

Defendant-Appellant Maurice Williams appealed his Superior Court conviction for Escape After Conviction. The charges stemmed from Defendant's failing to return to the Plummer Center in Wilmington as scheduled after he received a medical pass to leave the premises. Defendant raised two claims on appeal: (1) the trial judge abused her discretion when she refused to allow him to proceed pro se during his trial; and (2) she denied his request for the jury to consider a defense of justification. Because Defendant's request to represent himself was denied without a colloquy and the required legal analysis, the Supreme Court was "compelled" to reverse and remand the case for further proceedings. View "Williams v. Delaware" on Justia Law

A State Trooper stopped a Hells Angels member for speeding. When asked where he was going, the defendant "cordially" declined to answer. The State Trooper informed the defendant he would pat him down, and the defendant revealed he possessed two handguns. The State appealed the trial court's ultimate decision to suppress evidence of the handguns that were used to support two counts of carrying a concealed weapon. The Supreme Court affirmed the Superior Court judge's grant of defendant's motion to suppress because under the totality of the circumstances, no particularized, reasonable, articulable suspicion that the defendant was armed and dangerous existed. View "Delaware v. Abel" on Justia Law